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India Seeks to Escape an Asian Future Led by China

khansaheeb

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India Seeks to Escape an Asian Future Led by China

A flurry of trade talks herald an economic realignment toward the West.

By C. Raja Mohan, a columnist at Foreign Policy and a visiting research professor at the National University of Singapore’s Institute of South Asian Studies.

modi-boris-johnson-india-britain-trade-GettyImages-1350855433.jpg

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and British Prime Minister Boris Johnson pose during a session at COP26 in Glasgow, Scotland, on Nov. 2, 2021. CHRIS JACKSON/GETTY IMAGES

JANUARY 23, 2022, 7:00 AM

Last week’s launch of formal trade talks between India and the United Kingdom, with the declared ambition to ink a smaller deal in the next few months and a comprehensive agreement by the end of the year, is not much of a surprise. After all, Britain has made no secret of its desperate search for any and all partners to keep trade flowing after it walked out on the European Union.

But if one shifts focus to India and its reasons for pursuing a deal with Britain, things suddenly get more interesting. Even if Britain isn’t among India’s biggest trade partners, the start of talks marks nothing less than several major shifts in India’s foreign and economic policies. If Britain is seeking an economic future beyond Europe, India is looking westward to escape the growing prospect of a Chinese-led Asia.

Although India embraced globalization at the turn of the 1990s, there was little domestic support for liberalizing trade. Opposing free trade agreements united the left and the right; even more powerful was the resistance from an Indian capitalist class reluctant to open its captive market for foreign producers.

In the limited political space they thus had, the weak coalition governments ruling India until 2014 managed to negotiate just a small handful of free trade agreements—mostly with Asian partners, such as Japan, South Korea, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.

India’s new enthusiasm for trading with the West has not escaped Beijing’s attention.

When Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi led the Bharatiya Janata Party to power in 2014 with a majority in parliament, his government ordered a review of all the free trade deals India had signed. Despite a strongly held view across India that the agreements worked to the disadvantage of Indian industry, Modi continued to participate in the Asia-wide free trade negotiations that would eventually produce the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), but he pulled out at the very last moment in 2019.

If New Delhi’s decision generated deep disappointment among its Asian partners, there was also strong domestic criticism of having isolated India in the global trade domain—a sea change compared to the debate over previous decades. Over the last year, Modi has ended India’s blanket opposition to free trade agreements and returned to bilateral free trade talks with several blocs, including the EU and the Gulf Cooperation Council. The shift wasn’t just toward a new attitude on trade but toward a new set of countries: India’s natural economic partners, especially those in the Anglosphere and the West.

Britain has not traditionally been on the list of countries the Indian establishment has been comfortable with. During the Cold War and afterward, Britain’s presumed tilt toward Pakistan chipped away at New Delhi’s goodwill for London. But the Modi government has transcended hesitations and invested political capital in expanding the partnership by focusing on potential areas of convergence. Trade liberalization has emerged as a major priority with Britain.

In walking away from the RCEP in 2019, India signaled its reluctance to be part of an Asian economic integration led by China. The sharpening border conflict with Beijing as well as the fear of the Indian manufacturing sector being wiped out by cheap Chinese imports contributed to the decision. In the spring of 2020, Chinese aggression in eastern Ladakh reinforced India’s decision.

As it turned its back on the East, New Delhi began to look to the West for trade partnerships, and the Anglosphere seemed the most responsive. It’s not just post-Brexit Britain that began to take a fresh look at India. Australia, reeling under the economic coercion imposed by China, also sought to revive moribund trade talks with India.

As Joe Biden and Narendra Modi meet in Washington, the business of balancing China enters a serious phase.

New Delhi’s positive approach to trade with Canberra goes hand in hand with a deepening bilateral and multilateral strategic partnership. Australia appointed former Prime Minister Tony Abbott as a special envoy on trade. Abbott has made frequent trips to New Delhi in the last few months, and the two sides are said to be close to signing an interim agreement in the coming weeks.

In the last few weeks, New Delhi has also intensified talks on trade liberalization with a number of countries including Canada and Israel. A trade deal with the United Arab Emirates is said to be ready for signature. All this is small fry compared to the importance of the EU and the United States. Brussels and Washington contribute more than 10 percent each of India’s annual global trade in goods, which totals close to $1 trillion.

Until last year, Brussels was not even interested in engaging New Delhi on trade discussions; that decision stemmed from a failed effort to negotiate a trade deal with India between 2007 and 2013. A major political effort at revitalizing the Indian-EU partnership in the last two years has resulted in a formal political decision in May 2021 to renew the talks. As the two sides prepare for the negotiations, there will be many hurdles to overcome, and no one is denying the difficulty of arriving at an agreement.

The United States, on the other hand, is not negotiating free trade agreements with anyone at this stage but is engaged with India in overcoming multiple trade disputes that peaked during the Trump years. Despite these difficulties, the bilateral goods trade has continued to grow, reaching close to $110 billion in 2021.

While an Indian-U.S. free trade agreement is not in the cards, there is a recognition at both countries’ highest political levels that they need to urgently complement their growing security partnership with “an ambitious, shared vision for the future of the trade relationship,” as a White House statement put it this past September. The Modi government and the Biden administration have revived the joint trade policy forum, and there is a renewed effort to overcome many disputes.

The jury is still out on how well India and the West can translate their new geoeconomic convergence into concrete outcomes.

India’s new enthusiasm for trading with the West has not escaped Beijing’s attention. Reviewing India’s new trade activism, the state-controlled Global Times said New Delhi can’t turn its backon commercial engagement with China. It pointed to the growing volume of bilateral trade, which hit $126 billion in 2021up by nearly 44 percent over 2020 despite continuing military tensions and New Delhi’s policies aiming to reduce economic exposure to Beijing.

But India can’t ignore the fact that its trade remains massively unbalanced. China’s $70 billion bilateral surplus in 2021 is driven by the fact that India exports mostly raw materials to China and imports mostly manufactured goods. Although India can’t immediately lessen its economic dependence on China, it can certainly deepen economic integration with the West. At home, India can also revive its manufacturing sector to reduce imports from China.

Over the last year, New Delhi has outlined a series of incentives to promote manufacturing capacity in India, and access to Western machine tools and production technology will play an important role. Some of the early reviews of these policies are positive, but the full impact will be felt only in a few years.

New Delhi’s post-independence inward economic turn, policy of import substitution, and delusions of autarky saw the steady erosion of India’s trade and investment ties with the West. In the economic reform era that began in 1991, the West has returned to leading positions in India’s trade profile. But New Delhi has long struggled to seize the new possibilities with the West, even as China raced ahead to benefit from its growing access to Western capital, markets, and technology.

India’s political energies went into arguing with the West on first principles, seeking to redefine multilateralism and challenging its leadership of the global trading system. Rather than build on economic complementarity with the West, New Delhi turned to economies in the east that were similar to—and competing with—India’s.

India is now trying to reverse this by finding ways to integrate with its Western partners through free trade agreements. It is also interested in building resilient supply chains among trusted political partners. The economic fallout from Chinese-Western political tensions provides a new geopolitical context for India’s economic realignment. Of course, New Delhi is aware that the West can’t easily reverse the deep interdependence with China that has emerged over the last four decades.

The jury is still out on how well India and the West can translate their new geoeconomic convergence into concrete outcomes. For one, India’s trade negotiators are notoriously recalcitrant. In the West, trade bureaucracies have been attached to the mantra of universally open markets; we have yet to see whether they can shift to selective globalization among like-minded countries and take a strategic approach to commercial engagement with India. The Indian-British trade talks will provide some early answers.

East England company being setup by the Indians, the next Prime Minister may well be Indian and then the UK is definitely fu(ked.
 

samv

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India always seek to serve its western masters. They pursue policy for the approval of its masters as a household slave. That is why it always subservient to its masters want and need. If you look at India as a household slave, everything they do make sense.

It's like India always wants approval from the west - especially the USA.

West hates China + India loves west → India hates China
West hates Asian solidarity + India loves west → India hates Asian solidarity

Agree. Wonder why it is like this.

India voted against Sri Lanka - one of its closest neighbours - at the UN on several occasions by siding with the west, while China didn't.

Do you think a western country would vote against another western country. No way.
 

beijingwalker

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Imperial Japan also said they wanted to leave Asia and join Europe 脱亚入欧.

Congratulations, India is as powerful as Imperial Japan with an equal future.
Asia will be a better place without India, as for what was the root cause for the bad blood between the two countries , it's Indian harboring Dalai Lama and his "Tibet exile government". It's a blatant backstabing to China.
Britain used India as its base to invade China in 19th century, China's several unequal treaties were actually signed in India, so the relationship was not all that well to start with.

 

Tshering22

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India Seeks to Escape an Asian Future Led by China

A flurry of trade talks herald an economic realignment toward the West.

By C. Raja Mohan, a columnist at Foreign Policy and a visiting research professor at the National University of Singapore’s Institute of South Asian Studies.

modi-boris-johnson-india-britain-trade-GettyImages-1350855433.jpg

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and British Prime Minister Boris Johnson pose during a session at COP26 in Glasgow, Scotland, on Nov. 2, 2021. CHRIS JACKSON/GETTY IMAGES

JANUARY 23, 2022, 7:00 AM

Last week’s launch of formal trade talks between India and the United Kingdom, with the declared ambition to ink a smaller deal in the next few months and a comprehensive agreement by the end of the year, is not much of a surprise. After all, Britain has made no secret of its desperate search for any and all partners to keep trade flowing after it walked out on the European Union.

But if one shifts focus to India and its reasons for pursuing a deal with Britain, things suddenly get more interesting. Even if Britain isn’t among India’s biggest trade partners, the start of talks marks nothing less than several major shifts in India’s foreign and economic policies. If Britain is seeking an economic future beyond Europe, India is looking westward to escape the growing prospect of a Chinese-led Asia.

Although India embraced globalization at the turn of the 1990s, there was little domestic support for liberalizing trade. Opposing free trade agreements united the left and the right; even more powerful was the resistance from an Indian capitalist class reluctant to open its captive market for foreign producers.

In the limited political space they thus had, the weak coalition governments ruling India until 2014 managed to negotiate just a small handful of free trade agreements—mostly with Asian partners, such as Japan, South Korea, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.

India’s new enthusiasm for trading with the West has not escaped Beijing’s attention.

When Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi led the Bharatiya Janata Party to power in 2014 with a majority in parliament, his government ordered a review of all the free trade deals India had signed. Despite a strongly held view across India that the agreements worked to the disadvantage of Indian industry, Modi continued to participate in the Asia-wide free trade negotiations that would eventually produce the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), but he pulled out at the very last moment in 2019.

If New Delhi’s decision generated deep disappointment among its Asian partners, there was also strong domestic criticism of having isolated India in the global trade domain—a sea change compared to the debate over previous decades. Over the last year, Modi has ended India’s blanket opposition to free trade agreements and returned to bilateral free trade talks with several blocs, including the EU and the Gulf Cooperation Council. The shift wasn’t just toward a new attitude on trade but toward a new set of countries: India’s natural economic partners, especially those in the Anglosphere and the West.

Britain has not traditionally been on the list of countries the Indian establishment has been comfortable with. During the Cold War and afterward, Britain’s presumed tilt toward Pakistan chipped away at New Delhi’s goodwill for London. But the Modi government has transcended hesitations and invested political capital in expanding the partnership by focusing on potential areas of convergence. Trade liberalization has emerged as a major priority with Britain.

In walking away from the RCEP in 2019, India signaled its reluctance to be part of an Asian economic integration led by China. The sharpening border conflict with Beijing as well as the fear of the Indian manufacturing sector being wiped out by cheap Chinese imports contributed to the decision. In the spring of 2020, Chinese aggression in eastern Ladakh reinforced India’s decision.

As it turned its back on the East, New Delhi began to look to the West for trade partnerships, and the Anglosphere seemed the most responsive. It’s not just post-Brexit Britain that began to take a fresh look at India. Australia, reeling under the economic coercion imposed by China, also sought to revive moribund trade talks with India.

As Joe Biden and Narendra Modi meet in Washington, the business of balancing China enters a serious phase.

New Delhi’s positive approach to trade with Canberra goes hand in hand with a deepening bilateral and multilateral strategic partnership. Australia appointed former Prime Minister Tony Abbott as a special envoy on trade. Abbott has made frequent trips to New Delhi in the last few months, and the two sides are said to be close to signing an interim agreement in the coming weeks.

In the last few weeks, New Delhi has also intensified talks on trade liberalization with a number of countries including Canada and Israel. A trade deal with the United Arab Emirates is said to be ready for signature. All this is small fry compared to the importance of the EU and the United States. Brussels and Washington contribute more than 10 percent each of India’s annual global trade in goods, which totals close to $1 trillion.

Until last year, Brussels was not even interested in engaging New Delhi on trade discussions; that decision stemmed from a failed effort to negotiate a trade deal with India between 2007 and 2013. A major political effort at revitalizing the Indian-EU partnership in the last two years has resulted in a formal political decision in May 2021 to renew the talks. As the two sides prepare for the negotiations, there will be many hurdles to overcome, and no one is denying the difficulty of arriving at an agreement.

The United States, on the other hand, is not negotiating free trade agreements with anyone at this stage but is engaged with India in overcoming multiple trade disputes that peaked during the Trump years. Despite these difficulties, the bilateral goods trade has continued to grow, reaching close to $110 billion in 2021.

While an Indian-U.S. free trade agreement is not in the cards, there is a recognition at both countries’ highest political levels that they need to urgently complement their growing security partnership with “an ambitious, shared vision for the future of the trade relationship,” as a White House statement put it this past September. The Modi government and the Biden administration have revived the joint trade policy forum, and there is a renewed effort to overcome many disputes.

The jury is still out on how well India and the West can translate their new geoeconomic convergence into concrete outcomes.

India’s new enthusiasm for trading with the West has not escaped Beijing’s attention. Reviewing India’s new trade activism, the state-controlled Global Times said New Delhi can’t turn its backon commercial engagement with China. It pointed to the growing volume of bilateral trade, which hit $126 billion in 2021up by nearly 44 percent over 2020 despite continuing military tensions and New Delhi’s policies aiming to reduce economic exposure to Beijing.

But India can’t ignore the fact that its trade remains massively unbalanced. China’s $70 billion bilateral surplus in 2021 is driven by the fact that India exports mostly raw materials to China and imports mostly manufactured goods. Although India can’t immediately lessen its economic dependence on China, it can certainly deepen economic integration with the West. At home, India can also revive its manufacturing sector to reduce imports from China.

Over the last year, New Delhi has outlined a series of incentives to promote manufacturing capacity in India, and access to Western machine tools and production technology will play an important role. Some of the early reviews of these policies are positive, but the full impact will be felt only in a few years.

New Delhi’s post-independence inward economic turn, policy of import substitution, and delusions of autarky saw the steady erosion of India’s trade and investment ties with the West. In the economic reform era that began in 1991, the West has returned to leading positions in India’s trade profile. But New Delhi has long struggled to seize the new possibilities with the West, even as China raced ahead to benefit from its growing access to Western capital, markets, and technology.

India’s political energies went into arguing with the West on first principles, seeking to redefine multilateralism and challenging its leadership of the global trading system. Rather than build on economic complementarity with the West, New Delhi turned to economies in the east that were similar to—and competing with—India’s.

India is now trying to reverse this by finding ways to integrate with its Western partners through free trade agreements. It is also interested in building resilient supply chains among trusted political partners. The economic fallout from Chinese-Western political tensions provides a new geopolitical context for India’s economic realignment. Of course, New Delhi is aware that the West can’t easily reverse the deep interdependence with China that has emerged over the last four decades.

The jury is still out on how well India and the West can translate their new geoeconomic convergence into concrete outcomes. For one, India’s trade negotiators are notoriously recalcitrant. In the West, trade bureaucracies have been attached to the mantra of universally open markets; we have yet to see whether they can shift to selective globalization among like-minded countries and take a strategic approach to commercial engagement with India. The Indian-British trade talks will provide some early answers.


That's a little too much for a country that is insistent on not taking an anti-China stance, despite its other strategic partners having openly done so. Our interests with the West just happen to coincide and when there is trade with them, then why not? If China wants to lead the RCEP it is most welcome; we are not interested in being a part of it for a lot of reasons - the primary being our trade imbalance with China and India's excessive imports from some other countries in the region.

Add to that the ongoing political tensions between the two countries, it complicates the matter even more. There are some outstanding issues that need to be addressed and once those are resolved, then we really don't mind either ways.

East England company being setup by the Indians, the next Prime Minister may well be Indian and then the UK is definitely fu(ked.
Rishi Sunak and Preeti Patel are Indians only by race and faith. They have lived, studied and worked as British for decades and their alignment is more British than Indian. As public figures, they are friendly with politicians of all countries as is the protocol unless it undermines British interests.
 

Nan Yang

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India Seeks to Escape an Asian Future Led by China

A flurry of trade talks herald an economic realignment toward the West.

By C. Raja Mohan, a columnist at Foreign Policy and a visiting research professor at the National University of Singapore’s Institute of South Asian Studies.

modi-boris-johnson-india-britain-trade-GettyImages-1350855433.jpg

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and British Prime Minister Boris Johnson pose during a session at COP26 in Glasgow, Scotland, on Nov. 2, 2021. CHRIS JACKSON/GETTY IMAGES

JANUARY 23, 2022, 7:00 AM

Last week’s launch of formal trade talks between India and the United Kingdom, with the declared ambition to ink a smaller deal in the next few months and a comprehensive agreement by the end of the year, is not much of a surprise. After all, Britain has made no secret of its desperate search for any and all partners to keep trade flowing after it walked out on the European Union.

But if one shifts focus to India and its reasons for pursuing a deal with Britain, things suddenly get more interesting. Even if Britain isn’t among India’s biggest trade partners, the start of talks marks nothing less than several major shifts in India’s foreign and economic policies. If Britain is seeking an economic future beyond Europe, India is looking westward to escape the growing prospect of a Chinese-led Asia.

Although India embraced globalization at the turn of the 1990s, there was little domestic support for liberalizing trade. Opposing free trade agreements united the left and the right; even more powerful was the resistance from an Indian capitalist class reluctant to open its captive market for foreign producers.

In the limited political space they thus had, the weak coalition governments ruling India until 2014 managed to negotiate just a small handful of free trade agreements—mostly with Asian partners, such as Japan, South Korea, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.

India’s new enthusiasm for trading with the West has not escaped Beijing’s attention.

When Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi led the Bharatiya Janata Party to power in 2014 with a majority in parliament, his government ordered a review of all the free trade deals India had signed. Despite a strongly held view across India that the agreements worked to the disadvantage of Indian industry, Modi continued to participate in the Asia-wide free trade negotiations that would eventually produce the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), but he pulled out at the very last moment in 2019.

If New Delhi’s decision generated deep disappointment among its Asian partners, there was also strong domestic criticism of having isolated India in the global trade domain—a sea change compared to the debate over previous decades. Over the last year, Modi has ended India’s blanket opposition to free trade agreements and returned to bilateral free trade talks with several blocs, including the EU and the Gulf Cooperation Council. The shift wasn’t just toward a new attitude on trade but toward a new set of countries: India’s natural economic partners, especially those in the Anglosphere and the West.

Britain has not traditionally been on the list of countries the Indian establishment has been comfortable with. During the Cold War and afterward, Britain’s presumed tilt toward Pakistan chipped away at New Delhi’s goodwill for London. But the Modi government has transcended hesitations and invested political capital in expanding the partnership by focusing on potential areas of convergence. Trade liberalization has emerged as a major priority with Britain.

In walking away from the RCEP in 2019, India signaled its reluctance to be part of an Asian economic integration led by China. The sharpening border conflict with Beijing as well as the fear of the Indian manufacturing sector being wiped out by cheap Chinese imports contributed to the decision. In the spring of 2020, Chinese aggression in eastern Ladakh reinforced India’s decision.

As it turned its back on the East, New Delhi began to look to the West for trade partnerships, and the Anglosphere seemed the most responsive. It’s not just post-Brexit Britain that began to take a fresh look at India. Australia, reeling under the economic coercion imposed by China, also sought to revive moribund trade talks with India.

As Joe Biden and Narendra Modi meet in Washington, the business of balancing China enters a serious phase.

New Delhi’s positive approach to trade with Canberra goes hand in hand with a deepening bilateral and multilateral strategic partnership. Australia appointed former Prime Minister Tony Abbott as a special envoy on trade. Abbott has made frequent trips to New Delhi in the last few months, and the two sides are said to be close to signing an interim agreement in the coming weeks.

In the last few weeks, New Delhi has also intensified talks on trade liberalization with a number of countries including Canada and Israel. A trade deal with the United Arab Emirates is said to be ready for signature. All this is small fry compared to the importance of the EU and the United States. Brussels and Washington contribute more than 10 percent each of India’s annual global trade in goods, which totals close to $1 trillion.

Until last year, Brussels was not even interested in engaging New Delhi on trade discussions; that decision stemmed from a failed effort to negotiate a trade deal with India between 2007 and 2013. A major political effort at revitalizing the Indian-EU partnership in the last two years has resulted in a formal political decision in May 2021 to renew the talks. As the two sides prepare for the negotiations, there will be many hurdles to overcome, and no one is denying the difficulty of arriving at an agreement.

The United States, on the other hand, is not negotiating free trade agreements with anyone at this stage but is engaged with India in overcoming multiple trade disputes that peaked during the Trump years. Despite these difficulties, the bilateral goods trade has continued to grow, reaching close to $110 billion in 2021.

While an Indian-U.S. free trade agreement is not in the cards, there is a recognition at both countries’ highest political levels that they need to urgently complement their growing security partnership with “an ambitious, shared vision for the future of the trade relationship,” as a White House statement put it this past September. The Modi government and the Biden administration have revived the joint trade policy forum, and there is a renewed effort to overcome many disputes.

The jury is still out on how well India and the West can translate their new geoeconomic convergence into concrete outcomes.

India’s new enthusiasm for trading with the West has not escaped Beijing’s attention. Reviewing India’s new trade activism, the state-controlled Global Times said New Delhi can’t turn its backon commercial engagement with China. It pointed to the growing volume of bilateral trade, which hit $126 billion in 2021up by nearly 44 percent over 2020 despite continuing military tensions and New Delhi’s policies aiming to reduce economic exposure to Beijing.

But India can’t ignore the fact that its trade remains massively unbalanced. China’s $70 billion bilateral surplus in 2021 is driven by the fact that India exports mostly raw materials to China and imports mostly manufactured goods. Although India can’t immediately lessen its economic dependence on China, it can certainly deepen economic integration with the West. At home, India can also revive its manufacturing sector to reduce imports from China.

Over the last year, New Delhi has outlined a series of incentives to promote manufacturing capacity in India, and access to Western machine tools and production technology will play an important role. Some of the early reviews of these policies are positive, but the full impact will be felt only in a few years.

New Delhi’s post-independence inward economic turn, policy of import substitution, and delusions of autarky saw the steady erosion of India’s trade and investment ties with the West. In the economic reform era that began in 1991, the West has returned to leading positions in India’s trade profile. But New Delhi has long struggled to seize the new possibilities with the West, even as China raced ahead to benefit from its growing access to Western capital, markets, and technology.

India’s political energies went into arguing with the West on first principles, seeking to redefine multilateralism and challenging its leadership of the global trading system. Rather than build on economic complementarity with the West, New Delhi turned to economies in the east that were similar to—and competing with—India’s.

India is now trying to reverse this by finding ways to integrate with its Western partners through free trade agreements. It is also interested in building resilient supply chains among trusted political partners. The economic fallout from Chinese-Western political tensions provides a new geopolitical context for India’s economic realignment. Of course, New Delhi is aware that the West can’t easily reverse the deep interdependence with China that has emerged over the last four decades.

The jury is still out on how well India and the West can translate their new geoeconomic convergence into concrete outcomes. For one, India’s trade negotiators are notoriously recalcitrant. In the West, trade bureaucracies have been attached to the mantra of universally open markets; we have yet to see whether they can shift to selective globalization among like-minded countries and take a strategic approach to commercial engagement with India. The Indian-British trade talks will provide some early answers.

Just do not understand India.

Over 10 years ago, China, in one of the 5year plan already decided that North America and Europe Market were already saturated and any more export to these market will just cause more trade dispute.

So China started to concentrate building trade relationship with ASEAN, the Middle East and Africa.

Europe and America are also pivoting to Asia as while. Even Russia want to pivot to Asia. Asia is where the action and technology is.

Now I read that India want to pivot the other direction to Europe and North America ? How much more import can these saturated market support ?

Go figure.......... 🤷‍♀️
 

K_Bin_W

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It's impossible to escape the wrath of a black hole, it's quite simple, China is well on its way to become the biggest economy in the universe.

Like they say... "It's the economy stupid"

I am glad Pak is in good terms with our giant neighbor.
 

RayKalm

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China and India used to be at same development stage. Most unacceptable thing is not some people are richer than you. It is your once samely poor buddy suddenly becomes much richer than you.

Ironically, this falls in tune with the Indian mindset. They scam westerners out of millions through lies via phonecalls every year. Their excuse? "You guys are rich, we aren't".
 

letsrock

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It's like India always wants approval from the west - especially the USA.



Agree. Wonder why it is like this.

India voted against Sri Lanka - one of its closest neighbours - at the UN on several occasions by siding with the west, while China didn't.

Do you think a western country would vote against another western country. No way.
india's brahmins fancy they are whites with a tan.
 

applesauce

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That is not the reason per my Indian friends here.....China attacked India in 1962 backstabbing the cordial brotherly relationship... since than China has been putting down/opposing India in world's stages whether issue of terrorism, Indian getting any trade benefit from West, getting India a higher seat etc...It is recently that India has started opposing Chinese policy of intimidation, openly.

Citing this, some other Asian countries who have been bullied by China since decades such as Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia etc have started raising their voices against China's hegemonic designs and aspirations.

in 62' india literally invaded china with its forward policy. by that i mean they went beyond disputed areas that they themselves acknowledge is chinese. then they followed it up by completely ignoring chinese protests and warnings, then the war happened.

india deliberately provoked a war. rather, they thought china would be easy pickings like sikkim (god knows why, china had just push the us led UN force to a stalemate 10 years earlier, no idea why the Indians think they fight better than the us).

and before and since that time, china has offered multiple times to settle the border, or negotiate in faith at least. china has settle all of its land borders except for india and its puppet of bhutan. clearly showing the indians, who has not settled any of its borders, to be the problem.

china did not deliberately go against india, it is the indians who decided to make themselves the enemy because who knows why, guess they inherited the british racist views about the easterners and so - how dare those chinese be better than indians(wannabe honorary whites) in every single way possible-. the chinese barely think about the indians at all. indians want to claim land based on a line drawn by the british, a line that the British themselves have stated was illegal, and they refuse to negotiate.
 

SIPRA

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in 62' india literally invaded china with its forward policy. by that i mean they went beyond disputed areas that they themselves acknowledge is chinese. then they followed it up by completely ignoring chinese protests and warnings, then the war happened.

india deliberately provoked a war. rather, they thought china would be easy pickings like sikkim (god knows why, china had just push the us led UN force to a stalemate 10 years earlier, no idea why the Indians think they fight better than the us).

and before and since that time, china has offered multiple times to settle the border, or negotiate in faith at least. china has settle all of its land borders except for india and its puppet of bhutan. clearly showing the indians, who has not settled any of its borders, to be the problem.

china did not deliberately go against india, it is the indians who decided to make themselves the enemy because who knows why, guess they inherited the british racist views about the easterners and so - how dare those chinese be better than indians(wannabe honorary whites) in every single way possible-. the chinese barely think about the indians at all. indians want to claim land based on a line drawn by the british, a line that the British themselves have stated was illegal, and they refuse to negotiate.
No doubt, for the 1962 War, 100% responsibility lies on the shoulders of India. They started unilaterally violating McMahon Line, as delimited on maps, by installing military posts, on the North of this line. This Line, according to India itself, was international border between China and India, the claim, which China never accepted, but still regarded this Line as a de facto border, and never violated it.

Nehru asked China to accept India's unilateral claims, as final, and refused to hold any meaningful negotiations, on border.

It became utterly necessary for China to teach a lesson to Nehru and India, in order to maintain peace on the de facto borders. They achieved the said objective, very effectively.
 

DrJekyll

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I don't know whether India is seeking to 'escape' or not, but India's (and even Pakistan's) history is tied to English speaking countries. As a result there is little language barrier and while there are obviously cultural differences, over 75 years both sides have learnt to adapt. Pakistanis should not pretend that they are not tied to the Anglo-sphere. The large diaspora in UK, Canada, US, Aus/NZ, South Africa in comparison to non English speaking countries is proof of that. Its not that Pakistanis are queueing up for research scholarships in Chinese or Russian universities. This is the reality of South Asia. It is the necessity of geopolitics that Pakistan is in the China camp.

India never actively decided to cut off from China. In fact trade figures do not support that. But language barrier and historically lack of cultural exchanges means that the people of two countries do not understand each other very well.
 
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beijingwalker

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No doubt, for the 1962 War, 100% responsibility lies on the shoulders of India. They started unilaterally violating McMahon Line, as delimited on maps, by installing military posts, on the North of this line. This Line, according to India itself, was international border between China and India, the claim, which China never accepted, but still regarded this Line as a de facto border, and never violated it.

Nehru asked China to accept India's unilateral claims, as final, and refused to hold any meaningful negotiations, on border.

It became utterly necessary for China to teach a lesson to Nehru and India, in order to maintain peace on the de facto borders. They achieved the said objective, very effectively.
If not being pushed to the limit, China wouldn't have chosen a war in 1962, when China was in the worst shape facing hostility from both US and USSR, and had a severe nationwide food shortage.
 

SIPRA

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If not being pushed to the limit, China wouldn't have chosen a war in 1962, when China was in the worst shape facing hostility from both US and USSR, and had a severe nationwide food shortage.

You are right. India left no choice for China, other than to go for a war, to control this persistent nuisance, being created by Nehru & Co. There was no other option.
 

peagle

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If not being pushed to the limit, China wouldn't have chosen a war in 1962, when China was in the worst shape facing hostility from both US and USSR, and had a severe nationwide food shortage.

India has an old playbook that has served it well.
It acts all belligerent, and when it gets a beating it goes running to the western masters, who come running to save India, it has worked well so far.

America delivered nearly 1 billion dollars worth of weapons to the Indian front lines, plus America threatened China to back off, as claimed by Bruce reidel in an interview that I have not been able to find again so far.
 

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