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The end of the deal, hopes, delusions and treasons

SalarHaqq

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I can understand if they want to use the phrase Javid Nam in place of or alongside shahid, but somehow I truly doubt that this was the motive of those disgusting bloated maggots.

No, it wasn't, since what these liberals did was merely to erase shahid from street signs, not replace it with another honorific title. In some cases they removed the martyr's first name in order to blur the street's association with him.

See here:
https://www.tasnimnews.com/fa/news/1398/06/22/2095255/

Thankfully revolutionaries put a halt to the plot:
 

Sineva

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What do the posters here think of this argument?,last gasp of the pro-western reformists or the only option for iran?,or is it something in the middle,ie a nice idea but just not practical under the current circumstances?

Iran Stands to Lose the Most if the Nuclear Deal Isn’t Revived

By Esfandyar Batmanghelidj, the founder of the economic think tank Bourse & Bazaar, and Ellie Geranmayeh, a senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations.

Resistance and endurance are pointless if diplomatic and economic opportunities are not seized when they arise.​

https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/07/25/iran-nuclear-deal-economy-diplomacy-sanctions-fail-lose-most/?tpcc=recirc_trending062921
July 25, 2022, 3:56 AM

The Iran nuclear deal recently marked its seventh anniversary—but it may well turn out to be its last. Despite a year of negotiations in Vienna, which nearly delivered an agreement on how the United States and Iran would return to full compliance with the nuclear deal, the process is now on the verge of collapse.
All parties to the deal share blame, and they all stand to lose. For the West, there will be a dramatic setback for nonproliferation efforts in the Middle East. The failure of the nuclear deal also risks military escalation in a region playing a crucial role during the global energy crisis triggered by Russia’s war in Ukraine. For Iran, the risks are even greater.
In Doha last month, negotiators failed to break the deadlock over how to revive the 2015 agreement. According to Western powers, instead of closing outstanding issues, Iran attempted to reopen negotiations on terms that were settled in February. The consensus in Washington and European capitals is that Iran’s leaders are buying time. At best, Iranian negotiators need more time to forge a consensus in Tehran on whether it is worth rolling back the country’s nuclear program for a deal that may only last for the remainder of U.S. President Joe Biden’s term. At worst, Iran is delaying for the sake of advancing its nuclear activities.

The Iran nuclear deal recently marked its seventh anniversary—but it may well turn out to be its last. Despite a year of negotiations in Vienna, which nearly delivered an agreement on how the United States and Iran would return to full compliance with the nuclear deal, the process is now on the verge of collapse.
All parties to the deal share blame, and they all stand to lose. For the West, there will be a dramatic setback for nonproliferation efforts in the Middle East. The failure of the nuclear deal also risks military escalation in a region playing a crucial role during the global energy crisis triggered by Russia’s war in Ukraine. For Iran, the risks are even greater.
In Doha last month, negotiators failed to break the deadlock over how to revive the 2015 agreement. According to Western powers, instead of closing outstanding issues, Iran attempted to reopen negotiations on terms that were settled in February. The consensus in Washington and European capitals is that Iran’s leaders are buying time. At best, Iranian negotiators need more time to forge a consensus in Tehran on whether it is worth rolling back the country’s nuclear program for a deal that may only last for the remainder of U.S. President Joe Biden’s term. At worst, Iran is delaying for the sake of advancing its nuclear activities.
Iran has wavered about restoring the nuclear deal in large part because the Biden administration cannot guarantee that the deal will outlast his term. Donald Trump showed how easily a U.S. administration can withdraw, tanking the agreement. Iranian concerns over the deal’s durability have been compounded by the fact that Biden has maintained Trump’s maximum pressure sanctions during the negotiations.

Biden has also been unwilling to show flexibility on concessions to Iran that could offset the lack of U.S. guarantees—such as the removal of the U.S. designation of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a foreign terrorist organization (FTO). Making the optics even worse, Biden doubled down on a hawkish approach to Iran during his recent visit to Israel and Saudi Arabia.



Another U.S. exit from the nuclear deal is possible—maybe even probable—given the chances a Republican president will be inaugurated in 2025. But only one scenario is certain: If the nuclear talks collapse now, the political, security, and economic consequences for Iran will be profoundly negative.




The economic benefits of a revived deal for Iran would be immediate. If U.S. secondary sanctions were lifted, Iran’s oil exports would be around 1 million barrels per day higher. Even if we assume the oil price falls to $80 in the face of supply increases and weakening demand, Iran would be earning an additional $80 million in oil revenue each day. Iran could export more petrochemical products, steel, and manufactured goods.
The country would be paying less for the goods it imports, including food and medicine. Crucially, Iran would regain access its foreign exchange reserves, using those resources to stabilize the national currency and help tame inflation over the remaining two-year period under Biden. Even if sanctions were removed for just a couple of years, it would allow local companies to make long-delayed investments and households to restore their depleted savings.

Iranian policymakers must also consider Iran’s long-term economic potential and how this will be squandered if secondary sanctions remain in place. Since 2012, Iran has experienced a slow decline in its economic power. The country’s physical infrastructure and fixed capital are aging.


The effects of underinvestment and the lack of technology transfer are becoming ever more visible in the old cars, buses, trains, and planes that move Iranians around the country and in the age of the machinery that pumps the oil, rolls the steel, generates the electricity, and ploughs the fields. Any new machinery, domestically produced, is based on old designs. Critical technologies such as wind turbines and CT scanners are in short supply. The Iranian economy is not yet crumbling, but the cracks are multiplying.


Still, Iranian officials insist that the country’s economy has resisted sanctions. This is true, and it is an achievement that has spared the Iranian people even worse privation. But resistance means that Iran is pushing back, not moving forward. Between 1990 and 2007, the average Iranian and the average Pole enjoyed the same level of wealth. Then, beginning in 2012, the fortunes of Iranians began to decline, while Poles continued to get wealthier. If the trends of the last decade continue, by 2030 GDP per capita in Poland will be around $50,000. In Iran, GDP per capita will be slightly lower than it is today, at around $15,000. Even if Iranians are not getting poorer, they are being left behind.




Politically, Iran will be increasingly isolated on the international stage if the nuclear negotiations fail. The United States and Europe will point their fingers at Iran as the sole party to blame. Unlike Trump, Biden will have backing across European capitals to increase the pressure against Iran. Emboldened by renewed trans-Atlantic coordination following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the United States will have greater support in Europe to build a multilateral sanctions coalition against Iran.

Iran’s advanced nuclear activities have already been widely condemned. The recent resolution passed by the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Board of Governors censuring Iran for its lack of cooperation with the agency, which passed with an overwhelming 30 out of 35 countries voting in favor, provides a clear example of the trajectory ahead for Iran on the international stage. China and Russia opposed the resolution, and India abstained. Iran’s position now stands in sharp contrast to 2020, when the Trump administration attempted to snap back U.N. sanctions. At that time, the Security Council—including U.S. allies in Europe—delivered a humiliating blow to Washington.

An advisor to Iran’s supreme leader recently noted that while Iran has no intention to build a nuclear weapon, it has all the “technical” aspects necessary for doing so. There is a quiet but growing minority voice among Iran’s leadership that favors steps toward nuclear weaponization in order to transform how the rest of the world, especially the United States, relates to Iran. According to this view, Iran has already absorbed the greatest shock of U.S. sanctions and as such should become a nuclear power to create a regional balance with Israel (the Middle East’s only nuclear power) and protect itself from future U.S. and Israeli military attacks.


This is the strategy that Pakistan used to even the playing field with India in the 1990s despite the extensive pressures at the time from the West. Some in Iran argue that just like Pakistan, the West would eventually be forced to accept and respect it as a nuclear power.


A nuclear gambit will carry high risks for Iran. If Iran charges ahead with nuclear expansion, it is guaranteed that Israel will ramp up its operations inside Iran with the aim of hobbling Iran’s capabilities. The recent wave of attacks and assassinations inside Iran, widely attributed to Israel, demonstrate how extensively Israel has infiltrated Iran’s security apparatus. Such attacks are likely to increase and could drag Iran into a broader conflict with Israel. During Biden’s recent visit to Israel, he declared that he would resort to force to prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons. Even if the United States remains hesitant to get drawn into a new war in the Middle East, Israel will enjoy even greater latitude to attack Iran’s nuclear program and other military sites.


The collapse of the nuclear deal is also likely to severely restrict Iran’s regional ties—something that President Ebrahim Raisi’s government boasts about having expanded. While Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Iraq may look to continue de-escalation talks with Tehran, they will come under increasing pressure by the United States to isolate Iran, cutting off the economic incentives that have helped underpin renewed diplomacy. In 2019, Iran is widely believed to have responded to efforts to cut off its oil exports by coordinating attacks on Saudi and Emirati oil infrastructure. Regional diplomacy intensified soon after the attacks. Recent assessments make clear that even Saudi Arabia and the UAE—unlike Israel—do not favor a military response to the Iranian nuclear threat and fear that a collapse of nuclear diplomacy could result in regional escalation like in 2019.


Iran’s leaders need to decide swiftly if they want to revive the nuclear deal or expose themselves to the high risks associated with its failure. It may appear sensible for Iran to press Biden to sweeten the current offer, but as the delay caused over the IRGC’s FTO designation removal showed, the consensus on the value of the nuclear deal is as shaky in Washington as it is in Tehran.
Iran’s hard-liners are gambling that their deepening relations with China and Russia can ring-fence them from intensified Western pressures. As Russian President Vladimir Putin’s recent visit to Tehran showcased, the marginalization of Moscow following its war in Ukraine has pushed Iran and Russia closer. China and Russia will not cut ties with Iran, nor are they likely to join the West in pressuring Iran on its nuclear program as they did in the lead-up to the 2015 nuclear deal.


But the experience of the last decade makes clear that the political and economic support they may offer will be both limited and conditional—falling far short of an alliance. In the recent past, Iran has been used as a bargaining chip by both Beijing and Moscow in their own relations with the West. Moreover, given Chinese and Russian interests in Israel and Saudi Arabia, their relations with Tehran are unlikely to translate into the type of deep security and economic cooperation that some among Iran’s leadership are banking on as the alternative to reviving the nuclear deal.



The collapse of the nuclear deal will also have a lasting impact on Iran’s security. Iran will forgo the opportunity provided by the nuclear deal to work with global powers on modernizing its civil nuclear program and boosting its safety—its nuclear program will be characterized as a weapons program by default.

Developing an ability to resist sanctions—at least in the short term—was a smart tactic that put Iran in the best possible position to negotiate a fair deal with the United States. A fair deal is now on the table. Iranian policymakers must not confuse their tactics with strategy.



There is nothing strategic about closing critical paths to development and inviting isolation by the international community. Similarly, the Biden administration needs to be more courageous and flexible in its approach to diplomacy with Iran. Instead of focusing on short-term tactical goals ahead of upcoming U.S. midterm elections (which has dissuaded the administration from providing Iran with even symbolic concessions), the White House should consider the long-term strategic benefits of rejoining the nuclear deal.


Iran’s leaders also need to keep in mind the strategic picture. Some believe that even if the nuclear talks collapse, Iran can endure the political, security, and economic pains just as it did under the Trump administration. But endurance is pointless if diplomatic opportunities are squandered. There are just a few weeks during which the restoration of the deal remains possible. In this brief window, Iran can still finalize the nuclear negotiations from a position of strength. Given the economic and military risks associated with the failure of the nuclear deal, it may not be able to do so in the future.
 

SalarHaqq

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What do the posters here think of this argument?,last gasp of the pro-western reformists or the only option for iran?,or is it something in the middle,ie a nice idea but just not practical under the current circumstances?

Option A (last grasp of the western-apologetic liberals regarding the JCPOA experiment - this includes not just reformists but also Rafsanjani- and Rohani-led moderates). The authors of the article are closer to these factions, so it's quite unsurprising that they would portray a failure of the talks as being detrimental mostly to Iran and not so much to the west. It's another way of saying that the Raisi administration's principled stance at the negotiation table is undesirable and that Iran should make concessions with no tangible guarantees that the opposite side will abide by its committments, in other terms repeat the mistakes of the Rohani administration over again.
 
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Sineva

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Option A (last grasp of the western-apologetic liberals regarding the JCPOA experiment - this includes not just reformists but also Rafsanjani- and Rohani-led moderates). The authors of the article are closer to these factions, so it's quite unsurprising that they would portray a failure of the talks as being detrimental mostly to Iran and not so much to the west. It's another way of saying that the Raisi administration's principled stance at the negotiation table is undesirable and that Iran should make concessions, in other terms repeat the same mistakes over again.
Yes,thats basically what I`d thought too,especially with the authors talking up the supposed benefits of even a 2 year return,but not bothering to point out the downsides of returning to a deal that no one would obviously now have any faith in.
At this point its pretty obvious that the jcpoa would be even less likely to live up to the claims made for it than it did the first time around.
One would think that they would`ve finally realised by now that the west is not interested in a detente,or a "nixon goes to china",or even a one issue deal like this that both sides could claim as a "win-win".
For the west [sadly] the mena region is viewed solely through the prism of zero sum,and with the onset of cold war 2.0,this viewpoint will likely only become even more entrenched.
 

yavar

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Iran AEOI chief Mohammad Eslami: reactor to test fuel for other reactors will be built at the Isfahan Nuclear Technology Center, Mohammad Eslami said during a visit to the Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) in the city.

 

Sineva

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The eu`s foreign affairs 👨‍❤️‍👨bumboy👨‍❤️‍👨 Borrel gives his two cents on the jcpoa and its lack of success.
One can almost feel sorry for the poor bastard,as its likely been a totally thankless task on his part. :sarcastic:

https://www.ft.com/content/e759d274-7dba-4e78-851f-2775972f4c31

Now is the time to save the Iran nuclear deal

A restored agreement will show balanced international accords are possible in turbulent times
Josep Borrell

Seven years ago, the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, Germany, Iran and the EU’s high representative for foreign affairs and security policy concluded a landmark diplomatic deal. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action was the result of years of intense diplomacy on Iran’s nuclear programme and won the UN Security Council’s unanimous endorsement.

It secured strict limits on Iran’s nuclear activities and the most extensive monitoring and inspection regime ever implemented by the International Atomic Energy Agency. In return, it opened up the prospect of benefiting economically from the lifting of US, EU and UN sanctions to Iran.

Full implementation of this deal has been severely affected by Donald Trump’s decision in 2018 to withdraw the US from it and to pursue a unilateral “maximum pressure” campaign. For its part, Iran has ratcheted up nuclear activity to alarming levels. Regrettably, it has also limited IAEA monitoring, while failing to co-operate fully with the agency under its basic safeguards obligations. “Maximum pressure” failed. Meanwhile, and despite the best efforts of the remaining participants, Iran’s people have been deprived of the full benefits of the sanctions lifting.

To reverse this dangerous escalation, in my capacity as JCPOA co-ordinator, I seized the political momentum of a new US administration to launch in April 2021 a diplomatic process involving the JCPOA participants and the US. The aim was to facilitate a US return to the deal and full US and Iranian implementation of their JCPOA commitments.

After 15 months of intense, constructive negotiations in Vienna and countless interactions with the JCPOA participants and the US, I have concluded that the space for additional significant compromises has been exhausted. I have now put on the table a text that addresses, in precise detail, the sanctions lifting as well as the nuclear steps needed to restore the JCPOA.

This text represents the best possible deal that I, as facilitator of the negotiations, see as feasible. It is not a perfect agreement, but it addresses all essential elements and includes hard-won compromises by all sides. Decisions need to be taken now to seize this unique opportunity to succeed, and to free up the great potential of a fully implemented deal. I see no other comprehensive or effective alternative within reach.

We know the JCPOA remains politically polarising in Washington as the midterm elections approach. The deal may not have addressed all US concerns with respect to Iran. The EU shares concerns that go beyond the nuclear issue, such as human rights and Iran’s regional activities. We continuously address them with Iran in bilateral discussions. The JCPOA does not address them, and was never supposed to do so. It did, however, provide the benefit of winding down the previously expanding Iranian nuclear programme and opening it up to strict IAEA monitoring and inspections. This makes it a cornerstone of the global non-proliferation architecture.

Restoring the full implementation of the agreement now can deliver on these benefits again, including through strict limitations on Iran’s uranium enrichment capacity and close monitoring by the IAEA. It can also help bring about a more co-operative security dynamic in the region, creating a positive momentum of confidence building.

We know, too, that in Tehran there are significant reservations over fully implementing a deal after the negative experience of recent years. The deal on the table reflects, however, the determination of all JCPOA participants to ensure its sustainability, including the commitment of President Joe Biden and US assurances in this regard. As a result, the deal is better protected from potential unilateral moves to undermine it.

Every day with no agreement in Vienna postpones concrete economic benefits to the Iranian people through substantial US sanctions lifting, as well as the benefits of non-proliferation for the world. Concluding an agreement now will deliver significant economic and financial dividends as well as strengthen regional and global security. Rejecting it assures a loss on both accounts — who knows for how long.

It is now time for swift political decisions to conclude the Vienna negotiations on the basis of my proposed text and to immediately return to a fully implemented JCPOA. The deal serves the cause of non-proliferation in return for sanctions lifting, showing that in turbulent times balanced international agreements are still possible.

If the deal is rejected, we risk a dangerous nuclear crisis, set against the prospect of increased isolation for Iran and its people. It is our joint responsibility to conclude the deal.
 

Sineva

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Dont you just love how the west considers things like irans basic requirements that the us must offer guarantees that it will not leave the deal again,or that grossi must close the files on the re-opened pmd before iran will return to full compliance with the terms of the jcpoa, as "unrealistic".
Whats really ""unrealistic" is that the west believes that it can either return to the deal without paying any political price for having left it,or that it has some sort of realistic alternative "plan B" scenario if iran still refuses to return to full compliance and continues to accelerate its nuclear program.

https://diplomatic.substack.com/p/iran-not-expected-to-agree-to-revised

Iran not expected to agree to new EU proposal to salvage nuclear pact​

European official: “This summer is when things start going downhill”​

Laura Rozen
Jul 29
https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fa5f183f9-15d0-4071-b977-5d44c9db033d_1536x1056.jpeg

  • European Union diplomat: “We are trying to bridge remaining differences through all possible means, but no progress so far.”
  • European official: The “Iranians are stuck, or are pushing on, several unrealistic asks.”
  • On updated EU proposal, “I'm almost certain that it will fall short of Iran's expectations,” Crisis Group’s Ali Vaez. “If the Iranians were looking for a face-saving way out, the proposal would meet that criteria. But I don't think that's the case. So unfortunately, I don't think this last ditch effort is going to salvage the JCPOA.”
  • “I think the administration faces real practical and political limits what it can do, and what it is willing to do, on a Plan B situation,” Eurasia Group’s Henry Rome.
American and European diplomats and experts are gloomy about prospects that Iran will agree to a final compromise text on reviving the 2015 Iran nuclear deal that the European Union presented to the parties this week.

“We are trying to bridge remaining differences through all possible means, but no progress so far,” a European Union diplomat said Thursday.

The “Iranians are stuck or are pushing on several unrealistic asks--including ‘we will not return to JCPOA until [IAEA Director General Rafael] Grossi closes all files,’” another official with one of the European parties to the nuclear pact, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, said. “Everyone is looking elsewhere, but this summer is when things start going downhill.”

“To my understanding, the proposal contains slight revisions, and does not contain any substantive concessions from either side. And so, I'm almost certain that it will fall short of Iran's expectations,” Ali Vaez, director of the Iran program at the International Crisis Group, said Thursday (July 28th).

“If the Iranians were looking for a face-saving way out, the proposal would meet that criteria,” Vaez said. “But I don't think that's the case. So unfortunately, I don't think this last ditch effort is going to salvage the JCPOA.”

The State Department said it is reviewing the updated proposal from EU High Commissioner Josep Borrell; but said to date it has been Iran, and not the United States, that has not been willing to say yes to the deal on the table since March.

“It is our understanding that the proposal that Mr. Borrell put forward was based on the deal that has been on the table, that was painstakingly negotiated…that we have been prepared to accept since March,” State Department spokesman Ned Price told journalists at the State Department on Thursday (July 28). “We have not been the cause of that [holdup]. There has been one country that has prevented a return to compliance with the JCPOA. That is Iran.”

“What we have not seen from Iran, whether in March or in the ensuing months, is an indication from them that they are prepared to make that political decision necessary to return to compliance,” Price said. “That’s why we’ve continued to prepare equally for scenarios where we have a JCPOA, scenarios in which we don’t have a JCPOA.”

Limits to executing Plan B

The Eurasia Group’s Henry Rome said he believes both Iran and the United States, as well as the other parties, may see big risks in declaring the JCPOA dead yet.

Amid US/Euro pessimism “that the prospect for a deal continues to decline,… there is a strong interest still on the Iranian side, as well as on the American side, in not delivering the last rites yet,” Rome said.

“I think for Iran there are lots of benefits to keep this going,” Rome said. For Iran, the continued ‘Vienna talks’—(even in the absence of new talks or outcome)—“supports domestic markets, allows it to play on the global stage, provides cover for nuclear expansion,” he said.

“And I think for the U.S., the biggest thing declaring JCPOA as failed would mean is that it would need to…execute a Plan B, and I think there is very little interest in going down that route.”

“I think the administration faces real practical and political limits what it can do, and what it is willing to do, on a Plan B situation,” Rome said.

“The obvious target is to go after Iranian oil and petrochemical exports, which Treasury has done a bit of,” Rome said. But the US has other global objectives, he noted, including pressuring Russia over its war on Ukraine, that may make tightening Iran sanctions a secondary priority.

Russia and China shift

The Crisis Group’s Vaez also sees Iranian calculations affected by Russia’s war on Ukraine.

“The Iranians believe that with this coming winter, the Europeans will be so desperate for Iranian oil and gas, given concerns about Russian supplies to Europe, and so concerned about Iran’s nuclear advancement, that they would put pressure on the US to make concessions that it has been reluctant to make so far,” Vaez said.

“And I think the US believes that with time, Iran would realize its economic situation will only get worse under sanctions and Russia and China can’t do more to basically throw Iran a lifeline,” he said. “But we are really at the mercy of a single miscalculation.”

Vaez saw signs that Russia and China may be recalculating their interest in seeing the Iran nuclear deal revived, and prefer instead for now for the U.S. to have to contend with managing the unstable status quo.

“I am starting to think that in the realities of the new world, Russia and China might have a different threshold for concern than was the case in the past,” Vaez said. “Their threshold is probably weaponization.”

“Both of these countries would probably welcome a crisis that would bog down the U.S. in the Middle East, and divert its attention from Russia and China – as long as Iran does not join the nuclear club,” he said.

Notably, there was no mention of the JCPOA or the Iran nuclear issue at all in a Chinese state news agency report on a phone call between Chinese President Xi Jinping and Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi Friday (July 29).

The European Leadership Network’s Sahil Shah urged Iran to take the deal, even with uncertainty about what a new US president might do.

“Iran stands to lose the most from any of the alternatives to the JCPOA, including potentially becoming more diplomatically and economically isolated,” Shah said. “It should quickly seize the economic benefits the deal offers and use them to build further resilience regardless of what the future might hold.”
 

mohsen

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The eu`s foreign affairs 👨‍❤️‍👨bumboy👨‍❤️‍👨 Borrel gives his two cents on the jcpoa and its lack of success.
One can almost feel sorry for the poor bastard,as its likely been a totally thankless task on his part. :sarcastic:

https://www.ft.com/content/e759d274-7dba-4e78-851f-2775972f4c31

Now is the time to save the Iran nuclear deal

A restored agreement will show balanced international accords are possible in turbulent times
Josep Borrell
Now is the time to save the Iran nuclear deal = we need energy now, and don't care what Iran needs.

The mediation role didn't work, now it's the time to show their teeth, the actual role of EU.
 

Shawnee

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Time to close this tread forever

Same people who said “mullahs are desperate for SOME sanction relief”, now do not see Yemeni attack on Abqaiq in such a critical moment.

They are blind and cannot put themselves in enemy shoes.


Combine
winter + Abqaiq attack + Ghawar attack + Ukraine war

And possible
Taiwan war, Kosovo war, Turkey-Greece war, HZ-Israel war
 
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Sineva

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Once again the us shows us its complete and total [lack of?] commitment to returning to the jcpoa..........by imposing yet more sanctions.
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0901
I`m surprised that theres really much left for the west to sanction at this point,tho from the looks of this it isnt actually iranian companies,rather its their foreign partners that are now being targeted.
Once again the wests actions speak far more loudly than its words.
 

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