Well that is one way of looking at it. But I believe, in comparison to your suggestion, this is a cheaper option.
Well BMD systems (till now) do have an inherent flaw, they can be overwhelmed by dummy's.my opinion is anti-ballistic missiles aren't a deterrent but actually emboldens the enemy to develop more and better ballistic missiles.
MAD is the only sure way to prevent the use of such weapons in war.
It nevertheless, drives up the cost of having an effective ballistic missile force. Just the threat of one in the 1980's, (When it really wan't technically feasible.), broke Soviet resolve in trying to out-build us.Well BMD systems (till now) do have an inherent flaw, they can be overwhelmed by dummy's.
Example, Country A keeps firing sucds or useless rockets, Country B keeps defending with SM3's or it's equivalent, after a volley of 40 or 50 dummy's, Country A fires the real WMD and the BMD (of Country B) by that time is out of SM3's
SO yes, in this particular scenario MAD is the only way to keep WMD's at bay.
On the flip side, for greedy politicians BMD is cheaper.
@Desertfalcon What do you say?
Lets not forget the F15 launched satellite killer missile (1985), that played an important part in stopping space based weapons.It nevertheless, drives up the cost of having an effective ballistic missile force. Just the threat of one in the 1980's, (When it really wan't technically feasible.), broke Soviet resolve in trying to out-build us.
That used to be the case, but discriminating seekers have been around for a while. Decoys mimic, but not perfectly, the signature, flight profile and weight of an actual warhead, but they have differences that are determinable too.Well BMD systems (till now) do have an inherent flaw, they can be overwhelmed by dummy's.
The inherent flaw (in BMD) still remains. What if, the perpetrator fires 50 actual WMD missiles, and the defender only has 30 available BMD missiles, then what? MAD comes into play then, doesn't it?That used to be the case, but discriminating seekers have been around for a while. Decoys mimic, but not perfectly, the signature, flight profile and weight of an actual warhead, but they have differences that are determinable too.
Radar can differentiate between a warhead and a decoy or dummy warhead by measuring the properties of the internal chemical make-up, i.e. the warhead itself versus filler materials such as dense metals to give the dummy similar weight.
Decoys aren't perfect, they can be uncovered. Penetration aids too, though they are primarily radar blockers to prevent the decoys from being located while still in space. Penetration aids, such as balloons lose their effectiveness when inside of a medium.
As of 1996 the first discriminating interceptor demo was planned to take place in FY01. It will take advantage of the fly-along bus in a BMD core program test. Additional tests were planned in FY02 and FY03. The first test was to observe the target, decoys, and debris and perform real-time discrimination between them. One or both of the later tests may employ the discriminating seeker as the primary interceptor seeker.
In FY 2002 the Midcourse Counter-Countermeasures effort under 0603175C BMD Technology initiated advanced development of discriminating seeker components including multicolor focal plane arrays and laser radars. A Discriminating Seeker would be developed that is able to accurately discriminate emerging countermeasures, decoys, and re-entry vehicles. The technologies under development are multi-spectral infrared focal plane arrays, ultra compact laser radar (ladar), high-speed miniature processors, and data fusion algorithms. These components would be integrated into a lightweight Track-Via-Missile seeker after development and demonstration.
At greater distances (400 to 800 kilometers [250 to 500 miles]), the focal plan arrays would acquire the target cluster and perform simple discriminations. At shorter distances (less than 400 kilometers [250 miles]) the focal plan arrays and ladar would work together to accurately discriminate and track the target. The multi-spectral infrared focal plane arrays can accurately measure thermal characteristics of non-gray-body re-entry vehicles and decoys.
Ladar actively illuminate the target with a laser and measures backscattered Doppler-shifted radiation to calculate target range, velocity, and angular rates. Ladar does not rely on external illumination or emitted radiation from the target. Ladar substantially increases the number of target features measurable and significantly improves discrimination and aim point selection. Ladar could be applied to early deployment phase to track threat cloud dispersal. Ladar would assist in boost phase functions of hard body/plume discrimination and final aim-point selection.
After development and testing of the individual technology components of the seeker, the components would be integrated into a lightweight Track-Via-Missile seeker.
Ballistic missile defense (BMD) interceptors must discriminate between real targets and other objects such as decoys and debris for effectiveness in an ECM environment, or against reentry vehicles accompanied by decoys. An interceptor employing these technologies used in an architecture including ground-based radar and space-based infrared satellites, can protect U.S. cities from ballistic missile attack and protect our fighting forces from theater ballistic missiles. Simulation results show that depending upon the attack scenario, the single shot kill probability increases by as much as a factor of 9 after addition of advanced interceptor discrimination capability (i.e., Pk increases from 0.1 to 0.9). An interceptor mass growth of 25 percent will occur and the interceptor alone will be more expensive than without advanced discrimination. However, the system cost will decrease because of a reduction in number of required interceptors. Instead of shooting two or three interceptors at each target to meet the system effectiveness requirements, only one shot will be needed.
The technologies necessary for interceptor discrimination are: lightweight laser radar, simultaneous multispectral LWIR focal plane arrays, highly uniform focal plane arrays, and data fusion techniques to combine the outputs of active and passive sensors. The Advanced Discriminating Interceptor Program will develop and demonstrate these technologies in lab tests and low cost interceptor flight tests. Systems benefiting from this technology are the Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle, THAAD, CORPS SAM, and the Navy Theater Wide Interceptor.
That flaw is a different scenario though, different from the discussion on penetration aids/decoys and the ability to ascertain the validity of a warhead versus a decoy, but it does have credence and thus we do see the MAD doctrine come into effect... for larger powers. BMD works against limit adversaries who can't field long-range missiles, large warhead programs or who's missile force is smaller than the defending nations countermeasures. But as costs come down and technologies like lasers and long-rod kinetic perpetrators - as used on rail-guns, come on line, the balance once more shifts to the defender as these technologies allow for more rapid engagements at more limited costs. Both are being explored as counter-missile defense, lasers for destabilizing the flight profiles of missiles and warheads, rail-guns for kinetic destruction.The inherent flaw still remains. What if, the perpetrator fires 50 actual WMD missiles, and the defender only has 30 available BMD missiles available then what? MAD comes into play then, doesn't it?