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Featured Pakistan Navy Type 054AP Frigates - Update, News & Discussion

ziaulislam

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There is a lot more to AAW than just how many missiles you carry and their range. Otherwise, Type 045 wouldn't be considered one of the premier area defence destroyers out there.

One pro for Type 054A is that everything is produced inside China and all the subsystems are very mature. So once PN gets the ship, there shouldn't be too many teething issues that you would see with a new platform. I have no knowledge of what Indian built ships look like inside, but 054A combat system should be much newer than what you would see in a Russian built ship like Talwar class. You also wouldn't see any integration issues with using missiles, radar and ESM suites from different countries. That to me is something that I think always plagued Indian ships.

Having said all of this, it's not wise to dismiss IN surface fleet. Given the rather high requirements that Israeli Navy will likely have, I'm sure Barak-1 short range SAM will be very good at close in defence and probably better than even the Type 1130 CIWSs on Type 054A. Again, without knowing how well things are integrated on Shivalik, it's hard to say. Compared to Shivalik, Type 054As advantage is having a VLS system vs traditional launcher, since you can launch missiles faster. The illuminators and search radar should also be better than the Russian ones. But both HQ-16 and Shtil suffer from having to rely on illuminators. The main problem facing Shivalik is integration both Russians and Israeli weapons. I don't know what kind of sensor fusion they can have in this case. In the case of PLAN, they should theoretically have sensor fusion between the long range radar, main search radar, the illuminators and the x band radar on CIWS. And theoretically, there should be sensor fusion between the Chinese ships and possibly even with land based aircraft assets. Again, we do not know how much progress China has made in this front on 054A since they are not the primary air defence ships in PLAN.

If we look beyond Shivalik class, IN's newer ships with 32-cell Barak 8 air defense which would give them medium to long range air defense. While they will undoubtedly suffer from combining Russian/Israeli air defense systems, these ships should provide wider air defense umbrella than what 054A can provide. Given how much resources IN has, it's an indictment that project 15A and the new Project 17A (both larger ships) don't have much of an advantage over Type 054AP in AAW or ASuW.

For PN, there is no guarantee that IN will continue to squander the resource advantage it has. So, PN has to continue thinking about how to provide enough deterrent to prevent a IN blockade. The 4 054APs are a good first step. More conventional submarines are good to. I'm not a fan of purchasing more small ships. As PLAN continue its unprecedented buildup, PN should continue to make opportunistic purchases from China. That could come in the form of more 054APs or buying used 054As which probably still have a lot of service life.
Best approach will be focus on babur class and get 4 more ships of type 54 but with better air to air missle/RAM
But that may bump the cost

PN may simply find next mass oroduce ship as cost effective
 

AZADPAKISTAN2009

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First Ship Delivered :pakistan: :china:

What is status of the

  • Second Ship
  • Third Ship
  • Fourth Ship

  • Was seeing articles , 2nd, 3rd and 4th Ships are now in Water
  • Sea Trials
 

MastanKhan

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Hi,

I see that posters are dreaming too far ahead too soon.

You kids need to understand that it will take about 2-5 years for the crews to know the machine well and operate it to the best of its abilities by the end or around 4-5 years mark.

You simply just don't jump on a ship and get going.

For the same reason---you don't keep changing ships on the run.

The military equipment is based on tested, reliable, available where TESTED & RELIABLE overcomes show and pomp.

There is a reason the PAF like the RD93---.
 
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FuturePAF

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Best approach will be focus on babur class and get 4 more ships of type 54 but with better air to air missle/RAM
But that may bump the cost

PN may simply find next mass oroduce ship as cost effective
Probably best to go for a follow up design to the Type 054A; a Type 054B (aka Type 057 Frigate) as it were. Once the Chinese start build that design and work out the teething issues it will probably be mature enough to consider. In the meantime our crews and commanders can get accustomed to the Type 054A/P and point out what their needs are more succinctly, which will hopefully call for a slightly larger design with the universal VLS and long enough range missiles (150+ km range, like an improved version of the 9m96e2) to knock out threats in their mid-course and not terminal phase.

Hopefully in time the newer but smaller radar (as on newer AEGIS ships) on a type 057 Mount will be as powerful as the radar on the Type 052DL, and with the 48 universal cells, the type 057 will be able to carry an equal number of missiles to the Type 052DL using quad packing.

 
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khansaheeb

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We need to test the defense systems of these Chinese ships by attacking them with all variety of weaponry and multitude of missiles/torpedoes/shells armed with paint as warheads. Our ships and crews need to be ready for the challenges ahead. Let us see if they are fit for purpose.
 

ARMalik

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We need to test the defense systems of these Chinese ships by attacking them with all variety of weaponry and multitude of missiles/torpedoes/shells armed with paint as warheads. Our ships and crews need to be ready for the challenges ahead. Let us see if they are fit for purpose.

Done and dusted.
 

khansaheeb

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Let's just say It was done during the evaluation process many moons ago in China. There is a reason why Type 054 is in such large numbers in PLN.
I am talking about a creating real simultaneous attacks by air , ships and submarines and not under controlled conditions. Lets give PAF, PA, and PN special ammo and hit test ship how it lives up to it's specs and eliminate the weaknesses in training and technology. If it has already been done then great else it must be done.
 

Ibr0kEmYrAz0r

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I am talking about a creating real simultaneous attacks by air , ships and submarines and not under controlled conditions. Lets give PAF, PA, and PN special ammo and hit test ship how it lives up to it's specs and eliminate the loyedweaknesses in training and technology. If it has already been done then great else it must be done.
To perform those tasks well would probably be expected by a Cruiser/AAW Destroyer instead of on a 4000-tonnes general-purpose Frigate with median-range AAW abilities...

Sure, live-fire exercise (LFX) + training rounds can be deployed, but they usually are aimed at the other way around, at drones/small boats/target ships/decommissioned ships from the newly-acquired frigate; you just don't fire directly at a brand-new just-commissioned ship, no matter how "special" your magic ammos/missiles are supposed to be. That's just ludicrous!

Anyway, the ship's crew has yet to fully master her capabilities; being inducted into service does not mean the ship has reached the Initial operating capability (IOC), let alone full operating capability (FOC). There are months/years ahead before you even attempt to put a ship into such intense combat (simulated) situation.
 

khansaheeb

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To perform those tasks well would probably be expected by a Cruiser/AAW Destroyer instead of on a 4000-tonnes general-purpose Frigate with median-range AAW abilities...

Sure, live-fire exercise (LFX) + training rounds can be deployed, but they usually are aimed at the other way around, at drones/small boats/target ships/decommissioned ships from the newly-acquired frigate; you just don't fire directly at a brand-new just-commissioned ship, no matter how "special" your magic ammos/missiles are supposed to be. That's just ludicrous!

Anyway, the ship's crew has yet to fully master her capabilities; being inducted into service does not mean the ship has reached the Initial operating capability (IOC), let alone full operating capability (FOC). There are months/years ahead before you even attempt to put a ship into such intense combat (simulated) situation.
I remember what happened to HMS Sheffield. As I was a great fan of the ship and the adverts for the navy was it can do this and it can do that: fight ships, aircrafts and submarines at the same time. My heart sank when Sheffield was sunk by a few third world planes and Exocet missiles. We need to learn the lessons
To perform those tasks well would probably be expected by a Cruiser/AAW Destroyer instead of on a 4000-tonnes general-purpose Frigate with median-range AAW abilities...

Sure, live-fire exercise (LFX) + training rounds can be deployed, but they usually are aimed at the other way around, at drones/small boats/target ships/decommissioned ships from the newly-acquired frigate; you just don't fire directly at a brand-new just-commissioned ship, no matter how "special" your magic ammos/missiles are supposed to be. That's just ludicrous!

Anyway, the ship's crew has yet to fully master her capabilities; being inducted into service does not mean the ship has reached the Initial operating capability (IOC), let alone full operating capability (FOC). There are months/years ahead before you even attempt to put a ship into such intense combat (simulated) situation.

I was thinking more of learning from HMS Sheffield tragedy :-

Sinking[edit]​

Argentinean attack[edit]​


Argentine Navy Dassault-Breguet Super Étendard.
Sheffield was first detected by an Argentine Naval Aviation Lockheed SP-2H Neptune (2-P-112) patrol aircraft at 07:50 on 4 May 1982. The Neptune kept the British ships under surveillance, verifying Sheffield's position again at 08:14 and 08:43. Two Argentine Navy Super Étendards, both armed with AM39 Exocets, took off from Río Grande naval air base at 09:45 and met with an Argentine Air Force KC-130H Hercules tanker to refuel at 10:00. The two aircraft were 3-A-202, piloted by mission commander Capitán de Fragata (Commander) Augusto Bedacarratz, and 3-A-203, piloted by Teniente (Lieutenant) Armando Mayora.[13]

In the two weeks leading up to the attack, Argentinian pilots had been practising tactics against their own ships, including Type 42 destroyers of the same class as Sheffield, and therefore knew the radar horizon, detection distances, and reaction times of the ship radar, as well as the optimal procedure to programme the Exocet missile for a successful attack profile.[14] The technique they used is known colloquially as "Pecking the Lobes", in reference to the aircraft probing the side lobes of the emitting radar using the Radar warning receiver. The aircraft can avoid detection by avoiding the Main lobe of the emitting radar.

At 10:35, the Neptune climbed to 1,170 metres (3,840 ft) and detected one large and two medium-sized contacts. A few minutes later, the Neptune updated the Super Étendards with the positions. Flying at very low altitude, at approximately 10:50 both Super Étendards climbed to 160 metres (520 ft) to verify these contacts, but failed to locate them and returned to low altitude. They later climbed again and after a few seconds of scanning, the targets appeared on their radar screens.[15][16]

Both pilots loaded the coordinates into their weapons systems, returned to low level, and after last minute checks, each launched an AM39 Exocet missile at 11:04 while 20 to 30 miles (32 to 48 km) away from their targets. The Super Étendards did not need to refuel again from the KC-130, which had been waiting, and landed at Río Grande at 12:04.

Supporting the mission were an Argentine Air Force Learjet 35 as a decoy and two IAI Daggers as the KC-130 escorts.[15][16]

On Sheffield[edit]​

At approximately 10:00 on 4 May, Sheffield was at defence watches (second degree readiness), the southernmost of three Type 42 destroyers (the others being HMS Glasgow and Coventry) operating as a forward anti-aircraft picket 18 to 30 miles (29 to 48 km) to the west of the main task force which were south-east of the Falklands. The weather was fair and the sea calm with a 2-metre swell. HMS Invincible which was with the main task force was responsible for Anti-Air Warfare Coordination (AAWC). Sheffield had relieved her sister ship Coventry as the latter was having technical trouble with her Type 965 radar.[17]

Prior to the attack, Sheffield's radar operators had been experiencing difficulty distinguishing Mirage and Super Étendard aircraft, and the destroyer may have lacked effective IFF or radar jamming.[18] Despite intelligence briefings that identified an Exocet attack by Super Étendards as possible, Sheffield had assessed the Exocet threat as overrated for the previous two days, and disregarded another as a false alarm.

As the Type 965 could not detect low-flying aircraft, the two incoming enemy aircraft were not detected flying at 98 feet (30 m).[19] The two planes were detected at a distance of only 40 nautical miles (74 km) by the UAA1, a radar warning receiver. This was then confirmed by the 965M long range aircraft warning radar of Glasgow when the aircraft popped up to 120 feet (37 m) above sea-level for a radar check at 45 nautical miles (83 km).[20] The Glasgow immediately went to action stations, and communicated the warning codeword 'Handbrake' by UHF and HF to all task force ships. The radar contacts were also seen by Invincible, which directed Sea Harriers on combat patrol to investigate, but they detected nothing. The AAWC on Invincible declared the radar contacts as false and left the Air Warning at yellow, instead of raising it to red.[3]

In response to Glasgow's warning, an order to stand to was issued to the crews of the 4.5 inch gun, Sea Dart and 20 mm guns. The aircraft were detected on the forward Type 909 radar but not on the aft set.[3] Sheffield's UAA1 sensor was then blocked by an unauthorised transmission by the ship's satellite communications systems (SCOT). No information was received via data link from Glasgow. Seven seconds later, the first Exocet missile was fired, in response to which Glasgow fired its chaff. Onboard Sheffield, it was not until smoke from the missile was sighted by lookouts that the crew realised they were under attack. The bridge officers did not call the captain to the bridge, made no call to action stations, made no evasive measures, and made no effort to prepare the 4.5-inch gun, the Sea Dart missiles, or order chaff to be fired.[11][10] The antiair warfare officer was called to the operations room by the principal warfare officer, arriving just before the first missile hit.

Two Exocets had been launched, the second missile being sighted by Yarmouth and missing Sheffield, splashing into the sea 0.5 miles (0.43 nmi) off her port beam.[21] The Exocet that struck Sheffield hit her on the starboard side at deck level 2, travelling through the junior ratings' scullery and breaching the Forward Auxiliary Machinery Room/Forward Engine Room bulkhead 2.4 metres (7.9 ft) above the waterline, creating a hole in the hull roughly 1.2 metres (3.9 ft) by 3 metres (9.8 ft). Contemporary accounts suggested that the missile failed to explode, despite disabling the ship's electrical distribution systems and breaching the pressurised sea water fire main. The damage to the fire system severely hampered any firefighting response and eventually doomed the ship to be consumed by the fire.[22]

At the time of the hit, the captain was off duty in his cabin after having previously visited the operations room, while Sheffield's anti-air warfare officer (AAWO) was in the wardroom chatting to the stewards and his assistant was in the heads.[3] Sheffield and Coventry were chatting over UHF and communications ceased until an unidentified message was heard flatly stating, "Sheffield is hit."[17]

Response[edit]​


Burning Sheffield
The flagship, HMS Hermes, dispatched the escorts Arrow and Yarmouth to investigate, and a helicopter was launched. Confusion reigned until Sheffield's Lynx helicopter unexpectedly landed aboard Hermes carrying the air operations officer and operations officer,[17] confirming the strike.

With the main fire fighting systems out of action due to the loss of the fire main the crew were reduced to fighting the fire using portable electrically powered pumps and buckets. The control of firefighting lacked cohesion and was uncoordinated with no emergency HQ being established, while crew members were unclear as to where Command was located. Arrow and Yarmouth assisted in fighting the fire from the outside (to little effect) by stationing themselves to port and starboard respectively.[3]

The crew of Sheffield fought for almost four hours to save the ship before Captain Salt made the decision to abandon ship due to the risk of fires igniting the Sea Dart magazine, the loss of the combat capability of the destroyer, and the exposed position to air attack of Arrow and Yarmouth. Most of the Sheffield's crew climbed over onto Arrow, a few transferred by Gemini RHIB to Yarmouth, while some were taken by helicopter to Hermes.[3] As Sheffield's crew departed in Arrow, Sub-lieutenant Carrington-Wood led the crew in singing "Always Look on the Bright Side of Life" from Monty Python's Life of Brian.[23][24]

Over the next six days from 4 May 1982, as the ship drifted, five inspections were made to see if any equipment was worth salvaging. Orders were issued to shore up the hole in Sheffield's starboard side and tow the ship to South Georgia.[11] Before these orders were issued, the burnt-out hulk had already been taken under tow by Yarmouth. The high seas that the ship was towed through caused slow flooding through the hole in the ship's side, causing a list to starboard and which eventually caused Sheffield to roll over and sink on the edge of the Total Exclusion Zone in 1,000 fathoms (6,000 ft; 1,800 m) of water at 53°04′S 56°56′W on 10 May 1982, the first Royal Navy vessel sunk in action since World War II.[25]

 

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