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Inception-06

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You have found a gem.
Btw are you German? I'd love to learn German.
I just live in Germany, that’s a podcast may be you can finde it also in youTube just Google it, otherwise you can Test Spotify for one month, and then cancel the membership, there many more Pakistan armored warfare contests. You will learn that war’s can be won by men, tactics and strategy, maintenance and upgrading of equipment not only quality and quantity. You remember how Isreali Tank comanders stopped many Syrian Tanks on the Golan hights,the syrian had better equipment and higher numbers. Same on the Egyptian Sinai canal frontline, Israelis knocked out many Egyptian Tanks before they were blown off, and also in this case they had less numbers and not quality or quantity.

Do you know That because lack of coordination and communication Indians did blow off their own Tanks during Indo -Pack wars, or Pakistani Tank Generals and commanders were not capable to lead their formations in to the battle. What do you think how it goes on when a Pakistani Alzarrar Tank squadron gets the Task to stopp a Indian Tank wave. War starts from here, first the Pakistani Commander’s have to estimate the time and location where they could FINDE the enemy, then estimates the numbers, then make a plan hiding all Tanks in duck in Positions, or should all be mobil or both there are so many Parameters which @Signalian and @PanzerKiel are mentioning since years, but you young Greenhorns = Grünschnabel are only interest to discuss the numbers or Type of Pakistan armoured Corps. Learning Starts from books and the handling of a single Tank, which is not possible for us Hobby Generals that’s why we have to rely on war veterans Interviews and Military history books, Film’s etc. !
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Jf-17 block 3

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Send complete I-Corps to capture Jammu. Protect right flank using XXX Corps and left flank using elements of X Corps like 23 ID and 19 ID. Hopefully, armor will be put to good use by capturing an important city. If 6th Armor Div survives after taking part in capturing Jammu, then send it south-east.
Can Pakistan attack Jammu, Aknoor and Dras at the same time?
 

Signalian

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Can Pakistan attack Jammu, Aknoor and Dras at the same time?
Best bet is to concentrate on one at a time due to scarcity of men and material. Ensure that target is captured and can be defended till end of war from repeated counter attacks after capture.

If PA has 10 extra Divisions in the salient as well as logistics system to support all 10 divisions, then yeah attack to capture all 3. Mountain warfare becomes complex due to nature of terrain which limits angle of attacks and support routes by road. A well deployed platoon can hold off a company strength attack for a good amount of time, as seen in Kargil war.

Direct Explosive firepower of tanks helps in softening targets while rapid deployment through helicopter or APCs helps in minimizing time frame of capturing that area. Time is important so enemy cannot send reinforcements towards the target area. Artillery and tanks may have the same muzzle caliber but direct fire of tanks is faster than indirect fire of artillery. Numbers also matter, an artillery regiment will be firing 12-18 guns while a tank regiment will have 44 tanks blazing their guns from different directions. In Mountains if you take out the tanks, then the other option is gunships, maybe 4 or 6 and those also under PAF's air escort and maneuvering constantly to escape from enemy AD units. And when you have 44 tanks then you will also have 50 M-113s following them which means 50 x 12.7 mm guns for fire support. These will have 18 M-109's behind them and a contingent of AD tube launchers.

If Jammu is taken then Rajauri and Poonch can be strangled as the road access from south east side will be blocked. Later the road access towards Srinagar can be blocked from south so Srinagar will have access only from air through supplies landing in areas like Leh or Anantnag etc.
 

Signalian

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@farooqbhai007

You would usually have an artillery regiment supporting a brigade or 6 guns battery supporting a battalion. Im anticipating that in case of a major offensive more artillery guns will be assigned.
 

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Best bet is to concentrate on one at a time due to scarcity of men and material. Ensure that target is captured and can be defended till end of war from repeated counter attacks after capture.

If PA has 10 extra Divisions in the salient as well as logistics system to support all 10 divisions, then yeah attack to capture all 3. Mountain warfare becomes complex due to nature of terrain which limits angle of attacks and support routes by road. A well deployed platoon can hold off a company strength attack for a good amount of time, as seen in Kargil war.

Direct Explosive firepower of tanks helps in softening targets while rapid deployment through helicopter or APCs helps in minimizing time frame of capturing that area. Time is important so enemy cannot send reinforcements towards the target area. Artillery and tanks may have the same muzzle caliber but direct fire of tanks is faster than indirect fire of artillery. Numbers also matter, an artillery regiment will be firing 12-18 guns while a tank regiment will have 44 tanks blazing their guns from different directions. In Mountains if you take out the tanks, then the other option is gunships, maybe 4 or 6 and those also under PAF's air escort and maneuvering constantly to escape from enemy AD units. And when you have 44 tanks then you will also have 50 M-113s following them which means 50 x 12.7 mm guns for fire support. These will have 18 M-109's behind them and a contingent of AD tube launchers.

If Jammu is taken then Rajauri and Poonch can be strangled as the road access from south east side will be blocked. Later the road access towards Srinagar can be blocked from south so Srinagar will have access only from air through supplies landing in areas like Leh or Anantnag etc.
Is aknoor more valuable or Jammu?
 

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Is aknoor more valuable or Jammu?
In fact,Operation Grand Slam was a plan drawn up by the PA in May 1965 that consisted of an attack on the vital Akhnoor Bridge in Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir. The bridge was not only the lifeline of an entire infantry division of the Indian Army, but could also be used to threaten the city of Jammu, an important logistical point for Indian forces.
The Operation Grand Slam was designed as a twin of the Operation Gibraltar, both of which were meant to jeopardise India's control of Kashmir and bring it to the negotiating table without risking a general war across the international border.The idea for Grand Slam came from President Ayub Khan. When he reviewed the plans for Gibraltar in May 1965, he pointed to Akhnur on the map and called it a "jugular" for India. By seizing Akhnur, India's overland supply route to Kashmir would be cut off.
Ayub Khan was mistaken. India's supply route to Kashmir did not pass through Akhnur. (The National Highway 1A passed through Udhampur and Ramban, not Akhnur.) General Akhtar Malik, who was in charge of both Gibraltar and Grand Slam, however understood the President's demand for a "jugular". He developed secret plans to proceed to Jammu after taking Akhnur, where he could cut off the highway. These plans were not revealed to the President, who would have apprehended the possibility of a general war.
However one of the many reasons of its failure were the opening of a general front against PA by india, due to which the 10 inf( also included Shabbir shareef's 6ff) bde whoose AOR included Akhnoor was pulled back and sent to Sialkot when the prized bridge lay there just to be taken. In fact it is also noted that after 10th inf bde left the sector not an inch of Indian Territory was further gained. Also, another reason was the sudden change of command when Yahya Khan took over.
 

PanzerKiel

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In fact,Operation Grand Slam was a plan drawn up by the PA in May 1965 that consisted of an attack on the vital Akhnoor Bridge in Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir. The bridge was not only the lifeline of an entire infantry division of the Indian Army, but could also be used to threaten the city of Jammu, an important logistical point for Indian forces.
The Operation Grand Slam was designed as a twin of the Operation Gibraltar, both of which were meant to jeopardise India's control of Kashmir and bring it to the negotiating table without risking a general war across the international border.The idea for Grand Slam came from President Ayub Khan. When he reviewed the plans for Gibraltar in May 1965, he pointed to Akhnur on the map and called it a "jugular" for India. By seizing Akhnur, India's overland supply route to Kashmir would be cut off.
Ayub Khan was mistaken. India's supply route to Kashmir did not pass through Akhnur. (The National Highway 1A passed through Udhampur and Ramban, not Akhnur.) General Akhtar Malik, who was in charge of both Gibraltar and Grand Slam, however understood the President's demand for a "jugular". He developed secret plans to proceed to Jammu after taking Akhnur, where he could cut off the highway. These plans were not revealed to the President, who would have apprehended the possibility of a general war.
However one of the many reasons of its failure were the opening of a general front against PA by india, due to which the 10 inf( also included Shabbir shareef's 6ff) bde whoose AOR included Akhnoor was pulled back and sent to Sialkot when the prized bridge lay there just to be taken. In fact it is also noted that after 10th inf bde left the sector not an inch of Indian Territory was further gained. Also, another reason was the sudden change of command when Yahya Khan took over.
Several factual mistakes and wrong inferences.....

Op Grandslam was a multi brigade operation. You need to study about 10 Brigade, its role as per intial plan, what it actually did, role of its commander Brig Hayat, nature of relations between Brig Hayat, Gen Malik and Gen Yahya (GOC 7 Div from where this 10 Brigade was pulled out).....

10 Brigade departure was of no consequence.....12 Div or 7 Div (since operations were later on handed over to 7 Div) were still strong enough to take Akhnur despite departure of 10 Brigade or IA opening on International Border....

...Gen Yahya was invited to Staff College as a guest speaker in 1978 i think....he was asked this question that why didnt he take Akhnur, he simply said that he was ordered not to.

...and also lets not forget the role of Zulfiqar Bhutto and Kashmir Cell.
 
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PanzerKiel

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If things would have gone according to GOC 12 Division desires, 12 Division would have veered towards Jammu, with 7 Division going towards Naushara.......Kashmir would have been more or less cut off from mainland India, road Jammu-Samba-Kathua interdicted.....

Losses in Jura and Bedori were negligible when compared with gains in Munawar gap by Grandslam..These losses were expected due to bad troops to space ratio in 12 Division...
however, these losses were still within the limited laid down by Pak GHQ.

In the end, IA committed more forces against Jura and Bedori, while having nothing to counter any Pak thrust towards Akhnur...Two IA brigades had already been pulled out of Jammu...so IA was playing almost as per the needs of Gen Akhtar Malik, GOC 12 Division...

In fact, the full value of Gibralter was have been encashed only after capture of Akhnur, once 12 and 7 Division would have veered towards Naushara and Jammu....if this would have happened, there would have been no Operation Nepal by Indian 1 Corps.
 

Inception-06

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If things would have gone according to GOC 12 Division desires, 12 Division would have veered towards Jammu, with 7 Division going towards Naushara.......Kashmir would have been more or less cut off from mainland India, road Jammu-Samba-Kathua interdicted.....

Losses in Jura and Bedori were negligible when compared with gains in Munawar gap by Grandslam..These losses were expected due to bad troops to space ratio in 12 Division...
however, these losses were still within the limited laid down by Pak GHQ.

In the end, IA committed more forces against Jura and Bedori, while having nothing to counter any Pak thrust towards Akhnur...Two IA brigades had already been pulled out of Jammu...so IA was playing almost as per the needs of Gen Akhtar Malik, GOC 12 Division...

In fact, the full value of Gibralter was have been encashed only after capture of Akhnur, once 12 and 7 Division would have veered towards Naushara and Jammu....if this would have happened, there would have been no Operation Nepal by Indian 1 Corps.
and what was wrong with my post ? ^^
 

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GENERAL AKHTER HUSSAIN MALIK LETTER TO GENERAL ABDUL ALI MALIK

My Dear brother,
I hope you and the family are very well. Thank you for your letter of 14 Oct. 67. The answers to your questions are as follows:

a. The de facto command changed the very first day of the ops [operations] after the fall of Chamb when Azmat Hayat broke off wireless communications with me. I personally tried to find his HQ [headquarters] by chopper and failed. In late afternoon I sent Gulzar and Vahid, my MP [military police] officers, to try and locate him, but they too failed. The next day I tore into him and he sheepishly and nervously informed me that he was ‘Yahya’s brigadier’. I had no doubt left that Yahya had reached him the previous day and instructed him not to take further orders from me, while the formal change in command had yet to take place. This was a betrayal of many dimensions.

b. I reasoned and then pleaded with Yahya that if it was credit he was looking for, he should take the overall command but let me go up to Akhnur as his subordinate, but he refused. He went a step further and even changed the plan. He kept banging his head against Troti, letting the Indian fall back to Akhnur. We lost the initiative on the very first day of the war and never recovered it. Eventually it was the desperate stand at Chawinda that prevented the Indians from cutting through.

c. At no time was I assigned any reason for being removed from command by Ayub, Musa or Yahya. They were all sheepish at best. I think the reasons will be given when I am no more.

d. Not informing pro-Pak Kashmiri elements before launching Gibraltar was a command decision and it was mine. The aim of the op was to de freeze the Kashmir issue, raise it from its moribund state, and bring it to the notice of the world. To achieve this aim the first phase of the op was vital, that is, to effect undetected infiltration of thousands across the CFL [cease-fire line]. I was not willing to compromise this in any event. And the whole op could be made stillborn by just one double agent.

e. Haji Pir [Pass] did not cause me much anxiety. Because [the] impending Grand Slam Indian concentration in Haji Pir could only help us after Akhnur, and they would have to pull out troops from there to counter the new threats and surrender their gains, and maybe more, in the process. Actually it was only after the fall of Akhnur that we would have encashed the full value of Gibraltar, but that was not to be!

f. Bhutto kept insisting that his sources had assured him that India would not attack if we did not violate the international border. I however was certain that Gibraltar would lead to war and told GHQ so. I needed no op intelligence to come to this conclusion. It was simple common sense. If I got you by the throat, it would be silly for me to expect that you will kiss me for it. Because I was certain that war would follow, my first choice as objective for Grand Slam was Jammu. From there we could have exploited our success either toward Samba or Kashmir proper as the situation demanded. In any case whether it was Jammu or Akhnur, if we had taken the objective, I do not see how the Indians could have attacked Sialkot before clearing out either of these towns.

g. I have given serious consideration to writing a book, but given up the idea. The book would be the truth. And truth and the popular reaction to it would be good for my ego. But in the long run it would be an unpatriotic act. It will destroy the morale of the army, lower its prestige among the people, be banned in Pakistan, and become a textbook for the Indians. I have little doubt that the Indians will never forgive us the slight of 65 and will avenge it at the first opportunity. I am certain they will hit us in E. Pak [East Pakistan] and we will need all we have to save the situation. The first day of Grand Slam will be fateful in many ways. The worst has still to come and we have to prepare for it. The book is therefore out.
I hope this gives you the gist of what you needed to know. And yes, Ayub was fully involved in the enterprise. As a matter of fact it was his idea. And it was he who ordered me to by-pass Musa while Gibraltar etc. was being planned. I was dealing more with him and Sher Bahadur than with the C-in-C. It is tragic that despite having a good military mind, the FM’s [Foreign Minister Z.A. Bhutto’s] heart was prone to give way. The biggest tragedy is that in this instance it gave way before the eruption of a crisis. Or were they already celebrating a final victory!!
In case you need a more exact description of events, I will need war diaries and maps, which you could send me through the diplomatic bag.
Please remember me to all the family.
Yours,
Akhtar Hussain Malik
and what was wrong with my post ? ^^
Nichts mein Freund
 

Inception-06

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GENERAL AKHTER HUSSAIN MALIK LETTER TO GENERAL ABDUL ALI MALIK

My Dear brother,
I hope you and the family are very well. Thank you for your letter of 14 Oct. 67. The answers to your questions are as follows:

a. The de facto command changed the very first day of the ops [operations] after the fall of Chamb when Azmat Hayat broke off wireless communications with me. I personally tried to find his HQ [headquarters] by chopper and failed. In late afternoon I sent Gulzar and Vahid, my MP [military police] officers, to try and locate him, but they too failed. The next day I tore into him and he sheepishly and nervously informed me that he was ‘Yahya’s brigadier’. I had no doubt left that Yahya had reached him the previous day and instructed him not to take further orders from me, while the formal change in command had yet to take place. This was a betrayal of many dimensions.

b. I reasoned and then pleaded with Yahya that if it was credit he was looking for, he should take the overall command but let me go up to Akhnur as his subordinate, but he refused. He went a step further and even changed the plan. He kept banging his head against Troti, letting the Indian fall back to Akhnur. We lost the initiative on the very first day of the war and never recovered it. Eventually it was the desperate stand at Chawinda that prevented the Indians from cutting through.

c. At no time was I assigned any reason for being removed from command by Ayub, Musa or Yahya. They were all sheepish at best. I think the reasons will be given when I am no more.

d. Not informing pro-Pak Kashmiri elements before launching Gibraltar was a command decision and it was mine. The aim of the op was to de freeze the Kashmir issue, raise it from its moribund state, and bring it to the notice of the world. To achieve this aim the first phase of the op was vital, that is, to effect undetected infiltration of thousands across the CFL [cease-fire line]. I was not willing to compromise this in any event. And the whole op could be made stillborn by just one double agent.

e. Haji Pir [Pass] did not cause me much anxiety. Because [the] impending Grand Slam Indian concentration in Haji Pir could only help us after Akhnur, and they would have to pull out troops from there to counter the new threats and surrender their gains, and maybe more, in the process. Actually it was only after the fall of Akhnur that we would have encashed the full value of Gibraltar, but that was not to be!

f. Bhutto kept insisting that his sources had assured him that India would not attack if we did not violate the international border. I however was certain that Gibraltar would lead to war and told GHQ so. I needed no op intelligence to come to this conclusion. It was simple common sense. If I got you by the throat, it would be silly for me to expect that you will kiss me for it. Because I was certain that war would follow, my first choice as objective for Grand Slam was Jammu. From there we could have exploited our success either toward Samba or Kashmir proper as the situation demanded. In any case whether it was Jammu or Akhnur, if we had taken the objective, I do not see how the Indians could have attacked Sialkot before clearing out either of these towns.

g. I have given serious consideration to writing a book, but given up the idea. The book would be the truth. And truth and the popular reaction to it would be good for my ego. But in the long run it would be an unpatriotic act. It will destroy the morale of the army, lower its prestige among the people, be banned in Pakistan, and become a textbook for the Indians. I have little doubt that the Indians will never forgive us the slight of 65 and will avenge it at the first opportunity. I am certain they will hit us in E. Pak [East Pakistan] and we will need all we have to save the situation. The first day of Grand Slam will be fateful in many ways. The worst has still to come and we have to prepare for it. The book is therefore out.
I hope this gives you the gist of what you needed to know. And yes, Ayub was fully involved in the enterprise. As a matter of fact it was his idea. And it was he who ordered me to by-pass Musa while Gibraltar etc. was being planned. I was dealing more with him and Sher Bahadur than with the C-in-C. It is tragic that despite having a good military mind, the FM’s [Foreign Minister Z.A. Bhutto’s] heart was prone to give way. The biggest tragedy is that in this instance it gave way before the eruption of a crisis. Or were they already celebrating a final victory!!
In case you need a more exact description of events, I will need war diaries and maps, which you could send me through the diplomatic bag.
Please remember me to all the family.
Yours,
Akhtar Hussain Malik

Nichts mein Freund
Yahya Khan made to many failures, he remembered me the german failure not to take Dunkirk. Such personality’s should have been brought to court, imagine this idiot become president and mishandled East Pakistan to Bangla -desh ! Hopefully the Pakistan Army has taken consequences from the previous failures, to put the Bambus stick in wrong hands.
 
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Signalian

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Is aknoor more valuable or Jammu?
Akhnoor is more closer to the LOC. Its a vital location. If a divisional strength formation can capture it, well and good. For Jammu, a divisional strength formation may not be enough. Thats why I mentioned a whole Corps like 1st Corps.

IMHO, 1st Corps also cannot capture Jammu unless a miracle takes place.
 

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Repeat of 1971. Armor Divs resting at tank sheds as reserve analogy. Keep the shiny and well oiled tanks sit in their tracks then. Take them out on 23rd March Parade and park them again till next year.

The amount of time taken in hide and seek will never be enough for both countries to make gains at all. Salahuddin Ayubi had time and repeated opportunities at his hands, whereas in Indo-Pak scenario a nuclear weapon can end it all on the second day of war. You cannot wear India down, well maybe delay Indian forces for a certain amount of time. India has more troops, more tanks, more replacements, more resources.

If Infantry Div is given the job, it will suffer more casualties and take alot more time. The terrain leading up to Jammu may not be tank friendly as the forces get closer to Jammu. Let 6th Armor Div penetrate 10, 20 or 50 km into J&K towards Jammu. Both Armor Divisions give PA a chance each to conduct an offensive. They make the bridgeheads, then the infantry can come and clean up as the armor can be pulled back later on. Otherwise go through the air, drop airborne forces at Jammu, calculate the chances of success yourself, but first where are the resources. Make do of what is available - tanks.

Either PA takes Kashmir or let the Kashmir/LOC drama drag on for another century. Lose 50 soldiers annually for PA and 100 soldiers annually for IA on LOC. Drag on Siachen issue side by side also. Keep buying weapons like 5th gen aircraft and 4th gen tanks and nuclear submarines while universities and hospitals can be built and money can be thrown in research. A utopian view of Pakistan as a welfare state could be thought of eventually, which is impossible to even think right now.
Are there any plans in Pak army to raise another division equivalent to FCNA in Gilgit Baltistan for any offensive from Gilgit to Ladakh. It looks like PA has all attentions towards Jammu and Kashmir but not western Ladakh. On contrary, looks like this will be India who tries to capture GB from Ladakh.
 
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farooqbhai007

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You would usually have an artillery regiment supporting a brigade or 6 guns battery supporting a battalion. Im anticipating that in case of a major offensive more artillery guns will be assigned.
my question was something else , images were attached to post before i deleted that , but i showed 16 x M109s + 3 M113/Talha Command APCs at some garrisson , so i was wondering if 2 M109s were missing ,
The indians also follow same amount of Arty , 18 K-9s per regiment as shown in a sat image.
 

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