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Indian Air Force Failed Even in East Pakistan in 1971 War

Syama Ayas

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Indian Navy which can't even coordinate safe maintenance of its own ships and subs in its own yards, will launch coordinated air ops against enemy installations and actually hit something....wake me up when you actually have some proof Kumar.
Bilul, you are correct, no proof exists

Just some CIA lies
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time to prove your shonorness and demonstrate US Bangla diaspora influence

Go to Langley and pressurize CIA to retract this lies


https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP86T00608R000700080017-0.pdf
 

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Windjammer

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False statistics.
In this list made by PAF historian Kaiser Tufail only 18-19 IAF jets lost in E. pak dueing entire war of which only 3 were in air combat.
PAF Tezgaon runway was destroyed on 5th Dec itself halting all F-86E ops.

E3mz7knXwAgjx_k
If you had a brain, you would be dangerous. So Pakistan or PAF knew the names of all these Indian pilots and their fate... or maybe he is just copy pasting the Indian version. Any wonder you are always quick to quote him. 😆
 
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Huffal

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False statistics.
In this list made by PAF historian Kaiser Tufail only 18-19 IAF jets lost in E. pak dueing entire war of which only 3 were in air combat.
PAF Tezgaon runway was destroyed on 5th Dec itself halting all F-86E ops.

E3mz7knXwAgjx_k
Firstly this includes kills from f6 and mirage IIIE which were only stationed in the west

Secondly this only goes upto the 5th of december. Are you good mate?
Quantity does have its advantages it changes your doctrine to be more offensive. After the painful and tragic fall of EP, Pakistan actually worked on countering indias numerical preponderance.

In EP, imagine if the military commanders had what they asked for at least the ignominious surrender would not have happened.

Today, if we want Kashmir, we have no choice but to completely neutralize and even surpass indias numerical superiority at least in the context of PAF and PN.
The offsets have been made and perfected.
If you had a brain, you would be dangerous. So Pakistan or PAF knew the names of all these Indian pilots and their fate... or maybe he is just copy pasting the Indian version. Any wonder you are always quick to quote him. 😆
Dude this page only goes upto the 05th of dec and also includes kills from west Pakistan. Its not a summary of losses in East Pakistan. Its a summary of losses of the iaf through out the entire war, and conveniently the rest of the pages are MIA
 

Windjammer

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Dude this page only goes upto the 05th of dec and also includes kills from west Pakistan. Its not a summary of losses in East Pakistan. Its a summary of losses of the iaf through out the entire war, and conveniently the rest of the pages are MIA
He's trying to grow a brain and be clever, since PAF in Eastern front was grounded after 5th December and unable to do combat, he's trying to imply that only Three IAF aircraft were shot down in dogfights rather than 11 that PAF claimed in East.
Now going by the list, how would PAF know names of all the IAF pilots and if they were killed or survived... So obviously this list is the watered down self serving Indian version.
 

khail007

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There is also a very famous footage of PA AD forces shooting down a SU-7 in Dhaka in front of all the international journalists:


Zabardast - the scene of victim IAF aircraft and going down to the ground is marvelous, as a kite loses its string. The same scenes were witnessed by the population of Lahore in the 1965 war and enthusiastically chanting 'Bo-Kata' when the IAF aircraft were lost to PAF in a dogfight.
 

Bilal9

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Zabardast - the scene of victim IAF aircraft and going down to the ground is marvelous, as a kite loses its string. The same scenes were witnessed by the population of Lahore in the 1965 war and enthusiastically chanting 'Bo-Kata' when the IAF aircraft were lost to PAF in a dogfight.

Bhutani lost his ride over Tejgaon and crashed it over what is today Agargaon, behind the Parliament House Complex being completed at that time. General Zia's resting place is at that location (rearmost area in image). Tejgaon airport can be seen on the right.

iu


People from Dhaka will know what I am talking about. Agargaon today has most of the newer govt. administrative offices being built in Dhaka.
 

PanzerKiel

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Indians in all their exuberance make horrific mistakes....without going into details......their belief that they everything went right, and everything will go right costs them everytime....

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these are Pakistan Army soldiers, with a PA captain on the right, during the battle in EP in 1971, they are bringing back a dead body of a killed indian soldier

this pic is there on top of their article...

and even their claims of a REAL victory in 1971 are disputed by their own defence analysts......

It is believed that in the 1971 War, India had three vital objectives, of which only one was the capture of East Pakistan, ‘the other two’ were liberation of Azad Kashmir and the destruction of Pakistan’s war potential for 20 years, thus establishing India’s supremacy once and for all.

It is also believed that with the East Pakistan captured, the Indian Government abandoned the other two objectives because of American pressure, and that the pressure itself was a bluff.


Consider some of the exhibits.

The IA had budgeted for 40,000 casualties, easily three times those incurred in two weeks of fighting. Obviously a longer war was expected.

Lt.-Gen. K.P. Candeth’s entire plan for the Sialkot sector, where India deployed five infantry divisions and three independent armored brigades, makes sense only if we assume that he intended XI and XV Corps to eliminate the entire Sialkot salient, prior to turning north to outflank Azad Kashmir. In conjunction with frontal attacks by 19 and 25 Divisions in Kashmir, this would have cracked the front and AK would have fallen.

The IA Kashmir divisions more or less stood by defensively, letting the Pakistanis do the attacking. This makes no sense unless the idea was to let the Pakistanis expend their strength before India launched a counteroffensive.

Indian Southern Command launched a large, corps-sized force into Sind. Its objectives were exceptionally clear to cut the line of communication between Karachi and Lahore at two points, Hyderabad City and Rahim Yar Khan. The secondary objectives which we must not mistake for the primary ones, were to draw down Pakistani reserves from all over Pakistan, thus easing the task of Indian troops advancing in other sectors, and to occupy as much of Sind as possible, to exchange for possible losses elsewhere.

Indian XI Corps defending Punjab, with greater strength than the opposing Pakistan IV Corps, contented itself with a defensive role, making no move to attack Pakistan. This makes no sense unless we again say that the objective was to conserve IA strength before attacking the enormously strong Lahore defenses, allowing breakthroughs to made at other points, namely in the north by I and XV Corps and in the south by Southern Command.

Negotiations to end the fighting in the east were being mooted by Farman Ali, East Pakistan’ s governor, as early as December 10, after the fall of Jessore. By December 12 the process was in fall swing because it was clear that Pakistan could not hold out. The cease-fire was signed on December 16. Yet every single major Indian formation from Ferojpur to Uri and its counterpart on Pakistan’s side was getting ready for major offensives on December 17 and 19. As the war in the east wound down, both sides planned to step up the war in the west.

Pakistan had reduced its air sorties to the minimum required to defend its air bases. It had, from the start of the war, kept four squadrons in reserve. Concurrently, it avoided committing, it’s two armored divisions. Clearly, it was conserving forces for an anticipated long war.

Indian critics may say that Indian armed forces had no objectives in the West Pakistan.

If India lacked objectives in the west, why did India acted in a manner calculated to make the Pakistanis believe that India was about to attack there? India had crossed the international frontier in the east on November 21, 1971, without provoking a Pakistani attack in the west. Pakistan had, after all, realized right from 1947 that it could not defend its eastern wing without a counteroffensive in the west. So why did this counteroffensive not come on the 21st November? Clearly, that the Pakistanis, at least, were willing to separate the issue of war in the east and a possible response in the west.

Thus war in the west was avoidable. Clearly Pakistan hoped to avoid war, remaining quiet for 13 days while several Indian brigades established strong positions inside East Pakistan.

The notion of a sectorial war is rather siliy, unless you are the weaker power hoping to limit the scale of hostilities. A stronger power has no incentive for the sectorial approach. By fighting across the board, it prevents the adversary from lightly defending low threat sectors and concentrating in high threat ones.

Pakistan’s hope of limiting the war were certainly belied. Point is that Pakistan, after having sat quietly for a crucial 13 days, had had no interest in attacking first in the west, that too in such impulsive and ineffectual fashion, unless it aimed to preempt an Indian attack in the west.

There was no need for India to attack in the west just to prevent reinforcement of the east. Pakistan GHQ had already refused General Niazi’s requests for two more divisions when the magnitude of India’s build- up became clear. With only 12 divisions left in the west, including two (17 and 33 Divisions) raised in extremely hurried fashion, for Pakistan to further weaken the west by reinforcing the east was to tempt India into attacking. Further, the naval blockade of East Pakistan was already in place in November. Reinforcement from the air could have provided only troops with their individual weapons. And, had India found it necessary, it would have mounted an air blockade of the east after the war began on November 21. Remember, Pakistan was outnumbered about ten to one in the air in the east, which contributed significantly to the rapidity of Indian victory.

If Indian strategy was offensive-defensive, then why did they not also attack in Kashmir and Punjab, instead of limiting their offensive to the Pathankot sector ? This requires further amplification.

It may be easily accepted that India has to preempt Pakistan by attacking from Pathankot. The 50- kilometer deep corridor is too shallow to absorb a Pakistani first strike. Equally acceptable is the proposition that India must attack in the desert to obtain territory for further negotiation and to force dispersal of Pakistani reserves.

But then why did India not attack from Chhamb as well? Chhamb is so hard to hold that only an immediate, swift attack towards Marala can protect it. Just as India cannot prevent Pakistan from gaining some ground wherever it attacks, Pakistan must lose ground wherever India attacks. An offensive-defensive strategy requires for attacks all across the front.

Similarly, why did India not attack in the Punjab, particularly from Fazilka, and thus pre-empt the considerable Pakistani gains made by Pakistan’s 105 (1) Brigade? Even though India’s Foxtrot Sector held the equivalent of a reinforced division. In any case, Pakistan, with fewer troops, saw no reason to hold its hand and attacked immediately.


If Indian intention was offensive- defensive, when India had attacked the Sialkot sector in massive force, why they continued attacking? After having advanced 10-kilometers India could have simply dug in and let the Pakistanis bash their heads against Indians, as happened to Pakistan in Lahore in 1965, and to India in Khem Karan and Fazilka in 1965 and 1971 respectively.

Why did India not launch the armored division into Pakistan instead of waiting for Pakistan to launch its I Armored Division, thus conceding the initiative? The argument that using India’s strategic reserve would have left nothing to counter Pakistan’s Southern Strike Force is incorrect. If India was worried about this strike force, better to attack first, forcing its dissipation in defending his territory, then to wait for Pakistan to do the same to us. Besides, India had an armored brigade available to defend against Pakistan’s 1 armored division had India attack by I Armored Division gone seriously wrong.

It is senseless to say India must keep their strike force idle because they have to wait for Pakistan to strike, otherwise India won’t be able to hold off his strike force, and then assume Pakistan is not similarly constrained.

In short, it is clear that India was not following an offensive- defensive strategy

In Sind India followed an offensive-defensive strategy.

In Multan/Punjab India waited for Pakistan, to attack and bog itself down before moving. This was defensive-offensive.

In Sialkot, India had to attack no matter what strategy was involved, but India continued attacking even after ensuring the security of the Pathankot Corridor. This was offensive-offensive.

In Kashmir, India allowed letting Pakistan show its hand before striking. This was defensive-offensive.

There was, thus, no question of an offensive-defensive strategy.

To reiterate, had India not intended offensive objectives, India could merely have played along with the Pakistanis and continued lying passive in the west, something that also suited them.

Possibly this is insufficient to convince the skeptical reader who will demand a higher standard of proof. This reader will insist that as India had no intention to make strategic gains in the west, their failure to achieve these gains is no evidence of a defeat for India.

To meet these objections lets switch our argument.

A failure of Indian nerve can be said as the explanation for Indian failure to push the 1971 war to a logical conclusion. Those who disagree say since India had limited objectives which they achieved, the war did reach a logical conclusion.

If this is correct, then Indian strategic objectives were clearly faulty and that in retrospect, even their success ended up as a failure.

How does it make sense to fight the same opponent for the third time in 25 years, especially when he is inferior to you, and leave him with his war potential intact so that he can hope for another war?

The failure to include the recovery of Azad Kashmir in Indian strategic objectives is itself a confession of weakness.

And in as much as Bangladesh is today hostile, and Pakistan stronger than in 1971, even Indian limited objectives failed. It is instructive to remember that Pakistan had one division with four brigades against Eastern India. Bangladesh feels it necessary to have a 1,50,000 army now. There was one PAF fighter squadron in the east, and an insubstantial and transient naval presence. Bangladesh has atleast three times as many fighter planes and a permanent naval presence.
 

SQ8

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I think the PAF had ordered the second Mirage III/5 batch around 1967-1969. Had the 1971 War not happened, I suspect the PAF would've deployed a Mirage III/5 squadron to East Pakistan alongside several F-6 squadrons. In fact, the PAF would've also added an attack unit -- possibly A-5 -- there too. Remember, both East & West Pakistan had a combined defence budget, so the key military programs would've run faster thanks to more funding.

That said, a big failure on our part was not finalizing the purchase of Kockums SSKs from Sweden in the 1960s. Ayub Khan wasn't convinced about the PN's value at the time so NHQs programs weren't given much support. However, NHQ was apparently close to buying the Swedish SSKs. I think absorbing those before years ahead of 1971 would have given the PN a strong grasp of sub-surface warfare (that it eventually got via the Daphne SSKs). IMO stationing 2 modern SSKs at East Pakistan -- plus a reinforced PAF --- would've provided a credible A2/AD element.

Granted, none of the above absolves Pakistan of its wider political failure and refusal to give East Pak its agency, but some stuff to keep in mind. @SQ8
A F-6 sq was scheduled to be in Dhaka by the end of 71 to reinforce the F-86s there but alas there was more than just one type of bias at play there.
 
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Firstly this includes kills from f6 and mirage IIIE which were only stationed in the west

Secondly this only goes upto the 5th of december. Are you good mate?
No it includes both fronts (one can clearly see Tezgaon included).

Anyways here is remaining pages which shows IAF lost only 18 aircraft in air combat in whole war out of which 6 were ground attack aircraft and one was bomber and only 11 were fighters.
E3mz8b9WQAM-loI
 

Windjammer

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No it includes both fronts (one can clearly see Tezgaon included).

Anyways here is remaining pages which shows IAF lost only 18 aircraft in air combat in whole war out of which 6 were ground attack aircraft and one was bomber and only 11 were fighters.
E3mz8b9WQAM-loI
Yea, and these some two dozen IAF pilots in just one POW camp must have already been in Pakistan as a part of exchange programme.

download.jpeg
 

PanzerKiel

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Yea, and these some two dozen IAF pilots in just one POW camp must have already been in Pakistan as a part of exchange programme.

View attachment 803349

Their story goes back 46 years. Twelve Indian Air Force pilots, lodged in a Pakistani prisoner of war camp near Rawalpindi in 1971, hatched a great “conspiracy”. A conspiracy of escape. And three of them did escape, only to be caught four miles from the Afghanistan border.


During the 1971 war, the Pakistani army had taken 16 Indian Air Force (IAF) pilots as war prisoners and held them captive in a camp near Rawalpindi.


Parulkar was allowed to mingle with flight lieutenants MS Grewal, Harish Sinhji and nine other IAF pilots who had been captured during previous missions.

I have deliberately used indian or neutral sources, there are many other as well......SO, @Windjammer ,it is safe to say that there must be anywhere from 12 to 16, maybe more pilots who were made POW. And of course this doesnt include those who were killed.
 

Windjammer

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Their story goes back 46 years. Twelve Indian Air Force pilots, lodged in a Pakistani prisoner of war camp near Rawalpindi in 1971, hatched a great “conspiracy”. A conspiracy of escape. And three of them did escape, only to be caught four miles from the Afghanistan border.


During the 1971 war, the Pakistani army had taken 16 Indian Air Force (IAF) pilots as war prisoners and held them captive in a camp near Rawalpindi.


Parulkar was allowed to mingle with flight lieutenants MS Grewal, Harish Sinhji and nine other IAF pilots who had been captured during previous missions.

I have deliberately used indian or neutral sources, there are many other as well......SO, @Windjammer ,it is safe to say that there must be anywhere from 12 to 16, maybe more pilots who were made POW. And of course this doesnt include those who were killed.
Dear this picture I posted was issued by International Commission of Red Cross, whose job it is to visit POWs to find out their well being and if there are any issues. These Sikh IAF pilots were being held in a POW camp in Lylpure, now you can count at least 24 heads here, what about other camps and the captured Indian Hindu, Muslim or Christian pilots.

download.jpeg
 

PanzerKiel

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Their story goes back 46 years. Twelve Indian Air Force pilots, lodged in a Pakistani prisoner of war camp near Rawalpindi in 1971, hatched a great “conspiracy”. A conspiracy of escape. And three of them did escape, only to be caught four miles from the Afghanistan border.


During the 1971 war, the Pakistani army had taken 16 Indian Air Force (IAF) pilots as war prisoners and held them captive in a camp near Rawalpindi.


Parulkar was allowed to mingle with flight lieutenants MS Grewal, Harish Sinhji and nine other IAF pilots who had been captured during previous missions.

I have deliberately used indian or neutral sources, there are many other as well......SO, @Windjammer ,it is safe to say that there must be anywhere from 12 to 16, maybe more pilots who were made POW. And of course this doesnt include those who were killed.
To quote from this BBC report
They are called "the missing 54" - Indian soldiers forgotten in the fog of past wars with Pakistan, and who appear to have slipped through the cracks of the rival neighbours' troubled history.

The brother of one of the missing soldiers told me the government had failed in its job.
"In the euphoria over the war victories, we just forgot these soldiers," he said. "I blame successive governments and the defence establishment for their complete apathy. We even wanted a third party to mediate and get to the truth about these soldiers, but India did not agree to it."
 

PanzerKiel

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1640430260155.png


As per this Aljazeera report
According to India’s official records, Pakistan took 616 POWs during the 14-day war, including 12 air force officers and eight civilians.


Recounted in third person by Dhirendra S Jafa, Wing Commander (Retd.) Indian Air Force, "Death Wasn't Painful", brought by Sage books, salutes the sacrifices made by these fighter pilots, many of whom were taken prisoners of war (POW) and spent months in Pakistani prisons before returning to India.
The book, thus, is the tale of these 12 fighter pilots in enemy captivity- their deprivations, their longings for home and families, their interactions with Pakistani military officers and civilians is recounted.
 

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