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New Axis of Power: Sino-Iranian deal and its Implications

bolo

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UK, France and Australia are beneficiary of their relationship with US. What do you want them to do? They are no where near a position to challenge US, at least in foreseeable future.
Most countries are very realistic.
When Canada had Lester Pearson and P. Trudeau and Jean Chretien they didn't blindly do what the US told them to do. They did what was best for their country.
Since the founding of new China, China could not challenge the US or Soviet Union. Did China become a poodle of US when they were weak? Or they still did things to benefit their country and not blindly follow US orders.
So now America want China to stop made in China 2025 , stop BRI and continue to make low end plastic toys and run cheap brothels for American service men.
Fortunately for you and your country, your leaders are 1000x wiser than the Chinese members on PDF.
 

vi-va

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When Canada had Lester Pearson and P. Trudeau and Jean Chretien they didn't blindly do what the US told them to do. They did what was best for their country.
Since the founding of new China, China could not challenge the US or Soviet Union. Did China become a poodle of US when they were weak? Or they still did things to benefit their country and not blindly follow US orders.
So now America want China to stop made in China 2025 , stop BRI and continue to make low end plastic toys and run cheap brothels for American service men.
Fortunately for you and your country, your leaders are 1000x wiser than the Chinese members on PDF.
China is different. Even India is different. So is Iran, and Korea.

Not every countries will stand up and say no to western power, it's about history, geography, national character, and international environment.

China can say no, because China is too damn big for any invader to digest. When CCP in power, there is no way China will surrender, it's perpetual war and rebellion.

India is protected by Indian Ocean and Himalaya, more importantly, no super power around.

Iran is protected by Persian Gulf and mountainous geography. The western world worried a war with Iran will cut the oil supply, and trapped in Persia for years.

North Korea can say no, because North Korea was backed by China in 1950. No countries dare to cross the 38th parallel north Red Line of China since then.

While Canada won't say no to US, trade and investment bind Canada on US's bandwagon. Also Canada can NOT resist US invasion. No chance. Better sleep with the evil than killed.

Lester Pearson and P. Trudeau were politicians during Cold War, when US is checked and balanced.

Now what will fight for Canada if she was fcuked? No one.
 

bolo

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Lester Pearson and P. Trudeau were politicians during Cold War, when US is checked and balanced.

Now what will fight for Canada if she was fcuked? No one.
US is not going to invade Canada if she disagrees with US in the international stage. Jean Chretien did all that and that was after the cold war.

I'm surprised you don't know your own history. US and Russia hated China. Russia is next door. US have troops in South Korea and Japan. At the same time they were supporting Taiwan. Did you know when China built the first submarine they had to move production to western part because US was capable of bombing eastern China at the time? Perhaps you need to read more history books because not only do you not know China's situation all those years, you so not know alot about Canada or how western countries work. You should just stick to making fun of Indians and Vietnamese.
 
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zectech

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匹夫无罪怀璧其罪--《春秋左传·桓公十年》
Determination to be independence itself MAY be a sin in the eyes of west, especially US. But as well as trillions $$ of oil, it's unforgiving crime in the eyes of west, especially US.


The west, especially US don't care much if Eswatini want independence or hostile to US.


China will sacrifice a lot of foreign relationship in the region and worldwide for this deal. All you enemies will dislike this deal including EU, also China need to get prepared for the consequence.
There is no free lunch, China want the deal, get prepared pay for it.

Iran will leverage this deal to strengthen herself on security, economy, and many others. As well as integrating with the world on trade and investment.

EV is coming, the oil and gas is the Iran's biggest bargaining chip in this decade.

Victory comes from finding opportunities in problems.
China has to sell this to the Europeans as adhering to the JCPOA that Europe wants to save. Somebody has to look out for Iran and Iranian interests so they don't go rogue, blah, blah, blah. China will make sure Iran does not get nukes. If their economy collapses from no trade, this is what caused the rise of Hitler and extreme nationalism. A deal with China and promoting globalism and globalization tempers Iranian nationalism, blah, blah, blah.

China seeks only to make money and foster trade. This is in Europe's interests, blah, blah, blah.
 

925boy

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Iranians are nice people but their foreign policy seems to be more like a cry for attention from America rather than true hostility toward America. It's a bit like North Korea. Their alliance with India failed but to even attempt that should be a red flag for China.
hm....i appreciate your perspective on this, because it it different. But tbh, the way i know Iran doesnt to "cry for attention" from US is the damage Iran has done to US in the Middle East and South East Asia. Even US congress today always mentions the statistics of how many US troops in Iraq were either killed or injured during the 2nd Iraq war. If Iran only wants to cry for attention then why are Iran and US trading in blood?? Your nice proxy on a good leash North Korea on the other hand hasnt hurt any US troops in decades..so i agree they more complain to US for attention..North Korea also has nukes, so it could also "punish" US militarily(maybe) if it wanted, but China has probably told NK not to try it...for now at least.
 

SalarHaqq

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Iranians are nice people but their foreign policy seems to be more like a cry for attention from America rather than true hostility toward America. It's a bit like North Korea.
This is a misconception, my friend.

Firstly, as the previous poster above me reminded, Iran and the US have had an excessively furnished history of direct and indirect mutual confrontation ever since the 1979 Islamic Revolution which overthrew the shah of Iran, an American vassal ruler.

Iran and the US traded military strikes against one another in Lebanon (bombing of the US Marine barracks that killed 241 American servicemen in a single operation), in the waters of the Persian Gulf (the US regime's Praying Mantis operation in support of Saddam Hussein's war effort), in Iraq from the illegal US invasion in 2003 up to this very day. Prior to this, the former US embassy, considered a spy den, was taken over by Iranian students, after which Washington sent special forces to try and free the "embassy" personnel detained in Tehran but the operation failed thanks to an unexpected sand storm that ended up causing an accident and killing involved US troops.

The economic, diplomatic, intelligence and cultural war waged by the US and its allies on Iran is unprecedented in human history. For instance, on "social media" sites such as Twitter or Instagram, the volume of daily news items and posts published by the BBC's Persian-language service, equals something like ten times the amount of posts from the second most prolific foreign language service of the same BBC!

In order to understand the reasons behind Iran's policy towards the US during the Obama years, in particular with the nuclear deal (JCPoA) and Tehran's apparent engagement on a path of negotiation with a view to reducing tensions, you need to fully grasp the inherent characteristics of Iran's system of governance. Like China, Iran hosts a complex polity built upon a several millenia-old imperial basis. However, Iran's political system is properly pluralistic, dual to be precise - much more so than liberal, so-called democracies of the west. While in the west, the deep state, private interest groups as well as international oligarchic networks determine fundamental policy orientations, orientations which rival political formations systematically and wholeheartedly adhere to, in Iran the two political camps are diametrically opposed in their political outlooks as they strive for completely opposite, irreconcilable long term objectives including on the geopolitical front.

The first camp, which we shall call revolutionary, remains loyal to the anti-imperial and revolutionary principles of 1979 rooted in Islamic Iranian civilization: it advocates continued challenging of the zio-American dominated oppressive world order as well as preservation of religious integrity, upholding of national sovereignty, shielding of tradition from technical and scientific evolution, a maximum degree of independence for Iran as well as social justice at the global scale, in line with the tradition of the Imams of Shia Islam and as a way to prepare the ground for the return of the Islamc saviour, the Mahdi.

The second camp can be termed liberal. It consists of an alliance between two major political currents, the so-called centrists and reformists. This camp's political project represents a complete departure from the aforementioned principles and values of the 1979 Revolution. In that sense, it is a revisionist political force that broke with the ideological foundations of the political system in whose framework it operates and which it seeks to subvert from within, shaving and reforming it until it is no longer recognizable. This is the process which hostile foreign powers, to which the liberal Iranian camp serves as a de facto infiltrated fifth column, are referring to as the "normalization of Iran" which they wish to see implemented. We could add that the liberal segment of the Iranian establishment, which surfaced sometime in the late 1980's as a result of domestic shifts and a redefinition of political visions among certain currents within the system, is adopting a thoroughly defeatist, subservient attitude not just towards the US and zionist regimes but also towards international organizations as well as the financial and corporate networks of the global oligarchy. It is perfectly poised to embrace the interference of these foreign powers into Iran's internal affairs and to execute the predefined agendas they impose on nations. Its leading intellectuals and political strategists are content with aping western-inspired secularism, liberalism, civil society activism and so-called defence of human rights.

Hence this liberal faction clearly gravitates around the west from a geopolitical and idelogical point of view, as opposed to the vintage revolutionary forces. During the 2009 fitna that gave rise to divisive protests, in fact an attempt at "colored revolution" backed by the west following Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's reelection as the president, it was supporters of the reformists and centrists who turned the revolutionary slogan "Down with the USA" upside down and started chanting "Down with Russia, down with China" instead. Clearly it is this liberal camp and not the genuine revolutionary one, which aims at ending any and all resistance against the zio-American world order to which it is willing to submit hands down.

It was the same liberals who, in the framework of the Rohani administration, concluded the JCPoA (nuclear deal) with the US, while Rohani declared on state TV his willingness to reach follow on agreements. These plans for additional deals would have focused on regional policy, by which the west aimed to gradually dismantle Iran's region-wide system of alliances with Palestinian armed resistance groups, with Lebanese Hezbollah, with the Syrian government, with Iraqi PMU forces and with Yemen's Ansarallah movement. And on ballistic missile development, which would have caused Iran to bow to western terms on limiting the range and strength of its missile arsenal and on opening up the whole program for inspection by western agents. Both these potential deals would have deprived Iran of two of its main tools of deterrence against any hypothetical zio-American aggression. It is as if Iranian liberals did not learn any lessons from the Iraqi and Libyan examples which unfolded right before their eyes.

To draw a parallel with China's modern history, Iranian liberals of today are nothing like Zhou En-Lai nor like Deng Xiao-Ping (just as Iran's revolutionaries are nothing like the Gang of Four). Think of Iranian liberals as Gorbachev-cum-Yeltsins.

It should be noted that the liberal faction within the Islamic Republic is almost indistinguishible from the exiled anti-Islamic Republic opposition when it comes to their respective goals. This exiled opposition consists of a host of disparate but meanwhile streamlined elements loyal to the overthrown monarchy and its crown prince Reza Pahlavi, to the MKO terrorist cult, to "ethno"-separatist groupings, to small deviant religious currents (both Shia and wahhabi) plus to assorted, politically insignificant leftist and liberal entities.

Although they want the same thing for Iran, exiled anti-IR opposition on the one hand and domestic in-house liberals within the IR on the other are bitterly competing for the disgraceful position of chief executives of the zio-American scheme. While pragmatic elements among US Democrats and EU regimes by and large believe that Iran's domestic liberals have what it takes to succeed, hawkish forces in the west and in the region (from Netanyahu's Likud to MBZ and MBS, from American lib-hawks to neo-cons and trumpists) doubt the capacity of the domestic fifth-column to get the job done and to outsmart the revolutionary core of the IR, preferring to try and provoke a collapse of the political system through assorted pressure campaigns while touting the exiled opposition as a supposed "alternative".

Now, how is power distributed among Iran's institutions and political factions? To keep it as brief as possible: even while Supreme Leader Khamenei and the IRGC belong to the first camp since they are loyal to khomeinist ideology, and even while the revolutionary camp globally retains the upper hand owing to Iran's cleverly thought out constitutional architecture that makes infiltration and subversion of the system extremely difficult despite the system's partly democratic nature (the other part being theocratic), the same revolutionary forces believe in the educational and practical virtues of pluralism, in the sense that in their view, one cannot simply force the people into the path of righteousness through coercion alone.

In effect the founder of the Islamic Republic, Imam Khomeini, derived his legitimacy essentially from the massive popular support he enjoyed as the leader of the Revolution. However, following decades of nonstop, massive counter-revolutionary propaganda by hostile, foreign-based media on a scale unwitnessed anywhere to this day, some segments of public opinion came under the influence of the zio-American vectors of soft war. The challege therefore consisted, in the eyes of the revolutionary camp, in letting these children of the nation find back to the correct path through experience as a means to heighten their political discernment. The Supreme Leader played it very wisely: knowing the nature of the US regime, he knew fully well that the JCPoA was bound to fail, since the regime in Washington and its lackeys cannot be trusted. He also knew that once the JCPoA fails, the liberal project is bound to lose much of its legitimacy in the eyes of the Iranian population. The inevitable subsequent return to a policy in line with the principles of the Revolution, will thus benefit from enhanced popular support once it comes to pass.

This again is consistent with a school of thought within Shia Islam according to which Mahdi will not manifest until the believers show themselves worthy of his return, through their pious actions, social activism and unshakeable faith.

A second reason why the revolutionary camp, the Supreme Leader and the IRGC did not prevent the Rohani adminstration from attempting the JCPoA experience is because they simply didn't have the required resources in terms of political capital to do so. Notwithstanding the fact that they believe in political pedagogy as described above, even if they didn't, they would not have been able to stop the liberals from trying their luck. For while the revolutionary camp stil retains the upper hand overall, its powers are not dictatorial in nature. The Supreme Leader himself will not refrain from issuing his recommendations and directives, but will then act as an arbiter between factions, not as an autocrat. Therefore the revolutionary camp has to accomodate its liberal rivals up to a certain point. Failing which liberals would seek to destabilize the system from within by calling for mass protests "against dictatorship", something that the daughter of former president and influential leader of the centrist faction, Hashemi Rafsanjani, as well as other liberal figures openly threatened with.


Their alliance with India failed but to even attempt that should be a red flag for China.
As for India, Iran has had no full fledged alliance with New Delhi. Whatever relations Tehran established with India, these aren't directed against China. When it comes to adversity, Iran is focused on the zionist regime, NATO powers and to a lesser extent their regional allies. Apart from the flashpoints involving said hostile entities and Iran's own network of allies, Tehran does not like to take sides in regional conflicts unless they directly affect its vital interests or put its elementary security at stake.

Whenever it senses an opportunity to do so, thanks to its working relationships with both sides of such a conflict, Iran offers its mediation and takes initiatives designed to dampen tensions. This could be seen with Iran's diplomatic efforts in the Nagorno-Karabakh war between Armenia and Azerbaijan in the 1990's, or its hopes that the defunct Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline project would have helped encourage a peaceful resolution of some of the issues pitting Islamabad and New Delhi against each other. The fact that Iran termed the project "Peace Pipeline" is an illustration of its posture.

So there is no reason for Beijing to be any more suspicious about Iran's relations with India than it is vis a vis its Russian partner's far more strategic ties to New Delhi.


USA is stupid to push Iran to China. Iran desired to be USA friend. The sin of Iran is her antagonistic position against Israel, and her determination to be independence.
Iran as a whole did not have such a desire when it comes to the US regime. Only the liberal faction within Iran's political system, represented by the Rohani administration did. That same liberal faction would have no issues abandoning the Palestinians to their fate either.

But the Supreme Leader, genuine revolutionary forces and the IRGC are opposed to this and advocate continued resistance against both regimes of Washington and Tel Aviv.

Iran has lost much time on unrequited love with the west, and spurn China for all those nights, forever waiting for the US to return affection.

Again and again, US return Iran with merciless attack.
True but again, courtesy of the liberal administration of Rohani only. The rest of Iran's establishment never agreed with this policy. It's just that Iran is a religious democracy, and that the liberals have accumulated a certain amount of power - not enough to entirely change the system from within like they dream of, but sufficiently to force the hand of the revolutionaries into letting them at least give it a try with the nuclear deal.

Please read my comprehensive reply to our friend Feng Leng for more details.
 
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SalarHaqq

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their real goal is to break Western sanctions and link up with the West on their own terms
Not true.

To begin with, the respective goals pursued by the liberal and revolutionary factions in Iran are diametrical opposites.

Then, as far as revolutionaries are concerned the Supreme Leader made it plain when he spelled it out in no uncertain terms on a variety of occasions: there will be no normalization of ties with the US regime unless and until the latter changes its contemptible behaviour. As examples for these behaviour, US support for the zionist occupational regime in Tel Aviv and US military presence in the Persian Gulf were cited. In other words, conditions for normalization of the relations will not be met anytime soon in the eyes of the revolutionary establishment in Iran.

When it comes to liberals within the IR power structures, they certainly do wish to link up with the west, however, everything about their policy making indicates they are perfectly content in doing so without demanding anything meaningful in return. The text of the JCPoA had been prepared even prior to the start of negotiations by the so-called International Crisis Group (ICG), a Rockefeller Foundation-funded think tank. It was adopted as is with very minor, token changes. Then, on the following Iranian New Year, Rohani adressed the nation on state TV saying he was ready for "JCPoA's 2" (on Iran's ballistic missile force) "and 3" (on Iran's regional presence through its allies), hoping to conclude them soon. The text of the second JCPoA had been readied by the same ICG: it it nothing but a fully fledged disarmament program comparable to what Libya had acquiesced to prior to falling prey to NATO warmongering.

Chances are the Rohani team would have pressured the Supreme Leader and forces loyal to the principles of the 1979 Revolution in hopes of having them reluctantly accept this as well, using his popular mandate and supportive western propaganda beamed into Iran by foreign-controlled Persian-language satellite broadcasters as bargaining chips.

Such is the incommensurable submissiveness of Iran's liberal faction. They are no Dengs, they are no Zhous but potential Yeltsins tenfold. As such they are not interested in ensuring that relations with the west, which they are pushing for, are established on equal terms, they are readily disposed to transfer sovereignty and to make Iran dependent on international institutions.

All to the contrary of the genuine revolutionary forces, who reject ties with the west altogether, unless some highly implausible, fundamental revision of policy entailing total abandonment of imperial endeavours were to occur in the west.
 
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nahtanbob

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hm....i appreciate your perspective on this, because it it different. But tbh, the way i know Iran doesnt to "cry for attention" from US is the damage Iran has done to US in the Middle East and South East Asia. Even US congress today always mentions the statistics of how many US troops in Iraq were either killed or injured during the 2nd Iraq war. If Iran only wants to cry for attention then why are Iran and US trading in blood?? Your nice proxy on a good leash North Korea on the other hand hasnt hurt any US troops in decades..so i agree they more complain to US for attention..North Korea also has nukes, so it could also "punish" US militarily(maybe) if it wanted, but China has probably told NK not to try it...for now at least.
The only way for North Korea to punish USA is to attack American troops in South Korea. South Korea has a pretty powerful military to punch back. South Korea is no pushover

Iraq is one of the few Shia majority Arab states. Bahrain is the other. It is no brainer why Iran wants USA out of Iraq. Iran allied with oil rich Iraq, Syria and Hezbollah is a potent rival to Sunni Arab dominance

Not true.

To begin with, the respective goals pursued by the liberal and revolutionary factions in Iran are diametrical opposites.

Then, as far as revolutionaries are concerned the Supreme Leader made it plain when he spelled it out in no uncertain terms on a variety of occasions: there will be no normalization of ties with the US regime unless and until the latter changes its contemptible behaviour. As examples for these behaviour, US support for the zionist occupational regime in Tel Aviv and US military presence in the Persian Gulf were cited. In other words, conditions for normalization of the relations will not be met anytime soon in the eyes of the revolutionary establishment in Iran.

When it comes to liberals within the IR power structures, they certainly do wish to link up with the west, however, everything about their decisionmaking indicates they are perfectly content in doing so without demanding anything meaningful in return. The text of the JCPoA had been prepared even prior to the start of negotiations by the so-called International Crisis Group (ICG), a Rockefeller Foundation-funded think tank. It was adopted as is with very minor, token changes. Then, on the following Iranian New Year, Rohani adressed the nation on state TV saying he was ready for "JCPoA's 2" (on Iran's ballistic missile force) "and 3" (on Iran's regional presence through its allies), hoping to conclude them soon. The text of the second JCPoA had been readied by the same ICG: it it nothing but a fully fledged disarmament program comparable to what Libya had acquiesced to prior to falling prey to NATO warmongering. Chances are the Rohani team would have pressured the Supreme Leader and forces loyal to the principles of the 1979 Revolution in hope of having them reluctantly accept this as well, using his popular mandate and supportive western propaganda beamed into Iran by foreign-controlled Persian-language satellite broadcasters as bargaining chips.

Such is the incommensurable submissiveness of Iran's liberal faction. They are no Dengs, they are no Zhous but potential Yeltsins tenfold. As such they are not interested in ensuring that relations with the west, which they are pushing for, are established on equal terms, they are readily disposed to transfer sovereignty and to make Iran dependent on international institutions.

All to the contrary of the genuine revolutionary forces, who reject ties with the west altogether, unless some highly implausible, fundamental revision of policy entailing total abandonment of imperial endeavours were to occur in the west.
Iran is too big to be attacked or occupied. Iran is not one man/one family dictatorship like Qadaffi's Libya, Assad's Syria or Saddam's Iraq. Iranian military is somewhat a professional force in service of the state. The power is diffused even among the hardliners and conservatives. The majority of the young Iranians are liberal. The Islamic revolutionaries have to accomodate change in attitudes. There is a reason USA refrained from attacking Iran in spite of Iranian provacations.
 

Feng Leng

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This is a misconception, my friend.

Firstly, as the previous poster above me reminded, Iran and the US have had an excessively furnished history of direct and indirect mutual confrontation ever since the 1979 Islamic Revolution which overthrew the shah of Iran, an American vassal ruler.

Iran and the US traded military strikes against one another in Lebanon (bombing of the US Marine barracks that killed 241 American troops in a single operation), in the waters of the Persian Gulf (the US regime's Praying Mantis operation in support of Saddam Hussein's war effort), in Iraq from the illegal US invasion in 2003 up to this very day.

The economic, diplomatic, intelligence and cultural war waged by the US and its allies on Iran is unprecedented in human history. For instance, on "social media" sites such as Twitter or Instagram, the volume of daily news items and posts published by the BBC's Persian-language service, equals something like ten times the amount of posts from the second most prolific foreign language service of the same BBC!

In order to understand the reasons behind Iran's policy towards the US during the Obama years, in particular with the nuclear deal (JCPoA) and Tehran's apparent engagement on a path of negotiation with a view to reducing tensions, you need to fully grasp the inherent characteristics of Iran's system of governance. Like China, Iran hosts a complex polity built upon a several millenia-old imperial basis. However, Iran's political system is properly pluralistic, dual to be precise - much more so than liberal, so-called democracies of the west. While in the west, the deep state, private interest groups as well as international oligarchic networks determine fundamental policy orientations that rival political formations systematically and wholeheartedly adhere to, in Iran the two political camps are diametrically opposed in their political outlooks as they strive for completely opposite, irreconcilable long term objectives including on the geopolitical front.

The first camp, which we shall call revolutionary, remains loyal to the anti-imperial and revolutionary principles of 1979 rooted in Islamic Iranian civilization: it advocates continued challenging of the zio-American dominated oppressive world order as well as preservation of religious integrity, upholding of national sovereignty, shielding of tradition from technical and scientific evolution, a maximum degree of independence for Iran as well as social justice at the global scale, in line with the tradition of the Imams of Shia Islam and as a way to prepare the ground for the return of the Islamc saviour, the Mahdi.

The second camp can be termed liberal. It consists of an alliance between two major political currents, the so-called centrists and reformists. This camp's political project represents a complete departure from the aforementioned principles and values of the 1979 Revolution. In that sense, it is a revisionist political force that broke with the ideological foundations of the political system in whose framework it operates and which it seeks to subvert from within, shaving and reforming it until it is no longer recognizable. This is the process which hostile foreign powers, to which the liberal Iranian camp serves as a de facto infiltrated fifth column, are referring to as the "normalization of Iran" which they wish to see implemented. We could add that the liberal segment of the Iranian establishment, which surfaced sometime in the late 1980's as a result of domestic shifts and a redefinition of political visions among certain currents within the system, is adopting a thoroughly defeatist, subservient attitude not just towards the US and zionist regimes but also towards international organizations as well as the financial and corporate networks of the global oligarchy. It is perfectly poised to embrace the interference of these foreign powers into Iran's internal affairs and to execute the predefined agendas they impose on nations. Its leading intellectuals and political strategists are content with aping western-inspired secularism, liberalism, civil society activism and so-called defence of human rights.

Hence this liberal faction clearly gravitates around the west from a geopolitical and idelogical point of view, as opposed to the vintage revolutionary forces. During the 2009 fitna that gave rise to divisive protests, in fact an attempt at "colored revolution" backed by the west following Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's reelection as the president, it was supporters of the reformists and centrists who turned the revolutionary slogan "Down with the USA" upside down and started chanting "Down with Russia, down with China" instead. Clearly it is this liberal camp and not the genuine revolutionary one, which aims at ending any and all resistance against the zio-American world order to which it is willing to submit hands down.

It was the same liberals who, in the framework of the Rohani administration, concluded the JCPoA (nuclear deal) with the US, while Rohani declared on state TV his willingness to reach follow on agreements. These plans for additional deals would have focused on regional policy, by which the west aimed to gradually dismantle Iran's region-wide system of alliances with Palestinian armed resistance groups, with Lebanese Hezbollah, with the Syrian government, with Iraqi PMU forces and with Yemen's Ansarallah movement. And on ballistic missile development, which would have caused Iran to bow to western terms on limiting the range and strength of its missile arsenal and on opening up the whole program for inspection by western agents. Both these potential deals would have deprived Iran of two of its main tools of deterrence against any hypothetical zio-American aggression. It is as if Iranian liberals did not learn any lessons from the Iraqi and Libyan examples which unfolded right before their eyes.

To draw a parallel with China's modern history, Iranian liberals of today are nothing like Zhou En-Lai nor like Deng Xiao-Ping (just as Iran's revolutionaries are nothing like the Gang of Four). Think of Iranian liberals as Gorbachev-cum-Yeltsins.

It should be noted that the liberal faction within the Islamic Republic is almost indistinguishible from the exiled anti-Islamic Republic opposition when it comes to their respective goals. This exiled opposition consists of a host of disparate but meanwhile streamlined elements loyal to the overthrown monarchy and its crown prince Reza Pahlavi, to the MKO terrorist cult, to "ethno"-separatist groupings, to small deviant religious currents (both Shia and wahhabi) plus to assorted, politically insignificant leftist and liberal entities.

Although they want the same thing for Iran, exiled anti-IR opposition on the one hand and domestic in-house liberals within the IR on the other are competing for the disgraceful position of chief executives of the zio-American scheme. While pragmatic elements among US Democrats and EU regimes by and large believe that Iran's domestic liberals have what it takes to succeed, hawkish forces in the west and in the region (from Netanyahu's Likud to MBZ and MBS, from American lib-hawks to neo-cons and trumpists) doubt the capacity of the domestic fifth-column to get the job done and to outsmart the revolutionary core of the IR, preferring to try and provoke a collapse of the political system through assorted pressure campaigns while touting the exiled opposition as a supposed "alternative".

Now, how is power distributed among Iran's institutions and political factions? To keep it as brief as possible: even while Supreme Leader Khamenei and the IRGC belong to the first camp since they are loyal to khomeinist ideology, and even while the revolutionary camp globally retains the upper hand owing to Iran's cleverly thought out constitutional architecture that makes infiltration and subversion of the system extremely difficult despite the system's partly democratic nature (the other part being theocratic), the same revolutionary forces believe in the educational and practical virtues of pluralism, in the sense that in their view, one cannot simply force the people into the path of righteousness through coercion alone.

In effect the founder of the Islamic Republic, Imam Khomeini, derived his legitimacy essentially from the massive popular support he enjoyed as the leader of the Revolution. However, following decades of nonstop, massive counter-revolutionary propaganda by hostile, foreign-based media on a scale unwitnessed anywhere to this day, some segments of public opinion came under the influence of the zio-American vectors of soft war. The challege therefore consisted, in the eyes of the revolutionary camp, in letting these children of the nation find back to the correct path through experience as a means to heighten their political discernment. The Supreme Leader played it very wisely: knowing the nature of the US regime, he knew fully well that the JCPoA was bound to fail, since the regime in Washington and its lackeys cannot be trusted. He also knew that once the JCPoA fails, the liberal project is bound to lose much of its legitimacy in the eyes of the Iranian population. The inevitable subsequent return to a policy in line with the principles of the Revolution, will thus benefit from enhanced popular support once it comes to pass.

This again is consistent with a school of thought within Shia Islam according to which Mahdi will not manifest until the believers show themselves worthy of his return, through their pious actions, social activism and unshakeable faith.

A second reason why the revolutionary camp, the Supreme Leader and the IRGC did not prevent the Rohani adminstration from attempting the JCPoA experience is because they simply didn't have the required resources in terms of political capital to do so. Notwithstanding the fact that they believe in political pedagogy as described above, even if they didn't, they would not have been able to stop the liberals from trying their luck. For while the revolutionary camp stil retains the upper hand overall, its powers are not of dictatorial nature. The Supreme Leader himself will not refrain from issuing his recommendations and directives, but will then act as an arbiter between factions, not as an autocrat. Therefore the revolutionary camp has to accomodate its liberal rivals up to a certain point. Failing which liberals would seek to destabilize the system from within by calling for mass protests "against dictatorship", something that the daughter of former president and influential leader of the centrist faction, Hashemi Rafsanjani, as well as other liberal figures openly threatened with.

---------

As for India, Iran had no full fledged alliance with New Delhi. Whatever relations Tehran established with India, these aren't directed against China. When it comes to adversity, Iran is focused on the zionist regime, NATO powers and to a lesser extent their regional allies. Apart from the flashpoints involving said hostile entities and Iran's own network of allies, Tehran does not like to take sides in regional conflicts unless they directly affect its vital interests or put its elementary security at stake.

Whenever it senses an opportunity to do so, thanks to its working relationships with both sides of such a conflict, Iran offers its mediation and takes initiatives designed to dampen tensions. This could be seen with Iran's diplomatic efforts in the Nagorno-Karabakh war between Armenia and Azerbaijan in the 1990's, or its hopes that the defunct Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline project would have helped encourage a peaceful resolution of some of the issues pitting these two states against each other.

So there is no reason for China to be any more suspicious about Iran's relations with India than it is vis a vis its Russian partner's far more strategic ties to New Delhi.




Iran as a whole did not have such a desire when it comes to the US regime. Only the liberal faction within Iran's political system, represented by the Rohani administration did. That same liberal faction would have no issues abandoning the Palestinians to their fate either.

But the Supreme Leader, genuine revolutionary forces and the IRGC are opposed to this and advocate continued resistance against both regimes of Washington and Tel Aviv.




True but again, courtesy of the liberal administration of Rohani only. The rest of Iran's establishment never agreed with this policy. It's just that Iran is a religious democracy, and that the liberals have accumulated a certain amount of power - not enough to entirely change the system from within like they dream of, but sufficiently to force the hand of the revolutionaries into letting them at least give it a try with the nuclear deal.

Please read my comprehensive reply to our friend Feng Leng for more details.
Thanks for the insight. This explains why Iran acts in a "schizophrenic way" in term of its foreign policy. One moment, people are on the streets shouting "down with the Great Satan." The next moment, Iranian leaders are trying to integrate themselves fully into the Western system with all its multinationals.

From the Chinese perspective, I reckon the liberals in Iran are the wealthy people (mainly landowners) and they find American material consumption attractive. They think everybody else who is not wealthy is holding them back from pursuing American material consumption. By integrating closer to the Chinese economy, this raises everybody's standard of living, the American sanctions lose their bite and the liberal faction loses support and legitimacy.
 

vi-va

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US is not going to invade Canada if she disagrees with US in the international stage. Jean Chretien did all that and that was after the cold war.

I'm surprised you don't know your own history. US and Russia hated China. Russia is next door. US have troops in South Korea and Japan. At the same time they were supporting Taiwan. Did you know when China built the first submarine they had to move production to western part because US was capable of bombing eastern China at the time? Perhaps you need to read more history books because not only do you not know China's situation all those years, you so not know alot about Canada or how western countries work. You should just stick to making fun of Indians and Vietnamese.
I mentioned Lester Pearson and P. Trudeau was in Cold War situation when US was balanced and checked. Especially P. Trudeau who established Canadian diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China in 1970, before the United States did, and went on an official visit to Beijing in 1973.

Jean Chretien was PM right after Cold War. But China had good relationship with US back then. So there was no problem when Jean Chretien seeks close relationship with China.

Justin Trudeau face a very different situation. The relationship with US is far more vital than China for Canada. There is no way Canada can sacrifice the relationship with US for China.

I am very much aware of my own countries history, especially compare with foreigner cause I can read both Chinese and English and do cross check.

China foreign policy is very successful in past decades, we knew our position, we knew our long term interest and deal with it. We knew Taiwan issues very well. Thanks for caring.

China has to sell this to the Europeans as adhering to the JCPOA that Europe wants to save. Somebody has to look out for Iran and Iranian interests so they don't go rogue, blah, blah, blah. China will make sure Iran does not get nukes. If their economy collapses from no trade, this is what caused the rise of Hitler and extreme nationalism. A deal with China and promoting globalism and globalization tempers Iranian nationalism, blah, blah, blah.

China seeks only to make money and foster trade. This is in Europe's interests, blah, blah, blah.
haha, good story. But to be honest. EU is not that easy to be fooled. EU knew Iran strategic position too well.

There will be one day when the west won't pressure Iran that much, when OIL is not needed any more.
 

vi-va

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This is a misconception, my friend.

Firstly, as the previous poster above me reminded, Iran and the US have had an excessively furnished history of direct and indirect mutual confrontation ever since the 1979 Islamic Revolution which overthrew the shah of Iran, an American vassal ruler.

Iran and the US traded military strikes against one another in Lebanon (bombing of the US Marine barracks that killed 241 American troops in a single operation), in the waters of the Persian Gulf (the US regime's Praying Mantis operation in support of Saddam Hussein's war effort), in Iraq from the illegal US invasion in 2003 up to this very day.

The economic, diplomatic, intelligence and cultural war waged by the US and its allies on Iran is unprecedented in human history. For instance, on "social media" sites such as Twitter or Instagram, the volume of daily news items and posts published by the BBC's Persian-language service, equals something like ten times the amount of posts from the second most prolific foreign language service of the same BBC!

In order to understand the reasons behind Iran's policy towards the US during the Obama years, in particular with the nuclear deal (JCPoA) and Tehran's apparent engagement on a path of negotiation with a view to reducing tensions, you need to fully grasp the inherent characteristics of Iran's system of governance. Like China, Iran hosts a complex polity built upon a several millenia-old imperial basis. However, Iran's political system is properly pluralistic, dual to be precise - much more so than liberal, so-called democracies of the west. While in the west, the deep state, private interest groups as well as international oligarchic networks determine fundamental policy orientations that rival political formations systematically and wholeheartedly adhere to, in Iran the two political camps are diametrically opposed in their political outlooks as they strive for completely opposite, irreconcilable long term objectives including on the geopolitical front.

The first camp, which we shall call revolutionary, remains loyal to the anti-imperial and revolutionary principles of 1979 rooted in Islamic Iranian civilization: it advocates continued challenging of the zio-American dominated oppressive world order as well as preservation of religious integrity, upholding of national sovereignty, shielding of tradition from technical and scientific evolution, a maximum degree of independence for Iran as well as social justice at the global scale, in line with the tradition of the Imams of Shia Islam and as a way to prepare the ground for the return of the Islamc saviour, the Mahdi.

The second camp can be termed liberal. It consists of an alliance between two major political currents, the so-called centrists and reformists. This camp's political project represents a complete departure from the aforementioned principles and values of the 1979 Revolution. In that sense, it is a revisionist political force that broke with the ideological foundations of the political system in whose framework it operates and which it seeks to subvert from within, shaving and reforming it until it is no longer recognizable. This is the process which hostile foreign powers, to which the liberal Iranian camp serves as a de facto infiltrated fifth column, are referring to as the "normalization of Iran" which they wish to see implemented. We could add that the liberal segment of the Iranian establishment, which surfaced sometime in the late 1980's as a result of domestic shifts and a redefinition of political visions among certain currents within the system, is adopting a thoroughly defeatist, subservient attitude not just towards the US and zionist regimes but also towards international organizations as well as the financial and corporate networks of the global oligarchy. It is perfectly poised to embrace the interference of these foreign powers into Iran's internal affairs and to execute the predefined agendas they impose on nations. Its leading intellectuals and political strategists are content with aping western-inspired secularism, liberalism, civil society activism and so-called defence of human rights.

Hence this liberal faction clearly gravitates around the west from a geopolitical and idelogical point of view, as opposed to the vintage revolutionary forces. During the 2009 fitna that gave rise to divisive protests, in fact an attempt at "colored revolution" backed by the west following Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's reelection as the president, it was supporters of the reformists and centrists who turned the revolutionary slogan "Down with the USA" upside down and started chanting "Down with Russia, down with China" instead. Clearly it is this liberal camp and not the genuine revolutionary one, which aims at ending any and all resistance against the zio-American world order to which it is willing to submit hands down.

It was the same liberals who, in the framework of the Rohani administration, concluded the JCPoA (nuclear deal) with the US, while Rohani declared on state TV his willingness to reach follow on agreements. These plans for additional deals would have focused on regional policy, by which the west aimed to gradually dismantle Iran's region-wide system of alliances with Palestinian armed resistance groups, with Lebanese Hezbollah, with the Syrian government, with Iraqi PMU forces and with Yemen's Ansarallah movement. And on ballistic missile development, which would have caused Iran to bow to western terms on limiting the range and strength of its missile arsenal and on opening up the whole program for inspection by western agents. Both these potential deals would have deprived Iran of two of its main tools of deterrence against any hypothetical zio-American aggression. It is as if Iranian liberals did not learn any lessons from the Iraqi and Libyan examples which unfolded right before their eyes.

To draw a parallel with China's modern history, Iranian liberals of today are nothing like Zhou En-Lai nor like Deng Xiao-Ping (just as Iran's revolutionaries are nothing like the Gang of Four). Think of Iranian liberals as Gorbachev-cum-Yeltsins.

It should be noted that the liberal faction within the Islamic Republic is almost indistinguishible from the exiled anti-Islamic Republic opposition when it comes to their respective goals. This exiled opposition consists of a host of disparate but meanwhile streamlined elements loyal to the overthrown monarchy and its crown prince Reza Pahlavi, to the MKO terrorist cult, to "ethno"-separatist groupings, to small deviant religious currents (both Shia and wahhabi) plus to assorted, politically insignificant leftist and liberal entities.

Although they want the same thing for Iran, exiled anti-IR opposition on the one hand and domestic in-house liberals within the IR on the other are competing for the disgraceful position of chief executives of the zio-American scheme. While pragmatic elements among US Democrats and EU regimes by and large believe that Iran's domestic liberals have what it takes to succeed, hawkish forces in the west and in the region (from Netanyahu's Likud to MBZ and MBS, from American lib-hawks to neo-cons and trumpists) doubt the capacity of the domestic fifth-column to get the job done and to outsmart the revolutionary core of the IR, preferring to try and provoke a collapse of the political system through assorted pressure campaigns while touting the exiled opposition as a supposed "alternative".

Now, how is power distributed among Iran's institutions and political factions? To keep it as brief as possible: even while Supreme Leader Khamenei and the IRGC belong to the first camp since they are loyal to khomeinist ideology, and even while the revolutionary camp globally retains the upper hand owing to Iran's cleverly thought out constitutional architecture that makes infiltration and subversion of the system extremely difficult despite the system's partly democratic nature (the other part being theocratic), the same revolutionary forces believe in the educational and practical virtues of pluralism, in the sense that in their view, one cannot simply force the people into the path of righteousness through coercion alone.

In effect the founder of the Islamic Republic, Imam Khomeini, derived his legitimacy essentially from the massive popular support he enjoyed as the leader of the Revolution. However, following decades of nonstop, massive counter-revolutionary propaganda by hostile, foreign-based media on a scale unwitnessed anywhere to this day, some segments of public opinion came under the influence of the zio-American vectors of soft war. The challege therefore consisted, in the eyes of the revolutionary camp, in letting these children of the nation find back to the correct path through experience as a means to heighten their political discernment. The Supreme Leader played it very wisely: knowing the nature of the US regime, he knew fully well that the JCPoA was bound to fail, since the regime in Washington and its lackeys cannot be trusted. He also knew that once the JCPoA fails, the liberal project is bound to lose much of its legitimacy in the eyes of the Iranian population. The inevitable subsequent return to a policy in line with the principles of the Revolution, will thus benefit from enhanced popular support once it comes to pass.

This again is consistent with a school of thought within Shia Islam according to which Mahdi will not manifest until the believers show themselves worthy of his return, through their pious actions, social activism and unshakeable faith.

A second reason why the revolutionary camp, the Supreme Leader and the IRGC did not prevent the Rohani adminstration from attempting the JCPoA experience is because they simply didn't have the required resources in terms of political capital to do so. Notwithstanding the fact that they believe in political pedagogy as described above, even if they didn't, they would not have been able to stop the liberals from trying their luck. For while the revolutionary camp stil retains the upper hand overall, its powers are not of dictatorial nature. The Supreme Leader himself will not refrain from issuing his recommendations and directives, but will then act as an arbiter between factions, not as an autocrat. Therefore the revolutionary camp has to accomodate its liberal rivals up to a certain point. Failing which liberals would seek to destabilize the system from within by calling for mass protests "against dictatorship", something that the daughter of former president and influential leader of the centrist faction, Hashemi Rafsanjani, as well as other liberal figures openly threatened with.

---------

As for India, Iran had no full fledged alliance with New Delhi. Whatever relations Tehran established with India, these aren't directed against China. When it comes to adversity, Iran is focused on the zionist regime, NATO powers and to a lesser extent their regional allies. Apart from the flashpoints involving said hostile entities and Iran's own network of allies, Tehran does not like to take sides in regional conflicts unless they directly affect its vital interests or put its elementary security at stake.

Whenever it senses an opportunity to do so, thanks to its working relationships with both sides of such a conflict, Iran offers its mediation and takes initiatives designed to dampen tensions. This could be seen with Iran's diplomatic efforts in the Nagorno-Karabakh war between Armenia and Azerbaijan in the 1990's, or its hopes that the defunct Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline project would have helped encourage a peaceful resolution of some of the issues pitting these two states against each other.

So there is no reason for China to be any more suspicious about Iran's relations with India than it is vis a vis its Russian partner's far more strategic ties to New Delhi.




Iran as a whole did not have such a desire when it comes to the US regime. Only the liberal faction within Iran's political system, represented by the Rohani administration did. That same liberal faction would have no issues abandoning the Palestinians to their fate either.

But the Supreme Leader, genuine revolutionary forces and the IRGC are opposed to this and advocate continued resistance against both regimes of Washington and Tel Aviv.




True but again, courtesy of the liberal administration of Rohani only. The rest of Iran's establishment never agreed with this policy. It's just that Iran is a religious democracy, and that the liberals have accumulated a certain amount of power - not enough to entirely change the system from within like they dream of, but sufficiently to force the hand of the revolutionaries into letting them at least give it a try with the nuclear deal.

Please read my comprehensive reply to our friend Feng Leng for more details.
Although I almost knew most of the content in your post, because my personal hobby on China and Western history.
You said the best above all on the nature of Iran domestic politics.
 

925boy

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Thanks for the insight. This explains why Iran acts in a "schizophrenic way" in term of its foreign policy. One moment, people are on the streets shouting "down with the Great Satan." The next moment, Iranian leaders are trying to integrate themselves fully into the Western system with all its multinationals.

From the Chinese perspective, I reckon the liberals in Iran are the wealthy people (mainly landowners) and they find American material consumption attractive. They think everybody else who is not wealthy is holding them back from pursuing American material consumption. By integrating closer to the Chinese economy, this raises everybody's standard of living, the American sanctions lose their bite and the liberal faction loses support and legitimacy.
But China is in the same situation as Iran then! - CHina tries to act like its America's enemy, but at the end of the day Chinese govt cant feed Chinese citizens without business with America, simple! so lets just accept all countries have hard "pills" to swallow...no sensible, smart country can sacrifice its real practical citizen-focused interest because of ideology...that might not even pay off...smh.
 

Feng Leng

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But China is in the same situation as Iran then! - CHina tries to act like its America's enemy, but at the end of the day Chinese govt cant feed Chinese citizens without business with America, simple! so lets just accept all countries have hard "pills" to swallow...no sensible, smart country can sacrifice its real practical citizen-focused interest because of ideology...that might not even pay off...smh.
China successfully absorbed a lot of technology from the US during the past 30 years. At this point, there isn't much more technology to absorb and even if there was the Americans wouldn't share it so there is not much purpose to continuing to do business with America. The British thought they were exceptional too until nobody wanted the pound sterling anymore.
 

925boy

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China successfully absorbed a lot of technology from the US during the past 30 years. At this point, there isn't much more technology to absorb and even if there was the Americans wouldn't share it so there is not much purpose to continuing to do business with America. The British thought they were exceptional too until nobody wanted the pound sterling anymore.
you dont mean absorb, i think u mean stole? sorry, just being honest...China doesnt seem as able as US at making NEW, scalable, applicable tech as well as US though...if so why did CHinese state spies steal US COVID research and information recently??? sorry, just being honest again. Your J20 is from stolen F22 design, your UAV, is from stolen Predator drone technology, you also stole su-30 tech from Russia to make your J-11...so the list goes ON AND ON...i dont say this to deny China's power today though.
 

Feng Leng

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you dont mean absorb, i think u mean stole? sorry, just being honest...China doesnt seem as able as US at making NEW, scalable, applicable tech as well as US though...if so why did CHinese state spies steal US COVID research and information recently??? sorry, just being honest again. Your J20 is from stolen F22 design, your UAV, is from stolen Predator drone technology, you also stole su-30 tech from Russia to make your J-11...so the list goes ON AND ON...i dont say this to deny China's power today though.
LOL knowledge is not owned by anybody. You can't "steal" knowledge. Everybody is entitled to learn whatever they want from anybody else. Denying this is just an excuse for losing your technological advantage.
 

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