India and its Hybrid War

India and its Hybrid War | idrw.org

Going by the definition of Hybrid Warfare, what we witnessed in 1971 was the preparation, provocation and successful execution of a first rate Hybrid War.The 40th anniversary of the Bangladesh Liberation War passed by in the middle of December. As ever it was an occasion to reminisce independent India’s greatest military success. Most of the writing and recollecting, therefore, remained confined to the positive aspects of the campaign.

What we heard was the purely conventional story as has been repeatedly told — from Mrs Indira Gandhi’s directive to General Sam Maneckshaw and his legendary refusal to initiate hostilities prematurely, to how the Pakistani Army persisted with digging itself into a hole that it found surrounded by the Indian Army on December 16, 1971. Various individual acts of brilliance and bravery were also recounted. Since times are changing, the sailing of the US Navy’s Seventh Fleet into the Bay of Bengal found lesser space than in previous years. But that is par for the course.

Some of the more discerning comments were about how India managed a superb manoeuvre campaign. Instead of attacking conventionally, which it did initially, the Army bypassed dug-in Pakistani troops to get to the centre of gravity, Dhaka. Army-Air Force synergy came into play at this stage, and some suitably praised it, for it was exemplary. The mobility of the Indian military mind stood out in stark contrast to the Pakistani Army’s reactive and confused state of thinking.

But that was only to be expected since the perpetrator of atrocities and the harbinger of freedom carry with them contrasting manuals of perceptions. The preconceived assessment of India’s actions had already been made by the sheer scale of the Pakistani Army’s brutality. It was a cake walk in the battle of global opinion polls. In the euphoria of analysis it is not surprising that two aspects of the Bangladesh Liberation War get short shrift.

It was, for starters, a just war in the global perception stakes. Not since World War II was it possible to define good and bad in terms as clearly as it was in the weeks and months running up to December 1971. The villain and the vanquisher had been determined long before the first shot was fired. This was as much on account of Pakistan’s villainy as it was on India playing the perception management game.

Which then leads on to the second aspect of the war that has gotten short shrift thus far. It still remains an unanswered query, but which begs asking. Did India do everything in its abilities to ensure hostilities happened? Was Indian policy designed to trigger a war, or was it really a sleeping neighbour roused to goodness by the scale of cruelty heaped on East Pakistan? Did Pakistan simply walk into a mate prepared by the brilliance of India’s manoeuvres on the global chess board?

Asking questions in this direction does not take away from Pakistan’s perfidy toward its own people, and it doesn’t take away the goodness from India’s actions. India as the initiator of conflict does not become the villain. What it does is to lead us to the crux of the second aspect of the war that has gotten short shrift. Did India in 1971 predate the 21st century global fixation with Hybrid Warfare? Going simply by the prevailing definitions of Hybrid Warfare, it is possible to credit India with the preparation, provocation and successful execution of a first rate Hybrid War.

Military analysts around the democratic world have been poring over writing, training, conflicts, skirmishes, and evolving ideologies to arrive at a greater understanding of the nature of Hybrid Warfare. It is regarded as the greatest threat to the global order of things. The genesis of this fascination lies in a Beijing pamphlet credited to two officers of the People’s Liberation Army and mischievously titled ‘Unrestricted Warfare’. It created a storm when published in the late-1990s.

The concept of Hybrid Warfare was thus born, and in the last decade it has moved from concept papers in high brow military journals, to seminar rooms, to possible field training manuals. India recently conducted its first brain storming session on Hybrid Warfare in a closed-door seminar at the prestigious Army War College in Mhow. The attendees included serving and retired officers, military and civilian. Organised and hosted by the Army War College, the seminar represents India’s first attempt at understanding this phenomenon. Little wonder that the initiative was taken by the Army War College, doyen of military thought and teaching in India.

The widely accepted definition of Hybrid Warfare is credited to its most avid analyst, retired United States Marine Corps officer Frank Hoffman. Writing inConflict in the 21st century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars, published by the Potomac Institute of Policy Studies, Hoffman states, “Hybrid threats incorporate a full range of different modes of warfare, including conventional capabilities, irregular tactics and formations, terrorist acts, including indiscriminate violence and coercion, and criminal disorder.

Hybrid Wars can be conducted by both state and a variety of non-state actors. These multi-modal activities can be conducted by separate units, or even by the same unit, but are generally operationally and tactically directed and coordinated within the main battlespace to achieve synergistic effects in the physical and psychological dimensions of conflict. The effects can be gained at all levels of war.”

The global benchmark of a hybrid campaign is currently regarded to be that of the Lebanese Hizbullah in 2006 when it succeeded in halting and overturning Israel’s incursion into south Lebanon. Panelists and participants at the Army War College seminar did allude to a Hizbullah scenario in the future, but there was mention too of India in 1971. In fact one of the participants brought out points from Kautilya that could easily be taken as preparations for a Hybrid War.

Going by the myriad of actions and activities that constitute Hybrid Warfare, there is no doubt aspects of it did exist in the mind and thinking of Kautilya. Just as there is no doubt that what India conducted in 1971 was not merely a war in the conventional sense of the word, but a hybrid campaign that covered almost all aspects as highlighted by Hoffman. India prepared for the campaign physically as well.

But lessons from the conduct of the Pakistani Army are equally important. They serve to highlight the mind as the centre of gravity, in every aspect of warfare. As the Commandant of Army War College, Lt Gen Anil Chait, said, “The Army that rejects seminal thinkers, deprives itself of innovative ideas and intellectual self renewal. It will ultimately become a defeated Army, vanquished in the wake of foes who adapt more wisely and quickly, to the ever-evolving art and science of war.”