Mapping the kinetic aspect of the Operation Inherent Resolve to defeat ISIL (Updated)

[LeGenD]

"At its peak, IS ruled over 88,000 sq km (34,000 sq miles) stretching across the Iraq-Syria border." - BBC

The rise and fall of the Islamic State group: The long and short story

The US and its allies have reclaimed the last territory in Syria held by Islamic State (IS) militants.

www.bbc.com

Timeline: the Rise, Spread, and Fall of the Islamic State

At its height, the Islamic State - also known as ISIS, ISIL, or Daesh - held about a third of Syria and 40 percent of Iraq. By December 2017 it had lost 95 percent of its territory, including its two biggest properties, Mosul, Iraq's second largest city, and the northern Syrian city of Raqqa...

www.wilsoncenter.org

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OPERATION INHERENT RESOLVE

CJTF-OIR HOME

www.inherentresolve.mil

OPERATION INHERENT RESOLVE

www.centcom.mil

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Mapping the kinetic aspect of the Operation Inherent Resolve to defeat ISIS in the Middle East over the course of years (2014 - 2018).

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Historic developments:-

1. Fall of ISIL stronghold in Iraq (i.e. Fallujah) to US-backed forces in 2016; Operation Breaking Terrorism

Details: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Third_Battle_of_Fallujah

Watch how US and Iraqi airstrikes targeted this ISIS convoy

Helicopters and warplanes fired at vehicles on road about 12 miles south of Fallujah on Wednesday.

english.alarabiya.net

Iraq ‘retakes’ main government building in Fallujah

Commanders say forces met limited resistance from ISIL during push into centre of city which government lost in 2014.

www.aljazeera.com

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2. Fall of ISIL stronghold in Iraq (i.e. Mosul) to US-backed forces in 2017

Details: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Mosul_(2016–2017)

US Special Operations MRZR Buggies Spotted Full Of Javelin Missiles Near Mosul

SOCOM's tricked-out Polaris ATVs are getting their fight on against ISIS.

www.thedrive.com

A Tale of Two Mosuls, The resurrection of the Iraqi armed forces and the military defeat of ISIS

https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01402390.2019.1694912?src=recsys

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3. Fall of ISIL stronghold in Syria (i.e. Raqqa) to US-backed forces in 2017

Details: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Raqqa_(2017)

US Backed Forces Take Strategic Syrian Dam To Block ISIS From Escaping Raqqa

The maneuver appears to have been yet another blocking move, not just against ISIS forces but also against Syrian government and Russian forces.

www.thedrive.com

Marines "Burned Out" Two Howitzer Barrels During the Raqqa Offensive

New details highlight how important traditional artillery has been in the fighting against ISIS in Iraq and Syria.

www.thedrive.com

Watch

www.facebook.com

Rhetoric versus reality in the war in Raqqa

How the "most precise air campaign in history" left Raqqa, Syria, the most destroyed city in modern times. Explore our new interactive website to find out more.

raqqa.amnesty.org

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4. American troops eliminate ISIL chief Abu Bakr al Baghdadi in a military operation in Syria (i.e. Idlib) in 2019; Operation Kayla Mueller

Details: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Death_of_Abu_Bakr_al-Baghdadi

ISIL chief al-Baghdadi dead, confirms Trump

The US president says al-Baghdadi killed himself by exploding a suicide vest during the US raid in Syria’s Idlib.

www.aljazeera.com

US releases first images of Baghdadi raid

Raid commander says Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi's remains buried at sea - Anadolu Agency

www.aa.com.tr

Witnesses describe night of Baghdadi's death

Residents of the village where Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was staying spoke to Al-Monitor about what happened on the night of his assassination.

www.al-monitor.com

Everything We Know And Don't Know About The Raid That Killed ISIS Leader Al Baghdadi (Updated)

We know a surprisingly large amount about the deep raid into Syria to take out the depraved terrorist kingpin, but many questions still remain.

www.thedrive.com

Our Analysis Of New Info And Video From The Raid That Killed ISIS Head Al Baghdadi

New facts, videos, and imagery give new insights as to how U.S. forces got to the compound and then obliterated it after the operation was complete.

www.thedrive.com

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Lessons from Operation Inherent Resolve: From Ensuring the Enduring Defeat of ISIS to Stabilising the Region

Lessons from Operation Inherent Resolve: From Ensuring the Enduring Defeat of ISIS to Stabilising the Region

This event will look at experience from Operation Inherent Resolve in countering ISIS in Iraq and Syria, and its future as part of a broader civilian-led strategy to bring greater stability to the region. , The Combined Joint Task Force - Operation Inherent Resolve was established in 2014, with...

rusi.org

 

[Path-Finder]

all being shifted to afghanistan. Nicely left out others who did far more to defeat daesh than yankee sam.

 

[LeGenD]

all being shifted to afghanistan.

Former TTP members created ISIS-K in Afghanistan.

Formation and Relationship with ISIS Core
In 2014, Pakistani national Hafiz Saeed Khan was chosen to spearhead IS-K province as its first emir. Khan, a veteran Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) commander, brought along other prominent TTP members—including the group’s spokesman Sheikh Maqbool and many district chiefs—when he initially pledged allegiance to al-Baghdadi in October 2014. Many of these individuals were included in the first Khorasan Shura or leadership council.

IS-K’s early membership included a contingent of Pakistani militants who emerged in Afghanistan’s Nangarhar province around 2010, just across the border from the former Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan. Many of these militants were estranged members of TTP and Lashkar-e Islam, who had fled Pakistan to escape pressure from security forces. The appointment of Khan as IS-K’s first emir, and former Taliban commander Abdul Rauf Khadim as his deputy, further facilitated the group’s growth, utilizing long established recruitment networks in Afghanistan and Pakistan. According to the Combatting Terrorism Center at West Point, as of 2017, some members of Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jamaat-ud-Dawa, the Haqqani Network, and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) had also defected to IS-K.

IS-K has received support from the Islamic State’s core leadership in Iraq and Syria since its founding in 2015. As the Islamic State loses territory, it has increasingly turned to Afghanistan as a base for its global caliphate. Following IS-K’s official pledge of allegiance to the Islamic State’s global “ummah,” Islamic State wilayats (or provinces) in Iraq and Syria publicly announced their congratulations for the movement’s expansion into Central Asia through media statements and videos. To that end, the Islamic State has invested some financial resources in its Khorasan province—as much as several hundred thousand dollars—to improve its networks and organization in Central Asia. Additionally, a recent United Nations publication commented that “[ISIS] core continues to facilitate the relocation of some of its key operatives to Afghanistan,” including Abu Qutaiba, the Islamic State’s former leader in Iraq’s Salah al-Din province. Afghanistan remains a top destination for foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) in the region, as well as for fighters leaving battlefields in the Levant. IS-K’s public affairs prowess, global prestige, and sustained resources facilitate the recruitment of these FTFs, drawing them away from other militant movements.

Link: https://www.csis.org/programs/trans...rorism-backgrounders/islamic-state-khorasan-k

The Islamic State announced the formation of its Afghan affiliate in January 2015. ISKP (also known asISIS-K) was onceconcentrated in eastern Afghanistan, particularly in Nangarhar province,which borders the region of Pakistan formerly known as theFederally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). There, ISKP was mostly comprisedof former Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) militants who fled Pakistani army operations in the FATA after mid-2014.

https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/IF10604.pdf

Related information in following Pakistani publication:

http://issi.org.pk/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/IP-No-39-Amina-Khan.pdf

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Efforts to soften ISIS-K in Afghanistan are documented in following sources.

ISIS-K: deadly nuisance or strategic threat?

https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09592318.2018.1546293

Two U.S. Army Rangers killed in anti-ISIS raid in Afghanistan

Afghanistan remains mired in violence and bloodshed as the Taliban and ISIS fight over territory and clash against government and coalition forces.

www.nbcnews.com

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/behind-the-front-lines-in-the-fight-to-annihilate-isis-in-afghanistan/2017/07/23/0e1f88d2-6bb4-11e7-abbc-a53480672286_story.html

Coalition Denies ISIS-K Safe Haven in Afghanistan

An airstrike destroys an ISIS-K fighting position during Afghan Commando offensive operations in Mohmand Valley, Nangarhar province. Over the winter, Commandos pushed ISIS-K seven kilometers from Afghan civilian centers in Mohmand Valley. (DVIDS)

www.military.com

ISIL leader in Afghanistan killed in air raids

Abu Saad Erhabi killed along with 10 other members of ISIL’s Afghan branch, security agency says.

www.aljazeera.com

https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2020/10/22/taliban-isis-drones-afghanistan/

ISIS loses more than half its fighters from US airstrikes and Taliban ground operations

Col. Sonny Leggett, a spokesman for U.S. Forces Afghanistan, tweeted early Thursday morning that airstrikes on Wednesday killed three ISIS fighters in Kunar Province and forced 34 ISIS militants to surrender to Afghan forces in Tswokey district.

www.militarytimes.com

The Islamic State in Afghanistan Is Down, but Not Out

The Afghan Taliban is on the verge of entering into a power-sharing agreement with the Afghan government in a peace deal facilitated by the United States. Washington seems to be holding out hope that the deal will stabilize the country. But the Islamic State Khorasan Province remains a concern...

www.rand.org

Nicely left out others who did far more to defeat daesh than yankee sam.

FYI

Russian contribution = Limited efforts and capacity (Syria only)
Turkish contribution = Limited efforts and capacity (Syria only)
Iranian contribution = Sincere efforts but limited capacity (Syria and Iraq)

Who ‘Defeated’ ISIS? An Analysis of US and Russian Contributions | Russia Matters

www.russiamatters.org

Fighting ISIS in Syria: Operation Euphrates Shield and the lessons learned from the al-Bab Battle

https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09592318.2021.1875308

A Comparative Study of U.S. and Iranian Counter-ISIS Strategies

https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/1057610X.2016.1221265

 

[LeGenD]

The Air War Against the Islamic State
The Role of Airpower in Operation Inherent Resolve

Airpower played a pivotal role in the U.S.-led fight against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) from 2014 to 2019 and contributed to the success of Operation Inherent Resolve. This report sheds light on the impact of the air operations in Operation Inherent Resolve and whether airpower could have been applied differently to achieve faster, more-sustainable outcomes. The authors incorporate interviews with U.S. and coalition personnel, primary-source documents, and U.S. and coalition strike and sortie data to document the operational history of the air war, assess the relationship between airpower effects, and analyze the strategic and operational impact of airpower in Operation Inherent Resolve.

The authors find that, although airpower played an essential role in combating ISIS, airpower alone would not have been likely to defeat the militant organization. Instead, the combination of airpower and ground forces—led by Iraqi and Syrian partners—was needed to destroy the Islamic State as a territorial entity. The overarching strategy of Operation Inherent Resolve, which put ground-force partners in the lead, created several challenges and innovations in the application of airpower, which have implications for future air wars. To be prepared to meet future demands against nonstate and near-peer adversaries, the U.S. Air Force and the joint force should apply lessons learned from Operation Inherent Resolve.

Key Findings

• Airpower played a critical role in Operation Inherent Resolve, based on the "by, with, and through" strategy, which placed local partners as leaders of the fight to destroy the caliphate. In turn, partners' capabilities and interests shaped how airpower was used.
• Although more-aggressive air operations might have slightly accelerated the defeat of ISIS, they are unlikely to have significantly altered the timeline.
• The deep fight in Operation Inherent Resolve affected ISIS's finances, but it could not affect ISIS's main center of gravity—territory—meaning that strategic attack did not play a decisive role in this operation.
• Critical enablers, such as remotely piloted aircraft and aerial refueling aircraft, were in high demand and provided vital capabilities but were at times overstretched.
• Essential wartime skills, such as deliberate-targeting and defensive counterair operations, were used for the first time in years in a real operation, requiring reinvigoration of these proficiencies.
• Battlespace management within the Operation Inherent Resolve coalition was a point of disagreement, particularly between the Combined Joint Task Force Commander and the Combined Air Forces Component Commander, and affected the development of the deep fight.
• Necessary efforts to prevent civilian casualties and reduce collateral damage depleted precision-guided munition stockpiles.

Recommendations

• The joint force should revise its targeting doctrine based on the experience in Operation Inherent Resolve, including potentially incorporating the strike cell construct into doctrine or determining whether to use the Joint Air Ground Integration Center to integrate airpower with ground partners in the absence of forward joint terminal attack controllers.
• The joint force should reinvigorate, reexamine, and revise the target-development process to make it more efficient.
• The joint force should modify the allocation process for high-demand assets in joint campaigns to reduce inefficiencies and increase agility.
• The joint force should reexamine battlespace management and revise doctrine or tactics, techniques, and procedures so that it can more dynamically manage both the close and the deep fights.
• The Air Force will need to limit civilian casualties and collateral damage, requiring it to allocate precision-guided munitions efficiently across theaters and identify how to safely use second- and third-choice munitions.
• The Air Force should continue to develop more targeteers and intelligence professionals to support a reinvigoration of the target-development process.
• Self-defense rules of engagement in air-to-air operations should be stressed to airmen in training and real-world flying events. Leaders should emphasize to airmen that they are empowered and expected to defend the airspace, while avoiding inadvertent escalation.

Airpower Was Indispensable to Defeating ISIS

Some argue that airpower could have been applied more vigorously in Operation Inherent Resolve to have more quickly defeated ISIS. Airpower was essential, but ground forces led by Iraqi and Syrian partners were needed to destroy the Islamic State as a territorial entity.

www.rand.org