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Seeds of Indian Proliferation

A.Rahman

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Feb 12, 2006
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Seeds of Indian Proliferation

by Adnan Gill

A country indulges in Nuclear Proliferation in one or two ways, as a donor or as a recipient. As a donor it can export the nuclear technology to other nation -- called ‘Horizontal Proliferation’ -- or it can divert technologies from its Civilian Nuclear Program(s) to its Military Nuclear Program(s) -- called ‘Vertical Proliferation’. India is guilty of indulging in both, Vertical and Horizontal Nuclear Proliferation.

Horizontal Proliferation occurs when a country exports its indigenous resources (knowledge/items) and/or when it practices ‘Onward Proliferation’. Onward proliferation takes place when a country obtains a controlled item from overseas and retransfers it, or exports a reverse-engineered item without proper authorizations to a proliferant state or to a terrorist group. Proliferant states and smuggling networks use such tactics to avoid export controls in supplier states. Experts like David Albright, President of Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), believe proliferant states target Indian industries; consequently, Indian Onward Proliferation is expected be become a serious problem.

Vertical Nuclear Proliferation occurs when a country diverts knowledge and/or items from its safeguarded programs to its military programs. David Albright in an October 26, 2005 testimony before the US House Committee described the Indian Vertical Proliferation as, “India’s extensive military and civil nuclear programs are often connected, sharing personnel and infrastructure. In addition, some facilities currently have both a military and civilian purpose.” The Indian so-called “peaceful nuclear explosion” (detonated on May 18, 1974) is a prime example of the Vertical Proliferation (see Appendix - C). The fact is also confirmed by an Indian scientist Raja Ramanna who admitted that the radioactive core of India’s first nuclear device was the plutonium diverted from its American-Canadian supplied civilian nuclear reactor (CIRUS).

Since 1949, as a recipient, India has licitly and illicitly received nuclear technology from ‘Nuclear Supplier Group’ (NSG) countries like France, Great Britain, Canada, Germany, United States and Soviet Union/Russia(see Appendix - A). For its part, India effortlessly proliferates the nuclear technology to countries like Iraq, Iran, Egypt, Sudan and South Korea (see Appendix - B).

Exploiting the dual-use nature of civilian nuclear equipments and materials India had been using the cover of civilian programs to produce nuclear weapons. Experts believe, as in the case of 1974 nuclear blast, the plutonium for at least some of India’s nuclear devices tested in 1998 also originated from its American-Canadian supplied civilian nuclear reactor (CIRUS). In a June 15, 1998 Washington Post (p.A23) publication ‘India Cheated’, Victor Gilinsky and Paul Leventhal reported “You wouldn't know it from news reports, but most of the military plutonium stocks India dipped into for its recent nuclear tests came from a research project provided years ago by the United States and Canada. India had promised both countries it would not use this plutonium for bombs.” India boldly violates non-proliferation conventions and brazenly breaks bilateral agreements by transferring nuclear fuels and technology from its so-called civilian nuclear programs to its nuclear weapons programs.

The so-called "Atoms for Peace" CIRUS reactor was built by Canada and run by tons of heavy water supplied by the United States (see Appendix - A). In return for the reactor, India promised both suppliers in writing that the reactor would be reserved for "peaceful purposes" only. But in a display of barefaced defiance and belligerence, India broke its promise by diverting the plutonium from CIRUS to the manufacturing of nuclear weapons that were tested first in 1974 and then in 1998. The fact that neither Canada nor the United States has uttered a peep about India breaching the signed contract with contemptuous boldness is symptomatic of Western complicity in the building and modernization of Indian nuclear weapons arsenal through nuclear proliferation. Since it began operating in late 1950s the CIRUS reactor alone has produced well over 600 pounds plutonium which is enough to build over 50 nuclear weapons.

Strangely, despite Indian disposition to indulge in nuclear proliferation when or as they please, each new generation of American policymakers think that they will be able to gain Indian restraint and acceptance of nuclear controls by being a little more accommodating to them. The Indians long time ago learned of the American weaknesses that stem from a mix of an obsolete Cold War mentality and commercial greed. Hence, they effectively exploit the American weaknesses to build, expand and qualitatively improve their own nuclear arsenal.

Indian perseverance in the acquisition of latest nuclear technology through covert and overt means, and its practice of proliferation of nuclear technology in both vertical and horizontal manners worries peace and non-proliferation experts. In light of unscrupulous and unrestrained Indian proliferation record (see Appendix - B & C), experts openly question Bush Administration’s decision to transfer American nuclear secrets to India which can potentially compromise American national security due to Indian proliferation practices, including the ‘Onward’ proliferation (see Appendix - B). They argue that helping to ramp up India’s ability to import and export controlled nuclear items can neither be in the interests of the United States nor the global non-proliferation efforts.

Since the March 2, 2006 Indo-US Nuclear deal, the Bush Administration and Indian government officials have mounted a deceptive PR blitz in which they tirelessly champion India’s supposedly "impeccable" nonproliferation record. Factually, however, in order to buy into this sugarcoated propaganda, one would have to ignore and discount decades old Indian horizontal and vertical proliferation record (see Appendix - B & C) that started in 1960s when India decided to dip into irradiated Plutonium from its civilian CIRUS plant. Not withstanding the deceptive Indo-Bush Administration propaganda, experts point to mounting evidence of Indian proliferation record (see Appendix - A, B & C). Recently, ISIS unmasked a well-developed, active, and top secret Indian program to outfit its uranium enrichment program and circumvent export control efforts of other countries.

Essentially, the Indo-US Nuclear deal allows India to buy foreign-made nuclear reactors while allowing her to substantially ramp up her ability to produce materials for nuclear weapons. Understandably, the deal was widely criticized even within the Bush-Administration. In 2001, the, American ambassador to India, Robert Blackwill asked Washington to rethink its nuclear policy towards India. But Former Secretary of State Colin Powell, however, wanted a sensible incremental approach to increasing sensitive trade with India. In a 2003 interview Secretary Powell said, "We also have to protect certain red lines that we have with respect to proliferation."

Leading nonproliferation experts of Bush Administration, John D. Rood and Robert G. Joseph tirelessly lobbied for a deal in which India would have agreed to limit production of plutonium and to place all of its electricity-producing reactors under permanent International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, which would have been in accordance with the US laws too. But the Bush Administration was so intent on hammering a deal with India that by the time Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh arrived in Washington, many of the key items on Mr. Rood’s list had been taken off the table. Nuclear specialists in the US government say their concerns about weapons proliferation were overridden in final talks with India.

Secretary Condoleezza Rice is believed to be the force behind the hurriedly concocted and potentially damaging Indo-US Nuclear deal, which will arguably compromise American nuclear secrets vis-à-vis its national security. Reportedly, the deal is a brainchild of Secretary Rice's counselor and longtime colleague Philip Zelikow and (a Bombay-born expert at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and a former aide to Blackwill) Ashley Tellis. On April 3, 2006, the Washington Post (p.A01) reported, “Upon Rice's return from Asia, Zelikow began exchanging memos with Tellis, resulting in a 50-page ‘action agenda’ for U.S.-Indian relations completed in mid-May.” While making a case for India, in a memo Tellis argued, US would have to “help New Delhi develop strategic capabilities such that India's nuclear weaponry and associated delivery systems” to deter growing Chinese influence.

Indians were quick to pick on American desperation to conclude a deal. They outfoxed the Americans on negotiation table. The Post quoted a senior American official involved in the negotiation, the “Indians were incredibly greedy that day. They were getting 99 percent of what they asked for and still they pushed for 100." It was as if Bush Administration’s sole goal was to please the Indians at any cost.

The Post also revealed Bush Administration’s maverick strategy of assisting India in developing nuclear weapons. It reported, “the Bush administration originally wanted a pact that would let India continue producing material for six to 10 weapons each year, [but the signed deal] would allow it enough fissile material for as many as 50 annually.”

Sadly, in past too, instead of forcing India to freeze its Vertical Proliferation, the US State Department had been helping India get around the laws by arranging for France and later China to continue the Tarapur radioactive fuel supply. Considering Indian proliferation record (see Appendix - B & C), instead of rewarding India by signing the deal, at a minimum, Bush Administration should have insisted that Indian plutonium covered by "peaceful purposes" agreements be unavailable for nuclear weapons, and that the Tarapur fuel is not reprocessed to extract weapon grade plutonium. Under the 1963 agreement, India was bound to get US approval to reprocess the nuclear fuel. However, in a blatant disregard to the signed agreement, India disputed this and insisted it was free to reprocess the used fuel at any time. Regrettably, the US government as usual bowed to Indian demands fearing an irritant in US-India relations and dispatched the disagreement to the wastebasket of oblivion. Currently, there is enough Tarapur plutonium to manufacture hundreds of unaccounted nuclear weapons.

In March 2006, another ISIS report revealed details of Indian illicit and secret nuclear procurement program. The report effectively busted the myth of so-called ‘indigenous’ Indian nuclear program. The report highlighted the indisputable dependencies of Indian nuclear program on the foreign sources (see Appendix - A). It stated, “India has a long history of illicitly acquiring items for its own unsafeguarded nuclear facilities. Many of India’s nuclear programs have depended on extensive foreign procurement for materials, equipment, and technology. Indian nuclear organizations use a system that hires domestic or foreign non-nuclear companies to acquire items for these nuclear organizations. Such procurement appears to continue for its secret gas centrifuge enrichment plant near Mysore.”

The report also cataloged the deceptive and illicit procurement network established by Indian Department of Atomic Energy. “In an attempt to hide its true purpose from suppliers and others when it started this project in the 1980s… Under the direction of India’s Department of Atomic Energy, Indian Rare Earths (IRE) Ltd. of Mumbai, a public-sector undertaking focused on recovering minerals and processing rare earths, procures sensitive materials and technology for a secret gas centrifuge uranium enrichment plant codenamed the ‘Rare Materials Project' (RMP) outside Mysore, India. The Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC) operates the plant and appears to both coordinate procurements for this facility with IRE and pursue procurements for its own divisions through IRE. RMP itself is rarely acknowledged by the Indian government as a gas centrifuge plant.”

An impressive and resolute Indian proliferation record spans over five decades . The Indian nuclear program is developed, nourished and sustained by the Nuclear Supplier Group nations through direct and/or indirect assistance (see Appendix - A). Whenever Indian establishment failed to secure direct and/or indirect assistance from the NSG, it stole the nuclear technology through secret underground nuclear proliferation networks.

Each state that covertly or overtly paddles nuclear technology to India makes mockery of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) that entered into force on March 5, 1970. Article III – 2 of NPT states, “Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source or special fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by this article.”

Even though, India is not a NPT signatory, it has constantly fought to undermine and weaken the NPT and IAEA charters. American and European nearsightedness and compliancy has directly resulted into Indian constancy in pursuing nuclear bomb-making and nuclear proliferation. It is not surprising that the Indians expect the game of proliferation to continue.

Practically every nuclear reactor running or planned in India is either provided and/or built by a foreign country or had been designed from foreign blueprints (see Appendix - A) -- stolen and otherwise. Every ounce for the radioactive cores of Indian nuclear weapons comes from the nuclear reactors that India deceptively, legally or illegally secured from foreign nations.

Pointing to the serious risks posed to the American national security, in his October 26, 2005, testimony before the House Committee on International Relations Hearing on the US-India David Albright warned, “This agreement could pose serious risks to the security of the United States. If fully implemented, it could catapult India into a position as a major supplier of both nuclear and nuclear-related materials, equipment, and technology. With a weak and poorly enforced export control system, [Indians] could become major suppliers to the nuclear weapon programs of adversaries of the United States, in some cases possibly using technology which the United Sates originally provided.” India also has a huge manpower trained in nuclear secrets, which inherently makes it a considerable knowledge transfer risk (see Appendix - B).

Non-proliferation experts insist that India should be sanctioned for its proliferation record. To support their argument, they quote statements of Indian statesmen who admitted that the fears of international sanctions kept the nuclear weapons program in low-gear. The former Indian President Venkataraman said, all "preparations for an underground nuclear test at Pokhran had been completed in 1983 when I was the Defense Minister. It was shelved because of international pressure, and the same thing happened in 1995." Another example cited is of former Indian Prime Minister Gujral, "the Americans got in touch with Mr. (Prime Minister) Rao and for some reasons it was felt expedient to postpone the tests... It was a major decision where all dimensions and aspects had to be calculated. No decision could be taken in a hurry ignoring all the political, economic and international relations dimensions."

When it comes to Nuclear Proliferation India suffers from credibility problems. In a May 13, 1998, testimony before the US Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs then Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth explained how Indian government can not be trusted with its mere assurances. "We were told privately and publicly that India would continue to show restraint in the non-proliferation field, and would do nothing to surprise us… As a direct result of India's decisions and actions, we are now compelled to look again at our approach to India,” said Mr. Inderfurth.

Stung from Indian deceptions, after the 1998 nuclear test at Pokhran, Secretary Inderfurth advised Congress to coarse India in parting ways with its shadowy proliferation practices and encouraged it to become a responsible nation that respects non-proliferation norms. He said, “Instead of highlighting our cooperative efforts with India... we will now need to put much of the cooperative side of our agenda on hold and deal with the consequences of India's actions. We must focus anew on seeking a meaningful Indian commitment to cease from further testing, to join the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty immediately and without qualifications, and to respect other international non-proliferation norms.” Emphasizing the difficulty in trusting India, Secretary Inderfurth also advised the Senate Subcommittee that due to dishonorable Indian practices the US should revaluate its relations with India, “We will need to assess how we will deal with India in accordance with Glenn Amendment and other U.S. laws, which require sanctions far more restrictive than those placed upon Pakistan under the Pressler Amendment… I must caution that India's actions have made [engagements] far more difficult.”

Indian culpability in every step of Nuclear Proliferation cannot be ignored anymore. Instead of rewarding it for proliferating nuclear secrets and technologies to other nations, and to build its nuclear weapons arsenal, IAEA and NSG will have to place sanctions on India to, at minimum, slow down its mad pursuit of becoming a nuclear superpower. On account of Indian hegemonic behavior towards its neighbors and its inherent domestic instability steaming from a society built on racial/communal discriminations, the World Community cannot afford lose nukes from an unreliable and potentially fractured nation, like it almost witnessed when the Soviet Union was fractured.


APPENDIX – A

Foreign Development of Indian Nuclear Program:

Practically every Indian nuclear facility directly or indirectly is designed, based, and/or built with the support of foreign nations. Following are some of most glaring examples of India benefacting from foreign Nuclear Proliferation:

Alwaye, Kerala (1949)
IRE and French entities Societe de Produits Chimique and Banque Marocaine de Credit agreed to construct a facility at Alwaye (Kerala) to extract thorium from monazite sand.

Apsara, Trombay (1956)
With British assistance construction began on India's first reactor, 1 MW Apsara research reactor. Apsara, fueled by (6 kg of fuel rods) enriched uranium from the UK, went critical on 4 August 1957. Dr. H. Bhabha bartered uranium fuel rods, as well technical data for a swimming pool-type research reactor in exchange for the Indian consideration to purchase a British reactor.

Canada-India Reactor, U.S(CIRUS)/Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC), Trombay (1955)
Canada supplied India a powerful research reactor - 40 MW Canada-India Reactor (CIR).

Nuclear Fuel for CIRUS reactor, Trombay (1956)
India and Canada signed an agreement to supply half of the initial nuclear fuel needed for the CIRUS reactor.

Heavy water for CIRUS reactor, Trombay (1956)
India and United States signed a contract for the US to sell heavy water for the CIRUS reactor. By June 1956, the US provided four shipments of heavy water. One of shipments of 18.9 tons of heavy water was provided without a safeguards mandate.

Plutonium Separation Plant, Trombay (1961)
PM Nehru authorized project Phoenix to build a plant with a capacity of 20 tons of fuel a year. A US company Vitro International supplied India with blueprints to build a PUREX (plutonium-uranium extraction) reprocessing plant. The reprocessing plant was commissioned in mid-1964.

Heavy Water Production Plant, Nangal (1962)
India received its first heavy water production plant from Germany in 1962 and then built additional seven heavy water plants with the help of Soviet Union, France and Switzerland.

CIRUS/BARC, Trombay (1965)
The UK Atomic Energy Authority helped India establish Gauribidnur Seismic Station at BARC, which was used to develop and calibrate fast-slow explosive lenses used in 1974 nuclear device.

French Nuclear Laboratory, Saclay/Paris (1965)
While seeking information on polonium technology used for -- first generation -- neutron initiators for weapons, Bhabha met French scientists at the nuclear laboratory at Saclay, Paris.

Pulsed Fast Reactor, USSR (1969)
In December 1968, three Indian nuclear scientists, including P.K. Iyengar, visited the Soviet Union to study the nuclear research facilities at Dubna.

Tarapur Atomic Power Station (TAPS 1 & 2), Tarapur (1969)
US agreed to give $80 million in credit to India for the supply and construction of two Boiling Water Reactors (BWR) for the Tarapur Atomic Power Station (TAPS). General Electric (GE), started construction of the BWRs in October 1964. The reactors went critical in October 1969.

Technical Assistance, France (1969)
30 Indian nuclear scientists, engineers, and technicians traveled to France for training and subsequent work on the designs for an Indian fast breeder reactor.

Technical Assistance, Spain, Sweden, and France (1970)
Spain, Sweden, and France hosted Indian scientists to train them in advances in uranium ore mining and exploration.

Baroda Heavy Water Plant, Gujarat (1971)
A French consortium (GELPRA) supervises the design, engineering, and import of equipment for a 67.2-ton capacity heavy water plant in Baroda.

Rajasthan Atomic Power Station (RAPS), Rajasthan (1974)
Canada agreed to provide India blueprints for its CANDU pressurized heavy water power reactor (PHWR). The blueprints enabled India to build its first reactor of the Rajasthan Atomic Power Station (RAPS). The Canadian Government also funded the project by extending a $37 million loan.

TAPS, Tarapur (1976)
Germany, Spain, Sweden, and other European countries further developed and sustained TAPS BWRs.

Dhruva, Trombay (1977)
USSR agreed to provide India 250 tons of heavy water out of which the first 50 tons without safeguards. First consignment of heavy water for Dhruva reactor arrived on May 28, 1980.

TAPS, Tarapur (1978)
United States arranged Enriched uranium hexafluoride (UF6) fuel for TAPS reactor.

Fast Breeder Test Reactor (FBTR), Kalpakkam (1978)
France assisted India in building the FBTR in Kalpakkam.

TAPS, Tarapur (1980)
US supplied a 19 tons batch of enriched uranium to Tarapur Atomic Power Station (TAPS).

TAPS, Tarapur (1983)
France supplied a 19.5 tons batch of enriched uranium to Tarapur Atomic Power Station (TAPS).

MAPS-I, Madras (1983)
India clandestinely imported over 180 tons of heavy water from China (60 tons), Norway (15 tons), and the Soviet Union (4.7 tons) for MAPS-I reactor. A German exporter and a former Nazi, Alfred Hempel shipped tons of heavy water via Dubai to India.

Uranium Enrichment Plant/Rare Materials Project, Trombay/Mysore (1985)
India clandestinely acquired centrifuge technology from the USSR and built uranium enrichment plants at Trombay and Mysore.

West Germany (1989)
India imported 100 kg of high purity beryllium from West Germany. The supply was enough to provide the neutron reflecting tampers for a dozen or more weapons.

Bhabha Atomic Research Center (BARC), Trombay (1992)
UK exported nuclear and missile technology to India.

Kundankulam 1 & 2, Kundankulam (2002)
In a violation of Nuclear Suppliers Group ban, Russia agreed to construct two VVER-1000MW reactors in Koodankulam (Tamil Nadu). Nearly 300 Russian companies take part in the $1.5 billion project.


APPENDIX - B

Indian Horizontal Nuclear/WMD Proliferation:

India has a distinct record of WMD Proliferation to lot of countries. However proliferation to Iran and Iraq was most blatantly rampant. Although this collaboration can be traced as far back as 1970s, following is a list of most glaring examples of Indian WMD proliferation:

Tehran, Iran (1974)
Following Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s 1974 official visit to Tehran, Iran and India announced, contacts will be made "between the atomic energy organizations in the two countries in order to establish a basis for cooperation in this field."

Iraq (1974)
Saddam Hussein flew to India specifically to sign a nuclear cooperation treaty with the Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. The little known nuclear cooperation treaty involved the exchange of scientists, training, and technology. Iraqi scientists worked in India's plutonium separation labs. The same Iraqi scientists who gained valuable training and experience from working in Indian nuclear labs later took charge of the nuclear fuel reprocessing unit supplied to Iraq by the Italian company CNEN. An Indian scientist trained the Iraqi scientist at Atomic Energy Commission's computer center on the use of nuclear computer codes.

Iran (1975)
Iran hosted nuclear technical advisers from India who worked on its nuclear program.

Iraq (1979)
In 1979, Iraq sent engineers to visit India's nuclear establishments and scientists.

Bushehr, Iran (1980)
Iran requested Indian help in completing the Bushehr reactor after West Germany halted work on the project in 1980.

Bushehr, Iran (1982)
Indian radio and BBC World Broadcasts reported that India will send a group of nuclear engineers and scientists to Iran. They supposedly inspected the Bushehr nuclear power plant to study the problems.

Burma (1982)
Bhabha Atomic Research Center (BARC) exported Gamma Chamber-4000 to Burma.

Singapore and Sudan (1983)
India exported gamma chambers Singapore and Sudan.

South Korea (1983)
Neutron polarization analysis spectrometer exported to the (South) Korean Atomic Energy
Research Institute.

Bulgaria (1985)
Seamless titanium tubes were produced by the Nuclear Fuel Complex (NFC) from ingots were supplied by Mishra Dhatu Nigam Limited (MIDHANI) to Bulgaria.

Iran (1989)
Officials from Indian State Trading Corporation in Bombay admitted that they sold about 60 tons of thionyl chloride (a mustard gas or nerve agent precursor) to Iran for approximately $50,000. The same year another Indian State Trading Company's supplier, Transpek Private Ltd., sold about 257 tons of the same chemical to Iran.

Egypt (1990)
India agreed to aid Egypt in increasing the capacity of the Egyptian research reactor from 2 to 5 megawatts.

Iran (1991)
Indian Atomic Energy Commission announced that India will seek to export its nuclear technology. Following the Indian announcement the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran negotiates to purchase nuclear technology or expertise from India. As a result, India and Iran exchanged nuclear scientists.

Iran (1991)
Iran's Deputy Foreign Minister Alaeddin Borujerdi met Indian Prime Minister Narasimha Rao in New Delhi to discuss the purchase of 10MW reactor. Finally on November 11, 1991 the Indian Foreign Minister Sing Solanki signed a technical cooperation deal with Iran ensuring the delivery of reactor to Iran.

Moallem Kalayeh, Iran (1992)
Iran negotiated the purchase of a nuclear research reactor subsequently installed at the Moallem Kalayeh site. Though the construction on the site had already begun in 1987.

Iran (1994)
German Intelligence Agency (BND) reported that an Indian consortium was building a pesticide plant that could be linked to the production of chemical weapons in Iran.

Iran (1995)
On January 30, 1995, the German BND stated that Indian companies were aiding Iran in the development of tabun and sarin (nerve agents).

Iran (1995)
US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) reported that Indian firms have provided equipment and raw materials to Iran, which aided the Iranian development of chemical weapons.

Iran (1996)
Another Indian company, Transpek Industry Ltd., in 1990, won an estimated $12.5 million bid to install and commission a turn-key chemical plant in Iran. By 1996 the company built the world's largest manufacturing facility for thionyl chloride outside of Europe.

South Korea (1996)
India shipped heavy water and nuclear grade zircaloy to South Korea.

Fallujah, Iraq (1998)
Between 1998 and 2001, an Indian company NEC Engineers Private Ltd. illegally shipped 10 consignments (worth $800,000) of highly sensitive equipment, including titanium vessels and centrifugal pumps, to Iraq. NEC reportedly built the chemical plant in the city of Fallujah. In a statement by NEC Engineers Private Ltd's project manager, N. Katturajan said the chemical facility was controlled by Iraqi military. According to CNN “official at NEC Engineers Private Ltd. said large amounts of chlorine were removed from the Fallujah chemical complex, which was constructed by Indian engineers. Experts say chlorine can be used in the production of chemical weapons like mustard gas and nerve agents.” For their services rendered the Indian managers from NEC Engineers' Private Limited demanded $1 million.

South Korea (1998)
India shipped 100 tons of heavy water to South Korea.

Bushehr, Iran (2000)
An Indian nuclear scientist Dr. Y.S.R. Prasad who retired in 2000 made at least two visits to Iran's Bushehr nuclear facility. Mr. Chidambaram, a former head of the Atomic Energy Commission, acknowledged Dr. Prasad’s work in Iran. He said Dr. Prasad "originally went to Iran as part of an IAEA assignment. Later, he went back to Bushehr under a private contract with the Iranians." The Hindustan Times, quoted a classified government document, which stated Dr. Prasad spent years working on India's atomic energy programs, and did not seek government permission to go to Iran.

South Korea (2000)
India shipped 16 metric tons of heavy water to South Korea.

Vietnam (2001)
India at its Nuclear Fuel Complex (NFC), trained Vietnamese Scientists in uranium fuel production, zircaloy structural components, and analytical techniques.

Iran (2003)
The most damning admission of Indian nuclear proliferation to Iran came in December 2003. Indian external affairs minister Yashwant Sinha said "most certainly between Iran and India, there would be collaboration, there is collaboration".

Iran (2004)
In 2004, the US State Department blacklisted two Indian scientists. The Indian nuclear scientists were charged with nuclear proliferation to Iran. The US State Department spokesman Richard Boucher explained, "The cases reflected poor Indian commitment to non-proliferation."

In yet another instance, the US sanctioned two Indian firms for selling prohibited items to Iran.


APPENDIX - C

Indian Vertical Nuclear Proliferation:

Virtually every Indian nuclear facility directly or indirectly supports Indian nuclear weapons program. Following are some of most glaring examples the Vertical Nuclear Proliferation:

Canada-India Reactor, U.S(CIRUS)/Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC), Trombay (1955)
Canada supplied India a powerful research reactor which produced plutonium for India’s first nuclear weapon.

Power Reactor Fuel Reprocessing Plant (PREFRE), Anushakti Nagar (1969)
The facility reprocesses fuel from two unsafeguarded reactors at the Madres Atomic Power Station (MAPS).

Nuclear Fuel Complex (NFC), Hyderabad (1974)
Hyderabad site facilities produce special materials to fabricate fissile material into atomic bomb cores. Plant is capable of manufacturing enough plutonium for one to two bombs a year.

Fast Breeder Test Reactor (FBTR/ IGCAR), Kalpakkam (1978)
France assisted India in building the FBTR in Kalpakkam. It is based on the French "Rapsodie" model. The FBTR first reached criticality in 1985. Such Indian reactors produce more plutonium than they burn.

Variable Energy Cyclotron Center (VECC), Calcutta (1979)
Indian Government documents showed the facility's cyclotrons had been used for potential weapons-related research.

Madras Atomic Power Station (MAPS), (1981)
The power station has supplied spent fuel to the Tarapur reprocessing plant. Another source of unsafeguarded plutonium is the spent fuel from the Madras Power Station which provides India with nuclear weapons. At the facility scientists are also able to produce tritium. Tritium is used in the construction of fusion bombs and to boost the fission yields of thermonuclear weapons.

Plutonium Reprocessing Plant, Trombay (1961/1984)
The facility is based on the (PUREX). India obtained blueprints for the US-developed plutonium-uranium extraction process plant from the US firm Vitro International. Extracted plutonium from the plutonium reprocessing plant can/possibly be used for India's nuclear weapons program. It is estimated, by 1997, some 400kg of plutonium had been extracted at this facility.

Uranium Enrichment Plant, Trombay (1985)
The facility is an ultracentrifuge plant. It supplies enriched uranium for the CIRUS and Dhruva nuclear reactors.

Supercomputer Education and Research Center (SERC), Bangalore (1987)
IBM RS/6000 SP supercomputer was purchased in 1994 from US. After May 1998 nuclear tests, several international organizations accused SERC of participating in the design of weapons.

Rattehali Enrichment Facility, Trombay (1990)
Indian Rare Earths Limited (IREL) a subsidiary of the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) operates the plant. The DAE confirmed the existence of the plant in 1992. The plant operates several hundred domestically produced sub-critical centrifuge rotor assemblies, making the plant capable of yielding several kilograms of highly enriched uranium (HEU) per year for nuclear weapons.

Center for Development of Advanced Computing (C-DAC), Pune University (1991)
C-DAC supercomputer models are said to have been used to design the nuclear weapons tested in May 1998.

Beryllium Machining Facility (BMF), Navi Mumbai (1994)
These facilities produce beryllium blocks and machines beryllium into components. Beryllium was used in India's 1974 nuclear explosion.

Kalpakkam Atomic Reprocessing Plant (KARP), Kalpakkam (1996)
KARP currently reprocesses spent fuel from MAPS and FBTR. KARP provides plutonium for India's nuclear weapons program.


Fast Reactor Fuel Reprocessing Plant (FRFRP), Kalpakkam (2001)
The plant reprocesses plutonium-uranium carbide fuel from the FBTR. FRFRP and the KARP are fast becoming India's largest plutonium producer. This plutonium can/may be used for India's nuclear weapons program.
 

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This article (Seeds of Indian proliferation) was originally published in April, 2006. The following Congressional report by the official specialist in National Defense Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division titled CRS Report for Congress. India and Iran: WMD Proliferation Activities was released on November 8, 2006.
 

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Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Order Code RS22530
November 8, 2006
India and Iran: WMD Proliferation Activities
Sharon Squassoni
Specialist in National Defense
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Summary
Members of Congress have questioned whether India’s cooperation with Iran might
affect U.S. and other efforts to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons. India’s
long relationship with Iran and its support of Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) positions
on nonproliferation are obstacles to India’s taking a hard line on Iran, yet the Bush
Administration has asserted that U.S.-India nuclear cooperation would bring India into
the “nonproliferation mainstream.” India, like most other states, does not support a
nuclear weapons option for Iran. However, its views of the Iranian threat and
appropriate responses differ significantly from U.S. views. Entities in India and Iran
appear to have engaged in very limited nuclear, chemical and missile-related transfers
over the years, and some sanctions have been imposed on Indian entities for transfers
to Iran, the latest in July 2006. This report will be updated as necessary.
In congressional hearings on the proposed U.S. nuclear cooperation agreement with
India, Members questioned how India’s cooperation with Iran might affect U.S. efforts
to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons. India’s long relationship with Iran and
its support of Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) positions on nonproliferation are obstacles
to India’s taking a hard line on Iran, yet the Bush Administration has asserted that U.S.-
India nuclear cooperation would bring India into the “nonproliferation mainstream.” U.S.
law requires recipients of U.S. nuclear cooperation to guarantee the nonproliferation of
any U.S. material or equipment transferred. If a recipient state assists, encourages or
induces a non-nuclear weapon state to engage in nuclear-weapons related activities,
exports must cease. India’s nonproliferation record continues to be scrutinized, as India
continues to take steps to strengthen its own export controls. Additional measures of
Indian support could include diplomatic support for negotiations with Iran; support for
Bush Administration efforts to restrict enrichment and reprocessing; support for
multilateral fuel cycle initiatives, and for the Proliferation Security Initiative.
India’s Record of Support
India, like most other states, does not support a nuclear weapons option for Iran.
However, Indian views of the threat Iran poses and appropriate responses differ from U.S.
views. On September 24, 2005, India voted with 21 other states on International Atomic
CRS-2
Energy Agency (IAEA) resolution GOV/2005/77, which found Iran in noncompliance
with its safeguards agreement. However, the resolution did not refer the matter
immediately to the Security Council, and India apparently was one of several states
pressuring the EU-3 to keep the issue at the IAEA. According to Indian Foreign Secretary
Shyam Saran, India voted for the resolution and against the majority of NAM states which
abstained, because it felt obligated to do so after having pressured the EU-3 to omit
CRS-3
1 “Press Briefing by Foreign Secretary on the events in UN and IAEA,” New Delhi, Sept. 26,
2005, available at [http://www.indianembassy.org/press_release/2005/Sept/29.htm].
2 Briefing by Ministry of External Affairs Official Spokesperson on Draft Resolution on Iran in
IAEA, available at [http://www.indianembassy.org/press_release/2005/Sept/16.htm].
3 See CRS Report RS21592, Iran’s Nuclear Program: Recent Developments, by Sharon
Squassoni.
4 See [http://www.indianembassy.org/newsite/press_release/2006/Feb/2.asp].
5 Prime Minister’s Suo Motu Statement on Iran, New Delhi, Feb. 17, 2006, available at
[http://www.indianembassy.org/newsite/press_release/2006/Feb/7.asp].
reference to immediate referral to the U.N. Security Council.1 Moreover, the official
explanation of India’s vote seemed designed to highlight India’s differences with the
United States:
In our Explanation of Vote, we have clearly expressed our opposition to Iran being
declared as noncompliant with its safeguards agreements. Nor do we agree that the
current situation could constitute a threat to international peace and security.
Nevertheless, the resolution does not refer the matter to the Security Council and has
agreed that outstanding issues be dealt with under the aegis of the IAEA itself. This
is in line with our position and therefore, we have extended our support.2
Nonetheless, India again voted with the United States on February 4, 2006, when the
IAEA Board of Governors voted to refer Iran’s noncompliance to the U.N. Security
Council.3 The Ministry of External Affairs responded to questions about its vote in this
manner:
While there will be a report to the Security Council, the Iran nuclear issue remains
within the purview of the IAEA. It has been our consistent position that confrontation
should be avoided and any outstanding issue ought to be resolved through dialogue....
Our vote in favour of the Resolution should not be interpreted as in any way
detracting from the traditionally close and friendly relations we enjoy with Iran. It is
our conviction that our active role, along with other friendly countries, enabled the
tabling of a resolution that recognizes the right of Iran to peaceful uses of nuclear
energy for its development, consistent with its international commitments and
obligations, while keeping the door open for further dialogue aimed at resolving the
outstanding issues within the purview of the IAEA.4
India’s Prime Minister told the Indian Parliament on February 17, 2006, that “As a
signatory to the NPT, Iran has the legal right to develop peaceful uses of nuclear energy
consistent with its international commitments and obligations.” Nonetheless, PM Singh
also noted that “It is incumbent upon Iran to exercise these rights in the context of
safeguards that it has voluntarily accepted upon its nuclear programme under the IAEA.”5
India has supported the EU-3 negotiations, despite their ostensible objective of
halting Iran’s pursuit of sensitive nuclear technology (that is, enrichment, reprocessing
and heavy water). In part, this may be because the talks offered a second avenue of
negotiation that did not necessarily lead to U.N. Security Council sanctions, or because
they have offered a viable discussion forum. India welcomed the U.S. decision to join the
talks, stating:
CRS-4
6 See [http://meaindia.nic.in/pressbriefing/2006/06/01pb01.htm].
7 Iran Republic News Agency, “118 countries back Iran’s nuclear program,” Iran Times, Sept.
18, 2006. The article contains the full text of the statement.
8 See [http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/02/20060222-2.html]
India has all along advocated that issues relating to Iran’s nuclear programme ought
to be resolved through dialogue and that confrontation should be avoided. Against this
background, the readiness of the US to join in the dialogue between EU-3 and Iran,
which India has all along supported, is to be welcomed.6
In September 2006, however, India joined other NAM states in a statement issued
at the Havana NAM summit on Iran’s nuclear program. The statement “reaffirmed the
basic inalienable right of all states, to develop research, production and use of atomic
energy for peaceful purposes without any discrimination and in conformity with their
respective legal obligations. Therefore, nothing should be interpreted in a way as
inhibiting or restricting this right of States to develop atomic energy for peaceful
purposes. They furthermore, reaffirmed that States choices and decisions in the field of
peaceful uses of nuclear technology and its fuel cycle policies must be respected.”7
Two other U.S. nonproliferation policies that may help underpin a solution to the
Iran crisis are related to restrictions on the nuclear fuel cycle — a ban on transferring
enrichment and reprocessing technologies to states that are not already technology
holders, and steps toward multilateralizing the nuclear fuel cycle so that sensitive
technologies are not as widespread. A key new U.S. initiative in this area is the Global
Nuclear Energy Partnership, or GNEP. India, under the July 18, 2005 Joint Statement
with the United States, committed to refrain from transferring enrichment and
reprocessing technologies to states that do not have them, as well as to support
international efforts to limit their spread. India’s future support for those policies,
however, may be predicated on India being considered one of those technology holders.
A recent statement from President Bush on GNEP did not recognize India as such a
technology holder:
My administration has announced a new proposal called the Global Nuclear Energy
Partnership. Under this partnership, America will work with nations that have
advanced civilian nuclear energy programs — such as Great Britain, France, Japan,
and Russia — to share nuclear fuel with nations like India that are developing civilian
nuclear energy programs.... The strategy will allow countries like India to produce
more electricity from nuclear power, it will enable countries like India to rely less on
fossil fuels, it will decrease the amount of nuclear waste that needs to be stored and
reduce the risk of nuclear proliferation.8
Another tool that may be utilized by those desiring to prevent Iran from developing
nuclear weapons is the Proliferation Security Initiative. On November 2, 2005, Under
Secretary of State R. Nicholas Burns told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that
“Indian support for the multi-national Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) would be a
boon to the participating nations’ goal of tracking and interdicting dangerous terrorist and
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) cargoes world-wide. We hope India will choose to
CRS-5
9 R. Nicholas Burns, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, “Hearing on U.S.-India Civil
Nuclear Cooperation Initiative,” Remarks as prepared for the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, November 2, 2005, available at [http://www.state.gov/p/us/rm/2005/55969.htm].
10 See [http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/2005/infcirc647.pdf].
11 Questions for the Record Submitted to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice by Senator Richard
Lugar (#1), Senate Foreign Relations Committee, April 5, 2006.
12 Conversation with David Albright, Institute for Science and International Security.
13 Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of
Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 July Through 31 December 2000.
join PSI.”9 In April 2006, Secretary of State Rice told the House International Relations
Committee that the United States was pressing India to announce its intention to
participate in the Proliferation Security Initiative. Both the House (H.R. 5682) and Senate
(S. 3709) bills to create an exception for India from relevant provisions of the Atomic
Energy Act refer to the desirability of getting India to join PSI, but do not make it a
prerequisite for cooperation. Prime Minister Singh told the Parliament in August 2006
that the “Proliferation Security Initiative is an extraneous issue...Therefore, we cannot
accept it as a condition for implementing the July Statement. Separately, the Government
has examined the PSI. We have certain concerns regarding its legal implications and its
linkages with the NPT.”
Finally, efforts to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons rely on coordinated
export controls and strong national export control systems. India has agreed to harmonize
its export controls with the guidelines of the Nuclear Suppliers Group under the July 18,
2005 Joint Statement. India also passed a new law in May 2005, the Weapons of Mass
Destruction and their Delivery Systems (Prohibition of Unlawful Activities) Bill.
According to Indian officials, the Act prohibits the “possession, manufacture,
transportation, acquisition, development of nuclear weapons, chemical weapons or
biological weapons by non-state actors.”10 It would prohibit the export of any good or
technology from India “if the exporter knows it is intended to be used in a WMD
program.” The U.S. Commerce and State Departments have not yet assessed India’s
export control law and regulations,11 which were promulgated in response to U.N.
Security Council Resolution 1540 requiring all states to take actions to criminalize
proliferation, particularly to non-state actors.
Some observers have stated that India does not have the necessary regulations in
place to implement the law, and that India’s resources for implementation are remarkably
limited.12 A third issue is whether India will follow through in imposing penalties on
violators of export control laws and regulations.
India’s Nonproliferation Record
In its semi-annual, unclassified report in 2000 to Congress on the acquisition of
technology relating to weapons of mass destruction, the CIA identified India, along with
Iran and Pakistan, as a “traditional recipient of WMD and missile technology” that could
emerge as a new supplier of technology and expertise.13 The unclassified report also
noted that “private companies, scientists, and engineers in Russia, China, and India may
be increasing their involvement in WMD- and missile-related assistance, taking advantage
CRS-6
14 See [http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Iran/2867.html]
15 “India Denies Nuclear Cooperation with Iran,” Agence France Presse, December 13, 2003.
16 This discussion taken from a response to Questions for the Record Submitted to Secretary of
State Condoleezza Rice by Senator Richard Lugar (#2), Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
April 5, 2006.
17 John Larkin and Jay Solomon, “As Ties Between India and Iran Rise, U.S. Grows Edgy,” Wall
Street Journal, March 24, 2005.
18 Thionyl chloride is a Schedule 3 chemical under the Chemical Weapons Convention. It has
military and civilian uses, and is widely used in the laboratory and in industry.
of weak or unenforceable national export controls and the growing availability of
technology.” In 2001, the unclassified CIA report noted that “We are increasingly
concerned about the growth of ‘secondary proliferation’ from maturing state-sponsored
programs, such as those in India, Iran, North Korea, and Pakistan.”
Reported Transfers to Iran
Entities in India and Iran appear to have engaged in very limited nuclear, chemical
and missile-related transfers over the years. There are no publicly available indications
of activities related to biological weapons. In the early 1990s, when Iran actively sought
nuclear-related assistance and technology from many foreign sources, India appears to
have played only a minor role in contrast to other states. India signed an agreement in
November 1991 to provide a 10-megawatt research reactor to Tehran, but cancelled under
pressure from the United States. Nonetheless, India reportedly trained Iranian nuclear
scientists in the 1990s.14 More recently, India’s Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh stated
in December 2003 that India “has and would continue to help Iran in its controversial bid
to generate nuclear energy.”15
From 1998 to 2003, the United States has imposed nonproliferation sanctions on
several different Indian entities for chemical and biological-weapons related transfers to
Iraq.16 In 2004, the United States imposed sanctions on two Indian scientists for nuclearrelated
transfers to Iran: Dr. C. Surendar (sanctions on Dr. Surendar were lifted in
December 2005) and Dr. Y.S.R. Prasad. Both scientists were high-ranking officials in
the Nuclear Power Corporation of India, Limited (NPCIL). Indian officials protested,
stating that cooperation had taken place under the auspices of the IAEA Technical
Cooperation program. Other reports suggest that the scientists, who had served as
Chairman and Managing Director of the NPCIL, which runs India’s power reactors,
passed information to Iran on tritium extraction from heavy water reactors.17 In December
2005, sanctions were imposed on Sabero Organic Chemicals Gujarat Ltd. and Sandhya
Organic Chemicals Pvt. Ltd. for transfers of chemical-related items to Iran. In July 2006,
sanctions were imposed on two more chemical manufacturers in India for transfers to Iran
— Balaji Amines and Prachi Poly Products.
In the chemical area, there is one confirmed transfer of 60 tons of thionyl chloride,
a chemical that can be used in the production of mustard gas, from India to Iran in March
1989.18 Other shipments in that timeframe reportedly were halted under U.S. pressure.
India does not appear in the CIA’s unclassified nonproliferation report to Congress as a
supplier of chemical-weapons-related exports to Iran since the report began publication
CRS-7
19 David Albright and Susan Basu, “Neither a Determined Proliferation Nor A Responsible State:
India’s Record Needs Scrutiny,” Institute for Science and International Security, April 5, 2006,
available at [http://www.isis-online.org/publications/southasia/indiacritique.pdf]. See also
Albright and Basu, “India’s Gas Centrifuge Program: Stopping Illicit Procurement and the
Leakage of Technical Centrifuge Know-How,” March 10, 2006, available at [http://www.isisonline.
org/publications/southasia/indianprocurement.pdf].
20 Questions for the Record Submitted to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice by Senator
Richard Lugar (#3), Senate Foreign Relations Committee, April 5, 2006.
21 Questions for the Record Submitted to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice by Senator
Richard Lugar (#3), Senate Foreign Relations Committee, April 5, 2006.
in 1997. India signed the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1993 and deposited its
instrument of ratification until 1996.
Other Considerations
One consideration in assessing a country’s nonproliferation record is the extent to
which its export control and procurement system helps limit or eliminate illicit transfers.
David Albright, president of the Institute for Science and International Security, has
argued that three factors contribute to a flawed nonproliferation record for India in the
nuclear area: a poorly implemented national export control system; an illicit procurement
system for its own nuclear weapons program, and a procurement system that may
unwittingly transfer sensitive information about uranium enrichment.19 When asked
formally to respond to Albright’s allegations, the Administration stated it would be happy
to discuss the allegations in a classified session with Members of Congress.20
Albright has suggested that the illicit procurement system in India has led entities
to mislead suppliers about the ultimate destination of their goods. Such a system could
be used to mask onward proliferation. From February 2003 to April 2006, the
Department of Commerce opened 63 cases of possible Export Administration Regulations
violations by U.S. firms exporting to India; 33 of those cases are still open.21 In response
to Senator Lugar’s question for the record on investigations since 1998 into potential
violations of U.S. export laws, the State Department reported that in one case, a U.S. firm
exported technical information to an entity in India associated with its missile program.
In another case, a U.S. firm with a subsidiary in Singapore committed 36 violations of the
Export Administration Regulations by exporting various life sciences research products
to entities in the Indian Department of Atomic Energy and Indian Department of Defense.
In another case, a U.S. firm attempted the unlicensed export of biotoxins to North Korea
via a firm in New Delhi.
 

was

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Nov 11, 2007
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India engaged in illicit nuclear trade

WASHINGTON: A leading US newspaper Thursday published a report that questioned the adequacy and implementation of India's export control and nuclear classification procedures, saying that sensitive nuclear blueprints were leaked by an Indian government agency in 2006.
Sensitive drawings depicting the inner workings of a centrifuge, used to enrich uranium for nuclear bombs, were made available to bidders for a government project for as little as $10 (about Rs 450) in 2006, the Washington Post said.
The report titled '06 Blueprint Leak Intensifies Concerns Over US-India Deal' came a day ahead of the meeting of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, headed by Democratic vice presidential candidate Joe Biden, to review the implementing Indo-US nuclear deal and put it on fast track for approval.
In most Western countries, such drawings would be considered secret, but the Indian diagrams were available for a nominal bidding fee, the Post quoted David Albright, a former UN weapons inspector, as saying. He said he acquired the drawings to prove a point.
'We got them for about $10,' Albright told the Post. He called the incident a 'serious leak of sensitive nuclear information.'

'India has since tightened its bidding procedures, but the incident has fuelled concerns among opponents of a US-Indian civilian nuclear deal that Congress is expected to consider in the coming weeks,' the daily said.
A draft report by Albright and his Washington-based Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) that monitors the spread of weapons technology, also cites recent incidents in which it says India engaged in 'illicit nuclear trade.'
In one instance, ISIS said India used an array of trading companies to secretly acquire tons of tributyl phosphate (TBP), a chemical used to separate plutonium from spent nuclear fuel.
China, a longtime supplier of TBP to India, halted shipments of the chemical in 2003 after US criticism. India turned to independent trading firms that acquired TBP from German and Russian companies without revealing the true destination, the report said.
The ISIS report, due for release Friday, included photocopies of some of the centrifuge drawings obtained by Albright, although the group removed key specifications, the Post said.
Albright told the Post he shared his findings with State Department officials but was turned away. 'It didn't fit with their talking points,' Albright said. 'At the highest level, they were dismissive of our concerns.'
The Post said a State Department spokesman declined to comment on Albright's report, saying it had not been reviewed, and said the agreement was in the US interest.
The report also said India's illicit procurement of dual-use nuclear-related items for its unsafeguarded nuclear programme belies its commitment to the NSG.:rofl::woot:


http://www.dawn.net/wps/wcm/connect...news/world/india+engaged+in+illicit+nuclear+t
 

Neo

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The USA has turned a blind eye to India and will continue this policy as long as India fits in their plans to contain China. Even if she conducted fresh series of nuclear tests tomorrow Bush will accept it as "Peacefull" detonation. :disagree:

Talk about double standards! :enjoy:
 

jeypore

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Albright told the Post he shared his findings with State Department officials but was turned away. 'It didn't fit with their talking points,' Albright said. 'At the highest level, they were dismissive of our concerns.'
Like Albright says the state department is dismissive of his findings, and that is how is going to be because US clearly knows that if this deal is not done, there is France and Russia waiting in line. This deal is really all down to business and nothing else, and maybe to counter China, but majority is business.
 

Neo

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Like Albright says the state department is dismissive of his findings, and that is how is going to be because US clearly knows that if this deal is not done, there is France and Russia waiting in line. This deal is really all down to business and nothing else, and maybe to counter China, but majority is business.
What about morality? US doesn't hold ground to cry about Iranian or Pakistani nuclear programme when all she cares is business!
Morality comes cheap these days, with enough $$$ you can buy almost everything! :enjoy: :usflag:
 
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Neo

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By Joby Warrick
Washington Post Staff Writer
Thursday, September 18, 2008; Page A17

In January 2006, an Indian government agency purchased newspaper ads seeking help in building an obscure piece of metal machinery. The details of the project, available to bidders, were laid out in a series of drawings that jolted nuclear weapons experts who discovered them that spring.

The blueprints depicted the inner workings of a centrifuge, a machine used to enrich uranium for nuclear bombs. In most Western countries, such drawings would be considered secret, but the Indian diagrams were available for a nominal bidding fee, said David Albright, a former U.N. weapons inspector. He said he acquired the drawings to prove a point.

"We got them for about $10," said Albright, who called the incident a "serious leak of sensitive nuclear information."

India has since tightened its bidding procedures, but the incident has fueled concerns among opponents of a U.S.-Indian civilian nuclear deal that Congress is expected to consider in the coming weeks.

The accord, first announced in 2005 by the Bush administration, would lift a decades-old moratorium on nuclear trade with India, allowing U.S. companies to share sensitive technology despite that country's refusal to ban nuclear testing or sign the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Backers of the deal say it will cement U.S. ties with India and reward a country that has been a responsible steward of nuclear technology since it first joined the nuclear weapons club in 1974.

But opponents say India's record on nonproliferation is not as unblemished as is claimed by the White House, which regards the nuclear pact as one of the foreign-policy highlights of the Bush administration's second term. Critics, including former U.S. diplomats, military officers and arms-control officials, accuse the White House of rushing the agreement through Congress without considering the long-term implications.

"This deal significantly weakens U.S. and international security," said retired Army Lt. Gen. Robert G. Gard Jr., chairman of the Washington-based Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation. Yesterday, a group of 34 arms-control advocates and former government officials urged Congress to reject the deal in its current form.

Administration officials have repeatedly lauded India's efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear technology, contrasting its behavior with that of Pakistan, the home base of Abdul Qadeer Khan, the acknowledged nuclear smuggler who delivered weapons secrets to Libya, Iran and North Korea.

R. Nicholas Burns, the former undersecretary of state for political affairs and a chief supporter of the landmark accord, said in a recent forum that India was "playing by the rules of the [nuclear] club but not allowed to join the club." Burns said the agreement "strengthened the international nonproliferation regime because it resolves an inherent contradiction in the regime."

Likewise, India's government says it deserves the trust of the world's nuclear gatekeepers. "India has an impeccable nonproliferation record," External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee said last week. "We have in place an effective and comprehensive system of national export controls."

Opponents point to what they call decades of deceptive practices India has used to acquire nuclear materials from foreign governments. A draft report by Albright and his Institute for Science and International Security, a Washington-based nonprofit that monitors the spread of weapons technology, cites recent incidents in which it says India engaged in "illicit nuclear trade."

In an instance alleged by ISIS, India used an array of trading companies to secretly acquire tons of tributyl phosphate, a chemical used to separate plutonium from spent nuclear fuel. China, a longtime supplier of TBP to India, halted shipments of the chemical in 2003 after U.S. criticism. India turned to independent trading firms that acquired TBP from German and Russian companies without revealing the true destination, the report said.

The ISIS report, due for release today, included photocopies of some of the centrifuge drawings obtained by Albright, although the group removed key specifications. Albright said he shared his findings with State Department officials but was turned away.

"It didn't fit with their talking points," Albright said. "At the highest level, they were dismissive of our concerns."


A State Department spokesman declined to comment on Albright's report, saying it had not been reviewed, and said the agreement was in the U.S. interest. :crazy:

Other opponents have cited transfers of sensitive weapons technology by individual Indian scientists. In 2004, the State Department slapped sanctions on two Indian nuclear scientists alleged to have passed heavy-water technology to Iran. At least four Indian companies have been sanctioned over sales of missile technology to Tehran.

Such incidents underscore concerns about the possible transfer of India's expanded nuclear know-how by rogue scientists and businessmen, said Henry Sokolski, the Defense Department's top nonproliferation official in the George H.W. Bush administration.

As trade grows between India and Iran, so does the risk of "transfers of technology that could be useful for Iran's purported weapons of mass destruction," Sokolski said.
 

jeypore

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What about morality? US doesn't hold ground to cry about Iranian or Pakistani nuclear programme when all she cares is business!
Morality comes cheap these days, with enough $$$ you can vuy almost everything! :enjoy: :usflag:

Being an Indian i will not agree with you on morality bases, but in terms of US and its policies it always boils down to money. That's why in America the saying goes follow the money. And if you look at US-India deal follow the money and pieces of the puzzle will start to fit. i do agree with your sentence that having enough money you can buy anything from the States, legally or illegally. Perfect example is China, it's been doing this for long time.
 

AgNoStiC MuSliM

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Here is the link to the complete ISIS report:

http://www.isis-online.org/publications/southasia/India_18September2008.pdf

Excerpts:

ISIS believes that important questions remain about the adequacy and implementation of India’s export control and nuclear classification procedures. In addition, India’s illicit procurement of dual-use nuclear-related items for its unsafeguarded nuclear program belies its commitment to the NSG.

In assessing India’s nuclear procurement practices, ISIS found several incidents where India conducted illicit nuclear trade and leaked sensitive nuclear information.1 Questions about past and current practices must be clarified as the U.S. Congress considers final approval of U.S.-India nuclear cooperation. The two following examples provide a basis to explore if India still leaks sensitive centrifuge information, engages in illicit nuclear trade and whether it will act in accordance with its promises to the NSG.
 

SU 30 MKI

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Well it is not that much serious as much

1) China selling Magnetic ring to PAK
2) Nuclear Bomb Design from China to PAK
3) PAK Selling NUclear Bomb Design to Libya

Since at that time US also didnt sanctioned China. Its normal.

I dont know why u made such a hue and cry for small things again INdia and forget own doings.
 

Flintlock

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India has a far better record than most of the so-called non-proliferators.

Those who are complaining about double standards should first examine why the NSG put its faith in India in the first place.
 

Neo

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Well it is not that much serious as much

1) China selling Magnetic ring to PAK
2) Nuclear Bomb Design from China to PAK
3) PAK Selling NUclear Bomb Design to Libya

Since at that time US also didnt sanctioned China. Its normal.
Two wrongs don't make a wright. It may not be an issue to you as the beneficiary of the deal, it does matter to the critics in USA who've raised the issue.

I dont know why u made such a hue and cry for small things again INdia and forget own doings.
Ohh I'm sorry, did I hurt your feelings or touch a bad nerve? I donot represent the panel arguing Indian proliferation record, Americans are.
 

Neo

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India has a far better record than most of the so-called non-proliferators.

Those who are complaining about double standards should first examine why the NSG put its faith in India in the first place.
Ohh please, cut the "I'm holier than thou" rhetoric! Ask half the 45 member strong NSG body how they were bullied by Uncle Sam to "put faith" in India, its not a secret.
The nuclear waiver is immoral, corrupt and politically motivated. It has nothing to do with India's socalled clean proliferation record. Rest is BS! :usflag:
 

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