All PLA combat units are now fitted with the Type-95 bullpup. Some are in service with second line troops and this may include the Chinese border force, which does the patrol on the border. Otherwise they would be armed with the Type-81.Is the PLA intended to use those bullpup rifles at the Indo-Tibetan border or do they have other plans?
Look no further than this thread. We talk extensively about how the PLA used terrain and mountain passes to take the Indian position end on. I'll give a more complete explanation later if you don't have patience to sift through the posts.Staying on topic, I would be interested in knowing more about the mountain warfare capabilities of the PLA. History is replete with examples of armies using the terrain to their advantage. Like the Finns in the winter war, a smaller adversary can bleed a materially superior adversary.
In contrast to the frozen desert of the west, in the east, other than the broad swathe of the Brahmaputra Valley, and other tributary rivers, all the terrain consists of steep hills climbing to high hills, but not to mountains, not within the theatre (there are mountains to the north-west of the scenes of action, on the Bhutan-Tibet border, also on the Sikkim-Tibet border, and further west). We can see from the very beautiful photographs from Khullar's book what this dispupted country looked like. Further, we can combine the information about the Bailey Trail with the sketch map shown in the propaganda video on YouTube.
Having said that, please note that there were Alpine meadows at points in the east as well. There are photographs showing these.
Please connect the point midway between the international border as indicated and the road leading upwards to Tawang, thereafter forking to Le inside Tibet and to Bum La on the border (just go along with me on these descriptions; it will make the narrative unbearably long-winded to achieve political correctness at all points, at all times). On this road, the Bailey Trail debouches about midway between Bomdi La and Dirrang on the map.
Now consider the YouTube schematics, showing three Indian brigades lined up one after the other on the road. The description on YouTube and this map tie up in this manner. There was no head-on attack; rather, the PLA troops infiltrated into a flanking position, ready to ambush the Indian Army units in movement, and their attack, when it came, was wholly unexpected and led to disaster.
Sometime in the late 50s, two generals of the Indian Army fought a war game simulating a mysterious and unnamed Red Force (aha!) against a Blue Force. Three times, Red Force was led by a gunner, who was a POW during WWII, a brigade commander at that time, and went on to be the COAS later. He was a member of a noted family which also contributed a minister (two, counting the next generation) and a chairman of a major coal mining company. On each of the three occasions, Red Force attacked using the Bailey Trail or a parallel path, close to the Bhutan border. Three times, this general, General K, won.
The Indian Army knew that these positions were not defensible.
*note on the map the Indian brigades were strung out on the road from Tawang to Bomdila, and the PLA attack the road down its length from the west to east.I think I am starting to understand the situation as you described it. You're emphasis on enfilading was on the brigade scale, where because the Indian brigades were strung out facing from one side of the road to the other, the PLA was able to attack them end on via the open flank created by the 7th brigades collapse and the sneak attack through the Bailey trail.
Well sure (at the cost of going off-topic), but the nature of warfare has changed. For example, the OBL raid emphasized the importance of superior intelligence and well trained special forces units. How is the PLA adapting to this new environment, where brute force doesn't matter as much as speed and intelligence? At any rate i would be watching this thread closely. ThanksLook no further than this thread. We talk extensively about how the PLA used terrain and mountain passes to take the Indian position end on. I'll give a more complete explanation later if you don't have patience to sift through the posts.
That's a whole different kettle of fish I think. No connection between how the PLA did thing back then and how it might do special operations raids now (which the OBL mission was) .Well sure (at the cost of going off-topic), but the nature of warfare has changed. For example, the OBL raid emphasized the importance of superior intelligence and well trained special forces units. How is the PLA adapting to this new environment, where brute force doesn't matter as much as speed and intelligence? At any rate i would be watching this thread closely. Thanks
No, but OBL sent a message. Not just the special forces aspect of it. After all what the OBL raid accomplished was the "real" objective- hunting down a man responsible for 9/11. Despite the Aircraft carriers, the cruise missiles, F-22s, Aegis cruisers, what really mattered? Anyway, I apologize for carrying this discussion off-topic.The PLA also supposedly (according to an American historian) used a trail name the "bailey trial" that lead to the Bomdila road to cut off the Indian retreat after the main attack along the axis of the road started.
That's a whole different kettle of fish I think. No connection between how the PLA did thing back then and how it might do special operations raids now (which the OBL mission was) .
I'm not referring to the size of infantry platoon skirmishes at Nathula/Chola. It was the Indian artillery that played havoc with the Chinese there, destroying com centers, MMG bunkers and counter mortar fire that destroyed many Chinese gun positions. The Indian Army had the advantage as all the dominating peaks were in their hands from where artillery observation posts were able to direct fire with pin point accuracy. According to estimates there were more than 400 casualties on the Chinese side and destruction of most bunkers within 2km. 150 Indian soldiers were also martyred. Due to unacceptable number of casualties, the Chinese asked for a ceasefire.Look mate, these events get blown out of portion way too often. Two of them were platoon strength patrols who bumped into each because of the ill-defined LAC. the last one was a stand off with both sides mobilizing then demobilizing, when things were settled politically.
As regards CAS in the 1962 conflict, you are right when you say that the terrain did not permit effective air support. But Indian Canberra bombers could have destroyed the tenuous lines of communications including roads and bridges in the initial stages of the Chinese advance thus effectively cutting off logistic and artillery support which could have halted the Chinese to some degree. (This should not be confused with the superb cross country outflanking manoeuvers by the Chinese infantry which hit the Indian units from the flanks and rear which caught the latter by surprise).I think the reason why airforces weren't used on either side was because neither side had good basing around the area of battle and that terrain + fast resolution of battle + Chinese side using night attack made CAS useless. I really doubt that air power would have crippled the PLA in 1962