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The Nathu La skirmish & The Chola Incident: when Chinese were given a bloody nose

dray

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The Nathu La skirmish: when Chinese were given a bloody nose
Maj Gen Sheru Thapliyal

After the debacle of 1962, nothing could have enhanced the self esteem of the Indian Army than the mauling that was given to the Chinese at Nathu La in Sikkim on 11th September 1967 and at Chola on 1st October 1967. It must have come as a rude shock to the Chinese Army and also its political leadership. And by a happy coincidence, the Indian Army leadership which got the better of this eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation was the same that went on to create Bangladesh in 1971. Maj Gen Sagat Singh was GOC Mountain Division in Sikkim, Lt Gen Jagjit Aurora was the Corps Commander and Sam Manekshaw was the Eastern Army Commander.

I too served in Nathu La. After finishing my young officer’s course, it was on 21 July 1967 that I reported to my Unit, a mule pack artillery regiment in Sikkim. Those days young officers were made to have their professional mailing by sending them on long-range patrols (LRP) for area familiarisation, take part in khad race to increase their stamina and sending them to remote observations ports on Sikkim-Tibet border for a month. Having done my share of LRPs and having taken part in the khad race, I was sent to the main Sabu La observation post on the Sikkim-Tibet Border. This observation post is about a kilometre south-west of Nathu La. It dominates Nathu La by virtue of taking on higher ground and commands an excellent view of the pass as also the Chinese defense on the feature known as North shoulder. There were two observation posts at Sabu La and had a good old radio set 62 and PRC-10 and of course line communications to the guns deployed in the rear.

Nathu La at 14200 feet is an important pass on the Tibet-Sikkim border through which passes the old Gangtok-Yatung-Lhasa Trade Route. Although the Sikkim-Tibet boundary is well defined by the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 17 March 1890, the Chinese were not comfortable with Sikkim being an Indian protectorate with the deployment of the Indian Army at that time. During the 1965 War between India and Pakistan, the Chinese gave an ultimatum to India to vacate both Nathu La and Jelep La passes on the Sikkim-Tibet border. For some strange reason, the Mountain Division, under whose jurisdiction Jelep La was at that time, vacated the pass. It remains under Chinese possession till date. However, Lt. Gen Sagat Singh, true to form, refused to vacate Nathu La. Incidentally it is at Nathu La where Chinese and Indian forces are deployed barely thirty yards apart, closest anywhere on the 4000 km Sino-Indian border and the border remains undemacrated. Chinese hold the northern shoulder of the pass while Indian Army holds the southern shoulder. Two dominating features south and north of Nathu La namely Sebu La and Camel’s back were held by the Indians. Artillery observation post officers deployed on these two features have an excellent observation into Chinese depth areas whereas from Northern shoulder, Chinese have very little observations into Indian depth areas. This factor proved crucial in the clash that ensued. At the time of the clash, 2 Grenadiers was holding Nathu La. This battalion was under the command of Lt Col (Later Brigadier) Rai Singh. The battalion was under the Mountain Brigade being commanded by Brig MMS Bakshi, MVC.

The daily routine at Nathu La used to start with patrolling by both sides along the perceived border which almost always resulted in arguments. The only one on the Chinese side who could converse in broken English was the Political Commissar who could be recognised by a red patch on his cap. Sentries of both the forces used to stand barely one meter apart in the centre of the Pass which is marked by Nehru Stone, commemorating Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru’s trek to Bhutan through Nathu La and Chumbi Valley in 1959. Argument between the two sides soon changed to pushing and shoving and on 6 September 1967 a scuffle took place in which Political Commissar fell down and broke his spectacles. These incidents only added to the excitement. I developed excellent rapport with Capt Dagar of 2 Grenadiers and a few days before the clash we had gone to Gangtok together on “liberty” to see a movie. Little did I know that within a week, Dagar would be a martyr.

In order to de-escalate the situation it was decided by the Indian military hierarchy to lay a wire in the centre of the Pass from Nathu La to Sebu La to demarcate the perceived border. This task was to be carried out by the jawans of 70 Field Company of Engineers assisted by a company of 18 Rajput deployed at Yak La pass further north of Nathu La. The wire laying was to commence at first light on the fateful morning of 11 September 1967.

That morning dawned bright and sunny unlike the normal foggy days. The engineers and jawans started erecting long iron pickets from Nathu La to Sebu La along the perceived border while 2 Grenadiers and Artillery Observation Post Officers at Sebu La and Camel’s Back were on alert. Immediately the Chinese Political Commissar, with a section of Infantry came to the centre of the Pass where Lt. Col Rai Singh, CO 2 Grenadiers was standing with his commando platoon. The Commissar asked Lt Col Rai Singh to stop laying the wire. Orders to the Indian Army were clear. They were not to blink. An argument started which soon built up into a scuffle. In the ensuing melee, the commissar got roughed up. Thereafter the Chinese went up back to their bunkers and engineers resumed laying the wire.

Within a few minutes of this, a whistle was heard on the Chinese side followed by murderous medium machine gun fire from north shoulder. The pass is completely devoid of cover and the jawans of 70 Field Company and 18 Rajput were caught in the open and suffered heavy casualties which included Col Rai Singh who was wounded. He was awarded MVC later. Two brave officers – Capt Dagar of 2 Grenadiers and Major Harbhajan Singh of 18 Rajput rallied a few troops and tried to assault the Chinese MMG but both died a heroic death. They were posthumously awarded Vir Chakra and MVC respectively. 2 Grenadier opened small arms fire on North shoulder but it was not very effective. Within the first ten minutes, there were nearly seventy dead and scores wounded lying in the open on the pass. Within half an hour, Chinese artillery opened up on the pass as well as in the depth areas but it was mostly prophylactic fire due to lack of observation and failed to do much damage. Meanwhile we as artillery observation post officers asked for artillery fire, permission for which came a little later. Because of excellent domination and observation from Sebu La and Camel’s back, artillery fire was most effective and most of the Chinese bunkers on North shoulder and in depth were completely destroyed and Chinese suffered very heavy casualties which by their own estimates were over 400. The artillery duel thereafter carried on day and night. For the next three days, the Chinese were taught a lesson. On 14 September, Chinese threatened use of Air Force if shelling did not stop. By then the lesson had been driven home and an uneasy ceasefire came about. The Chinese, true to form, had pulled over dead bodies to their side of the perceived border at night and accused us of violating the border. Dead bodies were exchanged on 15 September at which time: Sam Manekshaw, Aurora and Sagat were present on the Pass.

Every battle has its own share of heroism, faint heartedness, drama and humour. The Nathu La skirmish was no exception. 2 Grenadiers were initially shaken up due to the loss of Capt Dagar and injury to their CO but found their man of the moment in Lieutenant Atar Singh who went round from trench to trench to rally the troops and was later promoted as Captain on the spot. On the lighter side was one artillery observation post officer, my colleague at Sebu La whose radio set was damaged due to shelling and he was out of communication with his guns. He rightly decided to go back to the base at Sherathang in the depth to get another radio set. While he was on his way back, Commander Artillery Brigade was coming up. He stopped the young captain, accused him of running away from the battle and sent him back after reducing him to his substantive rank of a second lieutenant. Casualties could not be evacuated for three days and nights as any move to do so invited a hail of Chinese bullets. Some wounded may well have succumbed to cold and rain. There were awards for bravery as also court martial for cowardice. However, what stood out was the steadfastness of the commanders and bravery of the jawans and junior officers. Indians refused to blink and the mighty Chinese dragon was made to look ordinary.

The situation again flared up twenty days later when on 1 October 1967 a face-off between India and China took place at Cho La, another pass on the Sikkim-Tibet border a few kilometers north of Nathu La. Despite initial casualties, 7/11 GR and 10 JAK RIF stood firm and forced the Chinese to withdraw nearly three kilometers away to a feature named Kam Barracks where they remain deployed till date. Cho La Pass is firmly in Indian hands. Indian Army had got better of the Chinese yet again.

No wonder, Sino-Indian border has remained peaceful ever since to the extent that today Chinese soldiers come and ask their Indian counterparts at Nathu La for cigarettes, rum and tea, mail is exchanged twice in a week in a hut constructed specially for this purpose and border personnel meeting takes place there twice a year. It was my privilege to command the Nathu La Brigade many years later and conduct the first border personnel meeting at Nathu La is 1995.

Maj Gen Sheru Thapliyal, SM (Retd), commanded the Nathu La Brigade and an Infantry Division in the Ladakh Sector

The article first appeared in Force Magazine in 2004

The Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS)
 

dray

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Face-offs post 1962

1965: China accuses India of preventing livestock from grazing within its territory along Sikkim border. Warning is issued in September as Indo-Pak war simmers.

1965: China sends troopers on probe missions along Sikkim-Tibet border. Seven border intrusions are made between September and December. India responds firmly, but does not provoke a full conventional conflict.

1967: In September, Chinese army launches a direct attack on Indian troopers in Nathu La. For six days in September, there are skirmishes, including exchange of heavy artillery fire. Chinese troopers try to push into Indian territory. Attack is repulsed by India.

1967: The Chola incident breaks out between Indian and Chinese troopers in Sikkim from October 1 to 10. India loses 88 men and 163 are wounded. The Chinese lose 300 men and another 450 are wounded in Nathu La and another 40 at Chola.

1986: The Chinese begin building permanent military structures on Indian territory in Tawang district of Arunachal Pradesh, forcing India to deploy more troops. After a standoff lasting months, the Chinese withdraw, thanks to then Army chief General K Sundarji’s amazing military planning and deployment.

Face-offs post 1962 -The New Indian Express
 

dray

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Chinese Incursion into India Points to Forgotten Territorial Dispute

The seas of East Asia are the centre of today’s global territorial disputes. Whether it be the contested Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in the East China Sea – where China, Japan and Taiwan claim sovereignty – or the South China Sea – where a myriad of overlapping claims lead to regular diplomatic spats – it is this region that seemingly threatens to embroil China in a conflict with its neighbours.

The news, then, that India has protested at an incursion of Chinese troops across a disputed border in Ladakh province, in the state of Jammu and Kashmir, is a timely reminder of one of the Chinese’s most incendiary border disputes.

There are two main border disputes between China and India. Aksai Chin is the first, forming a mountainous buffer zone between the neighbouring giants and which India claims is a part of the Ladakh province encroached upon in the past few days by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA)


The Aksai Chin dispute

The inhospitable nature of Aksai Chin did not stop a Chinese invasion force crossing into the disputed territory in October 1962 to inflict a swift rout upon the defending Indian forces, whose death toll climbed quickly amidst the harshness of winter. After India provided the Dalai Lama with sanctuary in 1959, Sino-Indian relations deteriorated rapidly and the border dispute was both a convenient excuse for conflict, whilst also providing a potentially beneficial strategic outcome for the Chinese. The Chinese extended their tentative claim line into what Indians considered their territory, before declaring a unilateral ceasefire.


Despite the bitter cold, the flats of Aksai Chin are conducive to warfare

Simultaneously, the PLA had advanced into the other disputed border zone. This territory forms the northern part of the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh, formerly the North East Frontier Agency of British India. As is so often the case, it is the former colonial authorities who lie at the heart of this particular dispute. During their 19th century incursions into the depths of India, the British claimed the region of Arunachal Pradesh and negotiated a border – known as the McMahon Line after its proponent – with Tibet, negating to inform the Chinese, who laid claim to part of the territory.


Arunachal Pradesh dispute

Even deep into the 20th century, and under communist rule, the Chinese were still rankled by what they saw as a deep territorial injustice as the McMahon Line was retained as an international boundary for a newly independent India.


Chinese forces cross the McMahon Line

On the 1st October 1967, almost exactly five years after the Sino-Indian War, the Chola Incident occurred. This one-day skirmish stemmed from PLA troops crossing the McMahon Line into the province of Sikkim, resulting in ten Chinese and four Indian deaths.

In mid-1987 a less intense skirmish between Indian and Chinese troops took place in the very far northeast of India in the Sumdorong Chu Valley. A restrained affair, it resulted in no fatalities but was confirmation once again of the fragile peace existing across the former British dominion border.

In exchange for recognising Sikkim as a province in 1993, India officially accepted Tibet as an autonomous region of China and a ‘line of actual control’ was agreed across their disputed borders. The passage of time, coupled with the economic importance of the Sino-Indian trading relationship, has seen the preservation of the line of actual control, despite Indian claims that the Chinese have violated it 500 times since 2010.

This accusation, coupled with China’s recent serious incursion, It is testament to the forces of nationalism, history and the vast size of both countries and a reminder that such events are always likely to reoccur. Removed from their political masters, the army generals on the Himalayan frontier between China and India can act with a degree of impunity, aware that the quashing of their ambitions will take at the very least time if not great resources and political persuasion.

Whilst wary eyes are cast towards the South China Sea and the Korean Peninsula for the potential flashpoints of regional conflict, a thought should be spared for the precarious balance of power along the old McMahon Line. It would only take a slight miscalculation of judgement for Asia’s two biggest powers to be brought to the brink of war. Whatever economic interdependence may exist between the two states could be dashed by the wants of sovereignty and nationalism.

Chola Incident | History's Shadow
 

Beast

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I mentioned this to a Chinese member before and he claimed it was a fabrication of history.
Indeed it is fabricate. Want me to show you how Indian always like to fabricate news?

It wasn't China, but Nehru who declared 1962 war: Australian journalist Neville Maxwell

Chola incident? Never recorded, never heard. Not even US and western news reported of this fabrication. The Indian just can't get over the defeat of 1962 by China and created this just to lie to everybody India is victor in 1967. Not even a video to illustrate it. :lol:

Let me show you 1962 video. :lol:



I think probably some fanatic gonna say those scene is just bollywood production video. You all be the judged. :lol:

I especially like the part where Indian soldier feel so happy to surrender to the Chinese. When they were POW, they still got the cheek to smile. :lol:
 

dray

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1967 Nathu la skirmishes: China got bloody nose from Indian Army

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1962 Indo-Sino war completed 50 years in 2012. This war was one of the bad memories of India where the country saw humiliating defeat from China. The 1962 Indo-Sino war defeat was the not only result of poor political and military leadership but also lack of preparedness of the Indian soldiers. Though many consider 1962 debacle a biggest failure of India, there was an event where Indian Army showed their potency to Red Dragons in 1967 forcing them to retreat.

In the skirmishes at Nathu La and Cho La in Sikkim during the period of 1st to 30th September 1967, Indian troops taught a tough lesson to Chinese Army in their own words. This was the only first time when Chinese Army got bloody nose from valiant Indian soldiers.

The beginning of the skirmishes

Background

The two strategic points Nathu La Pass and Jelep La Pass were the main root points of confrontation between India and China. During the 1962 Sino-Indian War, Nathu La witnessed skirmishes between soldiers of the two countries. Adamant China categorically rejected the Macmohan Line, which India claims an international border between India and China. During the 1965 India-Pak war, China extended its support to Pakistan and Chinese Army served an ultimatum and demanded that India withdraw its posts at Nathu La and Jelep La. Over confident of being winner of 1962 war, Chinese Army made several attempts of instigating India for war at both passes since 1965. Ultimately, in 1967 the hostility turned in a battle where India gave tit for tat to China.

The Background

According to HQ XXXIII Corps, the main defences of 17 Mountain Division were at Changgu, while Nathu La was only an observation post. In the adjoining sector, manned by 27 Mountain Division, Jelep La was also considered an observation post, with the main defences located at Lungthu. In case of hostilities, the divisional commanders had been given the authority to vacate the posts, and fall back on the main defences. Accordingly, orders were issued by corps headquarters to both divisions to vacate Nathu La and Jelep La.

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As a result, 27 Mountain Division vacated Jelep La, which the Chinese promptly occupied. However, Major General Sagat Singh, GOC 17 Mountain Division, refused to vacate Nathu La. He reasoned that Nathu La and Jelep La were passes on the watershed, which was the natural boundary. Vacating the passes on the watershed would give the Chinese the tactical advantage of observation and fire, into India, while denying the same to our own troops. He also felt that the discretion to vacate the posts lay with the divisional commander, and he was not obliged to do so, based on instructions from higher headquarters.


China’s pressure tactics

The Chinese had installed loudspeakers at Nathu La, and warned the Indians that they would suffer as they did in 1962, if they did not withdraw. However, Major GeneralSagat had carried out a detailed appreciation of the situation, and reached the conclusion that the Chinese were bluffing. They made threatening postures, such as advancing in large numbers, but on reaching the border, always stopped, turned about and withdrew. They also did not use any artillery, for covering fire, which they would have certainly done if they were serious about capturing any Indian positions. Ultimately, Sagat's fortitude saved the day for India, and his stand was vindicated in 1967, when there was a show down at Nathu La.

11th September to 1 October when Indians refused to blink

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In order to de-escalate the situation it was decided by the Indian military hierarchy to lay a wire in the centre of the Pass from Nathu La to Sebu La to demarcate the perceived border. This task was to be carried out by the jawans of 70 Field Company of Engineers assisted by a company of 18 Rajput deployed at Yak La pass further north of Nathu La. The wire laying was to commence at first light on the fateful morning of 11 September 1967.

11 September, the engineers and jawans started erecting long iron pickets from Nathu La to Sebu La along the perceived border while 2 Grenadiers and Artillery Observation Post Officers at Sebu La and Camel’s Back were on alert. Immediately the Chinese Political Commissar, with a section of Infantry came to the centre of the Pass where Lt. Col Rai Singh, CO 2 Grenadiers was standing with his commando platoon. The Commissar asked Lt Col Rai Singh to stop laying the wire. Orders to the Indian Army were clear. They were not to blink. An argument started which soon built up into a scuffle. In the ensuing melee, the commissar got roughed up. Thereafter the Chinese went up back to their bunkers and engineers resumed laying the wire.

Within a few minutes of this, a whistle was heard on the Chinese side followed by murderous medium machine gun fire from north shoulder. The pass is completely devoid of cover and the jawans of 70 Field Company and 18 Rajput were caught in the open and suffered heavy casualties which included Col Rai Singh who was wounded. He was awarded MVC later. Two brave officers – Capt Dagar of 2 Grenadiers and Major Harbhajan Singh of 18 Rajput rallied a few troops and tried to assault the Chinese MMG but both died a heroic death. They were posthumously awarded Vir Chakra and MVC respectively. 2 Grenadier opened small arms fire on North shoulder but it was not very effective. Within the first ten minutes, there were nearly seventy dead and scores wounded lying in the open on the pass. Within half an hour, Chinese artillery opened up on the pass as well as in the depth areas but it was mostly prophylactic fire due to lack of observation and failed to do much damage.

Meanwhile artillery observation post officers asked for artillery fire, permission for which came a little later. Because of excellent domination and observation from Sebu La and Camel’s back, artillery fire was most effective and most of the Chinese bunkers on North shoulder and in depth were completely destroyed and Chinese suffered very heavy casualties which by their own estimates were over 400. The artillery duel thereafter carried on day and night. For the next three days, the Chinese were taught a lesson.

Between 7 and 13 September 1967, China's People's Liberation Army and the Indian Army had six-day "border skirmish", including the exchange of heavy artillery fire.

On 14 September, Chinese threatened use of Air Force if shelling did not stop. By then the lesson had been driven home and an uneasy ceasefire came about. The Chinese, true to form, had pulled over dead bodies to their side of the perceived border at night and accused us of violating the border. Dead bodies were exchanged on 15 September at which time: Sam Manekshaw, Aurora and Major General Sagatwere present on the Pass.

The Indian casualties in the action were just over two hundred - 65 dead and 145 wounded. The Chinese are estimated to have suffered about three hundred casualties.

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Every battle has its own share of heroism, faint heartedness, drama and humour. The Nathu La skirmish was no exception. 2 Grenadiers were initially shaken up due to the loss of Capt Dagar and injury to their CO but found their man of the moment in Lieutenant Atar Singh who went round from trench to trench to rally the troops and was later promoted as Captain on the spot. On the lighter side was one artillery observation post officer at Sebu La whose radio set was damaged due to shelling and he was out of communication with his guns. He rightly decided to go back to the base at Sherathang in the depth to get another radio set. While he was on his way back, Commander Artillery Brigade was coming up. He stopped the young captain, accused him of running away from the battle and sent him back after reducing him to his substantive rank of a second lieutenant. Casualties could not be evacuated for three days and nights as any move to do so invited a hail of Chinese bullets. Some wounded may well have succumbed to cold and rain. There were awards for bravery as also court martial for cowardice. However, what stood out was the steadfastness of the commanders and bravery of the jawans and junior officers. The Indian casualties in the action were just over two hundred - 65 dead and 145 wounded. The Chinese are estimated to have suffered about three hundred casualties. Indians refused to blink and the mighty Chinese dragon was made to look ordinary. This was the first time the Chinese got a bloody nose, and the myth of their invincibility was broken.

Has India taken lesson from 1967?

Even after 46 years of bloodish skirmish between India and China, there is no change in the situation at the border. The year 2013 saw number of intrusion bids by China in Indian territory including Sikkim. Chinese Army not only intruded in Indian area but also claimed the territory threatening locals. However, so called political leadership of our country is not yet ready to recognize Chinese threat. Defence minister A K Antony rules out reports of incursion and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh advocates for bilateral ties with China. Defence experts have warned that neglecting China’s moves at border will be dangerous for national security. India needs strong political leadership and strong military defence to tackle cross border threats.

1967 Nathu la skirmishes: China got bloody nose from Indian Army
 

ice bomb

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It will be interesting to hear the chinese side of the 67 incident. I highly doubt we will ever hear it though, if 62 is but a footnote in their books, then what will the 67 skirmish been then.

It seems it wasnt clear how many casualties there were.
We have two versions here:
Because of excellent domination and observation from Sebu La and Camel’s back, artillery fire was most effective and most of the Chinese bunkers on North shoulder and in depth were completely destroyed and Chinese suffered very heavy casualties which by their own estimates were over 400.

Now where does the number come from? Which chinese source was been quoted here? How you inflict that many casualities in an artillery exchange? The devil lies in the details. Details that are not verified by either side.

The other version:

The Indian casualties in the action were just over two hundred - 65 dead and 145 wounded. The Chinese are estimated to have suffered about three hundred casualties.

It is clear that there were no concensus among indian sources how many casualties the chinese suffered. And if you cant even be sure of you own source, what is there to debate beside dick measuring contest?
Like I said we will never know the whole truth unless the chinese release their version.
 

dray

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The Chola Incident

While in Sikkim in September 1965, the 7/11 GR (Gorkha Rifles) was put on alert as a result of a Chinese ultimatum to withdraw from certain positions which they claimed to be there own. Along with a battalion from the Grenadiers and the 10 J&K (Jammu & Kashmir) Rifles a defensive position was established 4720 meters above sea level. For two years nothing happened and then suddenly on 11 September 1967, the Grenadier's position around Nathu La came under fire. To forestall any infiltration towards Gangatok, the 7/11 GR occupied battle locations around Manla the next day. The situation firing subsided and the battalion was shortly moved to Karponang, being replaced by the 10 J&K Rifles.

In order to enable the J&K Rifles to observe their raising day on October 1st, two companies of the 7/11 GR was ordered to relieve 2 companies from the 10 J&K Rifles. Accordingly C (2/Lt. M.S. Samuel) and D (Lt. R.S. Rathore) Companies along with their signals, mortar, RCL and MMG detachments moved to provide temporary relief on September 28th. C Coy (less two platoons) and the signal detachment was to be based at Twin Huts, south west of Chola. Two other platoons, along with the MMG detachment were to relieve the 10 J&K Rifles at Point 15181 and the RCL was to be at Chola. D Coy (less two platoons) were to be located at Point 15450 (to the west of Chola). On platoon was to be located at Rai Gap (east of Point 15450) and the fourth platoon was in the rear at Tamze along with the mortar section.

A day earlier, there had been a minor scuffle between the Sikh sentries of the 10 J&K Rifles and their Chinese counterparts on a flat patch of icy land of about 5 meters on the unmarked boundary. It had a boulder about 30 cm in height in the center of the narrow crest which marked the dividing line, according to the waterseed principle. Three Indians and an equal number of Chinese sentries were positioned on either side of the boulder, 2 metres from each other. During the fisticuffs, a Chinese sentry was roughed up and he lost a tunic button. The Chinese were thus smarting under a temporary reverse. This fact came to Major K.B. Joshi (Battalion CO 7/11 GR) much later. Having reached Twin huts by September 30, the two companies occupied forward positions by October 1. Major Joshi informed Lt. Rathore that he was on his way to Point 15450 and would be there by 0930 hours on October 1.

Fighting Starts

Major Joshi reached Rai Gap on the way to D Coy positions by 0915 hours. The sentry post at Pt. 15450 was visible from there. Just then he observed that the post was being surrounded by a section strength of Chinese troops. A second section was seen circumventing the D Coy platoon position along the northern cliff in a single file. Major Joshi at once informed Lt. Rathore of what he had seen. The later informed Major Joshi that the Chinese Coy Cdr. and the political commissar were staking claims to the boulder at the sentry post. Naib Subedar Gyan Bahadur Limbu was having a heated argument with his counterpart at the sentry post during which he rested his right foot on the boulder under dispute. The Chinese kicked his foot away. Gyan put his foot back and challenged them. Events were moving quickly.

By this time the Chinese had taken up position, presumably because their commander had already taken a decision to escalate the incident. And one of the Chinese sentries bayoneted Gyan wounding him in the arm. The Gorkha's response was swift. Both arms of the Chinese who hit the JCO were chopped off with a Khukri. At this point the Chinese opened fire and the two sides engaged in a firefight at close range. Lance Naik Krishna Bahadur, the Post Cdr., then led a charge against the Chinese in the vicinity who were forming up for an assault. Although hit & incapacitated, he continued to harangue his men forward. Rifleman Devi Prasad Limbu directly behind his Post Cdr. was already engaged in a close quarter battle with the enemy and his Khukri took off five Chinese heads.

Rifleman Limbu was soon claimed by a direct hit. For his action he was awarded a Vir Chakra, Posthumous. Lance Naik Krishna Bahadur's body was later returned by the Chinese with full military honours. The Chinese Officer who accompanied the remains to the Indian Army, praised the performance of the Indian troops, stating that "they fought like tigers." Meanwhile at Pt. 1540 Lt. Rathore was wounded in his left arm as soon as the firing started. He nevertheless continued to lead until he was hit in the chest and abdomen and died immediately thereafter. The mobile fire controller (MFC) at Chole was eating when the fighting started and he was hit in the right leg and incapacitated. Major Joshi took over immediately and accurate mortar fire on Chinese positions around Point 15450 and Chola. This put an end to further activity in this area. The Indian mortar barrage lasted until 1015 hrs. While engaged in directing his mortars Major Joshi saw a Chinese soldier trying to circumvent the cliff face under Pt. 15450. He immediately took his escort's rifle and brought him down.

Tinjong Excels

While Point 15450 was temporarily quiet, Tamze and the Rai Gap area came under rocket and RCL fire at around 1050 hours. The mortar position at Tamze came under heavy pressure as it threatened the rear of the Chinese positions. In the Rai Gap area a forward section post held by the J&K Rifles suffered heavy casualties when one of their bunkers received a direct hit by RCL fire. This post had not yet been taken up the troops from 7/11 Gorkha Rifles. Repeated Chinese attempts to overrun the post were broken up with effective MMG fire from Point 15180. Meanwhile Chinese HMGs were pouring accurate fire on the Chola and Twin Huts' position. Major Joshi's escort was killed and a handful of Chinese soldiers tried to move towards Major Joshi's party. These troops withdrew after Major Joshi himself shot two. The fighting, however, continued.

An offending Chinese 57mm RCL in the Rai Gap area was silenced by Major Joshi's mortars. The RCL detachment Cdr. at Chola found an enemy HMG position bringing down accurate fire on our posts at Point 15450. After keenly observing the position, he silenced it with the first shot. The Chinese immediately retaliated by bringing down fire on Timjong's position. Undaunted, even though alone, he continued to fire until all is ammunition was exhausted. He was awarded the Vir Chakra. By 1130 hours troops were withdrawn back from Pt. 15450 under covering fire from MMGs on Pt. 15180. Almost simultaneously the Chinese fired green lights, ostensibly for a ceasefire. However, Pt. 15180 noticed some enemy troops lined up just below the crest at Rai Gap and engaged them, forcing them to scatter. It was around this time that Major Joshi shot his fourth enemy soldier trying to sneak past the Indian lines. The fighting continued until 1600 hours when the whole battle zone was enveloped by a thick fog.

Under cover of this fog Major Joshi moved towards the Twin Huts. When the fighting started, Major Nair, the 2-in-C of the J&K Rifles and Cdr. of the Chola area, had informed his brigade about the developments. Brigadier Kundan Singh who was then also Officiating GOC moved up and ordered the rest of 7/11 Gorkha Rifles to Tamze. Their being no news from Major Joshi it was assumed that he was either killed or had been taken prisoner. There was much relief when he reached Twin Huts at 1700 hours. Here he gave a first hand account of the fighting and he drew up plans to use the 7/11 GR to recapture Pt 15450. While it was proposed that artillery would be used to support the attempts at recapturing the Pt. 15450, none was available in time. So infantry assault would have to be used.

The route for the counter-attack lay through the "black rocks" area, just south west of Pt. 15450. Since this route was unknown to the battalion, it was provided with a guide. Unfortunately the guide got lost and Captain Parulekar and B Coy fumbled on the black rocks. Soon the Chinese heard the commotion and fired magnesium flares to see what was happening. While they failed to engage B Coy, further movement by Parulekar was risky. Just then (0640 hours on October 2nd) Major Joshi decided to send Parulekar with a platoon to outflank the enemy from a north westerly direction, while the rest of the company and supporting mortars were readied for a frontal assault. Seeing that they were clearly outmanoeuvred the Chinese conceded Pt. 15450 without firing a single shot. By 0815 hours, Major Joshi had retaken Pt. 15450 and the boulder that started it all.

Bharat Rakshak :: Land Forces Site - The Chola Incident
 

Trev

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Indeed it is fabricate. Want me to show you how Indian always like to fabricate news?

It wasn't China, but Nehru who declared 1962 war: Australian journalist Neville Maxwell

Chola incident? Never recorded, never heard. Not even US and western news reported of this fabrication. The Indian just can't get over the defeat of 1962 by China and created this just to lie to everybody India is victor in 1967. Not even a video to illustrate it. :lol:

Let me show you 1962 video. :lol:



I think probably some fanatic gonna say those scene is just bollywood production video. You all be the judged. :lol:

I especially like the part where Indian soldier feel so happy to surrender to the Chinese. When they were POW, they still got the cheek to smile. :lol:
All your evidence are subjective and there are many sources about the Chola incident which are being posted by @DRAY.
 

dray

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dray

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Indeed it is fabricate. Want me to show you how Indian always like to fabricate news?
It wasn't China, but Nehru who declared 1962 war: Australian journalist Neville Maxwell

Check from page number 6 of that thread, it was proved that China attacked India and started the 1962 war, we were back stabbed by China, and that was the last time when we were unprepared, in 1967 China was paid back.

Also check these threads to know how China back stabbed a friend back then.

To all Indian members here. A question...

Lt-General Thorat's 1962 China warning fell on deaf ears.

Chola incident? Never recorded, never heard. Not even US and western news reported of this fabrication. The Indian just can't get over the defeat of 1962 by China and created this just to lie to everybody India is victor in 1967. Not even a video to illustrate it. :lol:

We are not responsible for your ignorance and terrible lack of knowledge, read more and get educated.

Same thread too many times.

Every topic comes up repeatedly in PDF, at least this one is far better than those hundreds of rape & defecation threads. :)
 
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Beast

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Ignorance is bliss!! :) Next time refer them to this thread, or maybe they can start with Wiki, I hope Wiki is not banned in their country. :)

Chola incident - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Any tom , dick, harry can edit wiki. Don't you know that? :lol:

I can be sure, it an Indian who added that in with Indian proof and Indian source. :lol:

All your evidence are subjective and there are many sources about the Chola incident which are being posted by @DRAY.

What many sources? Indian sources? :lol: Of cos, Indian will make up many sources to heal their wounded ego. :lol:

They are no independent party to verify all this Indian make up source.
 

dray

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Any tom , dick, harry can edit wiki. Don't you know that? :lol:

I can be sure, it an Indian who added that in with Indian proof and Indian source. :lol:


What many sources? Indian sources? :lol: Of cos, Indian will make up many sources to heal their wounded ego. :lol:

They are no independent party to verify all this Indian make up source.


And Wiki articles come with references at the bottom. :lol:

References
  1. Jain, J.P. (1974). Nuclear India. p. Volume 2, 339-40.
  2. China Daily, n. 24 October 1983.
  3. "Rapprochement Across the Himalayas: Emerging India-China Relations Post Cold"[1] p. 40
  4. "India-China relations", by Bidanda M. Chengappa, p. 63
  5. "Rapprochement Across the Himalayas: Emerging India-China Relations Post Cold"[2] p. 40
  6. BBC News: India and China agree over Tibet
  7. Baruah, Amit (2005-04-12). "China backs India's bid for U.N. Council seat". The Hindu. Retrieved 2009-03-17.
 

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