• Wednesday, December 19, 2018

Saudi Arabia's Ballistic Missile Force

Discussion in 'Arab Defence Forum' started by The SC, Jun 28, 2012.

  1. The SC

    The SC ELITE MEMBER

    Messages:
    15,341
    Joined:
    Feb 13, 2012
    Ratings:
    +16 / 15,553 / -0
    Country:
    Canada
    Location:
    Canada
    Saudi Arabia's Ballistic Missile Force

    INTRODUCTION

    One of the most overlooked military arsenals in the Middle East is the Saudi Arabian ballistic missile force. The presence of this capability, in context with the specific weapon system employed, raises a number of significant questions about the potential nuclear ambitions of Saudi Arabia. Analysis of currently available imagery also suggests that ballistic missiles are not a capability which Saudi Arabia will be seeking to divest itself of at any point in the near future.

    THE SAUDI MISSILE FORCE

    At some point in the mid 1980's, Saudi Arabia chose to pursue a ballistic missile force. Friendly Islamic nations such as Pakistan did not possess a significant ballistic missile program at this time, nor did North Korea. The only other nation producing ballistic missiles which would have been amenable to an export was China. Towards the end of the 1980's China agreed to develop a conventionally-armed ballistic missile for export to the Saudis. The weapon chosen for modification was the DF-3A (CSS-2) IRBM, a nuclear-tipped weapon already in service with the Chinese military for well over a decade.

    The first weapons were delivered to Saudi Arabia in 1988, and it is not known precisely how many were purchased. Sources provide varying estimates, ranging from between 30 missiles and 9 launchers to 120 missiles and 12 launchers. Identified DF-3A associated facilities inside of Saudi Arabia suggest that the number may well be far closer to the latter estimate; two facilities have been positively identified, each housing two garrisons and various support and storage facilities. These facilities are Al Joffer and Al Sulayyil, approximately 90 and 450 km southwest of Riyadh, respectively. The locations of these facilities, as well as two other facilities which may be related to the Saudi Arabian ballistic missile force and will be described later, can be seen in the image below:

    IMINT & Analysis: Saudi Arabia's Ballistic Missile Force

    THE DF-3A

    The DF-3A is a single stage IRBM initially developed for the PLA's 2nd Artillery Division. Entering service in 1971, the initial DF-3 variant was a nuclear-tipped weapon, representing the first Chinese-developed ballistic missile. An improved propulsion system and other refinements were introduced in the 1980's with the DF-3A variant. The initial DF-3 had a range of 2,500 km, increased to 2,800 km in the DF-3A. Maximum range capability with a reduced payload is 4,000 km, and the weapon is credited with the ability to fly a depressed-angle profile to a range of 1,550 km, providing a limited degree of anti-missile defense. The DF-3 series weapons are road mobile, but employ prepared launch sites, allowing them to be dispersed from a garrison. Preparation time for erecting and fueling the missile is approximately two hours, and the storable liquid fuel propellant allows the missile to remain ready to fire for a short period of time.

    The weapon is erected on a circular pad approximately 100 meters in diameter. A reinforced pad in the center serves as the panch point for the missile, with the support vehicles being positioned around the launcher on the pad. An example of a Saudi Arabian DF-3A launch pad can be seen in the image below:

    IMINT & Analysis: Saudi Arabia's Ballistic Missile Force

    AL SULAYYIL

    The first identified DF-3A facility in Saudi Arabia is at Al Sulayyil, near the southern end of the Jabal Tuwayq escarpment. This geological feature, running approximately 800 kilometers roughly south from a location north of Riyadh, provides a natural method of concealing and protecting Saudi Arabia's ballistic missile infrastructure. The complex consists of an administrative and support facility, and a large missile base contained within a secure perimeter. The Al Sulayyil facility was first described in detail by Ronen Bergman, writing for the Israeli publication Yediot Ahronot in March of 2002.

    An overview of the Al Sulayyil DF-3A complex can be seen in the image below:

    IMINT & Analysis: Saudi Arabia's Ballistic Missile Force

    The missile compound itself is divided into three main areas: two missile garrisons with associated support facilities, and a central compound. Both garrison areas differ in their layout due to terrain constraints, but are nearly identical in terms of the facilities they possess. Each garrison area, accessed by separate entry control points within the overall complex itself, contain a garrison compound for missile launchers and support equipment, three separate bunkers ostensibly for missile and/or warhead storage, a missile handling facility for warhead mating, and a high bay garage where missiles and launchers are joined and erected for calibration before deployment.

    An image of the northern missile garrison area can be seen below:

    IMINT & Analysis: Saudi Arabia's Ballistic Missile Force

    The southern missile garrison is located in close proximity to the compound's central area. The central area contains a former support area likely associated with the construction of the missile complexes, a possible launch control facility, and two bunkers.

    An image of the central area and the southern missile garrison area can be seen below:

    IMINT & Analysis: Saudi Arabia's Ballistic Missile Force


    The missile garrison itself is not as expansive in the southern facility as it is in the northern facility. The reasoning behind this is not clear. Both facilities contain four identical equipment and vehicle garages and a drive through garage likely maintaining the launchers themselves. The northern garrison possesses two additional garages and a high bay garage. As high bay garages are typically employed for launcher or missile support functions, it is possible that the northern facility provides training or maintenance support for the DF-3A unit.

    An image depicting the two DF-3A garrisons can be seen in the image below:

    IMINT & Analysis: Saudi Arabia's Ballistic Missile Force


    Despite reporting to the contrary which suggests that there are numerous launch pads contained within the complex, only two prepared launch sites have been identified within Al Sulayyil. It is possible that weapons may be erected from the reinforced pads or roadways surrounding many of the facilities, but this cannot be confirmed using the available imagery.

    AL JOFFER

    The second identified DF-3A facility in Saudi Arabia is the Al Joffer facility. As with the Al Sulayyil facility, it is located within the Jabal Tuwayq escarpment. The Al Joffer facility is located closer to the northern end of the escarpment, near Riyadh. The facilities found inside of the Al Joffer facility are virtually identical to those found at the Al Sulayyil facility, consisting of an administrative and support facility, and a secure missile complex consisting of two garrison areas and a central support area. Even the missile garrisons themselves depict the same differences as those described above in the Al Sulayyil facility. Different terrain considerations than those found at the Al Sulayyil facility result in the Al Joffer facility being more expansive, with the two missile garrisons being separated by a greater distance.

    An overview of the Al Joffer DF-3A complex can be seen in the image below:

    IMINT & Analysis: Saudi Arabia's Ballistic Missile Force


    Apart from the distances involved, there are two major differences between the Al Joffer and Al Sulayyil facilities. First, Al Joffer only contains a single fixed launch pad, whereas Al Sulayyil contains two. Secondly, Al Joffer still contains an active support facility inside of the main complex in the central area. Given that the imagery was captured in 2004, this suggests that the Al Joffer facility was not fully operational before that date, providing a potential explanation for the lack of a second prepared launch pad.

    In contrast, the Al Sulayyil facility, particularly the northern garrison area, has remained unchanged in imagery between 2003 and 2007, suggesting that it was the first facility to become operational with the DF-3A.

    An image comparing the Al Sulayyil northern garrison's appearance in 2003 (top) and 2007 (bottom) can be seen below:

    IMINT & Analysis: Saudi Arabia's Ballistic Missile Force


    POSSIBLE FACILITIES

    There are two potential facilities in Saudi Arabia that may serve the DF-3A force. One is located approximately 280 km west of Al Sulayyil near the settlement of Rawdah, while the other is located in Saudi Arabia's northwestern desert region. As with the previous two facilities, both of these locations are strategically placed inside of terrain features for protection.

    Rawdah

    The Rawdah complex is a massive facility consisting of numerous underground facilities (UGFs) and hardened bunkers. While the true purpose of this facility is not known, there is evidence to suggest that it supports DF-3A operations in some capacity. The complex is divided into two main areas, an support area and a separate area containing the aforementioned hardened facilities.

    An overview of the Rawdah complex can be seen in the image below:

    IMINT & Analysis: Saudi Arabia's Ballistic Missile Force


    The support area consists of an administrative compound with support facilities, an underground drive-through complex, and two potential missile launch pads. The administrative compound is relatively nondescript, but the other facilities are worthy of further inspection. The underground drive-through facility is nearly 600 meters long. In most cases it could be viewed as simply a pass through the terrain allowing for easier travel, but the support area is connected by a two lane paved road with the outside area. The purpose of this large UGF may be for storage or for command functions. The latter is unlikely given the lack of any visible communications-related infrastructure atop the terrain under which the drive-through facility passes. The most logical assumption therefore is that the facility is designed for a storage purpose. The two possible launch pads are the most significant evidence suggesting that the Rawdah facility does support the DF-3A. One pad can be seen with six 20 meter long objects which match the dimensions of DF-3A towed transporter-erectors. This pad is of a circular configuration 90 meters across, matching those found at the Al Sulayyil and Al Joffer DF-3A facilities. The reinforced launch pad in the center is missing, suggesting that this may be a training site. The second possible launch area consists of a concrete pad enclosed by a fence. While this potential launch site differs in configuration from those positively identified at Al Sulayyil and Al Joffer, its dimensions would allow a DF-3A to be erected and fired.

    The support area of the Rawdah complex can be seen in the image below:

    IMINT & Analysis: Saudi Arabia's Ballistic Missile Force


    The remaining facilities at Rawdah are concentrated to the northwest of the support area. This area contains numerous bunkers and UGFs, as well as two potential launch areas. The launch areas consist of a hardened pad and an extension of a roadway, locations similar if not to the circular launch pads favored by the operational garrisons, then certainly to those employed by the Chinese 2nd Artillery Division in association with certain missile types. As Chinese technicians are reported to have aided in the construction of Saudi Arabia's DF-3A facilities, it is possible that various launch pads were incorporated for evaluation. The numerous underground facilities suggest that while Rawdah may have a DF-3A support function, it likely serves other purposes as well. Precisely what is contained inside of the facilities is again not conclusively known, but some educated guesses may be made. As with the drive-through UGF to the southeast, no evidence of significant air circulation or ventilation is visible, suggesting that the various bunkers and UGFs are not intended for continued occupation. This suggests that the facilities are primarily intended for storage.

    An image of the storage complex at Rawdah can be seen below:

    IMINT & Analysis: Saudi Arabia's Ballistic Missile Force

    What precisely is stored in such an isolated and expansive facility is a matter of speculation. The answer may be tied to the location itself. The Rawdah complex is located in the southwestern quadrant of Saudi Arabia, the furthest distance from past and present potential aggressors such as Iran, Iraq, and Israel. This would make the Rawdah complex ideally suited to serve as a large-scale ammunition storage facility. Dispersal of the ammunition would likely be performed by air out of the Bisha airport 120 km to the south. Transportation via road is also possible, but unlikely given the distances involved and potential security concerns. It is likely that DF-3A components stored in the facility have already been dispersed. The facility was imaged in 2004, when the Al Joffer facility may not have been fully operational as described above. The Rawdah facility's DF-3A support function may have already been terminated with the dispersal of components to Al Joffer. It is possible that DF-3A missiles may still be stored at Rawdah, and that the launch facilities may serve as the training complex for Saudi Arabian missile crews.

    Western Garrison

    One final location has been identified that may potentially house DF-3A related facilities. This location is only visible in low resolution imagery but does share two of the identifiable characteristics of Al Sulayyil and Al Joffer: it is contained within significant terrain, and it is isolated from major population centers. This facility is also located much closer to Israel, a potential target for the Saudi DF-3A force.

    The possible western DF-3A garrison can be seen in the image below:

    IMINT & Analysis: Saudi Arabia's Ballistic Missile Force

    TARGETING OPTIONS

    From their garrisons at Al Sulayyil and Al Joffer, Saudi Arabian DF-3As can range targets as far away as India and western Europe when employed to their maximum range of 4000 km. Much of Africa falls within range as well.

    The image below depicts the coverage of the DF-3A ballistic missile when fired from Saudi Arabian garrisons to a range of 4000 km.

    Despite the extended range capability it is likely that the weapons are only employed to their typical range of 2800 km. Extending the range requires a reduction in payload and also results in decreased accuracy. Given that the DF-3A is already a relatively inaccurate weapon, decreasing the payload would only serve to seriously diminish the combat potential of the weapon system. As seen in the image below, the Middle East, portions of Africa and eastern Europe, and western India are still within range at the standard range of 2800 km.

    The most likely potential target for the Saudi Arabian DF-3A force is Iran. Sunni Saudi Arabia and Shi'a Iran are not the closest of nations due to religious differences and the Saudi's close relationship with the United States, to cite a few brief reasons. Saudi Arabian DF-3As are believed to be targeted on Iranian cities due to their inaccuracy and therefore their inherent unsuitability for strikes on military facilities or strategic targets.

    Israel is also a potential target for Saudi Arabian ballistic missiles. The likely scenario for a launch against Israel would be to employ the DF-3A in its depressed-angle launch mode, which confers a range of 1550 km. Targeting of Israel may be the reason behind the presence of the potential launch facility in western Saudi Arabia. As seen in the image below, launching from this facility allows the DF-3A to reach Israel with ease, even when fired using a depressed angle trajectory, a likely scenario given that this would increase the chances that the weapons would be able to avoid intercept by Israeli anti-missile defences.

    NUCLEAR POTENTIAL

    The inaccuracy of the DF-3A, combined with its 2,000 kg throw weight, has raised speculation as to the true Saudi Arabian intentions for the missile. Saudi Arabia is well aware of the inaccuracy of the weapon, claiming that they were not fired at Iraq in 1990/1991 to avoid civillian casualties. "King Fahd ruled out that option because of the fact that you cannot control it accurately. Our problem is that our war was not with the Iraqi people, it was with Saddam Hussein and his clique," stated Saudi Prince Bandar bin Sultan. This is in contrast to the alleged targeting of Iranian population centers.

    Saudi Arabia has been known to have had an interest in nuclear weapons for some time, dating back to the construction of a potential nuclear research center in 1975. Evidence suggests that Saudi Arabia was financially and perhaps technologically involved in the nuclear weapons programs of both Iraq and Pakistan. The Iraqi capability to develop nuclear weapons was removed in the 1980s during the Iranian and Israeli air raids on the Tammuz reactor complex southeast of Baghdad. Pakistan presents an interesting option. It has been suggested that Saudi Arabia would be provided with Pakistani nuclear weapons should Iran achieve the capability to produce nuclear weapons of its own. Pakistani warheads on Saudi Arabian weapons would not only represent a significant threat to Iran, but also to India. Saudi Arabian DF-3A garrisons are well defended and would be much more difficult for India to strike during a time of conflict, potentially providing Pakistan with an added nuclear deterrent capability due to close relations with the Kingdom.

    At the end of the day, Saudi Arabia does not currently possess a nuclear warhead for the DF-3A. The nation signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in 1988, and has stated that it would not arm the DF-3A with either nuclear or chemical warheads. Evidence of Saudi Arabia's nuclear ambitions cannot be ignored, however, and a nuclear-armed Iran could be the impetus needed for Saudi Arabia to finally acquire a nuclear capability for its ballistic missile force. It should be noted, however, that past Saudi Arabian assurances that chemical or nuclear warheads would not be acquired are ominously significant. Saudi Arabia did not unequivocally state that weapons of mass destruction would not be used to arm the DF-3A, raising significant questions.

    If the Kingdom, being aware of the DF-3As inaccuracy, is not pursuing a nuclear or chemical warhead capability, is there a covert biological warfare program underway in Saudi Arabia? Moreover, given that Saudi Arabia is reportedly not concerned with firing the weapons at Iranian civillians, has such a program existed since before 1990? This would potentially explain the Kingdom's real reasons for not wishing to fire their weapons into Iraq, unless they view Iraqi civillians with more regard than those of Iran, reasons reinforced by the alleged nuclear partnership between Iraq and Saudi Arabia.

    CONCLUSION

    The Saudi Arabian ballistic missile arsenal is one of the most interesting and important military aspects of the developing Middle Eastern political and military landscape. As Iran moves forward towards its alleged nuclear weapons program, Saudi Arabia may well attempt to acquire a similar capability for its missiles to serve as a deterrent. The potentially destabilizing effects of such a move, given the Kingdom's position regarding Israel, could ignite a new arms race, and even military conflict. The fact that this significant development may be related to a military capability that few individuals realize exists highlights the need for closer military analysis of potential adversarial situations worldwide.

    IMINT & Analysis: Saudi Arabia's Ballistic Missile Force
     
  2. The SC

    The SC ELITE MEMBER

    Messages:
    15,341
    Joined:
    Feb 13, 2012
    Ratings:
    +16 / 15,553 / -0
    Country:
    Canada
    Location:
    Canada
    Saudi Arabia possesses approximately 36 CSS-2 intermediate-range ballistic missiles

    [​IMG]


    DongFeng 3 (CSS-2) Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile
    A conventional high-explosive warhead variant of the DongFeng 3A was developed for an export order to Saudi Arabia in 1987. About 30~120 missiles and 9~12 launchers were reportedly delivered in 1988, though no known test launch has ever been made in the country. It is not known whether these missiles are still operational.

    [​IMG]
     
  3. WHF

    WHF FULL MEMBER

    Messages:
    580
    Joined:
    Sep 12, 2010
    Ratings:
    +0 / 353 / -0
    Dude u ppl bought 120 missiles in 1988 25 years have passed by and still u call it a formidable force, friend those missiles would be nearing their shelf life by now what use are they to u now?
     
  4. Arabian Legend

    Arabian Legend SENIOR MEMBER

    Messages:
    5,155
    Joined:
    Mar 7, 2012
    Ratings:
    +9 / 11,197 / -0
    Country:
    Saudi Arabia
    Location:
    Saudi Arabia
    FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
    New Insights On Saudi Arabia’s Strategic Rocket Forces Revealed In Exposé On Kingdom’s Covert Transition from Aging Chinese CSS-2 Missile Arsenal to New Mobile CSS-5 Nuclear Capability
    PATRIOT LOST Author Accuses Former Vice President Dick Cheney of High Crime and George Tenet’s CIA Management of Criminal Misconduct In Handling of Saudi Intelligence
    Los Angeles, California, June 17, 2010 – PATRIOT LOST, by Jonathan Scherck, uncovers former Vice President Dick Cheney’s decision to turn a blind eye to Saudi Arabia’s acquisition of nuclear capable CSS-5 medium range ballistic missiles from the People’s Republic of China during the George W. Bush administration.
    The book also implicates former Central Intelligence Agency Director George Tenet and senior agency veteran Charles Allen in a cover-up of U.S. satellite imagery in late-2003, imagery that provided initial warning of Riyadh’s oil-for-nuclear weapons deal with Beijing.
    U.S. complicity in such a drastic change in the balance of power in the Middle East is problematic for Washington in 2010. President Barack Obama has sought to engage Beijing at the tactical level on the problem of nuclear terrorism while at the same time opting to maintain the Bush era strategy of non-intervention in China’s state-to-state nuclear proliferation practices.
    “President Obama’s Nuclear Security Conference held in Washington in April 2010, focusing on the need to keep nuclear materiel out of the hands of international terrorists, was without question a step in the right direction. But such tactical level efforts will only go so far in reigning in the spread of nuclear weapons throughout the world.” – from PATRIOT LOST
    Scherck’s account was written from his perspective as a Collection Management Officer working in CIA’s Counter-Proliferation Division and is based on direct knowledge of previously undisclosed U.S. satellite imagery analysis of shipments originating from China to Saudi Arabia’s Jeddah Islamic Seaport. In this role, Scherck was also privy to interactions with Cheney’s Office of the Vice President specifically on the Saudi nuclear issue.
    “…I think we can all agree looking back now that the act in question—this misguided contempt for speaking truth to power, as it were—was less a classified matter than simply a criminal one.
    Likewise, as to the liberties I have knowingly taken herein in discussing otherwise classified imagery analysis, I am no less convinced. The events
    captured by U.S. spy satellites flying high above the Arabian Peninsula can hardly be considered in their proper context as an American state secret. Surely, those many illicit Chinese shipments into Saudi Arabia pose far less a threat to America’s national security than to the people of the Middle East.” – from PATRIOT LOST
    According to the book, Scherck was frequently at odds with analysts working in the CIA’s Directorate of Intelligence who were skeptical at the time of Riyadh’s interest in upgrading to the CSS-5, even amidst overwhelming imagery analysis published by the National Geo-Spatial Intelligence Agency. Saudi Arabia acquired a conventional missile capability (China’s CSS-2) in the 1980s as part of a deal brokered by Saudi Prince Bandar bin Sultan. Riyadh has yet to officially acknowledge its Strategic Rocket Forces’ transition to the mobile CSS-5 delivery system.
    PATRIOT LOST was first published earlier this month as an eBook, nearly 60 days after being submitted to the CIA’s Publication Review Board (PRB) for approval. Preliminary manuscript reviews typically take 30 days or less, according to the PRB. After receiving no response of any sort (beyond the initial confirmation of receipt), Scherck decided to make the book available to the public.
    Source: Know Thyself Enterprises, LLC
     
  5. opz

    opz FULL MEMBER

    Messages:
    128
    Joined:
    May 1, 2010
    Ratings:
    +0 / 141 / -0
    [​IMG]
     
  6. Serpentine

    Serpentine INT'L MOD

    Messages:
    11,952
    Joined:
    Dec 30, 2011
    Ratings:
    +30 / 33,611 / -0
    Country:
    Iran, Islamic Republic Of
    Location:
    Iran, Islamic Republic Of
    And according to who those blue countries on the map are concern?Western countries?They are the biggest concern of whole humanity who executed 2 of world's largest and bloodiest wars.
     
  7. The SC

    The SC ELITE MEMBER

    Messages:
    15,341
    Joined:
    Feb 13, 2012
    Ratings:
    +16 / 15,553 / -0
    Country:
    Canada
    Location:
    Canada
    Saudi Arabia possesses a minimum of 36 CSS-5 nuclear capable intermediate-range ballistic missiles

    [​IMG]

    DongFeng 21 (CSS-5) Medium-Range Ballistic Missile

    The DongFeng 21 (NATO code name: CSS-5) is a two-stage, solid-propellant, single-warhead medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) system developed by China Changfeng Mechanics and Electronics Technology Academy (also known as 2nd Space Academy). The missile design is based on the two-stage JuLang 1 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM). The DongFeng 21 is capable of delivering a 500kT nuclear warhead over a distance of 1,800km. Some DongFeng 21 missiles are reportedly armed with a conventional warhead. The improved DongFeng 21A with extended range was reportedly introduced in 1996. China has also developed the Kaituozhe 1 (KT-1) space launch vehicle based on the DongFeng 21 design.
    Specifications
    Official name: DongFeng 21 (DF-21)
    NATO reporting name: CSS-5
    Contractor: CASIC 4th Academy
    Service status: In service
    Configuration: Two-stage, solid propellant
    Deployment: Road mobile, 6X6 tractor truck + six-wheel trailer; or silo
    Length: 10.7m
    Diameter: 1.4m
    Launch weight: 14,700kg
    Range: 1,770km
    Re-entry vehicle mass: 600kg
    Warhead: One single 500kT yield, or conventional
    Guidance: Inertial + terminal radar guidance
    Accuracy: CEP 300~400m


    DongFeng 21C (CSS-5 Mod-3)

    First revealed in 2006, the DF-21C is a conventionally-armed MRBM system with upgraded mobile launcher and guidance system. The missile was said to have a payload of 2,000kg and a maximum range of 1,700km. Unlike the road-mobile DF-21A, the DF-21C is mounted on a 10X10 WS2500 TEL vehicle, which offers some limited off-road travelling ability. The new GPS-based guidance system has reduced the missile’s CEP to 30~40m, enabling it for precision-strike missions.

    DongFeng 21D (CSS-5 Mod-4)

    The U.S. Department of Defense has confirmed the existence of the DF-21D land-based ASBM system, which is the world’s first and only of its kind. By combining manoeuvrable re-entry vehicles (MaRVs) with a terminal guidance system, the DF-21C is capable of targeting a slow-moving aircraft carrier battle group from a land-based mobile launcher. The maximum range of the missile was said to be 3,000km, possibly achieved by carrying a smaller payload.
     
  8. Nishan_101

    Nishan_101 BANNED

    Messages:
    3,853
    Joined:
    Nov 23, 2007
    Ratings:
    +0 / 993 / -18
    I think the KSA should hire experts from Pakistan, China and Russia along with West for developing new generation Cruise missiles as well as Bllastic Missiles and launching platform for Satellites as well.
     
  9. MuslimConscript

    MuslimConscript FULL MEMBER

    Messages:
    212
    Joined:
    Aug 3, 2012
    Ratings:
    +0 / 275 / -0
    Did saudi have any BM other then CSS-3 and CSS-5?
    Maybe some from Pakistan or Saudi made?
     
  10. Yzd Khalifa

    Yzd Khalifa ELITE MEMBER

    Messages:
    12,262
    Joined:
    Mar 24, 2013
    Ratings:
    +11 / 16,161 / -1
    Country:
    Saudi Arabia
    Location:
    Saudi Arabia
    Yes, we do have Pakistani-made missiles, and we build our missiles on our own, Sir.
     
  11. SOHEIL

    SOHEIL ELITE MEMBER

    Messages:
    14,891
    Joined:
    Dec 9, 2011
    Ratings:
    +11 / 32,498 / -17
    Country:
    Iran, Islamic Republic Of
    Location:
    Iran, Islamic Republic Of
    any picture ?
     
  12. ali786

    ali786 FULL MEMBER

    Messages:
    174
    Joined:
    Jun 2, 2007
    Ratings:
    +0 / 132 / -0
    Im intrigued as to which pakistani ballistic missiles saudi arabia uses. Also does Saudi arabia use pakistani expertise to build its own unique designs?
     
  13. mb444

    mb444 SENIOR MEMBER

    Messages:
    2,159
    Joined:
    Apr 18, 2012
    Ratings:
    +1 / 3,081 / -1
    Country:
    United Kingdom
    Location:
    United Kingdom
    Can anyone provide any info on SA indigenous missile producing capability
     
  14. JUBA

    JUBA BANNED

    Messages:
    1,344
    Joined:
    Aug 6, 2012
    Ratings:
    +2 / 3,051 / -17
    Country:
    Saudi Arabia
    Location:
    Saudi Arabia

    I believe you can see 2 Pakistani missiles in here

    [​IMG]
     
  15. Super Falcon

    Super Falcon ELITE MEMBER

    Messages:
    12,968
    Joined:
    Jul 3, 2008
    Ratings:
    +0 / 4,507 / -4
    Country:
    Pakistan
    Location:
    United Arab Emirates
    carzy country for weapons which they dont know when to use and how to use

    i love saudia but decison which they make i dont get it they rely heavily on USA which is not good west history of selling weapons to muslims are very conterversial so many tags on those systems and some of them are useless

    saudis look seriously to russia for SU 35 and Mig 35 and new airdefence systems from russia and saudis can afford it russia happy to sell them on same amount of one jet price they get 2 jets from russsia and more reliable than western toys