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Military Strategy Anyone?

Discussion in 'Pakistan Army' started by fatman17, May 8, 2011.

  1. fatman17

    fatman17 PDF THINK TANK: CONSULTANT

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    Opinion Capital suggestion

    Dr Farrukh Saleem

    Sunday, May 08, 2011

    On September 3, 2008, helicopter-borne elements of Task Force 88, a ‘hunter-killer special operations team’ tasked to take down Al-Qaeda and the Taliban command structure, conducted a raid deep into Pakistani territory. On September 6, Pakistan closed the Torkham border crossing.

    On February 3, 2009, Nato’s supply route was, once again, shut down after the Taliban detonated explosives and destroyed a vital bridge. On September 30, 2010, Nato crossed into Pakistan and a military checkpoint came under attack. Three Pakistani soldiers were killed. Pakistan shut down Nato’s supply line.

    On April 24, 2011, Imran Khan delivered his ultimatum: “If drone strikes inside Pakistan do not stop within 30 days protestors will block all Nato supply routes across Pakistan.”

    What is our military strategy? They raid deep into our territory; we shut down their supply route. They send in drones; we shut down their supply route. Kerry-Lugar is bad. Raymond Davis is bad – shut down their supply route. They are destabilising Pakistan. They are after our nuclear assets – shut down their supply route.

    Do we have a military strategy? A military strategy is a “set of ideas implemented by military organisations to pursue desired goals.” A military strategy is also defined as the “art and science of employing the armed forces of a nation to secure the objectives of national policy.”

    We seem to have only one antidote to all American poisons. Or do we? What if the lone superpower builds an air-bridge? Remember; the United States Army Air Forces (USAAF) erected the ‘India-China Ferry’ during World War 2. On June 21, 1948, the Soviets blocked a US military supply train to Berlin. The United States Air Forces in Europe (USAFE) erected the great ‘Berlin Airlift’.

    To be certain, there would be a time when America will need neither the Quetta-Chaman-Spin Boldak/Kandahar nor the Khyber Pass channels. What will be our military strategy then?

    Noam Chomsky, the father of modern linguistics and professor emeritus at the MIT, wrote ‘Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media’ in which Chomsky analyses the propaganda model used by secret agencies to ‘manufacture consent’. Revisiting the debate on Kerry-Lugar, Raymond Davis or the ongoing propaganda model regarding drones it is clear that an anti-American sentiment is ‘manufactured’ in an attempt to leverage Pakistan’s negotiating position vis-à-vis the US. This strategy of ‘manufacturing anti-Americanism’ does not serve Pakistan’s long-term national interests and as a military strategy this ‘manufacturing’ will have dangerous repercussions for Pakistan’s civilian population.

    Furthermore, a National Security Strategy woven around the protection of an individual considered to be the ‘most dangerous terrorist’ by the lone superpower is deeply flawed.

    Successful military strategists insist that “however beautiful the strategy, you should occasionally look at the results” and that “in strategy it is important to see distant things as if they were close and to take a distanced view of close things.” What is needed is a comprehensive Swot Analysis of Pakistan’s strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats – and a military strategy based on Swot.



    The writer is a columnist based in Islamabad. Email: farrukh15@hotmail.com
     
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  2. Leader

    Leader ELITE MEMBER

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    leon panetta wants to take a hard line on Pakistan, while Clinton thinks it would lose control over pakistan,

    Pakistan is not a potential target YET.

    I from day one said that there is a clash on strategic thinking between the government of usa, and all powerful CIA.
     
  3. third eye

    third eye ELITE MEMBER

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    No

    Pakistan does not have a military strategy to handle US incursions or Drones. The reason is very simple.

    Pak has been infiltrated almost completely by CIA with the collusion of the ISI who has tried to replicate the Afgan template ( used against Soviets) . Having succeeded thus far it was lulled into complacency assuming what they were doing was the smartest thing - riding two boats simultaneously.

    Next, any military strategy would imply military actions - overt or covert to execute them. Given the compromise levels , lack of trust & the fact that aid from US is a key part in the Pak economy is Pak willing to undertake the near suicidal step and is Pak prepared for the military, economic & political repercussions ?

    However , if a coup takes place in Pak and a anti US leadership steps in then there exists a possibility. The implications as mentioned above remain.
     
  4. fatman17

    fatman17 PDF THINK TANK: CONSULTANT

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    lets assume for a moment and say that the pakistan military was aware of the op taking place (a view i hold) and decides to 'intercept' the US helos and one or two of them are shot down (there is no news of USAF fling CAP over the area) - what would be the 'repurcussions'.

    1- we defended our sovreignity! and does this stance have a short-term or long-term gain?
    2- the US is miffed and annouces to the world that Pakistan has obstructed their effort to take-down OBL! whom would the world believe? US or Pak?

    so the 'prudent' thing to do is to 'stand-down' and let the US take-down OBL - we are already 'willified' in the world and our credibility is next-to-zero anyway. this opens the door for a convergence on a new set of engagement for the future. lets be realistic. our military cannot fight a super-power.

    lets the hits come from our 'chest-thumping' forum members!
     
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  5. muse

    muse ELITE MEMBER

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    Discretion the better part of Pakistani valor?

    OK, lets grant that Pakistan army knew and it's president and premier knew --- So why did they make such a big show of saying they did not know ??

    See, it's more like this, ISI was keeping Osama for a rainy day and the US ripped the ISI off - and in the bargain ended up showing the rest of Pakistan the army of Pakistan is a hollow force that instead of protecting Pakistan as is it's sworn duty, has been negligent in that duty and today offers "discretion the better part of valor".

    Now had the Pakistan army not been in bed with Jihadis for as long as it has been, and had the Pakistan army been more interested in creating a lethal army with no rival in the world, instead of being a political and ideological army.. well, we would have been in a very different Pakistan and a very different Afghanistan and very different Indian and US
     
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  6. Break the Silence

    Break the Silence FULL MEMBER

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    @ fATMAN!
    Just want to ask two question Sir?
    1.Will Pakistan ask USA to leave from their main lands? If yes, then what would be the possible time frame, and if no, then why?
    2. Yesterday, I was watching some news debate on a national channel, there were some notable people arguing each other that if Osama was a terrorist, then what about America? Coz it WAS USA, who created Saddam, Taliban and Osama for their benifits and even Ronald reegan once praised the term "jihad". Those days, Osama and Taliban were freedom fighters, but when they turned against Usa, they became terrorists. So what we have to conclude from it(a political game??), as osama was not a saint , neither Usa.
     
  7. mymeaningislion

    mymeaningislion FULL MEMBER

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    yar all this mess is great game that is being played between all major countries now in this chess pakistan and saudis are turning their back from USA and making new collaboration with russia and china that is alarming for USA because in current state USA has exhausted its resources now to support its economy it need two things..first oil from saudis and second major resources from afganistan and balochistan. with these a side product of non nuclear pakistan is also in the budget of USA. US lost first two objective and for third one its trying hard. and i invite all intellectuals to think and try to understand in the context of whole situation . in current situation pakistan cannot fight directly with USA so a proxy war to be fight in this ISI has done good in afganistan and pakistan. this hoax of osama bin ladin was predicted by our think tank long before it occured but really i admited that the timing shocked us. if any rational person look into the incident of operation against osama it become clear that

    1=it was clearly a hoax because no evidence was provided
    2= the videos released were fake(in which he was portrait as watching his own videos).....look at then the person acting as osama first not facing the camera...second he is consistently grabbing the remote control and keeping his hand in the air it is clear sign of acting no natural instinct third if any psychologist out there will support my argumaent that he combed his bear for as many 10 to 12 time in the video just showing bad acting of osma and more over the persons who have seen osama real one know that in the video he wasnt there ........and i give u additional info that in 2002 a person namely tim nicklson was selected for plastic surgery and in california he was gone through 9 different surgeries and evenually a new osama was made....now come to the videos if u ask me make some what like that i will make in a day or two as it is not difficult at all. ask any movie maker he will tell u cons of footage.

    if u become unbiased and think rationaly u will understand what is going on . and to common people of pakistan i have a msg remember QUAID WORDS UNITY, FAITH and DISCIPLINE and work hard to make ur economy strong so to become self sufficient and doesnt need aid or any other rubbish. and to some west following pakistani youth stop Hippocratic behavior u ur self only shout at top of ur voice against foreign countries but when offered visa or job u sell your patriotism and instead of serving the nation u leave it. and at last to stop corruption we all are responsible the corrupt persons are around us and yet we dont stop them and if one cant stop them break away and dont talk to them make them alone in the society. but we appraise them so collective mistakes make a mess so it is last warning from ALLAHA. get ur self right or u will be replaced and dont blame army ....what area u have left for army....u choose those people those are most incompetent people on the face of earth and army have to take care of security,foreign affairs, economy, infrastructure, and the budget u allocate to army is still very low to the services it provides...


    so think first and then blame others..... message to all pakistanis and my indian friends
     
  8. Developereo

    Developereo ELITE MEMBER

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    Here's what I think happened:

    - Pak did NOT know about Osama.
    - US told Pak (a few minutes before the raid): We are coming in to take out "a" high value terrorist (name withheld). It will be a surgical seal operation at night. No one need know it even occurred. We won't tell. We'll simply claim he was taken out somewhere else.
    - Pak army agreed to stand aside. They didn't have enough time to investigate the identity of the target. A couple of F-16s were scrambled just for show -- in case anyone asked questions later.
    - The US had never intended to keep their word and splashed the news all over the media.
    - Embarrassed, the Pak establishment has been scrambling around to put the best spin.
     
  9. Waffen SS

    Waffen SS BANNED

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    A country where ideology is to be protected at the cost of NATIONAL INTEREST, one has NO ROOM LEFT FOR STRATEGY.

    A military that uses civilians to fight their proxy wars deserves no respect. The term "STRATEGY" is meaningless for such an institution.
     
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  10. mymeaningislion

    mymeaningislion FULL MEMBER

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    i think i should provide some information to u regarding what is happening and i will provide links of american media...wait and see. and blaming pak army wont solve the problem pak army is an institution and it required civil govt to fund it have any civilian govt made efforts to make pakistan financially strong no not at all . so why blaming others instead of taking blame as a nation. as a nation we have to change our attitude first stop evil among our selves then point out others. and if all pakistanis still acted according to planning of CIA ( media is playing very negative role) then u wont be able to with stand treats from inside and outside.

    i will provide links as soon as possible.....takecare and be positive.......america is country not a power from heavens......and most probably a economic disaster soon. i am not saying its own media.
     
  11. fatman17

    fatman17 PDF THINK TANK: CONSULTANT

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    just further validation that the army knew all along!

    Opinion

    Valid bilateral distrust

    Rahimullah Yusufzai

    Tuesday, May 10, 2011

    The world’s biggest, longest and costliest manhunt spread over more than 15 years finally ended on May 2 when President Barack Obama announced that Osama bin Laden has been killed in Pakistan.

    Though many all over the world have questioned the US side of the story and will continue to do so until some convincing proof of Bin Laden’s presence and death in his Abbottabad house is made available, far more important in the context of Pakistan are questions regarding the failure to detect the Al-Qaeda founder’s hideout located in plain sight of the Pakistan Military Academy, Kakul, in an army garrison city and the unchallenged intrusion of US Special Forces into Pakistani territory to eliminate the most wanted man in the world.

    The so-called “red lines” often mentioned by Pakistani authorities were brazenly crossed and there were American boots on the ground, and still Pakistan’s vaunted military didn’t react. Though it wasn’t the first time that the “red lines” were breached, the earlier US intrusions were in the godforsaken tribal regions of South Waziristan and North Waziristan, and not deep inside Pakistan: Abbottabad is located only 71 kilometres north of the federal capital, Islamabad.

    One has serious doubts about this version of events.

    For two hours or so, the US Blackhawk helicopters were in Pakistan’s airspace and American boots were on the ground and yet we are told that the country’s land and air forces and intelligence agencies were unaware of the presence of alien aircraft and soldiers inside our territory. It sounds unbelievable, and for this reason one is of the view that top Pakistani authorities were actually made aware of the US move but were told at the same time that the Pakistanis need not act or panic as the Americans were after a high-value target.

    This should explain the first reaction by Pakistan’s foreign ministry on May 3 and the statement by Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani the same day that justified the American military operation in Pakistan by pointing out that this was “conducted by the US forces in accordance with the declared US policy that Osama bin Laden will be eliminated in a direct action by the US forces wherever found in the world.” In so many words, the people of Pakistan were told that Pakistan had no choice in the matter as the mighty US would have gone ahead and undertaken this unilateral military mission anyway, overriding Islamabad’s objections. There was no stopping the US after it had received the first real actionable intelligence about the man who had caused so much pain to the Americans as a result of the 9/11 attacks. According to reports in the US media, the planners had calculated that there was a 40-60 percent chance of finding Bin Laden at his Abbottabad compound and it was considered good enough to undertake the mission.

    It is possible that the place where the US commando operation was to be conducted was revealed to the Pakistani authorities at the last moment to avoid complications, but the high-value target was never disclosed. That should explain CIA chief Leon Panetta’s insulting, but perfectly understandable, remark that the US didn’t trust the Pakistanis and thus couldn’t tell them that the target of their secret mission was Bin Laden. The Al-Qaeda leader’s presence in Abbottabad, a place teeming with soldiers, would certainly have aroused suspicion about Pakistani military’s intentions and prompted the US to keep the Pakistanis outside the loop and undertake the mission itself.

    Another reason for Panetta, who is designated to replace Robert Gates as US defence secretary, to distrust his counterparts in the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) was the continuing friction between the CIA and ISI as a result of the Raymond Davis affair. The arrest of the CIA operative in January after his having killed two Pakistanis in Lahore and his hurried release following the ISI-brokered “blood-money” deal with the families of the deceased, had provided the ISI with leverage to demand the expulsion of the CIA operatives infiltrated into Pakistan in the guise of diplomats. Through the Abbottabad operation the CIA appears to have neutralised the advantage hitherto enjoyed by the ISI, but their turf war is far from over.

    It should therefore surprise none that there is serious lack of trust between the two countries and their secret services. The US and Pakistan have clearly different agendas in our part of the world. One is a superpower with an imperialistic agenda and the aspiration to control the world, the other a struggling state confronted with multiple challenges, and yet a proud nuclear power with regional ambitions. If the Americans don’t trust the Pakistanis, there are valid reasons for them to do so. But Pakistanis also don’t trust the Americans, and in their case there are even more valid reasons for the distrust. The distrust is reciprocal and yet the two countries continue to maintain their loveless relationship due to the hard ground realities.

    Showing its punishing arm and superior technology, the world’s lone superpower got its public enemy number one not in some remote mountain hideout in the tribal borderland straddling the Pak-Afghan border but in Abbottabad, the summer hill-station known for its pleasant weather, quality schools and colleges and military installations. According to the US narrative leaked in bits and pieces to the media and corrected a few times, the mission was accomplished by 79 US navy SEALS flying in four Blackhawk helicopters from Afghanistan’s Bagram airbase and returning safely after a 40-minute ground raid on the Bin Laden compound in Abbottabad’s Bilal Town. If the Pakistanis were on board as one is suspecting, the operation was largely risk-free as no Pakistani jet-fighter was scrambled or artillery gun was readied to attack the intruding US helicopters. Another reason for suspecting that the Pakistani military had been informed by the US beforehand was the arrival of our soldiers at the Bin Laden compound soon after the Americans had flown away. The policemen also arrived at the scene fairly quickly but were turned back by the army officers guarding the place.

    It was understandable for the Americans to celebrate the success of the Abbottabad mission even though killing Bin Laden won’t mean the final defeat of Al-Qaeda or the end of the “war on terror” and victory for the US-led Nato forces against the Taliban in Afghanistan. They have reasons to praise the bravery of their commandoes who raided the compound and reportedly killed Bin Laden along with three others and took away his body. But to describe the mission as heroic seems far-fetched because 79 heavily-armed commandoes in the end had a fairly easy job shooting dead an unarmed Bin Laden and the three other men caught unawares in their sleep. The other inmates of the compound were women and children and there were no heavy weapons or suicide jackets around, contrary to what the Americans had come to believe. Killing one woman and causing injuries to another also wasn’t a manly and honourable thing to do. Questions are also being asked as to why Bin Laden wasn’t captured alive to bring him to justice. Former President George W Bush, in line with his Texan concept of frontier justice, wanted him “dead or alive” but it seems the Obama administration had decided not to make him prisoner and to throw his body into the sea to prevent the emergence of a grave turned into a shrine.

    More importantly, the United States’ job was made easier as the Pakistanis stood aside and let it accomplish the inappropriately named “Operation Geronimo” after a Native American chief who fought for the freedom of his people. The Pakistan government and military had little choice but to feign ignorance about the raid in Abbottabad and helplessly face criticism because any attempt to stop the American helicopters would have led to open confrontation and even war with the US. For the same reasons, Pakistan is unable to tackle the US drones launching missile attacks unchallenged in its tribal areas.



    The writer is resident editor of The News in Peshawar. Email: rahim yusufzai@yahoo.com
     
  12. Guest01

    Guest01 FULL MEMBER

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    I wonder how Farrukh saab has missed this. Pakistan has an active military strategy and that is to continue supporting taliban to fight against NATO and hurt them while protecting the HVTs as well as they can so that they can be later used to make Afghanistan toe the line. It has been a strategy all the while. Pakistan army and ISI have known since the soviet war that the most effective way is to create insurgency and that is the best strategy in their armour. They did the same in Afghanistan, tried the same in India in early 80s Punjab, experimented again in 80s in Kashmir then again in 98 (famous Kargill claims of non-regulars) and ISI and Pakistan army is doing exactly that in current day Afghanistan also. It has been a monetarily rewarding and low level conflict success strategy for Pakistan last several years. However, what we are now looking at is the unravelling of this strategy.

    So Farrukh saab can ask for a new military strategy but to be fair to Pakistan army and ISI, they have had a military strategy all these years.
     
  13. Jango

    Jango SENIOR MODERATOR

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    there is a big difference between military strategy and political strategy....pakistan has a well placed military strategy but absolutley no political strategy.. ..remember unless there is martiaal law....the govt gives the order to the army for an operation or strike.
     
  14. Guest01

    Guest01 FULL MEMBER

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    :undecided: Political strategy in Pakistan :undecided: Last time a guy had a political strategy, the then general saab :hang2: hanged him and started the madrassas.

    Politics is tolerated in Pakistan only till it serves generals purposes.

    And the situation in which Pakistan is finding itself currently is all due to the great military strategy that the army and ISI has been deploying. Strange that you came back saying that it is because of lack of political strategy :D
     
  15. Tiki Tam Tam

    Tiki Tam Tam <b>MILITARY PROFESSIONALS</b>

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    The US view, one of them

    The Double Game
    The unintended consequences of American funding in Pakistan.


    It’s the end of the Second World War, and the United States is deciding what to do about two immense, poor, densely populated countries in Asia. America chooses one of the countries, becoming its benefactor. Over the decades, it pours billions of dollars into that country’s economy, training and equipping its military and its intelligence services. The stated goal is to create a reliable ally with strong institutions and a modern, vigorous democracy. The other country, meanwhile, is spurned because it forges alliances with America’s enemies.

    The country not chosen was India, which “tilted” toward the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Pakistan became America’s protégé, firmly supporting its fight to contain Communism. The benefits that Pakistan accrued from this relationship were quickly apparent: in the nineteen-sixties, its economy was an exemplar. India, by contrast, was a byword for basket case. Fifty years then went by. What was the result of this social experiment?

    India has become the state that we tried to create in Pakistan. It is a rising economic star, militarily powerful and democratic, and it shares American interests. Pakistan, however, is one of the most anti-American countries in the world, and a covert sponsor of terrorism. Politically and economically, it verges on being a failed state. And, despite Pakistani avowals to the contrary, America’s worst enemy, Osama bin Laden, had been hiding there for years—in strikingly comfortable circumstances—before U.S. commandos finally tracked him down and killed him, on May 2nd.

    American aid is hardly the only factor that led these two countries to such disparate outcomes. But, at this pivotal moment, it would be a mistake not to examine the degree to which U.S. dollars have undermined our strategic relationship with Pakistan—and created monstrous contradictions within Pakistan itself.

    American money began flowing into Pakistan in 1954, when a mutual defense agreement was signed. During the next decade, nearly two and a half billion dollars in economic assistance, and seven hundred million in military aid, went to Pakistan. After the 1965 Pakistan-India war began, the U.S. essentially withdrew aid to both countries. Gradually, U.S. economic aid was restored, but the Pakistani military was kept on probation.

    Those civilian-aid programs were largely successful. Christine Fair, a specialist on South Asia at the Center for Peace and Security Studies, at Georgetown University, notes that the original model for economic assistance was “demand driven”—local groups or governments proposed projects and applied for grants. Aid usually came in the form of matching funds, so that grantees had a stake in the projects. Moreover, American specialists presided over the disbursement of these funds and served as managers. “That was effective,” Fair says. “But we haven’t done it for decades.”

    Then, in 1979, U.S. intelligence discovered that Pakistan was secretly building a uranium-enrichment facility in response to India’s nuclear-weapons program. That April, the military dictator of Pakistan, General Mohammed Zia-ul-Haq, hanged the civilian President he had expelled from office, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto; he then cancelled elections. U.S. aid came to a halt. At the same time, Zia began giving support to an Islamist organization, Jamaat-e-Islami, the forerunner of many more radical groups to come. In November, a mob of Jamaat followers, inflamed by a rumor that the U.S. and Israel were behind an attack on the Grand Mosque, in Mecca, burned the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad to the ground, killing two Americans and two Pakistani employees. The American romance with Pakistan was over, but the marriage was just about to begin.

    The very next month, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. President Jimmy Carter, in a panic, offered Zia four hundred million dollars in economic and military aid. Zia rejected the offer, calling it “peanuts”—the term often arises in Pakistani critiques of American aid, but it must have rankled the peanut farmer in the White House. Zia was smart to hold out. Under Carter’s successor, Ronald Reagan, U.S. aid nearly quintupled: about three billion dollars in economic assistance and two billion in military aid. The Reagan Administration also provided three billion dollars to Afghan jihadis. These funds went through the sticky hands of the Inter-Services Intelligence directorate, the spy branch of the Pakistani Army. Starting in 1987, the I.S.I. was headed by General Hamid Gul, a cunning and bitterly anti-American figure. The I.S.I. became so glutted with power and money that it formed a “state within a state,” in the words of Benazir Bhutto, who became Pakistan’s Prime Minister in 1988. She eventually fired Gul, fearing that he was engineering a coup.

    Milton Bearden, a former C.I.A. station chief in Pakistan, once described Gul to me as having a “rococo” personality. In 2004, I visited Gul—a short man with a rigid, military posture and raptor-like features—at his villa in Rawalpindi. He proudly asked his servant to bring me an orange from his private grove. I asked Gul why, during the Afghan jihad, he had favored Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, one of the seven warlords who had been designated to receive American assistance in the fight against the Soviets. Hekmatyar was the most brutal member of the group, but, crucially, he was a Pashtun, like Gul. As I ate the orange, Gul offered a more principled rationale for his choice: “I went to each of the seven, you see, and I asked them, ‘I know you are the strongest, but who is No. 2?’ ” He formed a tight, smug smile. “They all said Hekmatyar.”

    Later, Gul helped oversee the creation of the Taliban, reportedly using mainly Saudi money. The I.S.I. openly supported the Taliban until September 11, 2001. Since then, the Pakistani government has disavowed the group, but it is widely believed that it still provides Taliban leaders with safe harbor in Quetta, where they stage jihad against Western forces in Afghanistan.

    In 1990, President George H. W. Bush cut off military aid to Pakistan. Ostensibly, this was in response to Pakistan’s pursuit of nuclear weapons, but it’s also true that, after the Soviets were pushed out of Afghanistan, in the late eighties, the U.S. lost interest in Pakistan. U.S. assistance, directed almost entirely toward food and counter-narcotics efforts, fell to forty-five million dollars a year, and declined further after 1998, when Pakistan began testing nuclear weapons.

    After the September 11th attacks, Pakistan abruptly became America’s key ally in the “war on terror.” Under President George W. Bush, the U.S. gave billions of dollars to Pakistan, most of it in unrestricted funds, to combat terrorism. Pervez Musharraf, who served as President between 1999 and 2008, now admits that during his tenure he diverted many of those billions to arm Pakistan against its hobgoblin enemy, India. “Whoever wishes to be angry, let them be angry—why should we bother?” Musharraf said in an interview on the Pakistani television channel Express News. “We have to maintain our security.” Since Musharraf left office, there has been little indication that U.S. aid—$4.5 billion in 2010, one of the largest amounts ever given to a foreign country—is being more properly spent.

    The main beneficiary of U.S. money, the Pakistani military, has never won a war, but, according to “Military Inc.,” by Ayesha Siddiqa, it has done very well in its investments: hotels, real estate, shopping malls. Such entrepreneurship, however corrupt, fills a gap, as Pakistan’s economy is now almost entirely dependent on American taxpayers. In a country of a hundred and eighty million people, fewer than two million citizens pay taxes, and Pakistan’s leaders are doing little to change the situation. In Karachi, the financial capital, the government recently inaugurated a program to appoint eunuchs as tax collectors. Eunuchs are considered relentless scolds in South Asia, and the threat of being hounded by one is somehow supposed to take the place of audits.

    In 2008, Pakistan’s government made the dramatic announcement that it was placing the I.S.I. under the control of its Interior Ministry—a restructuring that was revoked within hours by inflamed military leaders, who effectively vetoed the government. That November, Lashkar-e-Taiba, a terrorist organization that has reportedly received backing from the I.S.I. to wage jihad in Kashmir, carried out attacks on tourists in Mumbai. According to American indictments, an I.S.I. officer directed the surveillance of suitable targets. Those sites included the Taj and Oberoi hotels, the train station, the Leopold Café, and the Chabad House, a Lubavitch outpost run by an American rabbi and his pregnant wife. According to Sebastian Rotella, who has written extensively for ProPublica about the attack, “They were going out of their way to kill Americans.” At the hotels, the attackers sorted through passports, looking for American and British citizens. In the end, a hundred and sixty-six people were killed, but only six were Americans. The Pakistani government denied any involvement, although it eventually conceded that the attacks had been planned in Pakistan.

    Ali Soufan, a former F.B.I. special agent who interrogated many of the Al Qaeda members captured in Pakistan, told me that “the majority of them said that Lashkar-e-Taiba had given them shelter.” After the battle of Tora Bora, he added, the Al Qaeda members who fled to Pakistan—including top leaders—were greeted by Lashkar operatives and taken to safe houses. Some Pakistanis worry that Lashkar may become the new Al Qaeda.

    In 2009, Senators Richard Lugar and John Kerry, recognizing that American military aid had given the Army and the I.S.I. disproportionate power in Pakistan, helped pass legislation in Congress sanctioning seven and a half billion dollars in civilian assistance, to be disbursed over a period of five years. Pakistan’s Foreign Minister, Shah Mehmood Qureshi, apparently at the direction of the military, flew to Washington, and insisted that his country would not be micromanaged. So far, less than a hundred and eighty million dollars of that money has been spent, because the civilian projects require oversight and checks on corruption. The Pakistani military, meanwhile, submits expense claims every month to the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad; according to a report in the Guardian, receipts are not provided—or requested.

    One day in March, 2004, when I was in Peshawar, in northern Pakistan, a firefight broke out in the tribal areas nearby. The newspapers said the Army was fighting Al Qaeda, and had surrounded Ayman al-Zawahiri, bin Laden’s deputy. Zawahiri escaped, but the troops captured a number of Al Qaeda fighters, including Zawahiri’s son Ahmed. The next day, a newspaper bore the headline “AHMED’S TALKING!” Yet Zawahiri doesn’t have a son named Ahmed. After that day, nothing more was said about Ahmed, but I kept puzzling over that tricked-up episode. I began to wonder, What would happen if the Pakistani military actually captured or killed Al Qaeda’s top leaders? The great flow of dollars would stop, just as it had in Afghanistan after the Soviets limped away. I realized that, despite all the suffering the war on terror had brought to Pakistan, the military was addicted to the money it generated. The Pakistani Army and the I.S.I. were in the looking-for-bin-Laden business, and if they found him they’d be out of business.

    A number of investigative reports have suggested that the I.S.I. diverted American money designated for fighting terrorism to the Taliban. According to a 2007 document released by WikiLeaks, U.S. military interrogators at Guantánamo implicitly acknowledged this problem when they placed the I.S.I. on an internal list of “terrorist and terrorist-support entities.”

    In October, 2009, I went to Washington to attend a daylong conference on “Al Qaeda and Its Allies.” (The event was sponsored by the New America Foundation and by the Center on Law and Security, at N.Y.U.’s law school, where I am a fellow.) The final panel discussion was devoted to Pakistan. Major General Mahmud Ali Durrani, a former Pakistani Ambassador to the U.S., spoke of the importance of having America and Pakistan united in their military strategy, especially in South Waziristan, which he called “the epicenter of militancy.” The halfhearted efforts of the Pakistani Army to oppose its radical protégés there had created a ferocious backlash. The Taliban attacked I.S.I. offices and began taking over parts of Pakistani territory, including the Swat Valley, which is less than a hundred miles from Islamabad. Just two weeks before the conference, a group of Taliban fighters attacked the military headquarters in Rawalpindi, a mile from where General Durrani lives. The I.S.I. had lost control of its creation.

    Durrani made a plea for the U.S. to continue its partnership with Pakistan. “Trust us, developing Pakistan’s capacity to fight terrorism will pay rich dividends,” he said. “I do not want to sound ungrateful, but what had been supplied over the last five years, in terms of hardware, is almost peanuts.” When I had the opportunity to ask a question, I pointed out that, since 9/11, the U.S. had given eleven billion dollars to Pakistan, the bulk of it in military aid, much of which was misappropriated to buy weapons to defend against India. If Pakistan didn’t have the equipment to fight insurgents and terrorists in the tribal areas, was that really America’s fault? And if American aid to Pakistan—especially military assistance—had done more harm than good, shouldn’t it be drastically reduced?

    Another retired general on the podium, Talat Masood, responded that the losses Pakistan had suffered in the “so-called war on terror” amounted to more than forty billion dollars. “So please don’t harp on the eleven billion,” he said.

    Pakistan has indeed suffered for its official alliance with the U.S. In 2006, there were six suicide bombings in the country; the next year there were fifty-six, with six hundred and forty people killed. Last year, twelve hundred people were murdered by suicide bombers. More than three thousand Pakistani soldiers and officers have been killed in the war, including eighty-five members of the I.S.I. Yet many of these wounds have been self-inflicted, for the military and the I.S.I. created and nurtured the very groups—such as the Taliban—that have turned against the Pakistani state. And the money used to fund these radical organizations came largely from American taxpayers.

    Many foreign-policy experts maintain that America cannot, at this juncture, cut off military aid to Pakistan—even if elements of the I.S.I. turn out to have harbored bin Laden. There are two prongs to this argument. One is that America needs Pakistan’s support in order to defeat the Taliban. If the U.S. withdraws aid, it is argued, Pakistan might insist that we can no longer fly drones over tribal areas. But Pakistan has covertly supported the drone program for years, in return for the U.S.’s targeting of Taliban forces that it cannot vanquish on its own. Without U.S. aid, the Pakistani military will need drone assistance more than ever.

    The more pressing concern is that radical Islamists will somehow get their hands on a nuclear bomb, either through covert means or by actually coming to power. “The military is playing on this fear,” a Pakistani reporter, Pir Zubair Shah, told me.

    As much as half of the money the U.S. gave to the I.S.I. to fight the Soviets was diverted to build nuclear weapons. The father of Pakistan’s bomb, A. Q. Khan, later sold plans and nuclear equipment to Libya, North Korea, and Iran. A month before 9/11, Pakistani nuclear scientists even opened a secret dialogue with Al Qaeda. The government of Pakistan has denied knowledge of what Khan and his associates were doing.

    In February, 2009, the Pakistani government announced that it had “dismantled the nuclear black market network.” There is no way of knowing if this is true. Neither the U.S. nor the International Atomic Energy Agency has been allowed to interview Khan. According to a recent report by the Congressional Research Service, the “current status of Pakistan’s nuclear export network is unclear.” Meanwhile, American policymakers have been paralyzed by Pakistan’s nuclear capability. They have repeatedly expressed the worry that, if Pakistan is alienated, its nuclear secrets and materials might get into the wrong hands. But that has already happened.

    Not only has American military aid been wasted, misused, and turned against us; it may well have undermined the Pakistani military, which has feasted on huge donations but is far weaker than its nemesis, the Indian military. If the measure of our aid is the gratitude of the Pakistani people and the loyalty of their government, then it has clearly been a failure. Last year, a Pew Research Center survey found that half of Pakistanis believe that the U.S. gives little or no assistance at all. Even the Finance Minister, Hafiz Shaikh, said last month that it was “largely a myth” that the U.S. had given tens of billions of dollars to Pakistan. And if the measure of our aid is Pakistan’s internal security, the program has fallen short in that respect as well. Pakistan is endangered not by India, as the government believes, but by the very radical movements that the military helped create to act as terrorist proxies.

    Eliminating, or sharply reducing, military aid to Pakistan would have consequences, but they may not be the ones we fear. Diminishing the power of the military class would open up more room for civilian rule. Many Pakistanis are in favor of less U.S. aid; their slogan is “trade not aid.” In particular, Pakistani businessmen have long sought U.S. tax breaks for their textiles, which American manufacturers have resisted. Such a move would empower the civilian middle class. India would no doubt welcome a reduction in military aid to Pakistan, and the U.S. could use this as leverage to pressure India to allow the Kashmiris to vote on their future, which would very likely be a vote for independence. These two actions might do far more to enhance Pakistan’s stability, and to insure its friendship, than the billions of dollars that America now pays like a ransom.

    Within the I.S.I., there is a secret organization known as the S Wing, which is largely composed of supposedly retired military and I.S.I. officers. “It doesn’t exist on paper,” a source close to the I.S.I. told me. The S Wing handles relations with radical elements. “If something happens, then they have deniability,” the source explained. If any group within the Pakistani military helped hide bin Laden, it was likely S Wing.

    Eight days before Osama bin Laden was killed, General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, the head of the Pakistani Army, went to the Kakul military academy in Abbottabad, less than a mile from the villa where bin Laden was living. “General Kayani told the cadets, ‘We have broken the backbone of the militants,’ ” Pir Zubair Shah, the reporter, told me. “But the backbone was right there.” Perhaps with a touch of theatre, Hamid Gul, the former I.S.I. chief, publicly expressed wonder that bin Laden was living in a city with three army regiments, less than a mile from an élite military academy, in a house that appeared to have been built expressly to protect him. Aside from the military, Gul told the Associated Press, “there is the local police, the Intelligence Bureau, Military Intelligence, the I.S.I. They all had a presence there.” &#9830;
    U.S. Support for Pakistan: A Long Messy History : The New Yorker
     
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