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http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/us-plans-first-icbm-defence-test/article18591143.ece
Washington, May 27, 2017 21:13 IST
Updated: May 27, 2017 21:13 IST

Pentagon will try to shoot down an intercontinental-range missile for the first time in a test next week.

Preparing for North Korea’s growing threat, the Pentagon will try to shoot down an intercontinental-range missile for the first time in a test next week. The goal is to more closely simulate a North Korean ICBM aimed at the U.S. homeland, officials said on Friday

The American interceptor has a spotty track record, succeeding in nine of 17 attempts against missiles of less-than-intercontinental range since 1999. The most recent test, in June 2014, was a success, but that followed three straight failures.

The system has evolved from the multibillion-dollar effort triggered by President Ronald Reagan’s 1983 push for a “Star Wars” solution to ballistic missile threats during the Cold War when the Soviet Union was the only major worry.

North Korea is now the focus of U.S. efforts because its leader, Kim Jong-un, has vowed to field a nuclear-armed missile capable of reaching American territory. He has yet to test an intercontinental ballistic missile, or ICBM, but Pentagon officials believe he is speeding in that direction.

Marine Lt. Gen. Vincent Stewart, director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, said this week that “left unchecked”, Mr. Kim will eventually succeed.

The Pentagon has a variety of missile defence systems, but the one designed with a potential North Korean ICBM in mind is perhaps the most technologically challenging. Critics say it also is the least reliable. The basic defensive idea is to fire a rocket into space upon warning of a hostile missile launch. The rocket releases a 5-foot-long device that uses internal guidance systems to steer into the path of the oncoming missile’s warhead, destroying it by force of impact.
 

victor07

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Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) program, managed by Boeing, has demonstrated capability to defend the U.S. homeland from a small number of intermediate-range or intercontinental missile threats with simple countermeasures? WTF?

Pentagon upgrades assessment of ability to defend against ICBMs
Wed Jun 7, 2017 | 6:19pm EDT
By Phil Stewart | WASHINGTON

After a successful May test, the Pentagon has upgraded its assessment of its ability to defend the United States against incoming intercontinental ballistic missiles, like the ones North Korea is attempting to develop, according to a memo seen by Reuters on Wednesday.
The conclusion could add to the U.S. military's view that, although much more work remains on missile defense, it is staying ahead of a mounting threat from North Korea, which has declared its intent to develop an ICBM capable of striking the U.S. mainland.
Since 2012, the Pentagon's Director of Operational Test and Evaluation had assessed only that the United States had a "limited capability" to defend against a threat like the one from North Korea or Iran using interceptors in the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) program, managed by Boeing Co (BA.N).
But after successfully intercepting a simulated ICBM last month, the Pentagon office elevated that assessment, the memo, dated June 6, said.
"GMD has demonstrated capability to defend the U.S. homeland from a small number of intermediate-range or intercontinental missile threats with simple countermeasures," the memo said.
The May 30 missile test, which experts compare to hitting a bullet with another bullet, involved a simulated launch of a type of ICBM from the Kwajalein Atoll in the Marshall Islands.
The U.S. military then fired a missile to intercept it from Vandenberg Air Force Base in California. The test ended with a head-on strike, resulting in obliteration.
It was the first live-fire test against a simulated ICBM, which the military said was made even more complicated by the use of decoys designed to throw off the interceptor.
Previously, the GMD system had successfully hit its target in only nine of 17 tests since 1999. The last test was in 2014. However, the interceptor technology has been making steady advances. More tests are planned to advance U.S. defense capabilities.
Vice Admiral Jim Syring, the director of the Missile Defense Agency, told a hearing in Congress he still felt the defense program needed improvement, even though his concerns about reliability had been addressed "in large part" in the past five to six years.
"It's just not the interceptor, the entire system," he said. "We are not there yet."
"We have continued work with the redesigned kill vehicle. We have continued work with the reliability of the other components of the system to make it totally reliable," he said. "We are not done yet."
At the same time, he assured he was confident in his ability to defend the United States.
The continental United States is around 9,000 km (5,500 miles) from North Korea. ICBMs have a minimum range of about 5,500 km (3,400 miles) but some are designed to travel 10,000 km (6,200 miles) or farther.
Syring said the ballistic missile defense review now underway would look not only at the capability of the current interceptors but whether more were needed.
"Where we need to be prudent and constantly vigilant on is what is the capacity increase we can expect from North Korea and what is our capacity needed to meet that threat," he said.

http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-northkorea-defenses-idUSKBN18Y2YL
 

ouy

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An analysis of mine about the THAAD interceptor and Radar (AN\TPY 2) from a technical standpoint.
The THAAD is a BMD (ballistic missile defense) system designed to shoot down short and medium-range ballistic missile, but can also take down longer range missiles, and has intercepted an IRBM in a test last July.

The system is comprised of the AN\TPY 2 x band radar, the interceptors, the launchers, and additional components. This analysis, however, focuses on the radar and the missile.
Full analysis:
goo.gl/kQSmgr
 

LeGenD

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From PATRIOT and THAAD to be interoperable to merger in the coming years? [1/2]

THAAD air-defense system can provide excellent cover to a high-value environment against different types of ballistic missiles which could be armed with WMD.





FTT-14 intercept event was significant in terms of its sheer complexity wherein THAAD demonstrated the capability to neutralize an SRBM class target in a Low Endo flight situation.



FTT-14 intercept event was also an important step towards making THAAD and PATRIOT interoperable in real-time conditions.

There were many THAAD flight test program "firsts" accomplished during FTT-14, including the lowest endo-atmospheric intercept to date; use of fielded THAAD ground segment hardware and software from the THAAD production program; and the first live mission to demonstrate automatic engagement coordination between THAAD and Patriot.

Link: http://www.defense-aerospace.com/ar...1/lockheed,-subs-comment-thaad-intercept.html



"Getting THAAD and Patriot to talk to each other is extremely important in building better operational capability and a better picture of incoming threats."
- Brig. Gen. Randall McIntire

Link: https://www.defensenews.com/digital...d-thaad-will-talk-what-does-that-really-mean/

Additional tests for interoperability were also scheduled, and latest test was conducted on April 6, 2018.

The Army's two key missile defense systems — Patriot and the Terminal High Altitude Air Defense system — successfully talked in a test conducted by the Missile Defense Agency and the service at White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico, April 6.

The Army is planning to tie THAAD and Patriot together within in two years and received a surplus of funding in the recently passed fiscal 2018 omnibus spending bill to proceed with the effort.

Tying the systems together is critical to establishing a more effective, layered approach to air-and-missile defense and could enhance the development of the Army’s future AMD command-and-control system, the Integrated Air-and-Missile Defense Battle Command System — or IBCS.

Both THAAD and Patriot picked up a live short-range Lynx missile target using their radars and tracked the target individually, but both systems "exchanged messages through tactical data links and verified interoperability between the weapons systems," according to an MDA statement.


Link: https://www.defensenews.com/land/20...fense-systems-patriot-and-thaad-talk-in-test/

"These two weapon systems are vitally important as components of our layered ballistic missile defense system and it is critical that they are able to transmit data and communicate with one another." - Lt. Gen. Samuel Greaves



But US is taking another step; enabling THAAD to use cutting edge PAC-3 MSE interceptors to expand its intercept possibilities against ballistic missiles in Low Endo situations and additional PATRIOT-specific benefits (explained below).

Relevant tender was posted on 27-10-2017

The proposed action is for the procurement of THAAD/PATRIOT Advanced Capability (PAC-3) Missile Segmnet Enhancement (MSE) Integration (TMI) and PATRIOT Launch on Remote (LOR) development. The action is to accomplish the development of capabilities in support of THAAD MSE Integration and PATRIOT Launch on Remote; design and implementation of an updated Fire Solution Computer software and architecture; Launcher Interface Network Kit software development activities; and a trade study to assess feasibility of launching a PAC-3 MSE from a THAAD launcher.

The proposed source for this effort is Lockheed Martin Missiles and Fire Control (LMMFC), 1701 West Marshall Drive, Grand Prairie, Texas, 75051, commercial and government entity (CAGE) code 64059. LMMFC is the developer and producer of the PAC-3 missile segment and support equipment, and the only source with the knowledge, expertise, and a full disclosure technical data package (TOP) to perform this effort. The Government does not have the necessary intellectual property rights to utilize the data for full and open competition.


Link: https://tenders.globaldatabase.com/tender/thaad-pac-3-mse-integration-and-patriot-launch-of-remote

Tender awarded to Lockheed Martin on 02-03-2018

The awarded action is for the procurement of THAAD/PATRIOT Advanced Capability (PAC-3) Missile Segment Enhancement (MSE) Integration (TMI) and PATRIOT Launch on Remote (LOR) development. The action is to accomplish the development of capabilities in support of THAAD MSE Integration and PATRIOT Launch on Remote; design and implementation of an updated Fire Solution Computer software and architecture; Launcher Interface Network Kit software development activities; and a trade study to assess feasibility of launching a PAC-3 MSE from a THAAD launcher.

The source awarded this effort is Lockheed Martin Missiles and Fire Control (LMMFC), 1701 West Marshall Drive, Grand Prairie, Texas, 75051, commercial and government entity (CAGE) code 64059. LMMFC is the developer and producer of the PAC-3 missile segment and support equipment, and the only source with the knowledge, expertise, and a full disclosure technical data package (TOP) to perform this effort. The Government does not have the necessary intellectual property rights to utilize the data for full and open competition.. Awarded Vendors: LOCKHEED MARTIN CORPORATION. Contract Award Dollar Amount: $173,768,671. Contract Award Date: 2018-03-02.

Link: https://govtribe.com/opportunity/fe...-and-patriot-launch-of-remote-w31p4q17g0001-1

Tender-related work is expected to be complete by 28-02-2022

Work is expected to be complete by Feb. 28, 2022, US Department of defense said in a statement Tuesday.

The contract is to accomplish the development of capabilities in support of THAAD MSE Integration and PATRIOT Launch on Remote; design and implementation of an updated Fire Solution Computer software and architecture; Launcher Interface Network Kit software development activities; and a trade study to assess feasibility of launching a PAC-3 MSE from a THAAD launcher, according to the tender published in October 2017.


Link: https://www.defenseworld.net/news/2...0_for_THAAD__PATRIOT_MSE_Integration_Contract



This integration will transform THAAD into an IAMD platform to cope with increasingly complex threats in the near future.

---

PAC-3 interceptor class emerged from 20+ years of investments, experiments, trials and battlefield-related experiences around the world.







Evolution of the PATRIOT family of interceptors, and resultant flexibility in PATRIOT battery configurations (M901; M902; M903) highlighted below.





PAC-3 interceptor class enable a PATRIOT battery to be equipped with a much higher count of high-quality interceptors, thanks to advances in the 'miniaturization' aspect of rocket technologies, and the resultant battery configurations (M902; M903) are much harder to overwhelm accordingly.







PATRIOT M902 battery configuration for reference below, equipped with a mix of PAC-2 GEM-T interceptors (LR-SAM against a wide range of airbreathing targets) and PAC-3 CRI interceptors (point defense against complex threats).



PAC-2 GEM-T provide long-range target engagement envelope to a PATRIOT battery, just in case.

Maximum range = 160 KM (versus aircraft and UAV)
Maximum ceiling = 24 KM
Speed = MACH 5+


PAC-2 GEM-T is also optimized for BMD missions, and can produce HTK results.



PATRIOT SAVES LIVES BY DOWNING MORE THAN 100 BALLISTIC MISSILES IN COMBAT

Since January 1st, 2015, Raytheon's Patriot integrated air and missile defense system has shot down more than 100 tactical ballistic missiles in combat operations around the world. More than 90 of those intercepts involved the low-cost Raytheon made Guidance Enhanced Missile family of interceptors. Patriot employs multiple interceptor missiles to destroy ballistic and cruise missiles, aircraft and drones. Guidance Enhanced Missiles work by flying at extremely fast speeds to close with the threat and detonating a blast-fragmentation warhead at precisely the right moment. "No single interceptor is a silver bullet," said Tom Laliberty, Raytheon vice president of Integrated Air and Missile Defense. "Using a mix of defensive missiles increases cost-effectiveness and gives commanders operational flexibility to choose the right interceptor at the right time."


Full read: https://www.raytheon.com/sites/default/files/2018-05/European Missile Defence Update_May2018_0.pdf
 
Last edited:

LeGenD

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From PATRIOT and THAAD to be interoperable to merger in the coming years? [2/2]



PAC-3 interceptor class make it possible for a PATRIOT battery to defeat increasingly complex threats such as MaRV released by ballistic missile(s), ballistic missile with countermeasures, mass attacks, and additional forms of highly maneuverable threats; complex DT/OT-11 and DT/OT-12 intercept events scheduled for PAC-3 interceptor class in 2004 were very telling.

DT/OT-12 intercept event for reference.

"The mission sequence was a two missile ripple-fire against the modified PAAT, closely followed by a two missile ripple-fire against the Storm target. Once the targets were intercepted and destroyed, the two remaining PAC-3s executed a preplanned self-destruct sequence."

Link: http://www.spacedaily.com/news/bmdo-04zl.html


A PAC-3 CRI interceptor defeated a PAC derivative simulating a target of very high Gs in a show of spectacular maneuvers (PAAT phenomenon); objective was to stress-test the PAC-3 CRI interceptor by pushing it to its limits during the course of its development.


A PAC-3 CRI interceptor defeated Perishing II MaRV (also identified as STORM MTTV) in another clash of impressive maneuvers.

The Storm Maneuvering Tactical Target Vehicle (MTTV) rocket, which performed its mission as planned, was used as a target to test the Patriot missile defense system.

"It has been an extraordinarily busy and successful two-week period for our launch teams, culminating with the successful MTTV launch for the Missile Defense Agency," said Mr. Ron Grabe, Executive Vice President and General Manager of the Company's Launch Systems Group.

"We are very proud of our record of supporting MDA's flight test programs with the most reliable target vehicles in the industry. We look forward to our future missions that will help MDA develop, test and deploy effective missile defense systems."

Orbital provided and tested the rocket's guidance and separation systems, performed all vehicle design, production and integration activities and conducted all launch day mission operations.

The MTTV rocket is a single stage vehicle which uses a retired U.S. government rocket engine from the Minuteman ICBM program and a modified Pershing II reentry vehicle.


Link: http://www.spacedaily.com/news/bmdo-04zl.html



PAC-3 interceptor class was subjected to a complex testing regime incorporating challenging targets simulating different types of airborne threats (MaRV; supersonic cruise missiles; terrain-hugging cruise missiles; TBMs operating in different trajectories; UAV and vice versa), and results are self-explanatory.


PAC-3 MSE is a big leap from the already impressive PAC-3 CRI.







It shall be noted that actual target engagement envelope of PAC-3 MSE is classified, and figures floating in the public domain are understated.

"The MSE's exact range and altitude capabilities against various types of targets are classified, but it's clear that the updated missile will allow MIM-104 Patriot batteries to cover far more area and have greater defensive capabilities against tactical ballistic missiles than its progenitors. The upgrades to the missile's motor, control system, software, front-end thermal protection, among other modifications, result in a far more effective weapon." - Tyler Rogoway

Related: https://www.defensenews.com/land/20...tance-record-to-defeat-threat-target-in-test/

In fact, target engagement envelope of PAC-3 MSE is constrained by PATRIOT's AN/MPG-65 radar system even though this radar system is a leap from the older PATRIOT's AN/MPG-53 radar system.

"Today that missile outperforms the organic Patriot radar, and so that is going to allow us to get more value out of Patriot missile from the integration. That is going to allow us to be more efficient with how we defend things, and that is going to allow us to increase the battlespace." - Brig. Gen. Randall McIntire



THAAD's powerful AN/TPY-2 radar system can extract the most out of PAC-3 MSE on the other hand.

Another important consideration for an air-defense system is its ability to distinguish real threats from countermeasures in a high-clutter environment; a ballistic missile can have sufficient room to accommodate and release different types of countermeasures to complicate BMD possibilities. PATRIOT's AN/MPG-65 radar system was particularly optimized for this end:

"The ultimate step is PAC-3-Configuration 3, which introduces an upgraded AN-MPQ-65 radar to increase detection in high-clutter environments, and to improve discrimination of closely spaced objects (better decoy recognition)." - Andreas Parsch

THAAD was also stress-tested in the FET-01 intercept event on similar grounds; it was presented a cutting-edge MRBM class target (MRBM-T3) which deployed unknown countermeasures (classified) in the process.

MRBM-T3 at a glance.



MRBM-T3 is a cutting-edge ballistic missile design with capabilities which are largely classified and concealed in the public domain. This target can simulate flight characteristics of cutting-edge ASBM and release countermeasures on top - extremely difficult to defeat.



Type-1 targets are simple baseline configurations.

Type-2 targets have increased capability or complexity.

Type-3 targets have unique configurations.

MRBM-T3:

- simulated flight characteristics of the Chinese DF-21D ASBM in the FTM-27 E1 intercept event for an Arleigh Burke class destroyer on December 14, 2016.

Link: https://defense-update.com/20161215_df21d_target.html

"During FTM-27 Event 1, in December 2016, an Aegis Baseline 9.C1 destroyer (which hosts the Aegis BMD 5.0 Capability Upgrade) engaged a complex medium-range ballistic missile target with a salvo of two SM-6 Dual I missiles. FTM-27 Event 1 was the first demonstration of Aegis BMD Sea-Based Terminal capability against complex ballistic missile targets." - DOT&E

- and released unknown countermeasures in the FET-01 intercept event to stress-test THAAD's target discrimination capabilities on July 30, 2017. The target also released an MaRV to stress-test THAAD further.

"In FET-01, the MDA demonstrated THAAD's ability to discriminate and intercept an RV from a separating MRBM target with countermeasures at an endo-atmospheric altitude. The MDA will use these data to improve interceptor seeker algorithms and to validate modeling and simulation." - DOT&E



I suspect that MRBM-T3 feature a cutting-edge MaRV and MDA does not want people to take a closer look at it (practice of covering it out in the open).

THAAD was able to defeat this extremely challenging target in a Low Endo flight situation (refer to Intercept Tests photo above).

Emphasis mine. If this merger materialize, THAAD might transform into the most effective and capable surface mobile IMAD platform in the world, better than the upcoming Russian S-500.

--- --- ---

@The Deterrent
@Fawadqasim1
@Irfan Baloch
@Oscar
@MastanKhan
@AmirPatriot
 
Last edited:

Yaseen1

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patriot has failed against cruise missile and is unable to intercept iran cruise missiles hitting saudi airports multiple times ,these cruise missiles are not in barrages but in small numbers ,imagine what will happen when russian or chinese more complex cruise missiles are fired.s400 is much better than u.s patriot system
From PATRIOT and THAAD to be interoperable to merger in the coming years? [2/2]



PAC-3 interceptor class make it possible for a PATRIOT battery to defeat increasingly complex threats such as MaRV released by ballistic missile(s), TBM with countermeasures, mass attacks, and additional forms of highly maneuverable threats; complex DT/OT-11 and DT/OT-12 intercept events scheduled for PAC-3 interceptor class in 2004 were very telling.

DT/OT-12 intercept event for reference.

"The mission sequence was a two missile ripple-fire against the modified PAAT, closely followed by a two missile ripple-fire against the Storm target. Once the targets were intercepted and destroyed, the two remaining PAC-3s executed a preplanned self-destruct sequence."

Link: http://www.spacedaily.com/news/bmdo-04zl.html


A PAC-3 CRI interceptor defeated a PAC derivative simulating a target of very high Gs in a show of spectacular maneuvers (PAAT phenomenon); objective was to stress-test the PAC-3 CRI interceptor by pushing it to its limits during the course of its development.


A PAC-3 CRI interceptor defeated Perishing II MaRV (also identified as STORM MTTV) in another clash of operationally-relevant maneuvers.

The Storm Maneuvering Tactical Target Vehicle (MTTV) rocket, which performed its mission as planned, was used as a target to test the Patriot missile defense system.

"It has been an extraordinarily busy and successful two-week period for our launch teams, culminating with the successful MTTV launch for the Missile Defense Agency," said Mr. Ron Grabe, Executive Vice President and General Manager of the Company's Launch Systems Group.

"We are very proud of our record of supporting MDA's flight test programs with the most reliable target vehicles in the industry. We look forward to our future missions that will help MDA develop, test and deploy effective missile defense systems."

Orbital provided and tested the rocket's guidance and separation systems, performed all vehicle design, production and integration activities and conducted all launch day mission operations.

The MTTV rocket is a single stage vehicle which uses a retired U.S. government rocket engine from the Minuteman ICBM program and a modified Pershing II reentry vehicle.


Link: http://www.spacedaily.com/news/bmdo-04zl.html



PAC-3 interceptor class was subjected to a complex testing regime incorporating challenging targets simulating different types of threats (MaRV; supersonic cruise missiles; terrain-hugging cruise missiles; TBMs operating in different trajectories; UAV and vice versa), and results are self-explanatory.



PAC-3 MSE is a big leap from the already impressive PAC-3 CRI.







It shall be noted that the true target engagement envelope of PAC-3 MSE is classified, and figures floating in the public domain are understated.

"The MSE's exact range and altitude capabilities against various types of targets are classified, but it's clear that the updated missile will allow MIM-104 Patriot batteries to cover far more area and have greater defensive capabilities against tactical ballistic missiles than its progenitors. The upgrades to the missile's motor, control system, software, front-end thermal protection, among other modifications, result in a far more effective weapon." - Tyler Rogoway

Related: https://www.defensenews.com/land/20...tance-record-to-defeat-threat-target-in-test/

In fact, target engagement envelope of PAC-3 MSE is constrained by AN/MPG-65 radar system even though this radar system is a leap from the older AN/MPG-53 radar system.

"Today that missile outperforms the organic Patriot radar, and so that is going to allow us to get more value out of Patriot missile from the integration. That is going to allow us to be more efficient with how we defend things, and that is going to allow us to increase the battlespace." - Brig. Gen. Randall McIntire



THAAD's powerful AN/TPY-2 radar system can extract the most out of PAC-3 MSE in terms of performance on the other hand.

Another important consideration for an air-defense system is its ability to distinguish real threats from countermeasures in a high-clutter environment; a ballistic missile can have sufficient room to accommodate physical countermeasures to complicate BMD possibilities. PATRIOT's AN/MPG-65 radar system was particularly optimized for these ends:

"The ultimate step is PAC-3-Configuration 3, which introduces an upgraded AN-MPQ-65 radar to increase detection in high-clutter environments, and to improve discrimination of closely spaced objects (better decoy recognition)." - Andreas Parsch

THAAD was also stress-tested in the FET-01 intercept event on similar grounds; it was presented a cutting-edge MRBM class target (MRBM-T3) which deployed unknown countermeasures in the process.

MRBM-T3 incorporating an MaRV at a glance (new design):





- simulated the flight characteristics of Chinese DF-21D ASBM in the FTM-27 E1 intercept event for an Arleigh Burke class destroyer on December 14, 2016.

Link: https://defense-update.com/20161215_df21d_target.html

"During FTM-27 Event 1, in December 2016, an Aegis Baseline 9.C1 destroyer (which hosts the Aegis BMD 5.0 Capability Upgrade) engaged a complex medium-range ballistic missile target with a salvo of two SM-6 Dual I missiles. FTM-27 Event 1 was the first demonstration of Aegis BMD Sea-Based Terminal capability against complex ballistic missile targets." - DOT&E

- and featured unknown countermeasures in the FET-01 intercept event to stress-test THAAD's target discrimination capabilities on July 30, 2017. The target also released an MaRV which maneuvered during the course of FET-01 to stress-test THAAD further.

"In FET-01, the MDA demonstrated THAAD’s ability to discriminate and intercept an RV from a separating MRBM target with countermeasures at an endo-atmospheric altitude. The MDA will use these data to improve interceptor seeker algorithms and to validate modeling and simulation." - DOT&E



THAAD was able to defeat this extremely challenging target in a Low Endo flight situation (refer to Intercept Tests photo above).

Emphasis mine. If this merger materialize, THAAD might transform into the most effective and capable mobile IMAD platform in the world, better than the upcoming Russian S-500.

--- --- ---

@The Deterrent
@Fawadqasim1
@Irfan Baloch
@Oscar
@MastanKhan
 

LeGenD

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patriot has failed against cruise missile and is unable to intercept iran cruise missiles hitting saudi airports multiple times ,these cruise missiles are not in barrages but in small numbers ,imagine what will happen when russian or chinese more complex cruise missiles are fired.s400 is much better than u.s patriot system
Terrain-hugging cruise missiles can 'hide' in the ground clutter which can affect visibility of radar systems on the surface.



1. S-400 system failed to shoot down a single terrain-hugging cruise missile in Syria in spite of numerous chances.

However, on April 6, 2017, in retaliation for a chemical weapons attack on Khan Sheykhoun that killed nearly 100 Syrian civilians, two U.S. Navy destroyers fired 59 BGM-109 Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles at Shayrat air base.

On their way to the target, most of the missiles in question passed over the Tartous area and then through the so-called “Homs Gap” – a depression between the mountains of western Syria and those in Lebanon – only 50 kilometers south of Hmemmem. Nevertheless, the Russian radars completely failed to detect them.


FYI: https://warisboring.com/russias-air-defenses-in-syria-have-some-big-problems/

2. Terrain-hugging cruise missiles always have a good shot at slipping through surface defenses via carefully programmed routes and approach their desired targets. However, if a desired target is shielded by a PATRIOT battery equipped with PAC-3 class interceptors, the battery will take care of the incoming threats.

EXAMPLE:-

During a test of the U.S. Army's Integrated Air and Missile Defense System (AIAMD) on Nov. 12 at White Sands Missile Range, a MQM 107 drone simulating as a cruise missile tried to avoid detection from the Patriot air defense system by flying below its radar coverage.



But the trick wasn't successful and the target drone was shot down by a PAC-3 interceptor after a firing solution was generated by the AIAMD using composite track data from multiple radars.

One of the two Sentinel radars connected to the Integrated Fire Control Network (IFCN) relayed the position of the target to the Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) Battle Command System (IBCS). The IBCS then commanded a remote Patriot PAC-3 launcher to engage the drone through the IFCN.


Link: http://alert5.com/2015/11/15/mqm-10...t-by-flying-low-but-was-shot-down-eventually/

---

MQM-107D drone at a glance.



The MQM-107A is powered by a Teledyne CAE J402-CA-700 turbojet in a nacelle under the fuselage, and is launched from a zero-length launcher with the help of a single solid-propellant rocket booster. The target can fly preprogrammed missions, but can also be controlled from the ground through a radio command guidance system. The Streaker's flight envelope includes speeds from about 370 km/h (200 kts) to 926 km/h (500 kts), constant high-g turns, and flight at very low altitudes.

Information taken from the directory of US missiles and rockets (Andreas Parsch).

---

In order to intercept terrain-hugging cruise missiles, a calculative multi-radar setup is necessary for which a good grasp of the geographical environment (where they will be stationed) is essential, and and the radar systems should not only complement each other with their respective FOV but also take cues from each other to guide interceptors. And radar systems should be technically up to the task as well (every radar system is not technically up to the task and produce weapons-grade lock on incoming cruise missiles).

Keep in mind that KSA haven't deployed PATRIOT defense systems everywhere (these are expensive and limited in number). Secondly, a PATRIOT battery stationed in Mecca have PAC-3 class interceptors.

FYI: https://www.janes.com/article/82511/saudi-patriot-pac-3-capability-confirmed

This particular battery did not let anything slip through as far as I am aware. However, other batteries might be old M901 configurations.

Do keep in mind that PATRIOT defense systems in KSA have prevented a great deal of death and destruction in there, keeping in full view the sheer amount of firepower the heavily armed Houthi rebels have subjected numerous locations in KSA to, since 2015. 100+ intercepts is very impressive showing from surface mobile air-defense systems.

My posts highlight the very best of PATRIOT configurations, and in American hands no less.

---

S-400 intercept record in Syria = 0
S-300 intercept record in Syria = 0

Not much to boast about. :whistle:
 
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Bogeyman

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American Accountability Office Missile Defense Report June 2019

Section on BMD (related to capabilities and activities)



SM-3 program



Command and control systems and sensors related activities


GBI program



Batch testing program table




Costs associated with MRBM testing

THAAD missile defense program tests, capabilities and deliveries


THAAD missile defense systems and model developed for South Korea

https://www.docdroid.net/uSoAPbL/amerikan-hesap-verebilirlik-ofisi-fuze-savunma-raporu.pdf#page=30





Pentagon Contemplating Role of AI in Missile Defense
https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2019/10/7/pentagon-contemplating-role-of-ai-in-missile-defense


Inside The U.S. Missile Defense Agency's Secret Next Generation Interceptor Oct 8, 2019

Earlier this year, the Pentagon’s Missile Defense Agency determined that a planned upgrade to the nation’s defense against long-range North Korean missiles wasn’t going to work. A seeker essential to homing in on hostile nuclear warheads wasn’t suitable for operations in space, where the current U.S. homeland defense is designed to intercept attackers.

The upgrade program was canceled in August, and within weeks a draft solicitation for a Next Generation Interceptor was issued to industry. The solicitation described a much more capable system for negating North Korean attacks, specifying nearly 50 threat scenarios in which the new system would need to work effectively. Some of the scenarios involved demanding challenges that are not within the operational “envelope” of the existing defensive network.

The Missile Defense Agency has said very little of substance about the Next Generation Interceptor program, such as when it must be operational or how it will be configured. What follows is a simple explanation of the new system, based on conversations with half a dozen people who are conversant with the agency’s objectives.

It will be a hit-to-kill missile. The head of the missile agency told a think tank audience on Monday that “all options are being considered.” That is only true in a narrow sense. Nobody is seriously considering using a beam weapon to counter incoming ballistic warheads. The plan is to develop a new hit-to-kill system sitting on a new solid-rocket stack that can destroy hostile warheads with the sheer energy of impact. Conceptually, the Next-Generation Interceptor resembles the existing approach to homeland missile defense.

It will have multiple warheads. The single-warhead design of existing interceptors can be overwhelmed by a moderate number of attackers. The Missile Defense Agency envisions 64 interceptors total in the current system, with 2-4 allocated to each attacker depending on circumstances. That means a threat involving two dozen warheads, or even a handful of warheads accompanied by sophisticated decoys, might saturate the system. The plan for the Next Generation Interceptor is to stick with 64 interceptor missiles, but equip each interceptor with multiple kill vehicles that can counter a number of attackers.

It will fit in existing silos. The current homeland missile defense system concentrates its interceptors in underground silos at Fort Greely in Alaska (four more are deployed at Vandenberg Air Force Base in California). The plan is to expand the number of silos at Fort Greely from 40 to 60, and perhaps reach a hundred later if threat developments dictate. But the expectation is that whatever configuration is selected for the new interceptors will allow them to be placed in the silos that have been constructed at Fort Greely. Those silos are wide enough to accommodate a Minuteman ICBM, so there is plenty of volume within which to make design tradeoffs.

It must be ready for deployment soon. Missile Defense Agency planners want to minimize the time required to switch from existing ground-based interceptors to the next-gen weapons, so pacing of the development program is critical. Some observers think it will take ten years before the first Next Generation Interceptor is delivered, but others involved in thinking through what is doable suggest deliveries could commence around 2026. The timing of when the new interceptors become available will depend on how much funding is allocated and whether any technological show-stoppers arise. Multiple warhead hit-to-kill systems have been under development for two decades and booster technology is well understood, so at least some of the players are optimistic about timelines.

It must be viable for decades to come. The need for a next-gen interceptor is driven by the threat emanating from rogue states whose behavior is considered unpredictable. That means mainly North Korea, but it could also include a future nuclear threat from Iran, and even accidental/unauthorized launches from a major nuclear power like Russia. Recent intelligence suggests that North Korea might grow the number of long-range missiles it has, or “fractionate” them by adding multiple warheads, or use lightweight decoys that mimic the signatures of real warheads. The Missile Defense Agency wants its new interceptor to have capabilities and growth potential adequate to keep up with the rogue-state nuclear threat for many years, no matter how it evolves.

Like interceptors in the existing homeland defense network, the Next Generation Interceptor will rely on target detection and tracking from a diverse assortment of sensors on land, at sea, in the air and in orbit. It may be configured as part of a layered defense in which there is an “underlay” of other weapons capable of intercepting long-range warheads, such as the Navy’s Aegis system. And it will be developed competitively, with two industry teams receiving awards in 2020.

Whether all of this is sufficient to allay the fears of those who think that the existing system cannot be allowed to languish while a next-gen solution is developed remains to be seen. Nuclear attack is the greatest military threat to national security, and the interceptors currently deployed in Alaska are the only weapons in the U.S. arsenal currently capable of intercepting intercontinental-range nuclear warheads. It was inevitable that something better would be needed someday, but the immediate question is what should be done to keep the existing system effective while the Missile Defense Agency pursues more capable alternatives.
https://www.forbes.com/sites/lorent...ret-next-generation-interceptor/#4f0702842663

Rethink Navy Ballistic Missile Defense October 2019

Last June, Defense News broke a story that the Navy was through with ballistic missile defense (BMD) patrols. This conclusion was based on comments made by then-Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Admiral John Richardson during the U.S. Naval War College’s 2018 Current Strategy Forum. There, he expressed frustration with committing “six multimission, very sophisticated, dynamic cruisers and destroyers” to “a tiny box, defending land.”1 Missing from this story, however, was his qualifying statement, “I want to get out of the long-term missile defense business and move to dynamic missile defense.” In this assessment, the CNO is on the mark. It is time the Navy gets out of the business of defending static land assets and reconsiders how ship-based BMD capabilities can best contribute to countering the missile threat.

The Navy should change how it employs Aegis BMD-capable ships for three reasons. The first, to which the CNO alluded, is that it underuses a limited asset. BMD ships are mobile, multimission surface combatants. There will never be enough Aegis cruisers and destroyers to meet all operational requirements. This means commanders must assess risk, establish priorities, and allocate resources accordingly. Facing peer or near-peer adversaries, commanders will be required to employ surface combatants when and where they are most needed and will need the flexibility to redeploy them when threats change or opportunities arise. Limiting ships to a single mission in a small geographic area is an inefficient use of a multimission asset and not justifiable when viable alternatives exist.

The second reason is that against a peer competitor or even a moderately competent regional adversary, operating in a constrained geographic area while radiating the powerful SPY-1 radar is not tenable. A ship operating in this manner is comparatively easy to target and vulnerable to threats such as antiship missiles, submarines, suicide boats, and mines. An Aegis ship on station remains formidable but is not invulnerable and would require forces to defend it. This would only exacerbate the lack of surface combatants. The Navy clearly recognizes the threat posed by antiaccess/area-denial weapons, and adopting concepts such as electronic maneuver warfare (EMW) and distributed maritime operations (DMO) aims to increase agility and expand the battlespace. Operating in a tiny box does not align with these concepts.

The final reason is that in most scenarios, ships are not going to be very good at defending land-based assets. This is primarily an issue of capacity. Potential adversaries are fielding missiles of increased range, accuracy, flexibility, and survivability. But beyond the impressive technological improvements, these weapons are being fielded in staggering numbers. U.S. adversaries possess extensive inventories of short- and medium-range ballistic missiles.2 With China and Russia, ballistic missile forces are complemented by an equal or perhaps greater number of land-attack cruise missiles. Against these numbers, by 2020 the U.S. Navy will have fewer than 400 Standard Missile (SM)-3s, of which 150 will be the older SM-3 Block I or IA (some nearing retirement age).3 There will be more SM-6s, but their BMD requirements will have to compete with those for air defense and antisurface warfare.

Furthermore, the available Navy-wide SM-3 and SM-6 inventory has to be divided among the various geographic combatant commands and must compete for shipboard vertical launch system space with SM-2 and Tomahawk land-attack missiles. In most cases, a single ship faces an unsolvable math problem. BMD patrols do deter adversaries and reassure allies of U.S. commitment. But the Navy is writing a check it cannot cash. This might be acceptable if there were no alternative. However, defending static land-based assets can be better accomplished by land-based BMD systems.



Time to Redefine Navy BMD
That the Navy is ill-suited to defending land assets does not mean it should abandon BMD. It does mean the Navy needs to rethink the mission and determine how Aegis BMD capability can best benefit the joint force. One area in which the Navy can uniquely contribute is in protecting aircraft carriers and amphibious ships from antiship ballistic missiles (ASBMs). If this sounds like a self-licking ice cream cone, consider the comparative vulnerability of an air base. While the Navy has agonized over the ASBM threat for years, the missile threat to land bases is far greater. It is impossible to move or hide an airbase. China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea all possess large inventories of missiles that can reach forward U.S. bases. Land-based BMD forces are capable and deploy with a greater number of antiballistic missile interceptors, but in a conflict they will be hard-pressed to defend forward bases. This means that a great deal of, if not most, U.S. forward power projection capability will be sea based. To ensure that capability remains survivable will require missile defenses that only the Navy can provide.

The inherent mobility of Aegis ships offers a surge capability. Aegis ships can defend amphibious forces during a raid, an evacuation, or until organic BMD can be established ashore. These ships can defend a port during a force debarkation or a forward-based expeditionary airfield when aircraft are present, or they can augment land-based BMD elements. Finally, Navy ships can surge to augment land-based BMD forces in the event the threat should outstrip the land-based BMD capability or in the event of casualties. Employed as a surge force, BMD ships are a ready deployable reserve for the joint commander, easing ship capacity constraints and risk to the ships.

Shifting the Navy’s BMD focus entails challenges. Though the Navy has retained control of ships on BMD stations, they are essentially geographic component commander theater assets. For joint force air component commanders (JFACCs), Aegis ships are their BMD assets, present in theater solely to meet national or regional BMD requirements. Even when land-based BMD forces are present, the JFACC will want to retain these forces to provide additional or backup capability. This may overstate the case, and this tendency may be more pronounced in peacetime when there are no obvious opportunity costs involved with locking an Aegis ship “in a tiny box.” But there is no denying that breaking this paradigm will be a challenge. The Navy must explain why refocusing sea-based BMD is not a parochial concern but critical to the joint effort. Given the former CNO’s comments, it appears this may be in progress.

Missile Defense in a Larger Context

Rethinking BMD requires changing how the Navy views the mission. Already the threats posed by maneuvering reentry vehicles, ASBMs, long-range cruise missiles, and hypersonic glide vehicles are blurring the distinction between BMD and air defense. Until recently, the Department of Defense treated BMD as a unique mission deserving special treatment. This is no longer practicable. Nor is relying on destroying missiles in flight. The numerical imbalance between threat missiles and interceptors and a punishing cost exchange ratio mean that shooting down all the missiles is impractical and unaffordable, even if air and missile defenses are highly effective.4 Therefore, the Navy and the other services must embrace integrated air and missile defense (IAMD) and adopt what the 2019 Missile Defense Review calls a comprehensive approach.5 Hard-kill systems must be combined with other offensive attack operations, such as electronic and cyber-attack operations, to counter an adversary’s targeting capabilities and kill chain both left and right of launch. While the services have paid lip service to IAMD for years, the time has come to break the rice bowls and integrate the various tools available to counter air and missile threats.

Shifting the Navy’s focus to a holistic approach to missile defense, instead of only BMD, and focusing on fleet missile defense and surge capability will require changes to doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership, personnel, and facilities. The first step is to adjust to expanded threats, which now include cruise missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles, and, soon, hypersonic glide vehicles. Instead of focusing on small numbers of missiles launched by rogue states, the fleet will have to prepare for multiple missile salvos. These likely will be employed in structured attacks, featuring dissimilar weapons (ASBM and antiship cruise missiles, for example) and electronic and cyber attacks. The Navy should expect that the enemy will understand the physical limitations of its shipboard systems and will attempt to stress sensor networks, degrade communications, and overwhelm Aegis missile-defense capability and capacity. The Navy’s tactics and material systems will have to be adjusted accordingly.

The dilemma posed by large numbers of missiles cannot be solved simply by acquiring more of the systems employed today. As the Navy reorients its focus, it must recognize that the primary objective of air and missile defense is not to shoot down missiles. This is particularly true when defending high-value maritime assets. Targeting the adversary’s sensors and communications through a combination of signature control, maneuver, deception, physical destruction, and cyber attacks will be the first line of defense. Offensive actions against the enemy’s missile forces and supporting infrastructure will be the second. At some point, however, ships will be unable to remain untargeted, either through error or operational necessity. Ships must be able to defend themselves and the high-value assets for the period required to accomplish the mission.

In the absence of a revolutionary directed-energy weapon, surface-to-air missiles, gun systems, jamming systems, and decoys will remain the tools of this fight. To survive, ships will have to synergistically employ kinetic and nonkinetic weapons. The complexity of these calculations and the limited decision time will require effective doctrine aided by networked, tactical decision aids.

New Organization and Systems
The threat environment also will force changes in how the Navy organizes air- and missile-defense forces. Since the aircraft carrier emerged as the primary Navy offensive force in World War II, the concept behind air defense has remained largely unchanged. Fighter aircraft and surface combatants form a layered screen for the carrier. Advances in air- and missile-defense technology increased weapons capability, and the size of battle groups decreased, but the fundamental principles of air and missile defense remain the same. Implementing DMO, distributed lethality, dynamic force employment, and EMW will require a different paradigm. One thing is certain—operations will be a far more difficult undertaking than today’s BMD deployment. Solving these challenges will require developing not only innovative operational concepts and doctrine, but also intense training at the shipboard, tactical-group, and task-force levels.

Finally, the type of systems the Navy fields also will have to change. Much of the service’s focus to date, including recent advances such as the SM-3 Block IIA, represents a joint Missile Defense Agency–Navy effort directed at limited numbers of long-range threats—hence the Navy has procured small numbers of highly capable and very expensive interceptors. The stark reality of comparative missile inventories (offensive missiles versus interceptors) will necessitate a shift to nonkinetic, directed-energy weapons and different (and cheaper) forms of hard-kill weapons. One suggestion from the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments study, Winning the Salvo Competition, is to shift from long-range to “lower-cost medium-range kinetic interceptors,” guns, and directed-energy weapons.6 While engaging threats at closer range may seem counterintuitive, kinetic antimissile weapons require a predictable flight path to account for interceptor fly-out time, and ship-based electronic-attack and directed-energy weapons cannot be engaged beyond the horizon. One point in the trajectory where the missile’s path is highly predictable and in range is in the final moments of flight, when the missile is heading directly at its target. This is nerve-racking for sure, but potentially effective, particularly if decoys and electronic attack can simultaneously be employed with short-range interceptors and directed-energy weapons.

Evolving air and missile threats, the limitations of Aegis BMD ships, changes called for in the Missile Defense Review, and, of course, the former CNO’s comments, indicate the Navy must rethink its BMD mission. The new norm will require planning and executing combined air and missile defense in an environment where flexibility is essential, capability distributed, and forces dispersed. The effort will be more complex than heading to a fixed location focused on a single BMD mission. Execution will put a premium on highly trained shipboard personnel and on staffs to understand the mission, the threat, and the range of capabilities the force can employ. It will involve dedicating the necessary time and effort to develop the operational concepts and doctrine that will fully integrate the tools of air and missile defense. Success will require investing in the proper hard- and soft-kill capabilities and training the fleet to employ them. If this seems a high cost, the alternative is less palatable.


https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2019/october/rethink-navy-ballistic-missile-defense

 

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