You have revived it, but on a dangerous point.Lets try to revive this old thread.
I remember reading this letter before and one of the first questions that came to my mind was did we succeed in bringing the Kashmir issue out of the freeze? i am guessing the international light to Kashmir issue was meant to be UN Resolutions and Super Power pressure for plebiscite. So did that materialize? If we look at the resolutions then it would seem that it did not materialize at all.
Some of the best UN resolutions that carried the favorable position for Pakistan were the resolutions in the 1950s and i would guess that the non-freezing of the issue was, the coming of such Resolutions. Let me add to that.
In 1950 the council Passed Resolution 80 which was a marked shift from Resolution 47 since contrary to 47, Resolution 80 called for mutual demilitarization of Kashmir and withdrawl of the armed forces by Pakistan and India, it called upon local authority to govern the three regions, Gilgit Baltistan, Azad Kashmir and the State of Kashmir which meant that the Resolution gave a form of defacto credence to the Azad government and ofcourse to the Azad forces which were equated with the State of Kashmir forces.
The all important Mcnaughton report and his solutions were made part of the Kashmir resolution. Then in 1952 we had Resolution 98 which again gave credence and recognition to the Azad forces since the number of troops by both Pakistani, Indian, Azad forces and State of Kashmir were decided. Post them the 1957 Resolutions called for restraint by both parties.
So an unfreezing would be the above and its implementation, disregarding any opposition. However the 1965 resolutions were Ceasefire resolutions in relation to Kashmir. Ofcourse discussions were held in the UN but starting a war and sending in military men and risking a war for a few words is not equitable exchange. Equitable exchange on the minimum would have been atleast a Resolution in line with the Resolution 80 or 98 or some form of absolute pressure.
The reason why i am saying this is because in war we study military objects and how those objects were achieved and how and why those objectives failed and while we study every aspect from Gibraltar, grandslam, Khem Karan, Lahore, sialkot, Haji pir Pass, Akhnur dagger, however we ignore this war objective and it was a war objective which was to bring the Kashmir issue in the scope of the world. Why and how did that objective fail and whether it failed or not? This question is ignored and i think the reason is that it is seen as a last saving grace where it is stated that " look atleast we got this objective." However lack of concrete resolution makes one wonder whether it was this objective where we witnessed our greatest failure or not. From 1965 November Resolution 126 was the last one and it spoke only of ceasefire and then the next resolution was in 1971 concerning December 1971.
From the political non-freezing front, what did we gain and if this was the central objective then what did we hope to gain and what did that gain look like? Initiating a conflict is such a big thing that the result should have been greater than the Resolution 80
You have also ignored an important cognate point.
The only successful threads on PDF in which Indian members may be involved are those that deal strictly with military matters or with dilemmas relating to Indian sociology, politics and economy. I have no doubt that any attempt by an Indian member even to refute some of the more egregious narrations by a small group of trouble-making members (not Indian) will lead to uproar. So bringing up Kashmir effectively is a signal to Indian members that they must stay away.
The consequences are not particularly important from a real-life point of view, but they are belittling, even humiliating. There seems to be little point in inviting that kind of humiliation.
From tomorrow. I have resolved only to post in exceptional cases, to clear tagged posts, in the evenings, after lunch.Adding to the Previous post, the political objective of internationalizing Kashmir didnt happen and along with that we witnessed that Pakistan's own stock in the International world plummeted since the US denied military exports to both countries and this embargo hit Pakistan the hardest since it was reliant on military equipment whereas we witnessed how in the Iran and Iraq war, the US helped Iraq everywhere it could.
So if we compare these two situations. The Resolution 80 and the non-existence of another of its kind post 1965 and the US support where for Pakistan it created an embargo but in Iraq Iran war, it supported Iran as much as it could which means that in terms of political goals of Internationalizing Kashmir and gaining International support, Pakistan failed in both objectives. So what was the reason for such a failure.
A major reason were the following.
1. Political objectives do become part of the war effort. That is natural like General Lee in the American Civil War where he counted on the political defeat of lincoln as a means for an end to the war effort of northern america. However this case was different because here Political objective was not becoming part of the war effort but war effort was becoming part of the political object. This meant that the political side of things was extremely effort and the entire skirmishes and battles would be centered around the political concept. The political objects werent just the internationalizing of Kashmir or the world support after but also internal political dynamics that were part of this as well. A victory would allow Ayub Khan more security and more power and would see the Democratic Restoration Movement die out which werent just happening in Pakistan but also in Azad Kashmir and coming to Azad Kashmir, by 1965 there were protests for the implementation of a proper governance system and a victory in concern of Kashmir would have given Ayub Khan a strong excuse when dealing with Ghulam Abbas, Sardar Ibrahim, Abdul Qayyum, Khurshid and amanullah. All of them especially the last name as Amanullah and his Plebiscite party was creating a very disturbing situation in Azad Kashmir. A victory in the Kashmir cause would allow Ayub Khan to not only stand as a titan infront of these politicians but would have also allowed him to garner more central power of Azad Kashmir as hero of Kashmir. Akhtar Malik may not know this but Ayub needed that victory to be his and his alone because All of those names had huge prestige behind them and they were all respected in Kashmir. Ayub needed something of the same stature to stand against them.
By focusing on political objectives, the war effort did not receive the necessary time and strategic planning that would have taken into account all the factors like the most important one that whether this action would lead to war and if it did, would India open another front? You are starting a major operation with the thought that this is done to internationalize Kashmir, then you are going to struggle when things get out of hand.
2. Whether Political or military, an objective of the war must be achieved and for its achievement, all planning and resources must be spent and all scenarios must be taken into account. Pakistan leadership did not take into account how far Is India willing to go which was quite odd considering that in 1962, India displayed that it was willing to enter into military solutions against military attacks. Yet even with that, we witness that the strategic thinking was simply not given its due share and the objectives were based on the best case scenario rather than the worst case scenario. The political objective of internationalization was also not given its due share of thinking like what happens when the world does not focus on the flashpoint but on those that are making it a flashpoint. Pakistan wanted to display initially that look, people are fighting the Indian army and are capturing areas and the situation is getting worse and when it would reach its apex either the UN would intervene or Pakistan would intervene militarily like it did in 1948. This was gibraltar however this was absolutely the best case scenario. Worst case scenario was that the infiltration effort would fail and the world would start to condemn Pakistan as aggressive and India would retaliate strongly. Basically that is what happened. Where was the solution for this. Why wasnt this analyzed? what was the counter plan in the UN? There was none and Bhutto played a very leading role in this.
3. The US support was dwindling by mid 1960s and was not at the level of 1950s which we saw with Pakistan trying to shift from the US influence when it condemned the Us actions in Vietnam and when Pakistan started to have greater relations with China which irked the US greatly especially the Sino-Pak Treaty 1963 and although they never condemned the treaty, they were not pleased that Pakistan had hatched out a dispute resolution. By 1965 the relations were sour between the two countries and here is the thing, In bhutto's book myth of independence, we see bhutto write on this topic on how the US wanted Pakistan to lend credence to the US war effort since it was getting no support and there was diplomatic pressure on Pakistan, so here we witness one of the worst case scenarios already taking place that the strategic ally was angry and i think because of that, US also canceled a state visit to Pakistan. So when this was happening, how could we count on the US support in our war effort. By the end of 1950s, we witness that the US was getting closer and closer to India since India offered a concrete ground to contain China. By mid 1960s it was abundantly cleat that the US relations with Pakistan and India were not like their Relations with both the nations in the 1950s. So expecting Us support as a political objective would be similar to having annexation of Calcutta and Delhi as the 1965 military objective. It was that impossible and the exact same thing happened. Pakistan, which had used alot of its ammunition and was not exactly home to huge reserves of equipment, found itself in a military embargo by its largest military importer. India on the other hand had the USSR
4. Now we come to resolutions. When the war effort began i.e gibraltar, did Pakistan file for any UN meeting or try to present any resolution or did anything beforehand to make sure the wheels would immediately turn the moment gibraltar began? No it had not. Pakistan had done little diplomatic homework in order to make sure the operation remained as much a secret as possible and due to this alot of the wheels that turned were left to their own devices for turning rather than being egged on by the prepared homework. Ideally the moment gibralter began, three days later the nations, under diplomatic influence should have presented resolutions and condemnations to India and the US making hostile statements and the UN floor echoing with Kashmir. There was no foreign policy homework. Military objectives require military preparation like if you annex to amritsar then the army would be creating corps and divisions for attacking and defending and holding, buying ammunition and equipment and vehicles for transport, paramilitary to be trained for hostile occupied regions. Military objective would see military preparation and just like that political objectives would see political preparation. The german empire happily allowed Lenin to send his papers and writing to Russia so that the Russian empire would become occupied with internal dissent. That is a semblance of political preparation. We seemed to have done nothing but the idle promises of Bhutto and the result was that the military objectives did not witness that much of a failure than the political ones did. They flat out failed and they were the ones that needed the most preparation.
and with that i hope @PanzerKiel and @Joe Shearer would start the 1971 war. Joe dont dilly dally