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Jan 19, 2006
Our 1st armoured div? Are u sure
like I said if I remember correctly. but one thing is for sure it was one of our armored div. now that I think about it, it had to be 1 as 6 at the time was not really in the immediate scheme of things vis a vis brass tacks
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Dec 5, 2006
Lt Col Rifat Nadeem Ahmed ( Retd) , AMC , son of Maj Gen Rafiuddin ( late) , Infantry , 18th PMA , has given the following comments. May be of interest to those interested in the military history of pre partition era .
Lt Col Zahid Mumtaz ( Retd )
54th Cavalry


Indian Medical Service
Until 1917, only Indian doctors were eligible for commissions in the Indian Army. Surgeon Major SCG Chuckerbutty was the first Indian to enter Indian Medical Service, the forerunner of Army Medical Corps, on 24 January 1855, while Lt Col Zalnoor Allee Ahmed was the first Muslim doctor to be commissioned on 1 October 1872. He served as RMO of 28th (Punjab) Regiment Bengal Infantry (12 Punjab) from 23 July 1884 until his retirement on 14 October 1903.

The Imperial Cadet Corps
In response to the demand of Indian aristocracy (rajas and nawabs), who wanted their sons to serve as officers in the Indian Army, Lord Curzon, the Viceroy of India, established the Imperial Cadet Corps at Meerut and Dehra Dun in 1901. The Corps only enrolled Indian aristocrats, who after undergoing three years’ training, were commissioned as officers in the ‘Indian Land Forces’, an entity, which did not include the Indian Army. These officers could serve in the forces of the maharajas or as staff officers in the Indian Army but were not allowed to command troops of the Indian Army. Obviously, it was not a popular scheme, and only 11 officers were commissioned until 1913. In 1914, the Corps was disbanded. On 25 Aug 1917, 9 of these officers were finally granted King’s Commissions in the Indian Army, becoming the first Indian commissioned officers (other than doctors). Three of them were Muslims:
• Capt (later Maj) Aga Kasim Shah, 1st Skinner’s Horse (Agha Khan’ nephew)
• Capt (later Lt Col Nawab Sir) Muhammad Akbar Khan of Hoti, KBE, CIE, 1st Brahmans/124th Baluchistan Infantry (6 Baloch)
• Capt (later Maj) Malik Mumtaz Muhammad Khan Tiwana, 4th Cavalry
All three served in the First World War and resigned or retired in 1920/21.

OTS Indore
Having decided to open the Officer Corps to Indians in 1917, five vacancies were offered to Indian cadets at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst in 1919. In the meantime, a Temporary School for Indian Cadets was opened at Daly School, Indore, in October 1918. On 1 December 1919, 39 Indians including 11 Muslims were granted King’s commissions from OTS Indore. Their seniority was post-dated to 17 July 1920, to make them junior to the first batch of Indians from Sandhurst, which was commissioned on 16 July 1920. The Muslim officers were:
• Lt Col Sir Sher Muhammad Khan, CIE, 25th Punjabis (9 Punjab), retired 1930. Became Member Legislative Assembly. Appointed Hon Lt Col in 4/8th Punjab (4 Baloch), 1944.
• Col Abdur Rahim Khan, Guides Cavalry/Indian Political Service. Retired as Federal Secretary 1953
• Brig Malik Gul Sher Khan Noon, OBE, 19th Lancers/RVFC, retired as Dir RVFC 1949
• Maj Gen Muhammad Akbar Khan, 5th Probyn’s Horse/ASC, retired 1950
• Col Malik Muhammad Ali Noon, 4th Hodson’s Horse/7th Light Cavalry/RVFC, retired 1949
• Maj Malik Muhammad Munir Khan Tiwana, 19th Lancers, retired 1945
• Capt Hamid Ullah Khan, 124th Baluchistan Infantry (6 Baloch), dismissed 1931
• Lt Col Mir Haider, 92nd Punjabis (4 Baloch)/ASC/9/8th Punjab (3 Sind), retired 1949
• Maj Mahsud Hayat Khan, 67th Punjabis (1/2nd Punjab), retired 1945
• Capt Muhammad Abdullah Khan, 28th Punjabis (12 Punjab), retired 1930
• Maj Muhammad Ayub Khan Popalzai, MBE, 12th Cavalry, retired 1944

RMA Sandhurst
Maj Gen Syed Iskander Mirza was among the first batch of 5 Indian cadets selected for Sandhurst in January 1919. He was the only one to receive the commission on 16 July 1920, in 33rd Cavalry (amalgamated with 34th Cavalry in 1921, to form 17th Poona Horse). He transferred to the Indian Political Service in 1926. Became Secretary Defence of Pakistan in 1947 and President in 1956. After him, 29 Muslim officers were commissioned from Sandhurst between 1921 and 1934, until the establishment of Indian Military Academy at Dehra Dun.

Senior most Pakistan Army Officers on 14 August 1947
At the time of Partition, four officers from OTS Indore were still serving:
• Brig Malik Gulsher Khan Noon, OBE, 19th Lancers/RVFC
• PA-1 Maj Gen Muhammad Akbar Khan, MBE, 5th Probyn’s Horse/ASC
• Col Malik Muhammad Ali Noon, 4th Hodson’s Horse/7th Light Cavalry/RVFC
• Lt Col Mir Haider, 4/8th Punjab (4 Baloch)/ASC & 9/8th Punjab (3 Sind)
Except for Maj Gen Akbar Khan, all retired in 1949, before the grant of PA numbers in 1950, and thus were never allotted PA numbers. Gen Akbar retired in 1950.

By Lt Col Rifat Nadeem Ahmad, AMC/19th Lancers

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Apr 24, 2007
Avengers last fall

A detailed account of Operation Swiftretort and evidence regarding the shootdown of Su30 (Avenger1) by PAF

Credit: Mobahila Tariq Bajwa (email: mobahila.bella@gmail.com)

As the 2nd anniversary of a historic PAF operation “swift retort” is around the corner, so here is a 10 minute read to recall the events which resulted in IAF losses of 2 fighters jets (Mig21, Su30) and a Heli in the form of Mi17 fratricide. This piece will debunk all types of fake Indian Propaganda.

It all began on 14th Feb 2019 when more than 40 Indian CRPF (Central Reserve Police Force) personal got killed as a result of a suicide bomb attack in Pulwama district of Indian Occupied Kashmir. Soon after the attack, the blame game started from the Indian side without any solid evidence of Pakistani soil being used in the planning or support of that attack.

Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan offered Indian authorities full support in the investigation of that incident. The warmongering Indian media started using the event as an opportunity of taking lead from each other in TRP. The testimony of this is the recently leaked WhatsApp chat of a Primetime Indian news Anchor Arnab Ghoswami where he termed the “ Pulwama incident” as a crazy win. The Indian government ordered their Airforce to carry out action inside Pakistan while hoping to cash it in their upcoming election campaign.

26th February:
Despite the incongruous weather condition, the mission was carried out on the night of 26th Feb 2019. As per the account of Indian PM Narendra Modi, he was the one who advised the action in such type of weather condition to take advantage of Clouds in order to avoid Pakistani radars.

On 26th Feb 2019 in the early hours multiple Indian formations closed in on different sectors along the Pakistani border. The PAF radars immediately detected enemy movement in the sectors of fazilka, Sircreek, Rahim Yar Khan and along LOC. The relevant PAF formations comprising of JF17 and F16 were directed to those locations. The 12 Indian Mirage 2000 fighter jets (from wolfpack squadron in Gwalior) escorted by 8 Su30 MKI from 15th squadron (Flying Lancer) having tail no.s SB155, SB164 and others approached LOC. Out of 12 mirages 2000, six jets violated Pakistani airspace along LOC by 3–4 nautical miles. Each of these 6 Mirage jets were equipped with Rafael Spice 2000 SOW to target a religious seminary in the village of Jabba (Balakot). These Mirages could only launch 4/6 bombs in the direction of target which fell few hundred meters away from madrassah building.

The target elevation picked up by the weapon’s GPS didn’t match the orthometric height which resulted in a miss. The satellite images have also shown that all the bombs overshoot their target by similar distances.

A detailed analysis in this regard is provided by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute in a piece titled “ Balakot a very Precise miss"
Link: https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/indias-strike-on-balakot-a-very-precise-miss/

It has been almost 2 years and IAF couldn’t provide even an iota of evidence to back their claims about Balakot.

27Th February:
Now it was PAF turn to deliver the punch. On the intervening night of 26–27th Feb IAF remained on the highest state of alert anticipating a retaliation from PAF. When dawn came IAF made a mistake of lowering their alert level believing PAF won’t dare to carry out any action in broad daylight. Meanwhile, PAF strike package comprising of four Mirage 5PA and dual seat Mirage IIIDAs from 15th squadron along with 2 JF17 from 16th sqdn headed towards LOC. The Mirages and JF17 were piloted by:
JF17 (tail no. 236) piloted by W/C Adnan Mehmood (Tamgha e Basalat)
JF17 (tail no. 246) pilot by S/L Sibtain Akhtar (Merit Certificate)
Mirage 5PA (tail no. 417) piloted by S/L Waqas Saleem (Merit Certificate)
Mirage 5PA (tail no. 420) piloted by S/L Fahad Babar (Merit certificate)
Mirage IIIDA dual seat(tail no. 601) piloted by GP Faheem (Tamgha-e-Jurat) and F/L Awais Rauf (Merit Certificate)
Mirage IIIDA dual seat (tail no. 612) piloted by W/C Rashid Sulheri (Merit Certificate) and S/L Faisal Hassan (Merit Certificate).

The strike package was escorted by multiple JF17 and F16 jets in air dominance configuration. Working at the rare of PAF package were Saab Erieye AEW&C and Dassault falcon 20ECM to jam the enemy controls.

Each Mirage 5PA was armed with H4 bomb while Mirage IIIDA streamed the H4 bombs via data link. Each JF17 was armed with 2 MK 83 (454kg) indigenous range extension kits. These 6 bombs were dropped at safety distance from 4 target locations in IOK. Those 4 Target locations included: Indian Army Brigade HQ in Poonch, Indian Army Brigade HQ in Rajouri, and Narian Foward support depot. In response to Indian Propaganda PAF provided weapon video as a testimony of the fact that PAF jets intentionally avoided taking out main Buildings of Indian Military formations to avoid any human loss.

Here is the link for that video:

Su30 Hit:
When PAF bombs landed in Indian Army compounds, IAF jets were vectored towards PAF formations. The communications of IAF got jammed by PAF assets of 24th squadron and they were in complete disarray while being up there in the sky. PAF F16s flying in fluid four formations led by S/L Hassan Siddique (Tamgh e Jurat ) detected a pair of Su30MKI heading towards strike package. S/L Hassan who was in lead after confirming valid firing parameters fired AIM-120-C5 (AMRAAM) which managed to hit one of the Su30’s (from 221 squadron). He was flying F16BM tail no. 84606. The distance between Hassan Siddique formation and Su30 was around 30–35Km and Su30 was flying in the area around Azmatabad (IOK). The puff and tadpole of Su30 after getting hit can be seen in the video recorded from Thanamandi (IOK), even the guy who shot the video validated that it was an IAF jet that came from the Indian side and got hit.

Here z the link to the video:

The guy also admitted the fact that he was looking towards Bhimhber gali area (IOK) while recording the video which is in line with the positioning of Su30 on 27th Feb. Even an ex IAF guy Sameer Joshi who is considered pretty close to IAF circles validated it in the map he tweeted on his profile.

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Here z link to his tweet:
IAF itself presented the evidence of Su30 hit in the form of detonated AMRAAM fired on it. Those who know the mechanism of AMRAAM action can understand how the detonated piece is solid evidence of a kill.

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Here z the video of PAF spokesperson on AMRAAM detonation:
In order to cover up the loss of Su30, IAF came up with a series of blatant lies. They claimed to recover AMRAAM from Manakote Mallas Village of Chassana located 80km from Loc. This fake claim got exposed by the eyewitness accounts recorded from that area. The Projectile which fell in Chassana was not AMRAAM, as the relatives of the injured person in chassana saw those Jets which dropped the bomb(nt A2A missile)circling above their head. F16 didn’t cross LOC so now the question is how can they spot F16 from 80km+ distance if it was AMRAAM. In addition to that, even the map presented by SJ also validates that AMRAAM was never fired in the direction of Chassana.
Here z the eyewitness account:

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To explain the detonation of AMRAAM, Indian defence experts came up with a theory of AMRAAM being fired at DMAX range so Su30 managed to dodge it. The fact is the max distance between different PAF F16 formations and Su30 was around 30–40km, not DMAX which is second by IAF sources as reported by ANI.

Some of the Indian experts like Sameer Joshi claimed that Su30 managed to dodge AMRAAM through tight maneuvers. Firstly, it signifies that Jamming mechanism didn’t work properly, secondly they failed to realize that both jets were head on at 1.7 mach speed or something, or lets even assume 1.3 mach for the sake of it in 40km distance. The AMRAAM is a 5.0 mach missile, with a good kept-on lock, that thing would be extremely difficult to dodge, near impossible, as the closer you get, the harder it becomes.

There are few other ex IAF guys like Anshuman Mainkar who came up with theory of counter measures like Chaff to explain the detonation of AMRAAM. Again this claim doesn’t hold any ground as AMRAAM was fired after confirming paramters from AWE&C. The AIM-120 AMRAAM uses a monopulse radar and employs 4 radar receivers. It operates in HPRF (high pulse repetition frequency) mode to lock onto a target once it goes active and transitions to MPRF (medium pulse repetition frequency) mode at shorter ranges. Once an AIM-120 locks a target up in HPRF mode, neither chaff or "conventional" self protection jamming gear will be of much use. MPRF mode, if I’m not mistaken, is even better at distinguishing chaff from from the real target.

In their further desperate effort to save face, IAF claimed PAF fired 4–5 AMRAAMs but couldn’t present even a single more AMRAAM other than the detonated one which hit Su30 despite a Challenge from PAF.

The F16.com which is renowned as the most credible F16 database also validated Su30 kill.

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Here z the link:

Another strong evidence of Su30 getting hit at the hands of PAF is the missing jet from the crash list of Su30. As per Indian MOD (reported by Indian media), the total number of Su30 lost by IAF stands at 12. But if one goes through IAF database it has a record of only 11 Su30 crashes instead of 12. Due to the loss of 12 Su30s (11 in crashes+1hit by PAF) Indian MOD placed an order of 12 new Su30 to keep its number at desired 272.

Here R some of the screenshots as evidence
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A detailed word on this can be read from this Twitter thread:

During IAF day parade in October 2019, 2 Su30s flew along with the Mirages which participated in Balakot mission. The Indian experts started calling one of those Su30s as the “Avenger1" which PAF claimed to shot despite the fact there was no such official claim from IAF. It was again an effort to cover up Su30 loss. The jet displayed during the parade had tail no. SB155 from 15th squadron while the one which PAF hit belonged to 221 squadron. This jet of 15th squadron was involved in Balakot mission on the night of 26th Feb in escort role not in the aerial engagement of 27th feb. The tweets made out by Ex IAF officers also validated that this jet was part of balakot Avenger formation, not the one which engaged F16 on 27th.
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Another interesting point over here is the non recognition for so-called “ AMRAAM Dodgers”. IAF even awarded Mi17 crew which became a victim of their own missile but not even a single merit certificate was announced for the pilots of Su30 which as per IAF claim successfully dodged AMRAAM. The fact of the matter is one Su30 became the prey of AMRAAM while the other one left the area with a tail between the legs.

Mi17 and Mig21 hit:
Once Su30 got hit all hell broke loose in the Indian camp. An IAF Mi17 helicopter (from 154 Heli Unit) was sent out on Search and Rescue mission for the crew of downed Su30. There was panic among the ranks of IAF which resulted in the shooting down of their own Mi17 by Israeli-made Spyder SAM. The presence of Heli in the combat zone also second the claim of Su30 hit by PAF. In the words of Alan Warnes “ You have to ask yourself what was Mi17 doing in that area and the answer is it was on SAR mission". Even SJ during his presentation at Indian Military Festival raised the similar point that no one flies Heli in a combat zone without any specific (SAR) mission.

When one of the Indian Su30 got hit, the other one left the area with the call “Bingo" (low on fuel) only 25 minutes into mission. The pair of Mirage 2000 also exited active zone citing malfunctioning of air intercept radars as a reason.

Meanwhile, 5 IAF Mig21 of 51 sqdn were scrambled from Srinagar AFS. Ideally, these Bison’s should have been working with more powerful NO11M Bars PESA radars of Su30, which would have allowed them to keep their radars switched off to avoid detection by PAF. But due to communication jam and Su30 exiting the active zone, Mig21 Bisons were left on their own. In this state of chaos, one of the Mig21 piloted by W/C Abhinandhan crossed LOC and became a victim of AMRAAM fired by W/C Noman Ali Khan ( Sitar e Jurat) who was flying F16A tail no. 92731.

Busting Indian F16 Propaganda:
Soon after the aerial combat, IAF came up with an absurd claim of hitting PAF F16. The Indian media started showing pictures of Mig21 wreckage provided by IAF as F16 to validate their fake claim. Here z the link for reference where @shivaroo accepted IAF did put its weight behind those images:


Now there can only be 2 explanations to this, either IAF is so dumb that they couldn’t recognize the wreckage of the jet they have been operating for decades or they have mala fide intention of spreading fake narrative about F16. Out of these two, the latter seems to be the case. Building on this fake claim, Indian media came up with a number of stories and imaginary characters like W/C Shahzaz ud din to spread their propaganda. All these claims got busted with solid evidence. The story about W/C Shahzaz and lynching got exposed by their own platform news laundry: https://www.newslaundry.com/amp/sto...ims-about-the-paf-pilots-lynching-dont-add-up

The Indian defence experts like Shiv Aroor , Vishnu Som , Sameer Joshi and others started demanding the serial noof missiles recovered from Mig21 wreckage so here are they are:

R73 left wing: 2304982122137b
R73 Right Wing: 2304982122201b
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Ex IAF Chief BS Dhanoa claimed that Abhinandhan fired R73 to hit F16, but in the pictures above one can see both the R73s with intact seeker and tail section as a testament of PAF claim that they never got fired.

Here z the link tothe video of ACM BS Dhanoa claim and its refute by world-renowned Defence expert Alan Warnes: https://twitter.com/swiftretort1/status/1277843547597746178?s=19

In addition, the fuel tanks of Abhinandhan Mig21 were intact which is evidence that he didn’t even take the initial step of aerial engagement that is to get light in weight by dropping fuel tanks.

When Foreign Policy Published news about F16 count by US officials, IAF started feeling pressure from the masses, so they came up with so-called Radar data to confirm F16 kill. Firstly what IAF presented was not real-time Radar data and it has been accepted by them in front of US officials

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Secondly, a detailed piece has been published by @tylerrogooway in this regard which emphasizes that they are multiple loopholes in IAF data

Link: https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zo...s-they-downed-an-f-16-is-far-from-irrefutable

Dr. Christine fair who is renowned for her anti-Pak stance was invited to the Indian Military festival to put her view forward on Indo-Pak Aerial Engagement. She ripped apart the Indian narrative on F16.

The annual report of Indian MOD for year 2019 also didn’t mention even a single word on F16 claim which proves even the authorities in MOD were not convinced with IAF baseless claim.

Link: https://twitter.com/VishnuNDTV/status/1210590865820794881?s=19

Operation Swiftretort will go down in history as one the of golden chapters of PAF. However, IAF will learn from its mistakes. IAF has already started to plug gaps. The platforms like Rafale equipped with Meteor will definitely add to the BVR capability of IAF. At the same time, it must be noted Rafale will require at least 2 years before IAF can achieve operational capability with it. On the other hand, PAF is inducting an advanced variant of a jet (JF17 Block III) already operational for a decade having full integration with the air defence system. They are mutually data-linked, alongside all AEW and ground sensors. PAF is also looking for the option of J10C to replace its aging fleet of Mirage. In the future, the major workload in PAF will rest with JF17. Despite all the modernization efforts undertaken by IAF, PAF will maintain a technical edge over its adversary.



Apr 24, 2007
General Agha Mohammad Yahya Khan
The Rise & Fall of a Soldier, 1947–1971

Brigadier A.R. Siddiqi (retd.)

Although this book is about General Yahya Khan’s personal trajectory in the Pakistan Army, yet it most importantly offers a historical insight into key political events from 1947 to 1971. The author, popularly regarded as Yahya Khan’s important PR-man, throws new light on the 1965 war and the still mysterious change in command in mid-offensive during that war; Yahya Khan’s take-over of power from Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan; army action and surrender in East Pakistan, and other issues considered contentious to-date. Moreover, this book offers an analysis on the Pakistan Army’s ideological positioning—in its Introduction, ‘The Pakistan Army and an Anatomy of Jihad’—throughout these years which help us understand the nature of armed conflicts within and without, the infiltration of the jihadi ethos against conventional professionalism of the army, as protectors of the homeland.

While most of the failings in the higher military and political command and that of the civil servants and politicians, of that time are well-known, and covered in a number of retrospective books, memoirs, and the Hamoodur Rehman Commission Report, this book holistically questions and analyses those alleged failings since the author presents his first-hand, objective account as a witness to essential developments in 1965 and 1971 wars and the events leading to both periods. Therefore, as an former Army PRO, Brigadier Siddiqi’s is an inside account and he does not hesitate to speak his mind.

Author Description

Brigadier A.R. Siddiqi (retd.) joined the military PR (ISPR) as a Captain in 1950, rising to the rank of Brigadier in 1970, and retiring on 30 September 1973. As a columnist he worked for Dawn, The Nation, The Daily Times, and Business Recorder. He launched and published the Defence Journal in 1975, and was its executive editor until 1997. He is the author of The Military in Pakistan: Image and Reality (Vanguard, 1996), East Pakistan: The End Game (OUP, 2004), Partition and the Making of the Mohajir Mindset (OUP, 2008), and Smoke without Fire: Memoirs of Old Delhi (Aakar Books, 2011). He is the recipient of the Republic Medal (1956), Pakistan Defence Medal with Kashmir Clasp (1965), Sitara-e-Khidmat (1970), and the War Medal (1971).

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