What's new

Indian Army ORBAT Against Pakistan-Visualised

S.Y.A

SENIOR MEMBER
Mar 21, 2008
3,504
2
3,890
Country
Pakistan
Location
Pakistan
This region has a minimum of two armored and two mechanized brigades, all independent. They are separate from the three mechanized divisions integral to V Corps


PAF has credible numbers here, almost half a dozen squadrons within range here. Outnumbering doesn't matter in real life. No force will let itself be degraded to zero in pursuit of something. FORCE IN BEING concept prevails in subcontinent.
its not about degradation, i am simply asking whether it will have enough time and resources to defend against IAF incursions and provide credible support to the army at the same time?

This region has a minimum of two armored and two mechanized brigades, all independent. They are separate from the three mechanized divisions integral to V Corps
sooo, a sort of a total of 4 divisions for the entirety of Sindh?
 

PanzerKiel

MILITARY PROFESSIONAL
Dec 5, 2006
3,918
187
25,434
Country
Pakistan
Location
Pakistan
its not about degradation, i am simply asking whether it will have enough time and resources to defend against IAF incursions and provide credible support to the army at the same time?
In the initial phases of battle, PAF will be busy fighting IAF of course. However, certain sorties and aircraft will be reserved solely for support of ground troops. In 1971, this figure was four whole squadrons
 
Last edited:

S.Y.A

SENIOR MEMBER
Mar 21, 2008
3,504
2
3,890
Country
Pakistan
Location
Pakistan
In the initial phases of battle, PAF will be busy fighting IAF of course. However, certain stories and aircraft will be reserved solely for support of ground troops. In 1971, this figure was four whole squadrons
in 1971 india managed to reach chor... paf support may not be available, army must look towards drones or attack helis for close air support.
 

PanzerKiel

MILITARY PROFESSIONAL
Dec 5, 2006
3,918
187
25,434
Country
Pakistan
Location
Pakistan
in 1971 india managed to reach chor... paf support may not be available, army must look towards drones or attack helis for close air support.
1971 comparison may not be apt for you. At that time there was no radar coverage in Sindh. Moreover, there were no fighters or bases which were there to support any sort of operations in Sindh. These problems have been rectified more than two decades ago.

Regarding Chor (Indians reached this point, almost 50 kms of plain desert, nothing else)......

In 1971 India had its 11 and 12 Divisions, an independent infantry brigade, and a couple of extra tank regiments in the area. It launched 11 Division on the Barmer- Chor axis while 12 Division was to attack from Tanot to Islamgarh and Reti. The 340 (I) Brigade appears to have looked after the Kutch sector.

11 Division’s attack succeeded at first, because the Pakistanis simply fell back on Naya Chor, and then dug in. The Indian attack ground to a halt.

12 Division was thrown off its schedule by a Pakistani attack from the Reti side, consisting of a brigade of 33 Division and a tank regiment. The force was attacked by a Hunter fighter detachment from Jodhpur and withdrew after suffering heavy losses but with its mission accomplished: 12 Division was no more a factor in the war.

India’s several raids into Pakistani Kutch were successful in boosting Indian morale, but could be of no strategic value because of the vast emptiness of the area.

Even when backed up to Naya Chor, Pakistan did not commit any brigade other than the one from 33 Division used in the spoiling attack at Islamgarh. It utilized, instead, mixed ad hoc forces’ consisting of a few companies of regulars, Rangers, and Mujahids. Pakistan has always been especially adept at economically employing such forces to delay India’s advances while conserving i ts regulars. It was thus able to keep in reserve almost its entire forces in Sind.

The operational problem in the Great Indian Desert is, simply, the sand that lies upto 7 meters deep. In the Mideast and North African Deserts the sand cover is shallow. Bulldozers can quickly sweep paths for advancing troops. Wide ranging maneuver is possible, to the extent that the desert actions of World War 2 have been compared to naval battles finding a flank was always troublesome, because both sides would keep going south of each other.

Tracked vehicles have a low footprint - the weight of a 40-ton T-72 tank is distributed along several square meters of tracks, thus reducing pressure on sand to less than that of a two-ton jeep. The jeep will sink into the sand, the tank will float.

Tracked vehicles can move freely in the desert, but not so their wheeled support and the un-mechanized infantry. Some mobility is provided by low-pressure tired vehicle and by aluminum track-ways. The latter is laid at a pace of about 2-3 kilometers an hour by specially equipped vehicles.

There is a difference, however, in laying a few kilometers of matting to help a division across sandy stretches, and laying matting to allow two corps to advance, and two more to operate on their flanks, to distances of hundreds of kilometers.

If the matting stayed laid, there might still be some reasonable prospects of supporting a quarter of a million troops in the desert, provided a very large engineer contingent is available. But because the sand is so deep, it shifts easily under the movement of heavy vehicles, wind and its own internal dynamics. This means the roadways have to be constantly maintained and re-laid.

Once Bikaner-Suratgarh railway line was being re-laid, an Indian newspaper article mentioned a 15-day sandstorm that halted all work. One hates to think what that would do to 40,000 vehicles in the desert.

During the early days of the 1971 War, Mr. K. Subhramanyam suggested that the success in the desert should be reinforced. As advances in other sectors were non-existent or slow, a third division should be committed to the desert. He was told that this was impossible, because our desert terrain required specialized equipment and training: forces from other sectors would not be able to function in this environment at such short notice.

in 1971 india managed to reach chor
I hope you are not calling that an achievement of any sort....Pakistani 18 Division only was responsible for the WHOLE Sind. With good attack ratios, superiority in men and material, and with total IAF superiority, IA reaching CHor, not even the present green belt is nothing. Large tracts of sand are of no use to anyone.
 

Sayfullah

SENIOR MEMBER
Sep 10, 2020
2,248
8
4,160
Country
Pakistan
Location
Canada
View attachment 831004
(In purple are the major drains while in blue are the canals, while the area area marked in brown is the Nara Desert)

As can be seen, Sindh has one of the most complex canal systems in the world. Not included in the above network plan are the numerous link canals and nullahs. This canal network is very dense and laterally extending. Hence they create a very large defensible tract with the desert creating a buffer. It'd be difficult for Indian forces to reach the irrigated area, not only because of PAF but also because of the terrain. Unlike North African deserts, the sand here is too fine to allow traffic to pass, moreover it is very soft and vehs sink into it. These deserts make it equally difficult for both tracked and wheeled traffic.

Also the Pakistani formations are well positioned. With two infantry Divisions which are mechanised and have Armd bdes, one complete Mech div having four integral IABGs (larger than other mech divs) and several IMBGs/IABGs throughout the region and an Artillery division. Add to this the two plus inf divs that might arrive from the 12 corps, Balochistan. None of these formations feature old tanks and are mostly equipped with AK and AK1.

Overall, even if we believe that IA has assembled Large forces and has moved in without detection the Indian attack due to the deserts would be funneled into few axis which the PA would be defending with solid defences based around the canals.
PA has the option to trade space for time but I doubt IA would be able to manage the space. First all IA mech forces will have to pass through the inhospitable terrain that opposes tracked vehs as well under pressure from PAF and Arty. Even if they somehow manage to reach the irrigated area in face of PAF and IABGs,
they'll be in no condition to launch an attack against the canal based defenses. Their wheeled logistics will find it impossible to make it through and the whole attack would be foiled, without PA playing a significant role. This will provide the 25 mech div with an opportunity for counter attacks.
Thus overall the defence of Sindh is pretty much solid with PA brilliantly basing its defence around the terrain and canals.

I believe that the only meaningful outcome for India can be in Southern Punjab region and that should be our main focus here.
As some from interior sindh, if Indians ever get to the irrigated land, they’ll face heavy resistance from heavily armed locals.
Also there’s numerous smaller canals as well almost every person’s farmland has a small canal running through it to help irrigate their land and it’s the same for my families farmland.
Sindh would be worse then Afghanistan for india.
 

Signalian

PDF THINK TANK: CONSULTANT
Aug 18, 2015
9,452
282
23,659
Country
Pakistan
Location
Australia
1971 comparison may not be apt for you. At that time there was no radar coverage in Sindh. Moreover, there were no fighters or bases which were there to support any sort of operations in Sindh. These problems have been rectified more than two decades ago.

Regarding Chor (Indians reached this point, almost 50 kms of plain desert, nothing else)......

In 1971 India had its 11 and 12 Divisions, an independent infantry brigade, and a couple of extra tank regiments in the area. It launched 11 Division on the Barmer- Chor axis while 12 Division was to attack from Tanot to Islamgarh and Reti. The 340 (I) Brigade appears to have looked after the Kutch sector.

11 Division’s attack succeeded at first, because the Pakistanis simply fell back on Naya Chor, and then dug in. The Indian attack ground to a halt.

12 Division was thrown off its schedule by a Pakistani attack from the Reti side, consisting of a brigade of 33 Division and a tank regiment. The force was attacked by a Hunter fighter detachment from Jodhpur and withdrew after suffering heavy losses but with its mission accomplished: 12 Division was no more a factor in the war.

India’s several raids into Pakistani Kutch were successful in boosting Indian morale, but could be of no strategic value because of the vast emptiness of the area.

Even when backed up to Naya Chor, Pakistan did not commit any brigade other than the one from 33 Division used in the spoiling attack at Islamgarh. It utilized, instead, mixed ad hoc forces’ consisting of a few companies of regulars, Rangers, and Mujahids. Pakistan has always been especially adept at economically employing such forces to delay India’s advances while conserving i ts regulars. It was thus able to keep in reserve almost its entire forces in Sind.

The operational problem in the Great Indian Desert is, simply, the sand that lies upto 7 meters deep. In the Mideast and North African Deserts the sand cover is shallow. Bulldozers can quickly sweep paths for advancing troops. Wide ranging maneuver is possible, to the extent that the desert actions of World War 2 have been compared to naval battles finding a flank was always troublesome, because both sides would keep going south of each other.

Tracked vehicles have a low footprint - the weight of a 40-ton T-72 tank is distributed along several square meters of tracks, thus reducing pressure on sand to less than that of a two-ton jeep. The jeep will sink into the sand, the tank will float.

Tracked vehicles can move freely in the desert, but not so their wheeled support and the un-mechanized infantry. Some mobility is provided by low-pressure tired vehicle and by aluminum track-ways. The latter is laid at a pace of about 2-3 kilometers an hour by specially equipped vehicles.

There is a difference, however, in laying a few kilometers of matting to help a division across sandy stretches, and laying matting to allow two corps to advance, and two more to operate on their flanks, to distances of hundreds of kilometers.

If the matting stayed laid, there might still be some reasonable prospects of supporting a quarter of a million troops in the desert, provided a very large engineer contingent is available. But because the sand is so deep, it shifts easily under the movement of heavy vehicles, wind and its own internal dynamics. This means the roadways have to be constantly maintained and re-laid.

Once Bikaner-Suratgarh railway line was being re-laid, an Indian newspaper article mentioned a 15-day sandstorm that halted all work. One hates to think what that would do to 40,000 vehicles in the desert.

During the early days of the 1971 War, Mr. K. Subhramanyam suggested that the success in the desert should be reinforced. As advances in other sectors were non-existent or slow, a third division should be committed to the desert. He was told that this was impossible, because our desert terrain required specialized equipment and training: forces from other sectors would not be able to function in this environment at such short notice.


I hope you are not calling that an achievement of any sort....Pakistani 18 Division only was responsible for the WHOLE Sind. With good attack ratios, superiority in men and material, and with total IAF superiority, IA reaching CHor, not even the present green belt is nothing. Large tracts of sand are of no use to anyone.
ravi
 

Sayfullah

SENIOR MEMBER
Sep 10, 2020
2,248
8
4,160
Country
Pakistan
Location
Canada
In the initial phases of battle, PAF will be busy fighting IAF of course. However, certain sorties and aircraft will be reserved solely for support of ground troops. In 1971, this figure was four whole squadrons
In any war Pak army can ask help from locals and hundreds of thousands of volunteers will come to help.
In 65, 50 000 mujahideen from sindh helped Pakistan army.
In any future war that number could be in the millions.
 

Lord Of Gondor

SENIOR MEMBER
Jul 9, 2010
2,800
0
2,676
Country
India
Location
India
Once Bikaner-Suratgarh railway line was being re-laid, an Indian newspaper article mentioned a 15-day sandstorm that halted all work. One hates to think what that would do to 40,000 vehicles in the desert.

FPlnPblaUAE_5Lp

IAF jag and a sand storm, image by Angad Singh
 

PanzerKiel

MILITARY PROFESSIONAL
Dec 5, 2006
3,918
187
25,434
Country
Pakistan
Location
Pakistan
sooo, a sort of a total of 4 divisions for the entirety of Sindh?
4 Mechanized Divisions, one artillery division, One Rocket / Missile Division, two independent infantry brigades, four self propelled artillery brigades, II Strike Corps (one armored and one mechanized division, having its own four armored, 3 mechanized and a artillery brigades) available as reserve for this area, two engineer brigades, four (+) air defence brigades, half a dozen PAF squadrons including two F-16 squadrons in range, a whole combat aviation group....to be a bit more specific.
 
Last edited:

JX-1

FULL MEMBER
Mar 14, 2022
336
0
657
Country
Pakistan
Location
Pakistan
I hope you are not calling that an achievement of any sort....Pakistani 18 Division only was responsible for the WHOLE Sind. With good attack ratios, superiority in men and material, and with total IAF superiority, IA reaching CHor, not even the present green belt is nothing. Large tracts of sand are of no use to anyone.
IA reached Umerkot but were repulsed back, if my memory is correct.
 

notorious_eagle

PDF THINK TANK: CONSULTANT
Dec 25, 2008
4,650
33
10,568
Country
Pakistan
Location
Pakistan
I do not think the logistics difficulty can be overcome at all.

Hon Sir

That's the Achilles Heels in modern combat as evident in Ukraine Russia conflict. The Ukrainians played it extremely smart by not engaging Russian Brigades and focused on picking their supply trucks which were practically undefended. Can't fight without food, fuel or ammunition. The Russian incompetence was just simply mind blowing because not even 40 years ago the Soviet Army built ROADS, let me repeat, they built their own ROADS to advance in Winter into Afghanistan. The PLA during Soviet-Sino crisis had retreated 100km inside their borders to avoid encirclements and were relying on the terrain to slow the Soviet advance. But Soviet engineers proved in Afghanistan that the 100km gap might as well be 1km for the Soviet engineers.

Its remarkable how mobile ATGM teams can make life living hell for the advancing Armored Brigades. I would be curious to see how IA would deal with Pakistan's Frontier troops that are sprinkled across LOC with ATGM's and are extremely mobile.
 

Users Who Are Viewing This Thread (Total: 1, Members: 0, Guests: 1)


Top Bottom