It's plain obvious how your assertions on Iran's foreign policy are quasi identical to Falcon29's, while I am adopting a diametrically opposed view. Anyone with a pair of eyes realizes this. The rest of your comment doesn't affect this reality, and neither does the fact that the two of you don't share the same ideology.You and Falcon have much more in common than he and I. Both of you believe in the same religion, only different interpretations of it. Both of you see the world through the lens of fantasy and cherry-picked facts that are irrelevant to the main point of the argument most of the time.
As I explained, Iran was not planning to manufacture nuclear weapons anytime soon, nor did its deterrence doctrine ever center on a rapid nuclear break-out option. The US and zionist regimes themselves were fully aware of this.How did the JCPOA contain Iran? Well, where do you want me to start? We lost all of our 20% enriched uranium stockpile. We lost 13,000 kilograms of our 3.5% enriched uranium stockpile and we handed over half of it for free to Russia. Now considering the fact that uranium is hard to mine in Iran, that's quite significant for our nuclear deterrence.
Plus, Iran is still pretty much in possession of every building block required for this solution to materialize, should she ever decide to go down that path (which she won't need to and therefore most probably won't engage in).
Seriously? I really don't understand how you would consider Iran's relations with Djibouti to be of strategic nature, let alone to form part of Iran's deterrent network of regional alliances?Well, countries where we had investments did cut their ties with us. Djibouti did cut all her ties with Iran. We built their parliament for them for free due to their geopolitical significance for us. Tajikistan did the same. We built a free power plant in Tajikistan due to cultural similarities.
Tajikistan did not cut ties with Iran, bilateral diplomatic relations are intact. They essentially shut down Iranian welfare funds operating on their soil and downgraded a few common projects.
Nor did Tajikistan play a role in Iran's regional deterrence architecture. Members of the Axis of Resistance do.
Besides, these two examples aren't a consequence of the JCPOA, they stem from bilateral US and Saudi lobbying.
As I noted above, Iran's deterrence doctrine never centered nor relied primarily on the nuclear weaponization option. Her conventional deterrence is largely sufficient. I invite you to ask PeeD, one of the most knowledgeable and respected Iranian users when it comes to military affairs and technicalities.Well, our nuclear breakout time was changed from weeks to months or years. If you don't understand the importance of nuclear deterrence, I can only feel sorry for you.
You're somewhat exaggerating the current breakout time and underestimating the pre-JCPOA one. After the JCPOA, Kerry and his colleagues were talking of one single year, not several years, while prior to the JCPOA, the general consensus was of a few months (rather than weeks).
Iran did not significantly reduce its “breakout time.” Prior to the JCPOA, Iran's breakout time — the amount of time it would take to accumulate enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon — was only 2-3 months. After the JCPOA, this timeline was increased to about 12 months
Five things to know about Iran’s nuclear announcement - Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation
By Sam Hickey On January 5, Iran announced it will breach the limits imposed by the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on the number of centrifuges it installs. Despite the headlines claiming Iran abandoned the deal, the reality is more nuanced. While Iran is no longer abiding by any...
And as said, a more rapid break out option can always be restored. Nothing was lost irreversibly in this respect.
You're ascribing too much importance to a particular aspect that is rather marginal in the big picture.
Sorry, but this argument is not functional in the context of the present discussion. It shall be reminded that when we're talking about Iran's ballistic missile deterrence, we don't mean possible long-term developments somewhere in the distant future but that which was/is already part of Iran's BM arsenal.The Iranian Space Agency was nearly dissolved by the Rouhani administration. We didn't have a successful launch until just recently. Do I need to say more?
If you're suggesting that some theoretical projects which might have seen the light of day way, way down the road, are the only thing defining Iran's ballistic missile deterrent, then Iran had no concrete, materially existing deterrent to speak of when the JCPOA was agreed upon. Thence in all logic, the JCPOA could not have neutralized that deterrent since it did not concretely exist yet. But you're applying an opposite type of reasoning in the nuclear field, where you won't consider readily existing ingredients for an increase in Iran's enriched uranium stockpile as a sufficient factor of deterrence.
Anyway, the thing that matters here is Iran's existing BM arsenal.
And that latter arsenal has kept being upgraded and expanded since the implementation of the JCPOA. In other words, the JCPOA did not roll back Iran's existing deterrence in terms of operational ballistic missiles; on the contrary, that capability was massively increased, thanks to the IRGC and the Leadership (it's well known that liberals were and are rather opposed to it, so all praise and credit goes to the mentioned institutions).
But even when it comes to the space program, we all saw how the IRGC revealed it had been pursuing its own parallel iteration all along. So Rohani's antics yet again were rendered irrelevant.
What has it to do with the JCPOA? Did the JCPOA bring about or faciliate instability in Syria?All sides have reached a stalemate in Syria. The instability and vulnerability of Syria as one of our main allies in the region go completely against our regional interests.
Also, many are quick to forget how Iran and particularly the IRGC are masters at turning threats into opportunities, something Hajj Qassem repeatedly insisted on. And so it is that the turmoil in Syria, which ought to have seriously threatened Iran's position in the Levant, unwillingly and paradoxically opened up new opportunities, such as the stationing close to the Golan Heights of military units under direct Iranian command, or Iran's role in supervizing entire brigades if not divisions of the Syrian armed forces including the NDF as well as Sunni tribal elements in the strategic Deir ez-Zour region, something that could not have been envisaged prior to the war.
The fact that the "regime change" project miserably failed due to Iran's intervention completely goes against the interest of Iran's enemies. The fact that they missed the opportunity to cut Iran off from the Mediterranean, which was to be a prelude to some (direct or indirect proxy-)attack on Iran herself following the removal of one of Tehran's main assets of deterrence, namely the supply line to Lebanon's Hezbollah, represents a sound defeat for the enemy. There's no stalemate in Syria, the zio-Americans and their cronies lost the war because they failed to reach their stated goal of "regime change" in Damascus.
I don't think I really need to address an argument like this, which claims that a US-client state such as Saudi Arabia, on the verge of normalizing its relations with Tel Aviv, represents a "threat" to the latter. Or Turkey, which has regular diplomatic relations with the zionist entity and no intention of fundamentally questioning said entity's legitimacy.Today, the regional hegemony of Israel (which has been non-existent since 1970s in my opinion) is threatened by countries like Turkey and Saudi Arabia way more than Iran. If they want to attack a country just for that purpose, they should target Turkey first and then maybe Saudi Arabia.
Again, the above cited comment appears as if it was lifted from Falcon29's rhetoric almost word for word. But even the latter has meanwhile ceased to repeat this delusional belief, seeing how Gulf monarchies have begun to adhere to Kushner's joke of a "peace plan".
Sure, the status quo is serving them so well that they are doubling and tripling down on their comprehensive, multi-dimensional efforts to bring about "regime change" in Iran.As I said, the US is gaining billions of dollars of money through freezing Iranian assets and arms sales to Arabs. Israel is normalizing her relations with all Arab countries one by one, something it couldn't have dreamed of just a decade ago. It seems that the status quo is serving them well and the Islamic Republic has run out of options to change it and honestly, it doesn't seem willing to change it as long as the IR system remains in power.
Conversely, Iran too isn't interested in challenging the status quo, so much so that this essential point of contention between Tehran and the Washington-Tel Aviv axis no longer exists, which is why Iran is now best friends with the US and is purchasing goods and services from the Americans worth far more than what the Yanks might earn from freezing Iranian assets under a sanctions regime... not!
Of course Isra"el" could have envisaged normalization of ties with Arab regimes a decade ago, since at that point they all (with the exception of Syria, Lebanon and pro-Iranian elements in Iraq, and to some extent Algeria and Sudan) had ceased any meaningful resistance against the occupation of Palestine, and had been refraining from supporting the Palestinian Resistance militarily ever since the Camp David accords.
Another faulty conclusion is drawn. Not impeaching Rohani does not make members of Majles responsible for Rohani's policies, nor does it imply that they are endorsing these policies, most of which are going to be revised by Rohani's successor with the full backing of the Majles.Previously, before the conservatives become the majority in the parliament, one could blame the inadequate foreign and domestic policies of Iran on the Rouhani administration. But when the impeachment of Rouhani was cancelled, it became evident that Rouhani alone is not responsible for the current situation.
Other than that, Rohani alone isn't at fault for Iran's economic woes indeed, since he shares this burden with the criminal US regime which imposed illegal sanctions on the Iranian people, in pursuit of "regime change", due to the fact that Islamic Iran has been challenging their illegitimate policies for over 40 years.