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Why Is China Building Up Its Nuclear Arsenal? 中国为什么在扩大核武库?

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中国为什么在扩大核武库?
Why Is China Building Up Its Nuclear Arsenal?

赵通2021年11月16日
15zhao-master1050.jpg
Christina Hägerfors
BEIJING — Forget about nuclear might. It’s time for the United States to talk to China about mutual vulnerability.
北京——忘掉核力量吧。现在美国与中国应该讨论一下“共同脆弱”了。
It’s clear that Beijing is rapidly expanding its nuclear arsenal. Commercial satellite images suggest China is building more than 100 new intercontinental ballistic missile silos. Reporting emerged last month that it tested a nuclear-capable hypersonic missile that circumnavigated the globe — the first nation to do so. America’s top military officer later confirmed that “significant event,” and now the Pentagon is warning that China could quadruple its arsenal by 2030.
很明显,北京正在迅速扩大其核武库商业卫星图像显示,中国正在建造100多个新的洲际弹道导弹发射井上个月有报道称,中国测试了一种可携带核弹头的高超音速导弹,可以绕地球飞行——这是第一个这样做的国家。美国最高军事官员后来证实了这一“重大事件”,现在五角大楼警告说,到2030年,中国的武器库可能会达到现在的四倍
Taken together, concerns over a “strategic breakout” by China are understandable. Without a willingness by the United States and China to enter a clear dialogue, the results could be catastrophic.
综上所述,对中国“战略突破”的担忧是可以理解的。如果美国和中国不愿进行明确的对话,结果可能是灾难性的。
Some American experts have argued that China is testing nuclear weapons delivery systems because it’s looking for ways to circumvent U.S. missile defenses, which Beijing’s nuclear experts fear could negate their country’s ability to absorb a U.S. nuclear attack and then retaliate.
一些美国专家认为,中国正在测试核武器投递系统,因为它正在寻找绕过美国导弹防御系统的方法。北京的核专家担心,这个防御系统可能导致中国无法在承受了一轮美国核攻击后发起反击。
While this may be technically correct, it misses the bigger geopolitical picture. The incremental development of U.S. missile defenses cannot explain the relatively abrupt Chinese buildup. Rather, President Xi Jinping’s March order to further “accelerate the construction of advanced strategic deterrent” systems most likely reflects his deepening concern that China’s inferior nuclear capability could embolden U.S. hostility and undermine Beijing’s rise at a critical moment in great power competition.
虽然这严格来说可能是正确的,但它忽略了更大的地缘政治图景。美国导弹防御系统的渐进式发展不能解释中国相对突然的军备扩充。与之不同的是,中国国家主席习近平3月下令进一步“打造高水平战略威慑”系统,很可能反映了他日益加深的担忧——在大国竞争的关键时刻,中国在核能力上的弱势可能助长美国的敌意,破坏中国的崛起。
Chinese officials have expressed the belief that the United States has become more desperate in seeking to forcibly disrupt China from surpassing the United States economically (in the near term) and militarily (down the line). They see growing U.S. pressure on China over human rights, the rule of law, Hong Kong and Taiwan as evidence that Washington is willing to take greater risks to stop China’s rise by delegitimizing the government, destabilizing the country and blocking national unification.
中国官员表示,美国已经在更疯狂地强行破坏中国,使其无法(近期)在经济上、(未来)在军事上超越美国。他们认为,美国在人权法治香港台湾问题上对中国施加的压力越来越大,证明华盛顿愿意冒更大的风险,通过削弱政府的合法性、破坏国家稳定和妨碍国家统一来阻止中国的崛起。
I did a brief stint as a local civil servant in Beijing working on matters of foreign affairs more than a decade ago and have spent the past seven years as an independent nuclear policy expert. It’s clear to me that Beijing’s nuclear buildup is ultimately an attempt to force Washington to drop the perceived strategic assault and accept a “mutual vulnerability” relationship — in which neither country would have the capability or will to threaten nuclear war without risking its own destruction.
十多年前,我曾在北京做过一段时间的地方公务员,从事外交事务,过去七年里,我一直是一名独立的核政策专家。在我看来,很明显,北京的核建设最终是试图迫使华盛顿放弃战略攻击,接受一种“共同脆弱”的关系——在这种关系中,任何一个国家都没有能力或意愿进行核战争威胁,否则会面临自身遭到毁灭的风险。
The United States has been reluctant to address China’s desire for such a relationship, which has contributed to anxiety in Beijing about U.S. pursuit of “absolute security.” To prevent their nuclear competition from escalating, it is time for the United States to acknowledge the de facto existence of mutual nuclear vulnerability with China.
美国一直不愿正视中国对这种关系的渴望,这导致北京对美国追求“绝对安全”感到担忧。为了防止两国的核竞争升级,现在美国应该承认与中国共同存在事实上的核脆弱性了。
This might sound like a bold move, but we must remember that there is precedent for this. And the grim alternative demands the effort.
这听起来可能是一个大胆的举动,但我们必须记住,这是有先例的。而且,不这样做的后果将十分可怕,因此有必要朝这个方向努力。
The 1985 Reagan-Gorbachev joint statement that “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought” helped lower the temperature of the Cold War. A similar mutual commitment by U.S. and Chinese leaders would help defuse today’s emerging arms race.
1985年里根和戈尔巴乔夫的联合声明称“核战争没有赢家,也绝对不能开打”,这帮助降低了冷战的温度。美中领导人如果做出类似的共同承诺,将有助于缓和当前正在出现的军备竞赛。
It would help stabilize the most important bilateral relationship in the world. It would also give Beijing reassurance that the United States was willing to accept peaceful coexistence and to refrain from challenging China’s core interests. (Within reason.)
这将有助于稳定世界上最重要双边关系。这也会让北京放心,美国愿意接受和平共处,不挑战中国的核心利益(在合理范围内)。
Reducing the threat of nuclear holocaust also could open up opportunities for substantive arms control negotiations — for example, on limiting the development of new missile systems and counter-space weapons — plus help contain bilateral military competition more broadly. With greater confidence in the future tenor of U.S.-China relations, Beijing could be inclined to act more proactively to cooperate with Washington on other bilateral problems, like trade disputes and cyberattacks, or pressing global challenges like the Covid-19 pandemic.
减少核毁灭的威胁还可能为实质性的军备控制谈判提供机会——例如限制新导弹系统和反空间武器的发展——并且有助于更广泛地遏制双边军事竞争。如果中国对美中关系未来走向有更大信心,可能会倾向于采取更积极的行动,在贸易争端和网络攻击等其他双边问题上,以及新冠大流行等紧迫的全球挑战上与华盛顿合作。
Of course, there are risks that it could backfire.
当然,这也有可能适得其反。
China could conclude that its nuclear buildup had worked as a pressure tactic and so further military buildup might exact even greater U.S. concessions.
中国可能会认为核建设作为一种施压策略是有效的,因此进一步增强军事力量可能会迫使美国做出更大的让步。
American allies in East Asia, in particular, have understandable concerns that China might increase its conventional-level military aggression once the risk of nuclear escalation is off the table.
美国在东亚的盟友尤其会担心,核升级的风险一旦消失,中国可能会增加常规级别的军事侵略,这种担心是合理的。
And there’s always the chance China might interpret U.S. acknowledgment of mutual vulnerability as a sign Washington is willing to overlook Beijing’s efforts to advance its perceived “core interests,” like occupying disputed territory in the South China Sea or achieving unification with Taiwan.
而且,如果美国承认双方的脆弱,在中国看来可能代表着华盛顿愿意无视北京为推进其所称的“核心利益”而采取的行动,比如占领南海有争议的领土或实现与台湾的统一。
By the same token, China might expect the United States to stop calling it out on human rights and domestic suppression by claiming the criticism threatens Beijing’s regime security. This could undermine President Biden’s effort to uphold universal values in diplomacy.
同样,中国也有可能声称对中国人权和国内镇压问题的指责威胁到北京的政权安全,期待美国停止这样的批评。这可能会破坏拜登总统在外交中维护普世价值的努力
But acknowledging mutual vulnerability does not have to be a blind leap of faith. There are measures the United States can take to mitigate these risks.
但承认共同脆弱并不等于是在盲目赌一把。美国可以采取一些措施来减轻这些风险。
America should invite China to talk frankly about mutual vulnerability, using dialogue as an opportunity to get clarifications and reciprocal commitments to create necessary conditions for the formal acceptance of mutual vulnerability.
美国应该邀请中国坦率地谈论彼此的弱点,利用对话作为获得澄清和相互承诺的机会,为正式接受共同脆弱创造必要条件。
China needs to present a mutually agreeable framework about its specific expectations of a mutual vulnerability relationship. That must include detailing what constitutes a true infringement of China’s core interests versus a high-level political disagreement for example, not treating normal exchanges on human rights issues as attempts to topple the regime and what reassurances Beijing could provide to address U.S. concerns about China’s regional military behavior and plans regarding Taiwan. One option might be to discuss military confidence-building measures with U.S. allies in East Asia or renounce military resolution of territorial disputes.
中国需要提出一个双方都能接受的框架,说明其对共同脆弱关系的具体期望。这个框架必须详细说明什么才是对中国核心利益的真正侵犯,什么只是高层政治分歧而已——例如,不要将人权问题上的正常交流视为推翻政权的企图——以及北京可以提供哪些保证来解决美国对中国地区军事行为和台湾问题计划的担忧。一个选择可能是与美国在东亚的盟友讨论建立军事互信措施,或者放弃用军事手段解决领土争端。
China is unlikely to want to bend — but to make it work, it must be flexible. It also is in China’s interest to understand that, just as U.S.-Russian mutual vulnerability did not shield Moscow from American critiques over human rights, U.S.-Chinese mutual vulnerability most likely wouldn’t force Washington to “respect China” in the manner Chinese officials wish. And that would not be because China’s nuclear arsenal is too small. Rather, China’s public rejection of a rules-based international order probably makes American officials question the wisdom of accepting mutual vulnerability more than anything else.
中国不太可能愿意屈服——但要让这个框架发挥作用,必须懂得变通。理解这一点也符合中国的利益,就像美俄的共同脆弱并没有令莫斯科在人权问题上免受美国的批评,美中的共同脆弱也很可能不会迫使华盛顿以中国官员希望的方式“尊重中国”。这并不是因为中国的核武库太小。而是因为,中国公开拒绝基于规则的国际秩序这一点,可能更让美国官员质疑接受共同脆弱是否明智。
But they should. Mr. Biden and Mr. Xi, scheduled to meet in a closely watched virtual summit, will be discussing ways to “responsibly manage the competition” between their nations and “ways to work together” where interests align.
但他们应该这样做。拜登和习近平将举行一个受到密切关注的虚拟峰会,他们将讨论如何“负责任地管理”两国之间的竞争,以及在利益一致时的“合作方式”。
The sooner the two sides realize that it is the shared understanding of agreeable behaviors — not unilateral nuclear buildup — that will stabilize their relationship, the quicker they can end this insanely wasteful and dangerous nuclear escalation and put resources to better use addressing pressing challenges like the pandemic and climate change.
能够稳定两国关系的,是对何为可接受行为的一致理解,而不是单方面的核武库建设,双方越早意识到这一点,就能越快结束这种疯狂的浪费和危险的核升级,并将资源更好地用于解决大流行和气候变化等紧迫挑战。
Acknowledging mutual nuclear vulnerability is a useful and necessary step toward putting the bilateral relationship on a much more constructive path.
承认共同的核脆弱是有益而必要的一步,可以令双边关系走上更具建设性的道路。
赵通是卡内基国际和平基金会驻北京的高级研究员。他著有《Narrowing the U.S.-China Gap on Missile Defense: How to Help Forestall a Nuclear Arms Race》。
翻译:纽约时报中文网

 

Song Hong

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We do some calculation as engineer, on the assumption China has 10 strategic bombers, 20 nuclear sub always on duty. Each carries 20 nuclear warhead. Then China will need 600 warhead. Add at least 400-600 on silos.

Hence China need at least 1100 warhead at least. 2000 will be comfortable for operational needs.
 

Song Hong

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I got this feeling that US nuclear engineering capabilities is on serious decay and that is one reason she wants to get China on the table. Sure US can be a warhead but how good and efficient it is?

The US corporates have been abusing her engineers, promoting MBAs for too long. We are now seeing massive project failure in the domain of US Aerospace defence.
 

vi-va

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I got this feeling that US nuclear engineering capabilities is on serious decay and that is one reason she wants to get China on the table. Sure US can be a warhead but how good and efficient it is?

The US corporates have been abusing her engineers, promoting MBAs for too long. We are now seeing massive project failure in the domain of US Aerospace defence.
US is renewing strategic assets. Ideally, new assets will ramp up after 2030.
During 2021-2030 period, US deterrence is declining against adversaries, actually. That's why US want to drag China to the negotiation table.

As you pointed out, US engineering capabilities is decaying. Russia conventional weapon is limited by budget, Russia has no choice but to match US nuclear arsenal.

So if China runs a nuclear arm race, US need to double its nuclear arsenals because of Russia.

The THREE-BODY PROBLEM, three-body is an unstable political system by nature.


We can also count India in this game. India can
  1. Opt out nuclear arsenal arm race, accept vulnerability.
  2. India joins the arm race.

In both scenarios, totally acceptable for China.
 
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