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Pakistan Navy as an Emerging Deterrent

FuturePAF

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An example which we can learn from Rasool Allah SAW, and early Muslims was that despite them enjoying the full support of Allah with angels at their disposal, they never picked up a fight which they can not win with their faith and human strength, Muslims once manage to hold the entire Arabia by crushing the rebellion in far yemen (riba Wars) then their focus was shifted towards the enemy to west ( Byzantines ) . why I am mentioning this here because a lot of Pakistani's tends to get Jazbati once 1-2 new systems are inducted and then in their excitement they want their country to openly show hostilities to every one or every enemy visible or hidden. Mark my words the day Pakistan induct its first AIP powered Sub which carry babur, many of our countrymen will be threatening half the world from India to US.
Did we learn nothing from the best people who walk the earth and created, managed one of the worlds greatest and largest empire?


on topic, its a good read but i believe that PN is now beyond the deterrence, they are up for big surprise for IN, time for blockades are long gone for IN.
Good point, we need to stay vigilant so we don’t get too jizbati. The PN, especially the Submarine force will have to keep an eye on not just the Indian activities in India, but their extended capabilities further out in the Indian Ocean, including their alliance with France and the use of French bases in the IOR.

 

Goritoes

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Good point, we need to stay vigilant so we don’t get too jizbati. The PN, especially the Submarine force will have to keep an eye on not just the Indian activities in India, but their extended capabilities further out in the Indian Ocean, including their alliance with France and the use of French bases in the IOR.

honestly if i were PN I would not just keep an eye on IN subs but also Israel's one, i won't be surprised that if we hear or see a classified document about Israel subs patrol and spy near Pakistani waters, once we have long endurance AIP equipped subs, than i don't see a issue if PN send them to gulf or even Mediterranean sea or Pacific ocean for intel gathering, everyone does it so should we but problem with us and our people is we get nothing and half of Pakistan gets so riled up that they are ready to face US+NATO+Dajjal+Aliens because we got Babur or 4 subs.
 

PanzerKiel

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Some random thoughts....

The contribution of the navies and air forces of both sides can be decisive in specific situations. Overall, however, since both countries are land powers, the final outcome of wars between them must be decided on land.

In 1971, for example, the Indian Navy blockaded East Pakistan. Pakistan had no reinforcements to spare, nonetheless, the psychological impact of complete and final isolation was considerable. Similarly, the IAF, by overwhelming the small PAF contingent in the East achieved rapid air supremacy. For an army such as Pakistan’s, accustomed to fighting under the secure protection of its active and efficient air force, loss of its air cover proved devastating to morale and operations.

Both these services thus contributed very substantially—perhaps even decisively—to the quick decision in the East. Considering that each day’s delay increased the possibility of United Nations intervention in some form, by helping to ensure a quick war, the two services proved strategically decisive.

The Indian Navy cannot contribute materially to a short war against Pakistan. In a long war it will become a vital actor, because the bulk of war supplies and civilian trade must come by sea.

Pakistan’s maritime strategy is the essence of simplicity:

  • Protect its coast with a combination of Arabian Sea and attacking the Indian Navy as close to its home bases as possible.
  • destroyers in the second-line, ranging upto 250 kilometers or so from the coast.
  • torpedo and missile boats in the third-line, operating close to the coast.
  • maritime reconnaissance aircraft, anti-submarine helicopters, and strike aircraft operating in conjunction with the surface forces.
  • Keep its larger Indian opponent off balance by using its small submarine force to threaten Bombay High and Indian shipping.
This is clearly a strategy of sea denial.

India, on the other hand, will seek to impose its naval will on Pakistan, a strategy of sea control by:
  • Aggressively seeking to attack all Pakistani coastal bases and targets, including the landing of amphibious forces to help the Army achieve strategic results.
  • Seeking to clear the Arabian Sea of all Pakistani shipping, military or civilian.
The dominant reality of the naval balance between the two countries is that sea-denial (Pakistan’ s strategy) is far easier and cheaper to achieve than sea-control (India’s strategy). The situation may be linked to that between Germany and the Allies in World War II. With a much smaller investment in men and equipment, the German Navy neutralized the much larger Allied fleets for almost five year;

India’s strike, power against Pakistan may have increased by a factor of five since 1971, but Pakistan’s ability to defend itself has increased by a factor of—say—twenty. While avoiding more exact comparisons to these figures than justified by the available data, a repeat of the Karachi raid may well be at least three times harder than was the case in 1971.

In 1971, Karachi was a sitting duck because Pakistan had no maritime reconnaissance capability. An ad hoc capability after the attack on Karachi was provided by Pakistan International Airways, akin to using Vayudoot or Indian Airlines to cover Bombay port and naval base. Pakistan had no land-based strike aircraft, nor any anti-ship missiles. The results are a matter of history, even if we dispute as to who inflicted the greater damage on Karachi, the IN or the IAF.

Today the major naval bases of Karachi and Gwader are well protected by anti-ship missiles. A small but adequate, reconnaissance element exists as well. Sea King holicopters, capable of anti- submarine warfare (ASW) and anti-ship missile strikes are available. Long-range strike elements of PAF equipped with AShMs are there. All this makes simply sailing in and blasting Gwader or Karachi impossible.

Today a repeat of 1971 may prove, more expensive to IN than to PN. If IN sends twenty warships to sink three Pakistani warships, and damage the port, but lose four or five of its expensive ships in return, the exchange ratio cannot be considered favorable.

A point to be kept in mind regarding PN's old destroyers equipped with anti ship missiles is that the sophistication lies in the missile, which is basically an inert round till fired, not in the ship.

If IN wants to fight the Pakistan Navy in its home waters, then even the otherwise insignificant Chinese missile boats become deadly. The Pakistan Navy may not be able to attack, except with submarines, but it certainly can defend.

The problem with defending against submarines is that the cost- benefit ratio favors the submarine. This has led the submarine to be a preferred weapon of the weaker naval power. As with any other weapon, no matter how good, numbers themselves are the best force multiplier, and Pakistanis submarines today present a threat more than twice its four, submarines presented in 1971.

The point is not that of quality: IN subs are much superior to Pakistan’s subs. It is instead:

— In 1971 Pakistan had just received its three Daphnes from France and many of the crew, Bengali in origin, had jumped ship before they reached Pakistan, so that the small force was effectively crippled. Today’s force is much more effective.

— Trying to stop a handful of submarines in an area as large as the Bay of Bengal and the Arabian Sea is a losing proposition.
 

FuturePAF

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Some random thoughts....

The contribution of the navies and air forces of both sides can be decisive in specific situations. Overall, however, since both countries are land powers, the final outcome of wars between them must be decided on land.

In 1971, for example, the Indian Navy blockaded East Pakistan. Pakistan had no reinforcements to spare, nonetheless, the psychological impact of complete and final isolation was considerable. Similarly, the IAF, by overwhelming the small PAF contingent in the East achieved rapid air supremacy. For an army such as Pakistan’s, accustomed to fighting under the secure protection of its active and efficient air force, loss of its air cover proved devastating to morale and operations.

Both these services thus contributed very substantially—perhaps even decisively—to the quick decision in the East. Considering that each day’s delay increased the possibility of United Nations intervention in some form, by helping to ensure a quick war, the two services proved strategically decisive.

The Indian Navy cannot contribute materially to a short war against Pakistan. In a long war it will become a vital actor, because the bulk of war supplies and civilian trade must come by sea.

Pakistan’s maritime strategy is the essence of simplicity:

  • Protect its coast with a combination of Arabian Sea and attacking the Indian Navy as close to its home bases as possible.
  • destroyers in the second-line, ranging upto 250 kilometers or so from the coast.
  • torpedo and missile boats in the third-line, operating close to the coast.
  • maritime reconnaissance aircraft, anti-submarine helicopters, and strike aircraft operating in conjunction with the surface forces.
  • Keep its larger Indian opponent off balance by using its small submarine force to threaten Bombay High and Indian shipping.
This is clearly a strategy of sea denial.

India, on the other hand, will seek to impose its naval will on Pakistan, a strategy of sea control by:
  • Aggressively seeking to attack all Pakistani coastal bases and targets, including the landing of amphibious forces to help the Army achieve strategic results.
  • Seeking to clear the Arabian Sea of all Pakistani shipping, military or civilian.
The dominant reality of the naval balance between the two countries is that sea-denial (Pakistan’ s strategy) is far easier and cheaper to achieve than sea-control (India’s strategy). The situation may be linked to that between Germany and the Allies in World War II. With a much smaller investment in men and equipment, the German Navy neutralized the much larger Allied fleets for almost five year;

India’s strike, power against Pakistan may have increased by a factor of five since 1971, but Pakistan’s ability to defend itself has increased by a factor of—say—twenty. While avoiding more exact comparisons to these figures than justified by the available data, a repeat of the Karachi raid may well be at least three times harder than was the case in 1971.

In 1971, Karachi was a sitting duck because Pakistan had no maritime reconnaissance capability. An ad hoc capability after the attack on Karachi was provided by Pakistan International Airways, akin to using Vayudoot or Indian Airlines to cover Bombay port and naval base. Pakistan had no land-based strike aircraft, nor any anti-ship missiles. The results are a matter of history, even if we dispute as to who inflicted the greater damage on Karachi, the IN or the IAF.

Today the major naval bases of Karachi and Gwader are well protected by anti-ship missiles. A small but adequate, reconnaissance element exists as well. Sea King holicopters, capable of anti- submarine warfare (ASW) and anti-ship missile strikes are available. Long-range strike elements of PAF equipped with AShMs are there. All this makes simply sailing in and blasting Gwader or Karachi impossible.

Today a repeat of 1971 may prove, more expensive to IN than to PN. If IN sends twenty warships to sink three Pakistani warships, and damage the port, but lose four or five of its expensive ships in return, the exchange ratio cannot be considered favorable.

A point to be kept in mind regarding PN's old destroyers equipped with anti ship missiles is that the sophistication lies in the missile, which is basically an inert round till fired, not in the ship.

If IN wants to fight the Pakistan Navy in its home waters, then even the otherwise insignificant Chinese missile boats become deadly. The Pakistan Navy may not be able to attack, except with submarines, but it certainly can defend.

The problem with defending against submarines is that the cost- benefit ratio favors the submarine. This has led the submarine to be a preferred weapon of the weaker naval power. As with any other weapon, no matter how good, numbers themselves are the best force multiplier, and Pakistanis submarines today present a threat more than twice its four, submarines presented in 1971.

The point is not that of quality: IN subs are much superior to Pakistan’s subs. It is instead:

— In 1971 Pakistan had just received its three Daphnes from France and many of the crew, Bengali in origin, had jumped ship before they reached Pakistan, so that the small force was effectively crippled. Today’s force is much more effective.

— Trying to stop a handful of submarines in an area as large as the Bay of Bengal and the Arabian Sea is a losing proposition.
Did the deployment of a French carrier battle group between Indian and Pakistani naval assets during the 2002 buildup prevent escalation on the part of the Indians?

I ask, because Chinese assets, while not treaty bound to assist Pakistan, could just by their presence sails from Djibouti and form a small task force between the two nations, and complicate the Indian strategy. In the light of Indian efforts vis a vi the Quad, it would give the PLAN good training against the Indians at the very least.
 

LightUponLight

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Paks by nature are aggressive even if they're equipped only with "sticks"!! Hence, proxy traitors of all sorts and at all levels are introduced by the LGBTs to moderate and modulate them....
Paks might be --- but our leadership is not. Let's be clear.
Babur equipped AIP Subs are exclusively offensive.
Weapons systems are one thing. Posture/doctrine is another.

We are trying to negotiate peace while we are not in a position of strength. This is against all basic laws of power.

We are trying to create peace without raising the price for Indian meddling in Pakistan. Without fear of consequences or tit-for-tat attacks, what real incentive does the Indian security/intel establishment have to stop supporting terror on our soil? None.

This policy is a sorry excuse at a time when Pakistan needed visionary, offensive leadership.

My 2c. Peace.
 

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