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Revisiting 1962 war with China: When India's prestige was in a shambles

IblinI

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, I admit that india has no answer to J20. It won't have an answet till 2030 at least. But india will reduce china's drone advantage in a few years with Ghatak, Project cheetah and archer.
Pal, you do know we are adding at least fifty J20 per year right, and the number would most likely to increased in the next few years, plus the induction of J20S and its drone wingman, and as of drone, you also do know the variety of our drones in actual service?
We have everything from DJI to UCAV, HALE recon drone, flying wing GJ11, HALE AEW divine eagle, electronic reconnaissance WZ-10
Dude, maybe you guys have a lot to catch up.
 

Bleek

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India is an unbeatable superpower since 2012 but Chinese can't accept it since we smashed them in 1962 and Galwan.

Jai Hind. Chinee weak.
 

walterbibikow

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yea, sure. but again china is not seeking to attack india, thus not having the "element of surprise" is not an issue.

if india started to poke around like in the 60s, then the chinese will bring more troops and while strategic surprise will probably not be achieved, tactical ones can be, due to china's much better mobility.
and yes, china now has more permanent forces in the mountains than before. but this is hardly a difficult task for china, relatively few are near the front, most are held further back in far easier to supply areas. if india launched an all out assault out of the blue, they could very well capture some border land initially, wont be long before the PLA will begin its counter assault though.

its a far bigger burden for india to keep men on the borders with its weaker infrastructure and lessor wealth. with which india has to support some 200k men on the borders, china only does so with 50-60k.

also, it doesnt get more "front line" than this, but those rifles looks nothing like sigs, and everything like INSAS
View attachment 900421


There are tons of articles on why the Ajun sucks, if you want to believe otherwise, i wont argue with you on it. in the mountains and disputed areas with china, it doesnt matter much anyhow.


and no im not bias on tejas. Your own military says it sucks.

"The IAF did chose to procure Tejas jets, but the service’s auditor general criticized the design for failing to meet 53 criteria, including deficiencies in its radar- and missile-warning systems, limited internal fuel, underpowered engine relative airframe weight, and lack of electronic warfare support."

Tejas 1A to fix these issues isnt expect until 2023 to 2024 at best.
but this point is moot, because even if the 1A is in service today, it gains you nothing because it is still inferior to J-10C and J-16 and especially the j-20 in PLA service right now.

ballistic missiles is not a match for rocket artillery. one is much easier and cheaper to produce and china has an overwhelming number of both in any case. in addition to terrain advantages, nearly 1/2 of indian population is in range of cheap to produce chinese rocket artillery. meanwhile most of china's population is only vulnerable to expensive intermediate range indian rockets

again, im not saying the indian military is terrible. its quite powerful in fact, but you aren't facing Bangladesh, china absolutely can, if push came to shove, take the disputed areas. it cannot occupy all of india or anything like that nor does it want to, but it has more than enough firepower and equipment advantages to take the disputed areas. but it would not do so without huge provocation or even large attacks from the indian side since china has bigger fish to fry, well really just the one fish bigger than china atm. the us in a korea or taiwan scenario.
@SIPRA https://theprint.in/defence/modi-go...-toughest-projects-yet-china-in-mind/1232207/

Indian conventional forces: You do need huge manpower to win the war in the Himalayas after all winning a war in the mountains is a different game altogether
The total available Indian Army strike forces near China’s border areas are assessed to be around 225,000 personnel. This incorporates the roughly 3,000 personnel attached to a T-90 Bhisma tank brigade stationed in Ladakh and the estimated 1,000 personnel attached to the Brahmos cruise missile regiment in Arunachal Pradesh. For the Army, this total near China’s border areas is divided into about 34,000 troops in the Northern Command,15,500 troops in the Central Command and 175,500 troops in the Eastern Command
The Indian Air Force has an estimated 270 fighters and 68 ground attack aircraft across its three China-facing commands. It is also expanding its network of Advanced Landing Grounds (ALGs), which constitute small air bases in forward locations to provide staging grounds and logistics hubs for aircraft strike missions.
In the Western Air Command, the IAF possesses around 75 fighters and 34 ground attack aircraft, besides 5 ALGs close to Chinese Tibetan areas. The Central Air Command features around 94 fighters, 34 ground attack aircraft, and one ALG. The Eastern Air Command hosts around 101 fighters and 9 ALGs. Crucially, the IA and IAF forces described above are all permanently close to China’s border, shortening their mobilization time and limiting the prospects of a successful Chinese cross-border advance

Chinese conventional forces: There is a total of 200,00-230,000 Chinese ground forces under the Western Theater Command, and Tibet and Xinjiang Military Districts. However, this apparent numerical near-equivalence with that of Indian regional ground forces is misleading. Even in a war with India, a significant proportion of these forces will be unavailable, reserved either for Russian taskings or for countering insurrection in Xinjiang and Tibet. The majority of forces are located further from the Indian border, posing a striking contrast with the majority of forward-deployed Indian forces with a single China defense mission. The new joint Western Theater Command is estimated to hold around 90,000-120,000 troops, principally divided into the 76th and 77th Group Armies. These Group Armies are headquartered towards the interior of Western China, in Chongqing and Baoji respectively. Because of ongoing unrest in Tibet and Xinjiang, the Western Theater Command’s ground operational authority does not extend to these regions. Instead, a special PLA Army-directed Military District has been created for each of these regions. In Tibet, the region closest to Indian border areas, the PLA presence is judged to number just 40,000 troops. More numerous forces are located in the Xinjiang region north of Tibet, totaling around 70,000. This means that China is regularly operating with a permanent Indian conventional force advantage along its border areas. In the event of a major standoff or conflict with India, it would have to rely upon mobilization primarily from Xinjiang and secondarily from the Western Theater Command forces deeper in China’s interior. By contrast, Indian forces are already largely in position. The PLA Air Force (PLAAF) also suffers from a numerical disparity to the IAF in the border region. Unlike the tripartite organizational division of Chinese ground forces facing India, the Western Theater Command has assumed control of all regional strike aircraft. In total, this amounts to around 157 fighters and a varied drone armory. This includes an estimated 20 GJ-1/WD-1K precision strike UAVs, 12 WD-1 ground attack and reconnaissance UAVs, 12 WD-1 precision strike UAVs, and 8 EA-03 reconnaissance and electronic warfare UAVs. A proportion of these are reserved for Russia-centric missions. By comparison, as noted earlier, the Indian Eastern Air Command can field around 101 fighters against China alone. China also uses eight airbases and airfields relevant to India strike missions, although a majority are civilian airports that can be commandeered in wartime. Other comparative weaknesses permeate the PLAAF’s posture against India. On a strict comparison of available 4th generation fighters, authoritative assessments hold that China’s J-10 fighter is technically comparable to India’s Mirage-2000, and that the Indian Su-30MKI is superior to all theater Chinese fighters, including the additional J-11 and Su-27 models. China hosts a total of around 101 4th-generation fighters in the theater, of which a proportion must be retained for Russian defense, while India has around 122 of its comparable models, solely directed at China. The high altitude of Chinese air bases in Tibet and Xinjiang, plus the generally difficult geographic and weather conditions of the region, means that Chinese fighters are limited to carrying around half their design payload and fuel. In-flight refueling would be required for PLAAF forces to maximize their strike capacity. China had only inducted 15 such tanker aircraft nationally as of 2022, meaning only a handful of its forces will benefit from this solution. Against these underpowered fighters, IAF forces will launch from bases and airfields unaffected by these geographic conditions, with maximum payload and fuel capabilities. The most significant PLAAF forward air bases and airfields near Indian border areas—which will be pivotal in combat operations—are located at Hotan, Lhasa/Gonggar, Ngari-Gunsa, and Xigaze. Each hosts regular PLAAF detachments, and these are the nearest facilities to Indian targets in Kashmir, northern India, and northeast India. They are vulnerable to a dedicated Indian offensive. Ngari-Gunsa and Xigaze reportedly have no hardened shelters or blast pens for their aircraft, which sit in the open.Lhasa/Gonggar has recently developed hardened shelters able to protect up to 36 aircraft, while Hotan reportedly hosts “two aircraft shelters” of unknown capacity. An Indian early initiative to destroy or incapacitate these four bases—and achieve air superiority over them—would compel China to rely more upon aircraft from its rear-area bases, exacerbating its limited fuel and payload problems. Moreover, China lacks the redundancy and related force survivability compared to India in their comparative numbers of regional air bases. In sum, India has a stronger regional air position, with “a large number of airfields in the east and west, so even if some airfields are down, operations can continue from other locations.
Experience shortcomings that are not shared by the IAF amplify China’s air disadvantage. Recent PLAAF exercises with unscripted scenarios have found that pilots are excessively reliant upon ground control for tactical direction. In unanticipated combat scenarios, this dependence on explicit control tower guidance becomes extreme, while “ground commands” are simultaneously often unable to keep up with the complex and changeable air situation.

This suggests that PLAAF combat proficiency may be significantly weaker than often estimated. Progressive base hardening in the eastern US-facing PLAAF facilities has reduced this risk in that area. A lack of similar measures in the India-facing west suggests that Indian destruction or temporary incapacitation of some of the four above air bases would further exacerbate these PLAAF operational inflexibilities and weaknesses. Recognizing this dilemma, instead of a regional aircraft offensive, Chinese strategic planners envision early long-range missile strikes against Indian air bases in the event of conflict. However, India benefits from the greater number and redundancy of regional air bases, and the daunting number of Chinese missiles that would be required to truly incapacitate relevant IAF forces. High number of disparate targets per air base, the requirement for at least two missiles per target, and the ability of base officials to repave the blast crater with quick-drying concrete within six hours, has articulated the operational problem: To keep one airfield shut for 24 hours, the PLAAF will require 220 ballistic missiles. This will not make any difference to IAF operations in the east or in the west since the IAF has a large number of other operational airfields to operate from. If the PLAAF attacks just three airfields, it will require 660 ballistic missiles per day for attacking the runway and taxi track alone. China’s stock of 1,000-1,200 MRBMs/SRBMs will be over in less than two days when attacking just three airfields, with no other major target systems like C2 centres or air defence units being addressed. India began its process of integrating runway replacement fiberglass mats into its base defense systems, meaning it was likely calculated. However, India is presently inducting these fiberglass mats and associated paving equipment, which will further reduce its runway reconstitution timeframe.It is therefore unlikely that the numerous PLAAF disadvantages detailed above can be overcome by China’s superior missile forces. This is critical beyond the air competition itself: In any India China conflict, the PLA cannot launch an attack without the support of the PLAAF.To address its force shortfalls in the event of war, China could surge air and ground forces from its interior toward the border. However, what our analysis suggests is that the IAF’s superiority would mean that critical logistical routes—such as air bases and military road and rail links—could be cut by bombing or standoff missile strikes, limiting the extent to which China’s position could be reinforced. Such a Chinese surge would also attract attention from the United States, which would alert India and enable it to counter-mobilize its own additional forces from its interior.
 
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walterbibikow

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Pal, you do know we are adding at least fifty J20 per year right, and the number would most likely to increased in the next few years, plus the induction of J20S and its drone wingman, and as of drone, you also do know the variety of our drones in actual service?
We have everything from DJI to UCAV, HALE recon drone, flying wing GJ11, HALE AEW divine eagle, electronic reconnaissance WZ-10
Dude, maybe you guys have a lot to catch up.
@Hellfire2006 @SSBN81 @Cheepek @SIPRA @VkdIndian
That is required to modernize the masses of obsolete jets whose designs stemmed from the 1960s. Once again all these procurement rates are guesstimated based on the pace of new units being observed with the type and serial nos observed suggesting overall no of airframes per unit. It's still not a precise way to grasp at a number
Anyway look at the India China Border map. Tibet is in between us. Or more appropriate word Himalayas is between us. Entire Tibet is situated on top Himalayas. Top of J&K also is high Himalayas.This entire region avarage height from sea level is more than 5000 metres or near 2 kilometres or 16,000 feet. All Chinese military air fields are situated in those high altitude of Tibet and himalayas . China can deploy its fighter planes from only those airfields against India.

Engine and capabilities issues : At this height oxygen level drop significantly. At sea level it is 21% and at 5000 metres or 16,000 feet it drop to 10%. Jet engine needs oxygen to burn fuel and generate thrust. When a fighter jet try to start its engine for take off from runway, it's suck a lot of air through its intake and the engines generates a huge thrust. But at those high altitude, the fighter planes jet engine is not able to produce enough thrust. Engine doesn't start that effectively. If some how it manages to start it fails to keep running. But on other side of India except Leh all our airfields for China centric operations are at normal heights. Like Hasimara airforce station near Sikkim in West Bengal which is just 105 metres or 350ft from sea level. IAF’s fighter planes can takeoff with its optimum load or even max load. As result IAF’s fighter planes can perform much better than it's Chinese counter part. Our Su-30 and Rafales can perform deep strike mission inside China. But Chinese plane cannot do that. Their force can only perform tactical bombing with limited ammunition. IAF can deploy and use its full force against China. But that is not possible for China.

Airfields maintenance and operation issues : Maintaining and operating those airfields at high altitudes are very tough. Air is very thin. Oxygen levels are very low. Mainland Chinese people is not habituated with such environments. But at winter, temperatures may go upto - 35 degree celsius. Snow covers the land. It's very very tough to keep the airfields active and maintain the supply chain to support air mission. IAF also face such issues but only in Leh airfield.

Radar Coverage issue: In mountain areas, China cannot deploy its heavy and powerful ground based radars in limited areas. In mountain regions ground radars has big problem to identify low flying fighter plane due to signal blocking by mountains. Our Jaguar DARIN III, Su-30MKI and Mirage 2000 has radar with terrain mapping capability. It helps them to fly in between the mountains pass. Even high flying AWACS also face difficulties to track fighter planes that fly in ground hugging mode in Himalayas. It also crippled PLA’s air defence system which rely on radar guidance to find and attack air targets. IAF also has such issues but only in some of our forward operating bases or advance landing grounds which is in deep inside the mountain. Most of our airfields near China border are on plain areas. Our ground based radars are much better positioned to track Chinese attacking fighter planes.
 
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IblinI

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@Hellfire2006 @SSBN81 @Cheepek @SIPRA @VkdIndian
That is required to modernize the masses of obsolete jets whose designs stemmed from the 1960s. Once again all these procurement rates are guesstimated based on the pace of new units being observed with the type and serial nos observed suggesting overall no of airframes per unit. It's still not a precise way to grasp at a number
Anyway look at the India China Border map. Tibet is in between us. Or more appropriate word Himalayas is between us. Entire Tibet is situated on top Himalayas. Top of J&K also is high Himalayas.This entire region avarage height from sea level is more than 5000 metres or near 2 kilometres or 16,000 feet. All Chinese military air fields are situated in those high altitude of Tibet and himalayas . China can deploy its fighter planes from only those airfields against India.

Engine and capabilities issues : At this height oxygen level drop significantly. At sea level it is 21% and at 5000 metres or 16,000 feet it drop to 10%. Jet engine needs oxygen to burn fuel and generate thrust. When a fighter jet try to start its engine for take off from runway, it's suck a lot of air through its intake and the engines generates a huge thrust. But at those high altitude, the fighter planes jet engine is not able to produce enough thrust. Engine doesn't start that effectively. If some how it manages to start it fails to keep running. But on other side of India except Leh all our airfields for China centric operations are at normal heights. Like Hasimara airforce station near Sikkim in West Bengal which is just 105 metres or 350ft from sea level. IAF’s fighter planes can takeoff with its optimum load or even max load. As result IAF’s fighter planes can perform much better than it's Chinese counter part. Our Su-30 and Rafales can perform deep strike mission inside China. But Chinese plane cannot do that. Their force can only perform tactical bombing with limited ammunition. IAF can deploy and use its full force against China. But that is not possible for China.

Airfields maintenance and operation issues : Maintaining and operating those airfields at high altitudes are very tough. Air is very thin. Oxygen levels are very low. Mainland Chinese people is not habituated with such environments. But at winter, temperatures may go upto - 35 degree celsius. Snow covers the land. It's very very tough to keep the airfields active and maintain the supply chain to support air mission. IAF also face such issues but only in Leh airfield.

Radar Coverage issue: In mountain areas, China cannot deploy its heavy and powerful ground based radars in limited areas. In mountain regions ground radars has big problem to identify low flying fighter plane due to signal blocking by mountains. Our Jaguar DARIN III, Su-30MKI and Mirage 2000 has radar with terrain mapping capability. It helps them to fly in between the mountains pass. Even high flying AWACS also face difficulties to track fighter planes that fly in ground hugging mode in Himalayas. It also crippled PLA’s air defence system which rely on radar guidance to find and attack air targets. IAF also has such issues but only in some of our forward operating bases or advance landing grounds which is in deep inside the mountain. Most of our airfields near China border are on plain areas. Our ground based radars are much better positioned to track Chinese attacking fighter planes.
17596_170512150640_1.gif
 

Hellfire2006

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Pal, you do know we are adding at least fifty J20 per year right, and the number would most likely to increased in the next few years, plus the induction of J20S and its drone wingman, and as of drone, you also do know the variety of our drones in actual service?
We have everything from DJI to UCAV, HALE recon drone, flying wing GJ11, HALE AEW divine eagle, electronic reconnaissance WZ-10
Dude, maybe you guys have a lot to catch up.
I know that
And I agree with you
 

SIPRA

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@Hellfire2006 @SSBN81 @Cheepek @SIPRA @VkdIndian
That is required to modernize the masses of obsolete jets whose designs stemmed from the 1960s. Once again all these procurement rates are guesstimated based on the pace of new units being observed with the type and serial nos observed suggesting overall no of airframes per unit. It's still not a precise way to grasp at a number
Anyway look at the India China Border map. Tibet is in between us. Or more appropriate word Himalayas is between us. Entire Tibet is situated on top Himalayas. Top of J&K also is high Himalayas.This entire region avarage height from sea level is more than 5000 metres or near 2 kilometres or 16,000 feet. All Chinese military air fields are situated in those high altitude of Tibet and himalayas . China can deploy its fighter planes from only those airfields against India.

Engine and capabilities issues : At this height oxygen level drop significantly. At sea level it is 21% and at 5000 metres or 16,000 feet it drop to 10%. Jet engine needs oxygen to burn fuel and generate thrust. When a fighter jet try to start its engine for take off from runway, it's suck a lot of air through its intake and the engines generates a huge thrust. But at those high altitude, the fighter planes jet engine is not able to produce enough thrust. Engine doesn't start that effectively. If some how it manages to start it fails to keep running. But on other side of India except Leh all our airfields for China centric operations are at normal heights. Like Hasimara airforce station near Sikkim in West Bengal which is just 105 metres or 350ft from sea level. IAF’s fighter planes can takeoff with its optimum load or even max load. As result IAF’s fighter planes can perform much better than it's Chinese counter part. Our Su-30 and Rafales can perform deep strike mission inside China. But Chinese plane cannot do that. Their force can only perform tactical bombing with limited ammunition. IAF can deploy and use its full force against China. But that is not possible for China.

Airfields maintenance and operation issues : Maintaining and operating those airfields at high altitudes are very tough. Air is very thin. Oxygen levels are very low. Mainland Chinese people is not habituated with such environments. But at winter, temperatures may go upto - 35 degree celsius. Snow covers the land. It's very very tough to keep the airfields active and maintain the supply chain to support air mission. IAF also face such issues but only in Leh airfield.

Radar Coverage issue: In mountain areas, China cannot deploy its heavy and powerful ground based radars in limited areas. In mountain regions ground radars has big problem to identify low flying fighter plane due to signal blocking by mountains. Our Jaguar DARIN III, Su-30MKI and Mirage 2000 has radar with terrain mapping capability. It helps them to fly in between the mountains pass. Even high flying AWACS also face difficulties to track fighter planes that fly in ground hugging mode in Himalayas. It also crippled PLA’s air defence system which rely on radar guidance to find and attack air targets. IAF also has such issues but only in some of our forward operating bases or advance landing grounds which is in deep inside the mountain. Most of our airfields near China border are on plain areas. Our ground based radars are much better positioned to track Chinese attacking fighter planes.

Array Bhai: Yudh hona he nahin, aur aap Mahabharat pay Mahabharat likhtay ja rahay ho.😂😂😂
 

applesauce

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@SIPRA https://theprint.in/defence/modi-go...-toughest-projects-yet-china-in-mind/1232207/

Indian conventional forces: You do need huge manpower to win the war in the Himalayas after all winning a war in the mountains is a different game altogether
The total available Indian Army strike forces near China’s border areas are assessed to be around 225,000 personnel. This incorporates the roughly 3,000 personnel attached to a T-90 Bhisma tank brigade stationed in Ladakh and the estimated 1,000 personnel attached to the Brahmos cruise missile regiment in Arunachal Pradesh. For the Army, this total near China’s border areas is divided into about 34,000 troops in the Northern Command,15,500 troops in the Central Command and 175,500 troops in the Eastern Command
The Indian Air Force has an estimated 270 fighters and 68 ground attack aircraft across its three China-facing commands. It is also expanding its network of Advanced Landing Grounds (ALGs), which constitute small air bases in forward locations to provide staging grounds and logistics hubs for aircraft strike missions.
In the Western Air Command, the IAF possesses around 75 fighters and 34 ground attack aircraft, besides 5 ALGs close to Chinese Tibetan areas. The Central Air Command features around 94 fighters, 34 ground attack aircraft, and one ALG. The Eastern Air Command hosts around 101 fighters and 9 ALGs. Crucially, the IA and IAF forces described above are all permanently close to China’s border, shortening their mobilization time and limiting the prospects of a successful Chinese cross-border advance

Chinese conventional forces: There is a total of 200,00-230,000 Chinese ground forces under the Western Theater Command, and Tibet and Xinjiang Military Districts. However, this apparent numerical near-equivalence with that of Indian regional ground forces is misleading. Even in a war with India, a significant proportion of these forces will be unavailable, reserved either for Russian taskings or for countering insurrection in Xinjiang and Tibet. The majority of forces are located further from the Indian border, posing a striking contrast with the majority of forward-deployed Indian forces with a single China defense mission. The new joint Western Theater Command is estimated to hold around 90,000-120,000 troops, principally divided into the 76th and 77th Group Armies. These Group Armies are headquartered towards the interior of Western China, in Chongqing and Baoji respectively. Because of ongoing unrest in Tibet and Xinjiang, the Western Theater Command’s ground operational authority does not extend to these regions. Instead, a special PLA Army-directed Military District has been created for each of these regions. In Tibet, the region closest to Indian border areas, the PLA presence is judged to number just 40,000 troops. More numerous forces are located in the Xinjiang region north of Tibet, totaling around 70,000. This means that China is regularly operating with a permanent Indian conventional force advantage along its border areas. In the event of a major standoff or conflict with India, it would have to rely upon mobilization primarily from Xinjiang and secondarily from the Western Theater Command forces deeper in China’s interior. By contrast, Indian forces are already largely in position. The PLA Air Force (PLAAF) also suffers from a numerical disparity to the IAF in the border region. Unlike the tripartite organizational division of Chinese ground forces facing India, the Western Theater Command has assumed control of all regional strike aircraft. In total, this amounts to around 157 fighters and a varied drone armory. This includes an estimated 20 GJ-1/WD-1K precision strike UAVs, 12 WD-1 ground attack and reconnaissance UAVs, 12 WD-1 precision strike UAVs, and 8 EA-03 reconnaissance and electronic warfare UAVs. A proportion of these are reserved for Russia-centric missions. By comparison, as noted earlier, the Indian Eastern Air Command can field around 101 fighters against China alone. China also uses eight airbases and airfields relevant to India strike missions, although a majority are civilian airports that can be commandeered in wartime. Other comparative weaknesses permeate the PLAAF’s posture against India. On a strict comparison of available 4th generation fighters, authoritative assessments hold that China’s J-10 fighter is technically comparable to India’s Mirage-2000, and that the Indian Su-30MKI is superior to all theater Chinese fighters, including the additional J-11 and Su-27 models. China hosts a total of around 101 4th-generation fighters in the theater, of which a proportion must be retained for Russian defense, while India has around 122 of its comparable models, solely directed at China. The high altitude of Chinese air bases in Tibet and Xinjiang, plus the generally difficult geographic and weather conditions of the region, means that Chinese fighters are limited to carrying around half their design payload and fuel. In-flight refueling would be required for PLAAF forces to maximize their strike capacity. China had only inducted 15 such tanker aircraft nationally as of 2022, meaning only a handful of its forces will benefit from this solution. Against these underpowered fighters, IAF forces will launch from bases and airfields unaffected by these geographic conditions, with maximum payload and fuel capabilities. The most significant PLAAF forward air bases and airfields near Indian border areas—which will be pivotal in combat operations—are located at Hotan, Lhasa/Gonggar, Ngari-Gunsa, and Xigaze. Each hosts regular PLAAF detachments, and these are the nearest facilities to Indian targets in Kashmir, northern India, and northeast India. They are vulnerable to a dedicated Indian offensive. Ngari-Gunsa and Xigaze reportedly have no hardened shelters or blast pens for their aircraft, which sit in the open.Lhasa/Gonggar has recently developed hardened shelters able to protect up to 36 aircraft, while Hotan reportedly hosts “two aircraft shelters” of unknown capacity. An Indian early initiative to destroy or incapacitate these four bases—and achieve air superiority over them—would compel China to rely more upon aircraft from its rear-area bases, exacerbating its limited fuel and payload problems. Moreover, China lacks the redundancy and related force survivability compared to India in their comparative numbers of regional air bases. In sum, India has a stronger regional air position, with “a large number of airfields in the east and west, so even if some airfields are down, operations can continue from other locations.
Experience shortcomings that are not shared by the IAF amplify China’s air disadvantage. Recent PLAAF exercises with unscripted scenarios have found that pilots are excessively reliant upon ground control for tactical direction. In unanticipated combat scenarios, this dependence on explicit control tower guidance becomes extreme, while “ground commands” are simultaneously often unable to keep up with the complex and changeable air situation.

This suggests that PLAAF combat proficiency may be significantly weaker than often estimated. Progressive base hardening in the eastern US-facing PLAAF facilities has reduced this risk in that area. A lack of similar measures in the India-facing west suggests that Indian destruction or temporary incapacitation of some of the four above air bases would further exacerbate these PLAAF operational inflexibilities and weaknesses. Recognizing this dilemma, instead of a regional aircraft offensive, Chinese strategic planners envision early long-range missile strikes against Indian air bases in the event of conflict. However, India benefits from the greater number and redundancy of regional air bases, and the daunting number of Chinese missiles that would be required to truly incapacitate relevant IAF forces. High number of disparate targets per air base, the requirement for at least two missiles per target, and the ability of base officials to repave the blast crater with quick-drying concrete within six hours, has articulated the operational problem: To keep one airfield shut for 24 hours, the PLAAF will require 220 ballistic missiles. This will not make any difference to IAF operations in the east or in the west since the IAF has a large number of other operational airfields to operate from. If the PLAAF attacks just three airfields, it will require 660 ballistic missiles per day for attacking the runway and taxi track alone. China’s stock of 1,000-1,200 MRBMs/SRBMs will be over in less than two days when attacking just three airfields, with no other major target systems like C2 centres or air defence units being addressed. India began its process of integrating runway replacement fiberglass mats into its base defense systems, meaning it was likely calculated. However, India is presently inducting these fiberglass mats and associated paving equipment, which will further reduce its runway reconstitution timeframe.It is therefore unlikely that the numerous PLAAF disadvantages detailed above can be overcome by China’s superior missile forces. This is critical beyond the air competition itself: In any India China conflict, the PLA cannot launch an attack without the support of the PLAAF.To address its force shortfalls in the event of war, China could surge air and ground forces from its interior toward the border. However, what our analysis suggests is that the IAF’s superiority would mean that critical logistical routes—such as air bases and military road and rail links—could be cut by bombing or standoff missile strikes, limiting the extent to which China’s position could be reinforced. Such a Chinese surge would also attract attention from the United States, which would alert India and enable it to counter-mobilize its own additional forces from its interior.
You need to stop using indian analysis when its so outright, and obviously terrible.
if you must post indian sources at least post something that is plausible instead of actual garbage.

your article talks about incapatitating 4 chinese air bases, almost like its a given and without effort, but then goes on to claim that to keep even 1 indian airbase shut down, it would take 220 SRBMs per day. never mind that, that number is pulled out of their ***, how many SRBMs does india have to keep chinese air bases shut down? or does your article think only india has access to quick-drying concrete? what about those tens of thousands of chinese long range rocket artilery?

it also makes the hilarious claims that Su-30MKI is superior to all theater Chinese fighters.
that alone tells me that your article is worthless nationalistic chest thumping meant only for domestic idiots.

in no universe is the su-30 mki with its outdated BARS PESA armed with R-77 better than the j-11BG/D j-16 armed with 1900 T/R AESA and PL-15. never mind that the western threater command has j-20 now.

im not gonna bother reading more of that trash article that this.
 

walterbibikow

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it also makes the hilarious claims that Su-30MKI is superior to all theater Chinese fighters.
that alone tells me that your article is worthless nationalistic chest thumping meant only for domestic idiots.

in no universe is the su-30 mki with its outdated BARS PESA armed with R-77 better than the j-11BG/D j-16 armed with 1900 T/R AESA and PL-15. never mind that the western threater command has j-20 now
Are you blind or retarded? I've already given the link of Hindustan Times where it has been clearly said that Astra missile contract will reduce India's dependency on Russian R-77 and Israeli Derby beyond-visual-range missiles. As far as avionics are concerned, SU-30 MKI is now equipped with DRDO developed Dhruti DR-118 RWR
Integration of the Indian fighter fleets with superior Israeli Software Defined Radios (BNET-AR/Global-Link) now stands complete. Pilots can communicate with each other without been eavesdropped by the rival pilots in the vicinity.
Su-30MKI also now features an indigenous ANS-1100A VOR/ILS System that helps aircraft navigate by using fixed ground-based beacons when coming for landing and an Upgraded RAM-1701AS Radio Altimeter which aids Pilot to carry out low level or night flight below 2500 feet.

It's worth noting that N011M is not simply a PESA, but instead, it's a transition between PESA and AESA in that it adopts technologies from both: each transceiver on the antenna array of N011M has its own receiver amplifier, which is the same as AESA, and with noise level of 3dB, which is also in the same class of AESA arrays. However, for transmitting, N011M uses PESA technology in that a single Chelnok traveling wave tube is used for EGSP-6A transmitter. There are three receiving channels for N011M
 
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SIPRA

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"They are so midiocre, yet they are so confident". :partay:

Indians are the most delusional lot on the globe. We Pakistanis also have those traits, but at a far lesser level.😂😂😂

Are you blind or retarded? I've already given the link of Hindustan Times where it has been clearly said that Astra missile contract will reduce India's dependency on Russian R-77 and Israeli Derby beyond-visual-range missiles. As far as avionics are concerned, SU-30 MKI is now equipped with DRDO developed Dhruti DR-118 RWR
Integration of the Indian fighter fleets with superior Israeli Software Defined Radios (BNET-AR/Global-Link) now stands complete. Pilots can communicate with each other without been eavesdropped by the rival pilots in the vicinity.
Su-30MKI also now features an indigenous ANS-1100A VOR/ILS System that helps aircraft navigate by using fixed ground-based beacons when coming for landing and an Upgraded RAM-1701AS Radio Altimeter which aids Pilot to carry out low level or night flight below 2500 feet.

It's worth noting that N011M is not simply a PESA, but instead, it's a transition between PESA and AESA in that it adopts technologies from both: each transceiver on the antenna array of N011M has its own receiver amplifier, which is the same as AESA, and with noise level of 3dB, which is also in the same class of AESA arrays. However, for transmitting, N011M uses PESA technology in that a single Chelnok traveling wave tube is used for EGSP-6A transmitter. There are three receiving channels for N011M

Array Bhai: Aap nay phir aik aur Mahabharat chhairh di.😛😛😛
 

Dungeness

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That's because Pakistan has always had less to be delusional about.

Like CPEC is still alive and will change the fortunes of the country.


Too much delusions make India a laughing stock in the world.

From "Superpower by 2012" to "Super-supercomputer by 2017" , or "Manned space flight by 2015"....... :partay:

You never cease to amuse. :cheesy:
 

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