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F-22Raptor

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Related discussion: https://defence.pk/pdf/threads/the-...ship-ballistic-missiles.684218/#post-12688458

I just wanted to add something here. Just because we do not have photographic evidence of the DF-26 or DF-21D hitting a moving target on the sea does not mean it has not hit one on land. It is almost 100% certain the PLARF has set moving targets on land as to avoid intel collection and possibly provoking other countries. Do these jokers really think they would not test these missiles on moving targets when it is literally designed to hit moving targets? Also, there are rumors that the two launched last week did indeed strike a moving target (IIRC some decommissioned ship).
FYI

The Navy's Secretive And Revolutionary Program To Project False Fleets From Drone Swarms

The advanced electronic warfare program uses swarms in the air and sea to cooperatively fool a wide variety of sensors dispersed over a large area.

November 7, 2019

The U.S. Navy has been quietly developing what could be one of the most important, transformative, and fascinating advances in naval combat, and warfare in general, in years. This new electronic warfare "system of systems" has been clandestinely refined over the last five years and judging from the Navy's own budgetary documents, it may be operational soon, if it isn't already. This secretive new electronic warfare "ecosystem" is known as Netted Emulation of Multi-Element Signature against Integrated Sensors, or NEMESIS.

NEMESIS is not just some 'paper program.' From publicly available, but obscure documents we've collected, it's clear that, for years, the Navy has been developing and integrating multiple types of unmanned vehicles, shipboard and submarine systems, countermeasures and electronic warfare payloads, and communication technologies to give it the ability to project what is, in essence, phantom fleets of aircraft, ships, and submarines. These realistic-looking false signatures and decoys have the ability to appear seamlessly across disparate and geographically separated enemy sensor systems located both above and below the ocean's surface. As a result, this networked and cooperative electronic warfare concept brings an unprecedented level of guileful fidelity to the fight. It's not just about disrupting the enemy's capabilities or confusing them at a command and control level, but also about making their sensors tell them the same falsehoods across large swathes of the battlespace.

Another way of looking at it is NEMESIS shifts from traditional electronic warfare tactics, in which multiple electronic warfare systems execute individual electronic attacks on multiple enemy sensors to achieve largely individual or localized effects, to a very diverse set of networked electronic warfare systems cooperatively making electronic attacks on huge portions of an enemy's sensor network. That network may stretch across large distances and multiple warfighting domains. In doing so, it achieves a cohesive set of far more unified, powerful, and convincing effects.

It sounds like science fiction, but it is anything but—it's the next quantum leap in the quiet, but ferocious struggle to control the invisible domain of electronic warfare.

The Invisible War
Electronic warfare (EW) has become an essential part of military strategy over the better part of the last century. This has only become more pronounced in recent decades as military systems have increasingly migrated into the digital age.

NATO's simplest definition of electronic warfare is as follows:

The purpose of EW is to deny the opponent the advantage of, and ensure friendly unimpeded access to the electromagnetic spectrum. EW can be applied from air, sea, land, and space, and target communication and radar systems. It involves the use of electromagnetic energy to provide improved understanding of the operational environment as well as to achieve specific effects on the modern battlefield.

Electronic warfare encompasses a huge variety of operations and tactics, such as disrupting enemy communications and preventing your own from being disrupted. Maybe the most well-known form of EW has to do with jamming enemy radar systems, but there are many forms of electronic warfare that don't involve traditional jamming. These include detecting, spoofing, and distracting enemy sensor systems and denying them the opportunity to successfully target friendly forces to varying degrees.

Cyberwarfare tactics and the ability to actually disrupt enemy sensors, networks, and command and control systems at the software level are a highly critical emerging realm of warfare that in some cases can cross over and become blended with electronic warfare tactics. Even the use of directed energy weapons can be part of a force's electronic warfare bag of tricks.

Although it is the least visible component of a present-day military's order of battle and overall capabilities, and much of the details of exactly what capabilities exist and how they are realized remains in the shadows, electronic warfare is becoming one of the most important facets of modern warfare. As a result, future combat will occur just as much in this invisible spectrum as the visible one.

The Cold War Gave Birth To Modern Electronic Warfare
Electronic warfare, as we understand it today, is not new. The U.S. military has been deploying EW technologies that go beyond simple jamming since at least the mid-20th Century. Stealth technology would never have been so successful without electronic warfare backstopping it during combat operations. In fact, the only engagement in which an F-117 was ever shot down occurred on the only night of the aircraft's use during Operation Allied Force when electronic warfare support was not available.

EW, at least how we understand it in modern, advanced terms, dates back much farther, to the height of the Cold War when the CIA launched the PALLADIUM project, which deployed radar spoofing systems and submarine-launched balloons carrying metallic radar reflectors in order to stimulate and probe Cuba's Soviet-made air defenses. The effort was part of a grander objective to understand how vulnerable the A-12 Oxcart—the CIA's progenitor of the SR-71 Blackbird and the first aircraft to integrate stealthy attributes as a driving factor in its design—would be to enemy air defenses. You can read all about this fascinating bit of history in this past piece of ours.


An A-12 Oxcart.

Considering that the CIA possessed the capability 65 years ago to clandestinely launch airborne radar reflectors from submarines and combine them with electronic warfare capabilities that could simulate or spoof the presence of American fighter aircraft on the most advanced Soviet radar systems of the era, it isn't hard to use one's imagination to ponder what is possible today. We know that EW capabilities have evolved drastically in step with advances in sensor, emitter, and computer processing technologies and the increasingly potent data networks that integrate and fuse their capabilities with other systems and platforms. NEMESIS is the next evolutionary leap in this regard, and a particularly huge one at that.

Electrons Not Bombs
The U.S. Navy's leadership has stated repeatedly that developing a major leap in EW capabilities has been a vital area of research over the last decade. On Oct. 29, 2013, then-Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Admiral Jonathan Greenert, the service's top officer, said as much when he spoke at a convention of the Association of Old Crows (AOC).

At the conference, Greenert told attendees that the Navy was looking for ways to move away from traditional weaponry and turn instead more heavily towards electronic warfare and information warfare. “We've got to evolve this paradigm,” he said, adding that electronic warfare could essentially replace kinetic warfare in many situations:

"We're using the electromagnetic spectrum as a domain and as a means, and we understand and grasp it. We have to figure out how we can beat things electronically first. Why do we spend all this money kinetically if we can jam, spoof, or do otherwise? We need to prepare the fleet to enact an electronic warfare plan the same way they think of a communications or surface warfare plan."

In 2015, the National Interest published an op-ed titled “Winning the Airwaves: Sustaining America's Advantage in the Electromagnetic Spectrum,” in which authors Bryan Clark and Mark Gunzinger wrote that America had failed to maintain its electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) superiority since the end of the Cold War. This failure had allowed “China, Russia and other rivals with an opportunity to field systems that target vulnerabilities in sensor and communication networks the U.S. military has come to depend on. As a result, America’s once significant military advantage in the EMS is eroding, and may in fact no longer exist,” they said.

The same authors produced a 2015 white paper for the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) think tank detailing how America could regain EMS superiority, writing that the Department of Defense “now has the opportunity to develop new operational concepts and technologies that will allow it to 'leap ahead' of its competitors and create enduring advantages in EMS warfare.” The document lists NEMESIS as one such technology, but does not disclose any further details about the program.

Two years earlier, however, budget documents show that the Navy was beginning to develop a highly integrated constellation of next-generation systems for spoofing or fooling distributed sensors and the platforms that host them.

NEMESIS Genesis
An electronic warfare development program known as Netted Emulation of Multi-Element Signature against Integrated Sensors or “NEMESIS” first emerged in Navy Research, Development, Test & Evaluation Budget Item Justification documents in the service's budget proposal for the 2014 Fiscal Year, which it published in April 2013. In that and subsequent budget requests, NEMSIS appeared under the program elements “PE 0602271N / Electromagnetic Systems Applied Research” and “PE 0603271N / Electromagnetic Systems Advanced Technology.”

In these budget documents, the Navy describes NEMESIS as a “System of Systems (SoS) able to coordinate distributed EW resources against many adversary surveillance and targeting sensors simultaneously” which “will benefit the warfighter by providing platform protection across the battlespace against many sensors, creating seamless cross-domain countermeasure coordination, and enabling rapid advanced technology/capability insertion to counter emerging threats.”

More specifically, the Fiscal Year 2014 Electromagnetic Systems Applied Research RDT&E Budget Item Justification states that NEMESIS “addresses the need to generate the appearance of a realistic naval force to multiple adversarial surveillance and targeting sensors simultaneously.”



Later in that same document, a more detailed description of the program states that NEMESIS consists of “reconfigurable and modular EW payloads, Distributed Decoy and Jammer Swarms (DDJS), effective acoustic countermeasures (CM), and Multiple Input/Multiple Output Sensor/CM (MIMO S/CM) for false force generation to both above and below water sensors.”

The 2018 and 2019 budget justifications state that "Nemesis expendable decoys and prototype system hardware will be completed and delivered for field testing" and that demonstrations of these expendable decoys "will be conducted during fleet experimentation, as well as during focused field and laboratory tests."



A Shadowy NEMESIS
There is little publicly available information surrounding NEMESIS aside from these unclassified budgetary documents and a few publications and presentations that mention the program, usually to a very limited degree. Many specifics about the NEMESIS system remain unknown, but the documents help add context to the budget line item justifications we've presented above.

On April 9, 2014, Bob Smith, Director of Disruptive Technologies at the Office of Naval Research (ONR) gave a presentation at the National Defense Industrial Association’s 15th Annual Science and Engineering Technology Conference that described several innovative Navy prototype research programs, or INPs. A slide from the presentation offered a basic, but absolutely impressive overview of the NEMESIS program while of course stating “Additional details classified.”



The presentation stated that NEMESIS worked against distributed sensor systems in order to confuse or spoof an enemy force's surveillance and targeting systems. That document also said that the NEMESIS system “enables rapid advanced technology/capability insertion for emerging threats”, meaning that NEMESIS could be quickly modified and upgraded to counter the latest capabilities that are still under development.

At the time, ONR said that NEMESIS addressed current limitations of traditional EW systems and multiple items on the United States Pacific Command (PACOM) Integrated Priority List (IPL), a list of the Pacific Command's highest priorities for ensuring its forces are capable of accomplishing their missions.

According to the same ONR presentation, NEMESIS consisted of "modular and reconfigurable EW payloads" including "decoy and unmanned air and surface platforms" based on the ONR's Science & Technology and Future Naval Capabilities programs. NEMESIS combined functionality and capabilities from Code 31: Information, Cyber and Spectrum Superiority; Code 33: Mission Capable, Persistent and Survivable Naval Platforms; and Code 35: Aviation, Force Projection and Integrated Defense.

Shortly after that ONR presentation, the publicly available 2015 Navy Program Guide offered a definition of NEMESIS in its appendix, stating that NEMESIS could “synchronize electronic warfare (EW) affects across a variety of distributed platforms to create coherent and consistent EW effects" and that "NEMESIS emphasis is on the coordination and synchronization of EW capabilities and tactics against sensors in many scenarios.”

That same guide also stated that development of NEMESIS began in 2014 and was an interdisciplinary project involving well-known research centers, such as the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and ONR:

In 2013 the Navy approved NEMESIS as a FY 2014 INP New Start. Initial NEMESIS activity involved planning discussions among the Office of Naval Research, the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, fleet commands and analysts, acquisition programs of record, government laboratories and warfare centers, the Defense Advanced Research Programs Agency, and federally funded research and development centers and university affiliated research centers.

To ensure NEMESIS is addressing current and future threats to naval battle group operations, threat assessments were initiated with the Intelligence Community, and a Navy Warfare Development Command NEMESIS war game will be conducted in 2015.




On Feb. 4, 2015, Dr. Thomas Killion, then-Director of Technology at the Office of Naval Research, gave a presentation at the ONR Naval Future Force Science and Technology Expo. In that presentation, NEMESIS is listed as a current Innovative Naval Prototype (INP) program alongside some of the Navy's most important leading-edge weapons development initiatives, including the Electromagnetic Railgun, the Large Displacement Unmanned Underwater Vehicle, the Integrated Topside information operations and communications suite, and the Autonomous Aerial Cargo Unmanned System.



The Navy’s 2015 Program Guide also mentions that the Navy conducted a war game in 2015 to test the NEMESIS system. Another budget document, the 2017 RDT&E Project Justification document for the Navy's "Space and Electronic Warfare (SEW) Architecture/Engineering Support" program, states that this war game took place in late February 2015:

NEMESIS War Game: This Office of Naval Research (ONR) sponsored war game was conducted by NWDC and completed 23-26 Feb 2015. The primary purpose of the war game was to obtain fleet stakeholder input into the requirements for and design of a classified ONR Innovative Naval Prototype. The results of this effort will be used to design prototypes that could eventually be fielded as a Navy program of record.

That document also states that the NEMESIS war game which took place in 2015 "consisted of multiple events designed to explore innovative concepts and technologies associated with EMW", or electromagnetic warfare, and "obtain fleet stakeholder input into the requirements for and design of a classified ONR Innovative Naval Prototype." The descriptions of this war game appear to describe a seminar or "tabletop" exercise designed to formulate initial ideas for developing such a system, but exact details of the war game remain unknown.

The 2017 Navy Program Guide states that dedicated hardware for NEMESIS was developed in 2016 and that NEMESIS was expected to be demonstrated at full capability in late 2018:

NEMESIS has been in development since 2014, including close collaboration with the Office of Naval Research, the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, fleet commands and analysts, acquisition programs of record, government laboratories and warfare centers, the Defense Advanced Research Programs Agency, and federally funded research and development centers and university-affiliated research centers. During 2016, NEMESIS capabilities began hardware development, technique and software migration and field testing at the sub-system level. In FY 2017-2018 flight and at-sea testing will be conducted on integrated system level capabilities in preparation for graduation demonstrations in late FY 2018.

The guide goes on to list the NEMESIS system’s developers: Georgia Tech Research Institute, Johns Hopkins' Applied Physics Lab, Massachusetts Institute of Technology's (MIT) Lincoln Lab, the Naval Undersea Warfare Center, the Office of Naval Research, and the Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command. The Navy just recently rebranded Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command as the Naval Information Warfare Systems Command.



EW Swarms
While the exact components of the NEMESIS system remain unknown, there are some hints about what types of decoys and swarms could make up such a system. In a 2017 Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) white paper titled “Winning in the Gray Zone: Using Electromagnetic Warfare to Regain Escalation Dominance," authors Bryan Clark, Mark Gunzinger, and Jesse Sloman described the various elements that made up EW ecosystems then in development, such as NEMESIS and DARPA's System of System Integration Technology and Experimentation (SoSITE).

The document described swarms of expendable unmanned aerial systems that “incorporate cognitive processing and coordinate their actions through communication networks,” meaning they can share data in real-time and operate semi-autonomously to jam an adversary’s sensors, act as or release decoys, gather targeting information, and detect and map air defense networks.


A DARPA SoSITE concept graphic of networked expendables, showing what appear to be small unmanned systems similar to the Nomad rotor-propelled drone, larger unmanned combat air vehicles reminiscent of the Northrop Grumman X-47B, and another unknown small UAV flying in concert with an F-35 Joint Strike Fighter and an E-2 Hawkeye.

Launching waves of these UAVs could extend U.S. forces’ sensor networks, confuse or obscure enemy defenses, provide a resilient communications network, coordinate and assign targets for weapons salvos, and even “provide targets to hypersonic weapons that have a very short time-of-flight," the paper explained.

Aside from providing fire and communications support, the NEMESIS system was said to be capable of creating viable false targets that would "increase the number of potential targets" an adversary would have to engage. These false targets would "mimic the RF emissions and radar returns of real platforms" and include infrared decoys and "concepts and capabilities to simulate the computer network activity of deployed forces." The NEMESIS system even included underwater "high-fidelity acoustic decoys" which can generate "additional targets for the enemy to investigate or attack," according to the CSBA white paper. These acoustic decoys could include radio emulators and simulate propeller noise or other propulsion systems, as well as specific equipment on surface ships and submarines.
The CSBA said these decoys could increase the size of the forces or amount of munitions an enemy force would have to respond with, ideally making that adversary less willing to risk a larger use of its assets. What that means is that this EW system can not only disrupt an adversary's tactics, but to some extent also dictate his battlefield decision-making.

The CSBA report described how these effects could be achieved using small unmanned EW systems launched from either high altitude balloons or undersea platforms, such as submarines or unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) to create these electronic warfare effects:

Launching EMW expendables at higher altitudes is another approach to extending their ranges and endurance. Launching small EMW UAVs, missiles, or munitions from very high altitude (60,000 to 120,000 feet) balloons could be a less expensive option than using a missile. High altitude balloon technologies are very mature and may cost significantly less than other delivery methods. Furthermore, defeating balloon-delivered EMW expendables would likely require SAMs that can reach very high altitudes. Using these expensive SAMs to defeat large numbers of balloons—some which might be decoys—could be costly and operationally impractical for aggressors.

Another innovative delivery method for EMW expendables could be from undersea platforms, which may be the best use of undersea payload capacity in general. [...] Undersea platforms could be one of the most effective methods to deliver EMW expendables because they can closely approach enemy coastlines and targets. This allows shorter-range expendables to be employed, which are less expensive, smaller, and can be carried in higher numbers than larger payloads like cruise missiles.


Numerous sea and submarine-launched UAVs and autonomous swarm systems have already been developed or are in development. Small drone swarms can also be launched from virtually any type of ship and from shore, and even aircraft, as well. In fact, the Navy already has a swarming electronic warfare capability in the form of the ever-evolving Miniature Air Launched Decoy (MALD). But pairing various platforms, from radar reflector and electronic warfare payload-carrying balloons and swarms of drones of different sizes and performance capabilities, and networking them together to work cooperatively to confuse, spoof, and/or blind enemy sensors dispersed over a wide area is clearly what this system is all about.

The Office of Naval Research has been testing a small, low-cost rotary-wing drone known as Nomad, described as “a highly affordable expendable design” that can be deployed without the need to ensure it returns to its parent vessel. The Nomad can be launched from tubes using a CO2 ejection system that can fit on a variety of platforms and tests of this compact UAV have found that “multiple Nomads can safely operate in the same airspace and fly in a coordinated fashion.”


Nomad undergoing testing.

One of the only non-Navy mentions of the NEMESIS program found online is in a NavalDrones.com article from 2017, which describes the Nomad specifically as being part of the NEMESIS system. While that claim is unconfirmed on an official level, the Naval Research Laboratory has publicly disclosed tests of the Nomad system without mentioning NEMESIS. Still, given that many of the NEMESIS documents state that “Distributed Decoy and Jammer Swarms (DDJS)” are an integral part of the system, it’s possible, if not probable, that Nomad and swarms of other small drones are part of this highly sophisticated and networked electronic warfare capability.

The 2017 CSBA paper also cites a wide range of other unmanned systems that could hypothetically be integrated into the NEMESIS system, although it remains unknown which specific expendables are used:

Small expendables in development or use today include the Switchblade precision missile, which is in use with Special Operations Forces; small UAVs such as the Coyote UAV, used in the Navy’s Low-Cost UAV Swarming Technology (LOCUST) program; and loitering munitions like the Lockheed Martin Fire Shadow. Expendables have also been integrated with launch platforms. The Navy is developing a submarine-launched version of the Blackwing UAV, which is similar to the Switchblade. Furthermore, the U.S. Air Force has deployed the Miniature Air-Launched Decoy (MALD) since the 1990s.

The aforementioned LOCUST would be one of the most obvious platforms to execute major parts of the NEMESIS concept. The Navy has been experimenting with this highly deployable swarming drone capability for years and the airframes are highly adaptable and can be launched from almost anywhere.


Lockheed Martin has been also developing small unmanned aerial vehicles such as the tiny Outrider micro-aircraft, which can be launched from canisters that fit inside submarine missile tubes. The Naval Research Laboratory has tested all-electric folding wing drones designed to launch from torpedo tubes using existing launch systems. Glimpses of other similar systems in development have been offered over the last few years, including ones designed to carry infrared and electro-optical payloads.

Northrop Grumman has tested electronic warfare drones dropped from EA-18G Growlers inside canister deployment systems and air-launched electronic warfare enabled swarming munitions are set to become a major staple of aerial warfare.

Earlier this year, the Office of Naval Research issued a special notice for a research opportunity to develop a “Long Endurance Advanced Off-board Electronic Warfare Platform,” or LEAP. This program was listed under two of the same codes as NEMESIS, ONR Code 35: Aerodynamics, Autonomy, Flight Dynamics & Control, as well as Code 31: Electronic Warfare. The proposed vehicle design to be researched was for a ship-launched, long-range expendable decoy that can carry modular EW payloads.

Swarms of small unmanned surface vessels and even undersea vessels seem to fulfill aspects of NEMESIS' cross-domain capability as well. But leveraging swarms of smaller and somewhat expendable aerial drones and munitions that can work in conjunction with larger, less numerous, and more advanced platforms allows the NEMESIS concept to cover large geographical areas associated with modern naval combat and to distribute EW capabilities in a more resilient and decentralized manner than in the past. In doing so, it also allows for these swarms and the various dissimilar nodes that can make up the NEMESIS system at any given time to create fleets of ships and aircraft that aren't really there across a huge area as well as execute more mundane tasks, such as jamming individual enemy emitters or working as sacrificial decoys for enemy weapons themselves.

All of this could, and eventually will, also be networked with existing, more traditional electronic warfare systems such as those mounted on the Navy's surface combatants. In particular, this could be networked with the SLQ-32 SEWIP and the new and shadowy SLQ-59 that has recently arrived on some of the Navy's vessels. The Navy's EA-18G Growler could also act as a major component in this EW ecosystem and as a forward command and control node.

It's also worth remembering that NEMESIS, or at least parts of it, would also be an incredible and obvious intelligence collecting tool when it comes to probing and evaluating an enemy's defenses and recording its electronic order of battle. This could be done even in peacetime, very much in the same vein of PALLADIUM so many years ago, but on a much larger and more elaborate scale.

Evolution Of A Revolution
In Fiscal Year 2015, the NEMESIS program expanded beyond the Navy’s PE 0602271N / Electromagnetic Systems Applied Research program and began appearing in the budget line justification documents of several additional programs in subsequent fiscal years. During the next fiscal cycle, the Navy’s Electromagnetic Systems Applied Research program continued to work on NEMESIS as it had in prior years. Then, in Fiscal Year 2017, the program’s budget increased significantly “due to hardware procurement and conducting field experiments of NEMESIS technologies.”



The Fiscal Year 2017 RDT&E Project Justification for the NEMESIS work conducted by Navy program PE 0603271N / Electromagnetic Systems Advanced Technology states that Fiscal Years 2017 and 2018 are dedicated to “the integration and demonstration of these new technologies”.



In Fiscal Year 2018, NEMESIS appeared on two new Navy research program elements titled “PE 0602792N / (U)Innovative Naval Prototypes(INP) Applied Research” and “PE 0603801N / (U) Innovative Naval Prototypes (INP) Advanced Technology Development.” Those programs' goals for that fiscal cycle, respectively, were:

PE 0602792N / (U)Innovative Naval Prototypes(INP) Applied Research: Complete the Nemesis project by finishing research efforts to develop and mature technologies in multiple areas that will be used to assess the feasibility of Nemesis to coordinate Electronic Warfare (EW) operations across distributed EW systems. Technologies being matured include swarming vehicle operations, distributed resource mission control, multi-domain coordinated operations and advanced RF component and subsystems technologies. These emerging technologies are being designed and developed for prototype Nemesis systems which will be capable of performing coordinated EW operations across distributed EW systems.

PE 0603801N / (U) Innovative Naval Prototypes (INP) Advanced Technology Development: Complete the Nemesis project, previously funded in 0603271N Electromagnetic Systems Advanced Technology Development, by designing and building prototype Nemesis payloads that implement industry standards for software, hardware, and firmware interfaces. Nemesis expendable decoys and prototype system hardware will be completed and delivered for field testing. Demonstrations of Nemesis platforms and payload will be conducted during fleet experimentation, as well as during focused field and laboratory tests.


These budgetary documents state that the Innovative Naval Prototype programs "represent game-changing technologies with the potential to revolutionize operational concepts. They are disruptive in nature as they would dramatically change the way naval forces fight. INPs push the imagination of our nation's technical talent to deliver transformational warfighting capabilities."



In Fiscal Year 2019, funding continued to decrease in both the PE 0603271N / Electromagnetic Systems Advanced Technology and PE 0602271N / Electromagnetic Systems Applied Research programs due to the fact that the NEMESIS program was now being developed under the Innovative Naval Prototypes programs, suggesting it has advanced beyond research and development and is now working towards an operational state.

Electronic Warfare: The Next Generation
The very existence of NEMESIS proves that a revolution in electronic warfare is well underway. If the capabilities we've described can be gleaned from scant publicly available information, there are no doubts that more advanced NEMESIS components and capabilities remain classified. It is also likely that some components of the system have existed long before they began to be integrated with other platforms under the NEMESIS program. Above all else, that is what NEMESIS does: it pulls together various leading-edge EW concepts and networks them together for a combined electronic warfare fight the likes of which we have never seen before.

As more nations develop and refine their advanced integrated sensor networks, next-generation EW "systems of systems" such as NEMESIS will become more vital to protecting the U.S. and allied assets and for giving them a leg up by being able to directly manipulate what the enemy believes is occurring on the battlespace based on their own sensors' data. As such, NEMESIS can help level the playing field against increasingly capable sensor networks, whether by blinding certain parts of those networks while spoofing others or by having the enemy fire its treasured weaponry at ghosts in the sea and in the air. Even a formation of what appears to be an incoming bomber force on radar and a puzzling group of bright signatures on infrared sensors could draw the enemy's attention away from critical parts on a real offensive.

Yes, much of this sounds almost like magic, and it is probably the closest thing the military has to it, but going by even the limited information we were able to uncover about NEMESIS, it really does represent the evolutionary next great leap in electronic warfare—one that will elevate this murky art from a supporting aspect of military operations to a primary offensive and defensive one.

LINK: https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zo...e-capability-will-change-naval-combat-forever

China's ASBM battle concepts have already been defeated and most don't even realize it.
 

LeGenD

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acha chalo, I'll put my point across in a different way, maybe my point of view is wrong & you can show me where I'm wrong. I'll ask a few questions, tell me if you agree:

1. the f35's primary aim is to create total situational awareness of the contested theater from relatively safe distance because of all the sensors it is proliferated with, do you agree?

2. even the u.s. admits that the heat/ir/thermal signature is almost impossible to mask so best to create an aircraft that can manage everything & attack or facilitate the attack of air & ground targets without being in the range of ir guided or thermal guided weapon systems, do you agree?

3. the u.s. also admits that it is impossible to be stealthy against all bands of radars so it is best to be stealthy against radar bands that can pose a direct threat in combat so the radar networks on L band can see the aircraft all they want from afar, because they'll not be able to reach it let alone kill it, do you agree?
1. YES; the F-35 is excellent for creating situational awareness of the theater - you got this right.

The 'relatively safe distance' part of your statement suggest a certain type of mission in which the F-35 is relocated to the battle management role and facilitate other war-machines in doing their job. This is certainly possible and extensively tested employment dynamic.

But the aforementioned role is not a requirement; the F-35 is a well-equipped war-machine in itself and a true VLO design on top. If a mission necessitate strikes on multiple targets and internal payload of the F-35 is the limiting factor, then solution is in "numbers."

Essentially this:


[1]

2. True VLO design is supposed to be LO in a range of spectrums such as Electromagnetic, Infrared, Visual, and Acoustic.

The F-35 is LO in infrared spectrum as well:


[1]


[2]


[2]


[2]


[2]


[3]

There is a limit to how many photos I can post in one reply so I would suggest you to dig into limitations of infrared imaging.

3. Do you know that it is possible to make an aircraft LO across all bands? B-2A Spirit was a FIRST.

The S-400 system is equipped with several radar systems to facilitate its target acquisition process. Therefore, solution is to make an aircraft LO across all bands with appropriate mix of design-related considerations and RAM applications. This is true for F-35 in fact.

I will give you a hint:


[4]

Now check this revelation:


[5]

What does it tell you? That the S-400 system can detect, track, and engage the F-35 around 21 miles mark given its sensor fidelity. On the flip side, VLO characteristics of the F-35 reduced target acquisition and engagement capacity of the S-400 system to this level in its case. And this is the point all along; the F-35 is supposed to make it possible for the pilot to engage and KILL the S-400 system much earlier. Mission accomplished.

Even if the S-400 system is linked to additional number of A2/AD arrangements in the vicinity, they will be useless because they do not match S-400 system in sensor fidelity to begin with.

Dedicated LF radar systems such as YJ-27 class can make it possible for the S-400 system to detect, tack, and engage the F-35 at earlier distances such as around 30 - 50 KM mark subject to positioning and level of integration but even this enhancement is of limited benefit and both types of assets will be taken out. Even if you have limited knowledge of NATO conventional warfare methods, you will know as much.

REFERENCES

[1] Link: https://www.scribd.com/document/381450409/Norway-and-F-35-7-nov-2013

[2] Link: https://basicsaboutaerodynamicsandavionics.wordpress.com/

[3] Hamstra, J. W., & McCallum, B. N. (2010). Tactical aircraft aerodynamic integration. Encyclopedia of Aerospace Engineering.

[4] Link: https://slideplayer.com/slide/12976539/

[5] Link: https://www.airforcemag.com/article/f-15ex-vs-f-35a/
 

LeGenD

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A lot of american equipmtent is overrated.
Dear Abid, American equipment have lived up to expectations in numerous hands, environments and battles around the world on average. There are examples of American equipment under-performing in certain situations and/or environments initially but becoming much better subject to technical revisits from relevant manufacturer(s).

American patriot defence system failed to intercept yemeni houthi missiles.
Saudi have repeatedly mentioned numerous intercepts of incoming ballistic missiles and UAV in the course of their conflict with Houthi rebels but they have not made much information Public in this regard.

Saudi did show raw footage of successful intercepts of a recent strike package from Houthi rebels.




The ballistic missile that was intercepted in this case of strikes is believed to be the latest Burkan 3 variant which is a decent MRBM with good speed and CEP. Iran is known to help Houthi develop increasingly sophisticated weapons in fact. Other targets that were intercepted were reportedly UAVs. Patriot battery in use defeated the entire strike package in fact.

Intercept possibilities vary according to radar coverage and fidelity on the ground, and also due to the intercept envelope of interceptors in use. Patriot is a low-tier American A2/AD solution which provides much smaller intercept envelope for BMD than other American A2/AD solutions.



Patriot is becoming much better in its class of A2/AD solutions nevertheless.



Performance levels will - significantly - vary according to launcher configuration, number of radar systems and fidelity, and the type of interceptors sourced. The A2/AD arrangements might be very good in some areas but not necessarily in all areas because big-ticket A2/AD items are expensive to procure and network in large numbers. Interested customers can strive for excellence in this matter but there can be political situations and/or upheavels at times.


Now there is not much to see in the case of Russian big-ticket A2/AD items and their foreign derivatives; no offense to these groups. Both S-300 and S-400 systems do not have much to show in Syria for instance. Armenian S-300 systems under-performed in war with Azerbaijan which is another reminder.



Modern NATO naval A2/AD arrangements are vastly superior defensive applications however. Patriot (and the sort) will feel and look underwhelming in comparison to these applications in particular. USA and Japan have done much technical homework in recent years and outcomes are promising for them.

Yugoslav army unit (The 3rd Brigade of the 250th Air Defense Missile Brigade) shot down the "stealth" F-117A by using soviet S-125 Neva/Pechora surface-to-air missile.
The F-117 sortie-to-loss ratio in global conflicts for reference:

Operation Just Cause = 6 - 0
Operation Desert Storm = 1219 - 0
Operation Allied Force = 743 - 1
Operation Iraqi Freedom = 87 - 0

1. Yugoslavia was in the position to draw valuable lessons from the Persian Gulf War (1991) in which a new generation of American equipment and technologies surprised much of the world. Yugoslavia committed to a high degree of portability and scores of Russian VHF radar systems to help shape its A2/AD arrangements.


If you check reports of the time, NATO was under no illusion.



2. The F-117 that was shot down in Yugoslavia - this incident happened in the 4th day of Operation Allied Force but was a one-time achievement as well and this wasn't easy either.

"Consequently, despite inputs from the VHF acquisition radar, the X-band* engagement radar of Dani’s SA-3 battery was able to track the F-117 only at a distance of 8 miles (13 km), obtaining a lock and launching two missiles towards it only on the third attempt (the colonel would order his men to switch the engagement radar on for no more than 20 seconds for each attempt in order to avoid being targeted by NATO electronic warfare aircraft)."


This might surprise you but the F-117 was not provided onboard EW capabilities - a shortcoming. This shortcoming was mitigated with support of EA-6B Prowler in some missions. The F-117 is obsolete in comparison to other American stealthy aircraft in fact.

B-2A Spirit was/is a vastly superior VLO design with formidable onboard EW capabilities. F-22A Raptor and F-35 Lightning II are a significant leap from the F-117 as well with superior VLO design, sensor fusion, formidable onboard EW capabilities and particularly designed for A2A engagements. B-2A Spirit demonstrated intimidating performance in Operation Allied Force (this aircraft damaged Yugoslavia more than any other strike platform in a total of only 50 sorties), and F-22A Raptor did very well in Syria in view of Russian defenses.

The DF-21D/DF-26 poses a real threat to american aircraft carriers in the South China sea:

Indeed.

There must also be 'support infrastructure' in place for the ASBM to strike at ships in the Pacific. This support infrastructure is expected to encompass Ground stations, OTH radars and resulting coverage, BeiDou guidance and active reconnaissance platforms to facilitate Chinese military operations in the Pacific. KILL CHAIN components in short.

Americans have done much homework in relation. They hinted disrupting the KILL CHAIN of ASBM back in 2013. They have significant investments in surveillance and Electronic Warfare (EW) technologies. They have developed and adopted a variety of Hard-kill* and Soft-kill technologies to help counter a wide range of perceived threats to the USN in passing years.

*Examples provided below.

1. Footage of a live-intercept event (FTM-21) for reference:


USS Lake Erie (CG-70) neutralized a complex ballistic missile simulating target (ARAV-C++) via an SM-3 class interceptor. You can see how speedy this target missile is/was at take-off.

2. Documentary of a live-intercept event (FTM-25) for reference:



USS John Paul Jones (DDG-53) neutralized a Strike Package of 1 x ballistic missile simulating target (ARAV-B) via an SM-3 class interceptor and 2 x sea-skimming cruise missile types via SM-2 class interceptors.

3. Classified live-intercept event (FTM-27 E2) for reference:

"The agency called the test “complex” but would not elaborate. It was designated Flight Test Standard Missile-27 Event 2 (FTM-27 E2) and seemed to mirror many elements of the first salvo SM-6 test intercept of an MRBM target in Dec.2016.

That test, FTM-27, had two SM-6s fired in immediate succession. The first interceptor was unarmed and designed to only collect test data while the second interceptor carried an explosive warhead and intercepted a Lockheed Martin-built target missile in its terminal stage (Defense Daily, Dec. 15, 2016). MDA did not confirm by publication time if this test copied that test style.

The Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance, a nonprofit that advocates for missile defense advances and deployment, said at the time
that the target in FTM-27 emulated a Chinese Dong-Fen 21 (DF-21) ballistic missile equipped with a maneuverable re-entry vehicle and designed to destroy American aircraft carriers."


USS John Paul Jones (DDG-53) neutralized a complex ASBM simulating target via SM-6 class interceptor(s). This particular target was capable of replicating Flight performance and characteristics of the Chinese DF-21D ASBM.

Americans are well-versed in Rocket Science. Let us not forget this.

Any source for this?
Well-documented examples are following.

1. Operation Burnt Frost in 2008

Intercept altitude: 240 KM above Earth
Target and velocity: USA 193 spy satellite @ 7.8 KM/sec
Interceptor and velocity: SM-3 Block 1A @ 3.0 KM/sec




This wasn't standard a HTK intercept either but the hydrazine fuel tank of USA 193 spy satellite was to be struck in order to vaporize it. This was akin to hitting a particular spot on the bullet with another bullet - such was the level of precision demonstrated in this case.

This was absolutely ambitious call back in 2008:

"To carry out Operation Burnt Frost, the United States had to go where no Aegis – or any other navy’s – warship had gone before. The technical and operational challenges posed by the decision to destroy this satellite were significant. The school bus-size satellite was to be engaged higher and at a faster speed than any target engaged during years of testing the national BMDS and Aegis BMD systems, and the satellite’s hydrazine tank – the target’s aim point – was only a fraction of the overall mass of the satellite.

Given the higher closing velocities due to the satellite’s speed of greater than 17,000 miles per hour, a successful intercept would require longer radar and missile-seeker ranges, extended missile flight time and greater guidance accuracy. The Navy’s BMD warships were the assets of choice – the only assets capable of destroying the satellite reliably and efficiently.

Three Aegis warships – the Lake Erie (CG 70), Russell (DDG 59) and Decatur (DDG 73) – were tasked to participate in the satellite shoot down, with Lake Erie designated as the principal firing ship. Following extensive materiel, electronic and training preparations (including critical, one-time modifications to the SM-3 missiles), on Feb. 20, 2008, Lake Erie launched a single SM-3 missile, which intercepted the satellite at an altitude higher than 150 miles and a closing speed greater than 22,000 miles per hour."



2. Live-intercept event (FTM-44) in 2020

Target: ICBM-T2 (three-stage*)
Interceptor: SM-3 Block 2A

*Following as per MDA:

Stage 0 = Trident C4 (901 kN Thrust Vac)
Stage 1 = Orion 50-S XLT (667 kN Thrust Vac)
Stage 2 = Orion 50 XLT (194 kN Thrust Vac)


USS John Finn (DDG-113) neutralized an ICBM-class target via an SM-3 class interceptor.

Check following animation:


- to understand how different technologies and systems come together to make ambitious BMD missions a reality in modern times.
 

LeGenD

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At what stage ? Most of the interception takes place before terminal stage or mid course which is easier job specially in intercontinental range missile due to availability of time.

Medium range and short range ballistic missiles can be far too dangerous due to less reaction time and slightly manuverable warhead in comparison to traditional missiles.
Fundamental consideration for a (credible) BMD solution is to ENABLE intercept possibilities for incredibly fast-moving targets in time-constrained situations. It would not be much of a BMD solution otherwise.

I have discussed AEGIS at length below to help potential readers understand this system in a better way and draw realistic conclusions about it.

RAPID INTERCEPTOR LAUNCH CAPABILITY

Following footage disclose ACTUAL interceptor launch speed of an AEGIS-based platform:


WE merely blink and the interceptor is gone (well-up in the air in pursuit of a target).

SM-3 class interceptors have neutralized SRBM, MRBM, IRBM and ICBM class targets in various live-intercept situations and events thus far. I have highlighted two live-intercept events above in which an SM-3 class interceptor took care of a speedy SRBM class target (FTM-21 and FTM-25 respectively).

Easier job specially in intercontinental range missile due to availability of time? Bro, are you kidding me?

ICBMs = massive ballistic trajectory approaching extreme altitudes in Midcourse phase + incredibly fast in Midcourse phase through Terminal Phase.

ICBMs necessitate herculean levels of investment and technical efforts to counter them - only USA have managed to conceptualize and demonstrate BMD capability against ICBMs and it took many years to develop and hone interceptors for the needful.

GBI inventory = 44
SM-3 Block IIA inventory = Classified

MOTIVATION

You might have knowledge of the fate of INS Eliat?



It was the incident of INS Eliat that motivated foundation of AEGIS to help neutralize (maneuverable) threats in time-constrained situations.

"One of the drivers for the development of SPY-1 was the need to address the low-altitude anti-ship cruise missile threat, which stresses the engagement time-line of the combat system because threats emerge from behind the Earth’s horizon at relatively short ranges from the ship." - O'Haver et al (2018)

AEGIS took over 10 years to develop and first AEGIS-based warship was rolled out in 1983:

"By 1981, the USS Ticonderoga (CG 47) became the Unites States’ first AEGIS-guided missile cruiser. It was a game-changer. Even new advances in Soviet missile technology could not keep pace with the new defensive capabilities of the AEGIS, providing the United States with a critical new asset in the all-important strategic chess game at sea. On January 22nd, 1983 when Ticonderoga was commissioned, the rallying cry was: “Stand by, Admiral Gorshkov, AEGIS is at sea!”" - Lockheed Martin

- with (revolutionary) AN/SPY-1A radar system at its core:

"The AMFAR demonstrator was conceived, designed, fabricated, and tested by APL between 1964 and 1969 and served as the advanced development model for technologies incorporated into the Aegis AN/SPY-1A radar. It brought all elements of the radar system together and demonstrated the feasibility of automatic detection and tracking with resistance to environmental clutter through computer control. Key technology areas addressed by the AMFAR program included tube-based transmitter design, planar phased-array design, electronic counter-countermeasures (now known as electronic protection) development, automatic detection and tracking, and computer control. The major experimental subsystems included a high-power transmitter, a phased-array antenna, a signal-processor system, and a computer control system." - O'Haver et al (2018)

O'Haver, K. W., Barker, C. K., Dockery, G. D., & Huffaker, J. D. (2018). Radar development for air and missile defense. Johns Hopkins APL Tech. Digest, 34(2), 140-153.

But it wasn't the end of story.

CONTINOUS MODERNIZATION

AEGIS modernization efforts continued beneath the hulls in passing years.

Persian Gulf War (1991) motivated transformation of AEGIS into a BMD-capable A2/AD solution.

"During Operation Desert Storm (1991), Iraqi forces used ballistic missiles against military and civilian targets with sufficient effect to spur the U.S. Navy to pursue a BMD capability. Initial studies by APL verified the feasibility of modifying the Aegis Combat System, including the AN/SPY-1 radar and Standard Missile-2 Block IV, to add an Area BMD endo-atmospheric engagement capability to protect ports and forces ashore against ballistic missile threats such as the Scud variety seen in Desert Storm.

Key AN/SPY-1 advances necessary to support the new Area BMD mission included the ability to respond to cues from offboard sensors, increased sensitivity, new surveillance approaches for early detection of threats, new tracking approaches, and new functionality to discriminate ballistic missile warheads. APL worked closely in the early to mid-1990s with the Aegis prime contractor, Lockheed Martin, and the Naval Surface Warfare Center Dahlgren Division to incrementally design and field-test each of these capabilities."
- O'Haver et al (2018)







What do you think Common Source Library is? Meaningful (classified) information about a wide range of (Foreign) offensive applications* is stored in there to help INFORM intercept possibilities against them.

TERMINAL PHASE DEFENSES

Terminal phase defenses of AEGIS have come a long way since 1983 as one of the outcomes of continuous modernization drive (see above).

Different types of targets were introduced to stress-test terminal phase defenses of AEGIS in passing years:



However:


Capability to intercept (maneverable) hypersonics was FIRST demonstrated in the FTM-27 E2 live-intercept test which was carried out in 2016. The target in this case was capable of replicating Flight performance and characteristics of the Chinese DF-21D ASBM*, and it was defeated in Terminal phase via SM-6 class interceptor(s). The target is assumed to be (very impressive) MRBM-T3c2 with classified MaRV.

*USA is remarkably well-versed in Rocket Sciences. They have developed some of the most sophisticated ballistic missiles and commercial-purpose rockets in the world. Just check the brochure of Northrop Grumman for instance - this company have produced numerous rocket motors (different types and specifications). And Northrop Grumman is but one American company involved in this business. Multiple American companies are involved in this business in fact. They can develop (any) kind of missile for "target practice." Keep this fact in mind.

Key enablers:

1. Very impressive sensor fidelity of AEGIS of AN/SPY-D(v) radar system

"The Aegis Combat System is controlled by an advanced, automatic detect-and-track, multi-function three-dimensional passive electronically scanned array radar, the AN/SPY-1. The SPY-1 is a 6 megawatt radar that is able to perform search, tracking, and missile guidance functions simultaneously with a tracked object capacity of well over 100 targets at more than 100 nautical miles."


2. Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC)


NOTE: USN is the only naval force in the world with credible CEC; all claims to the contrary are merely semantics of fanboys in Public discourses (bewakoof bana rahey hain). CEC is completely another level of sensor-netting in comparison to standard network-centric considerations in which all (enabled) assets can share and see the same battlefield picture. This is very expensive and difficult undertaking and majority of the countries do not have funds for the needful.

3. Rapid interceptor launch capability of AEGIS-based platform (see above)

"The Defense Department is eyeing Raytheon's Standard Missile-6 as a counter-hypersonic interceptor, a weapon already effective against "advanced maneuvering threats" and now slated for a flight test against a hypersonic boost-glide target in fiscal year 2023."


HGVs are incredibly difficult to intercept but SM-6 class interceptors have (unspoken) potential against these threats.

If their are capability gaps in the present, these will be bridged in passing years.


*INTEL FACTOR

USN did not reach the stage of having countermeasures for a wide range of increasingly sophisticated threats out of the blue. There is decades worth of background research* and surveillance techniques** involved in this matter (courtesy of the pressures of the Cold War), which helped shape industries and INFORM development of incredibly sophisticated A2/AD solutions which could make it possible to defeat a wide range of increasingly sophisticated threats in modern times.

*To achieve in-house capability to develop sophisticated missiles of all shapes and sizes.

**To monitor (and document) flight characteristics of all types of ballistic missiles tested and/or fielded by other countries in passing years with support of incredibly sophisticated Spaceborne assets such as DSP and SBIRS.

"In 2019, the SBIRS satellites were able to detect almost 1,000 missile launches, according to the company. McCormick said this is a two-fold increase as compared to the past two years."


SOFT-KILL TECHNOLOGIES

AEGIS-compliant interceptors are not like bullets which are cheap to mass-produce; these are expensive technologies in short and simple terms.

Soft-kill technologies create a separate layer for defeating a wide range of increasingly complex threats as well, and significance of these technologies is vastly understated in Public discourses. There are numerous pointers in FIRST post of this thread. Do give it a read as well.

I am providing some pointers as well.







NEXT LEAP

AEGIS-based platforms will receive a significant sensor package upgrade in the form of AN/SPY-6 radar systems.



Word is that AN/SPY-6 is much more sensitive than the already very impressive AN/SPY-1D(v) radar system.

THE BOTTOM LINE

This discussion is focused on AEGIS-mediated defensive applications of USN in large part but scope is limited to surface combatants. Following bloc diagram provided an overview of AEGIS-mediated functions and payload on surface combatants such as destroyers and cruisers.



There is much to say about offensive options of well-equipped surface combatants, incredibly sophisticated submarines and incredibly sophisticated aircraft (bringing different types of payload to the equation) but this discussion is for another time. There is much to say about tactics and exposure levels as well. There is much about USN that is not made public and will not be made public anytime soon; this is often mentioned in American military sources and talks.

I would simply say that picking fights with USN is (very) bad idea.
 

The Accountant

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Fundamental consideration for a (credible) BMD solution is to ENABLE intercept possibilities for incredibly fast-moving targets in time-constrained situations. It would not be much of a BMD solution otherwise.

I have discussed AEGIS at length below to help potential readers understand this system in a better way and draw realistic conclusions about it.

RAPID INTERCEPTOR LAUNCH CAPABILITY

Following footage disclose ACTUAL interceptor launch speed of an AEGIS-based platform:


WE merely blink and the interceptor is gone (well-up in the air in pursuit of a target).

SM-3 class interceptors have neutralized SRBM, MRBM, IRBM and ICBM class targets in various live-intercept situations and events thus far. I have highlighted two live-intercept events above in which an SM-3 class interceptor took care of a speedy SRBM class target (FTM-21 and FTM-25 respectively).

Easier job specially in intercontinental range missile due to availability of time? Bro, are you kidding me?

ICBMs = massive ballistic trajectory approaching extreme altitudes in Midcourse phase + incredibly fast in Midcourse phase through Terminal Phase.

ICBMs necessitate herculean levels of investment and technical efforts to counter them - only USA have managed to conceptualize and demonstrate BMD capability against ICBMs and it took many years to develop and hone interceptors for the needful.

GBI inventory = 44
SM-3 Block IIA inventory = Classified

MOTIVATION

You might have knowledge of the fate of INS Eliat?



It was the incident of INS Eliat that motivated foundation of AEGIS to help neutralize (maneuverable) threats in time-constrained situations.

"One of the drivers for the development of SPY-1 was the need to address the low-altitude anti-ship cruise missile threat, which stresses the engagement time-line of the combat system because threats emerge from behind the Earth’s horizon at relatively short ranges from the ship." - O'Haver et al (2018)

AEGIS took over 10 years to develop and first AEGIS-based warship was rolled out in 1983:

"By 1981, the USS Ticonderoga (CG 47) became the Unites States’ first AEGIS-guided missile cruiser. It was a game-changer. Even new advances in Soviet missile technology could not keep pace with the new defensive capabilities of the AEGIS, providing the United States with a critical new asset in the all-important strategic chess game at sea. On January 22nd, 1983 when Ticonderoga was commissioned, the rallying cry was: “Stand by, Admiral Gorshkov, AEGIS is at sea!”" - Lockheed Martin

- with (revolutionary) AN/SPY-1A radar system at its core:

"The AMFAR demonstrator was conceived, designed, fabricated, and tested by APL between 1964 and 1969 and served as the advanced development model for technologies incorporated into the Aegis AN/SPY-1A radar. It brought all elements of the radar system together and demonstrated the feasibility of automatic detection and tracking with resistance to environmental clutter through computer control. Key technology areas addressed by the AMFAR program included tube-based transmitter design, planar phased-array design, electronic counter-countermeasures (now known as electronic protection) development, automatic detection and tracking, and computer control. The major experimental subsystems included a high-power transmitter, a phased-array antenna, a signal-processor system, and a computer control system." - O'Haver et al (2018)

O'Haver, K. W., Barker, C. K., Dockery, G. D., & Huffaker, J. D. (2018). Radar development for air and missile defense. Johns Hopkins APL Tech. Digest, 34(2), 140-153.

But it wasn't the end of story.

CONTINOUS MODERNIZATION

AEGIS modernization efforts continued beneath the hulls in passing years.

Persian Gulf War (1991) motivated transformation of AEGIS into a BMD-capable A2/AD solution.

"During Operation Desert Storm (1991), Iraqi forces used ballistic missiles against military and civilian targets with sufficient effect to spur the U.S. Navy to pursue a BMD capability. Initial studies by APL verified the feasibility of modifying the Aegis Combat System, including the AN/SPY-1 radar and Standard Missile-2 Block IV, to add an Area BMD endo-atmospheric engagement capability to protect ports and forces ashore against ballistic missile threats such as the Scud variety seen in Desert Storm.

Key AN/SPY-1 advances necessary to support the new Area BMD mission included the ability to respond to cues from offboard sensors, increased sensitivity, new surveillance approaches for early detection of threats, new tracking approaches, and new functionality to discriminate ballistic missile warheads. APL worked closely in the early to mid-1990s with the Aegis prime contractor, Lockheed Martin, and the Naval Surface Warfare Center Dahlgren Division to incrementally design and field-test each of these capabilities."
- O'Haver et al (2018)







What do you think Common Source Library is? Meaningful (classified) information about a wide range of (Foreign) offensive applications* is stored in there to help INFORM intercept possibilities against them.

TERMINAL PHASE DEFENSES

Terminal phase defenses of AEGIS have come a long way since 1983 as one of the outcomes of continuous modernization drive (see above).

Different types of targets were introduced to stress-test terminal phase defenses of AEGIS in passing years:



However:


Capability to intercept (maneverable) hypersonics was FIRST demonstrated in the FTM-27 E2 live-intercept test which was carried out in 2016. The target in this case was capable of replicating Flight performance and characteristics of the Chinese DF-21D ASBM*, and it was defeated in Terminal phase via SM-6 class interceptor(s). The target is assumed to be (very impressive) MRBM-T3c2 with classified MaRV.

*USA is remarkably well-versed in Rocket Sciences. They have developed some of the most sophisticated ballistic missiles and commercial-purpose rockets in the world. Just check the brochure of Northrop Grumman for instance - this company have produced numerous rocket motors (different types and specifications). And Northrop Grumman is but one American company involved in this business. Multiple American companies are involved in this business in fact. They can develop (any) kind of missile for "target practice." Keep this fact in mind.

Key enablers:

1. Very impressive sensor fidelity of AEGIS of AN/SPY-D(v) radar system

"The Aegis Combat System is controlled by an advanced, automatic detect-and-track, multi-function three-dimensional passive electronically scanned array radar, the AN/SPY-1. The SPY-1 is a 6 megawatt radar that is able to perform search, tracking, and missile guidance functions simultaneously with a tracked object capacity of well over 100 targets at more than 100 nautical miles."


2. Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC)


NOTE: USN is the only naval force in the world with credible CEC; all claims to the contrary are merely semantics of fanboys in Public discourses (bewakoof bana rahey hain). CEC is completely another level of sensor-netting in comparison to standard network-centric considerations in which all (enabled) assets can share and see the same battlefield picture. This is very expensive and difficult undertaking and majority of the countries do not have funds for the needful.

3. Rapid interceptor launch capability of AEGIS-based platform (see above)

"The Defense Department is eyeing Raytheon's Standard Missile-6 as a counter-hypersonic interceptor, a weapon already effective against "advanced maneuvering threats" and now slated for a flight test against a hypersonic boost-glide target in fiscal year 2023."


HGVs are incredibly difficult to intercept but SM-6 class interceptors have (unspoken) potential against these threats.

If their are capability gaps in the present, these will be bridged in passing years.


*INTEL FACTOR

USN did not reach the stage of having countermeasures for a wide range of increasingly sophisticated threats out of the blue. There is decades worth of background research* and surveillance techniques** involved in this matter (courtesy of the pressures of the Cold War), which helped shape industries and INFORM development of incredibly sophisticated A2/AD solutions which could make it possible to defeat a wide range of increasingly sophisticated threats in modern times.

*To achieve in-house capability to develop sophisticated missiles of all shapes and sizes.

**To monitor (and document) flight characteristics of all types of ballistic missiles tested and/or fielded by other countries in passing years with support of incredibly sophisticated Spaceborne assets such as DSP and SBIRS.

"In 2019, the SBIRS satellites were able to detect almost 1,000 missile launches, according to the company. McCormick said this is a two-fold increase as compared to the past two years."


SOFT-KILL TECHNOLOGIES

AEGIS-compliant interceptors are not like bullets which are cheap to mass-produce; these are expensive technologies in short and simple terms.

Soft-kill technologies create a separate layer for defeating a wide range of increasingly complex threats as well, and significance of these technologies is vastly understated in Public discourses. There are numerous pointers in FIRST post of this thread. Do give it a read as well.

I am providing some pointers as well.







NEXT LEAP

AEGIS-based platforms will receive a significant sensor package upgrade in the form of AN/SPY-6 radar systems.



Word is that AN/SPY-6 is much more sensitive than the already very impressive AN/SPY-1D(v) radar system.

THE BOTTOM LINE

This discussion is focused on AEGIS-mediated defensive applications of USN in large part but scope is limited to surface combatants. Following bloc diagram provided an overview of AEGIS-mediated functions and payload on surface combatants such as destroyers and cruisers.



There is much to say about offensive options of well-equipped surface combatants, incredibly sophisticated submarines and incredibly sophisticated aircraft (bringing different types of payload to the equation) but this discussion is for another time. There is much to say about tactics and exposure levels as well. There is much about USN that is not made public and will not be made public anytime soon; this is often mentioned in American military sources and talks.

I would simply say that picking fights with USN is (very) bad idea.
My brother u r right. However, 8t is not simple as written in the details shared by you. There r lots of if and buts involved.

R u suggesting that SM6 has capability to take out HGV at all ranges irrsepective of the stage involved ? A hardly thing there is any possibility of t
Related discussion: https://defence.pk/pdf/threads/df-2...sile-for-pakistan.706779/page-2#post-13051550


Fundamental consideration for a (credible) BMD solution is to ENABLE intercept possibilities for incredibly fast-moving targets in time-constrained situations. It would not be much of a BMD solution otherwise.

I have discussed AEGIS at length below to help potential readers understand this system in a better way and draw realistic conclusions about it.

RAPID INTERCEPTOR LAUNCH CAPABILITY

Following footage disclose ACTUAL interceptor launch speed of an AEGIS-based platform:


WE merely blink and the interceptor is gone (well-up in the air in pursuit of a target).

SM-3 class interceptors have neutralized SRBM, MRBM, IRBM and ICBM class targets in various live-intercept situations and events thus far. I have highlighted two live-intercept events above in which an SM-3 class interceptor took care of a speedy SRBM class target (FTM-21 and FTM-25 respectively).

Easier job specially in intercontinental range missile due to availability of time? Bro, are you kidding me?

ICBMs = massive ballistic trajectory approaching extreme altitudes in Midcourse phase + incredibly fast in Midcourse phase through Terminal Phase.

ICBMs necessitate herculean levels of investment and technical efforts to counter them - only USA have managed to conceptualize and demonstrate BMD capability against ICBMs and it took many years to develop and hone interceptors for the needful.

GBI inventory = 44
SM-3 Block IIA inventory = Classified

MOTIVATION

You might have knowledge of the fate of INS Eliat?



It was the incident of INS Eliat that motivated foundation of AEGIS to help neutralize (maneuverable) threats in time-constrained situations.

"One of the drivers for the development of SPY-1 was the need to address the low-altitude anti-ship cruise missile threat, which stresses the engagement time-line of the combat system because threats emerge from behind the Earth’s horizon at relatively short ranges from the ship." - O'Haver et al (2018)

AEGIS took over 10 years to develop and first AEGIS-based warship was rolled out in 1983:

"By 1981, the USS Ticonderoga (CG 47) became the Unites States’ first AEGIS-guided missile cruiser. It was a game-changer. Even new advances in Soviet missile technology could not keep pace with the new defensive capabilities of the AEGIS, providing the United States with a critical new asset in the all-important strategic chess game at sea. On January 22nd, 1983 when Ticonderoga was commissioned, the rallying cry was: “Stand by, Admiral Gorshkov, AEGIS is at sea!”" - Lockheed Martin

- with (revolutionary) AN/SPY-1A radar system at its core:

"The AMFAR demonstrator was conceived, designed, fabricated, and tested by APL between 1964 and 1969 and served as the advanced development model for technologies incorporated into the Aegis AN/SPY-1A radar. It brought all elements of the radar system together and demonstrated the feasibility of automatic detection and tracking with resistance to environmental clutter through computer control. Key technology areas addressed by the AMFAR program included tube-based transmitter design, planar phased-array design, electronic counter-countermeasures (now known as electronic protection) development, automatic detection and tracking, and computer control. The major experimental subsystems included a high-power transmitter, a phased-array antenna, a signal-processor system, and a computer control system." - O'Haver et al (2018)

O'Haver, K. W., Barker, C. K., Dockery, G. D., & Huffaker, J. D. (2018). Radar development for air and missile defense. Johns Hopkins APL Tech. Digest, 34(2), 140-153.

But it wasn't the end of story.

CONTINOUS MODERNIZATION

AEGIS modernization efforts continued beneath the hulls in passing years.

Persian Gulf War (1991) motivated transformation of AEGIS into a BMD-capable A2/AD solution.

"During Operation Desert Storm (1991), Iraqi forces used ballistic missiles against military and civilian targets with sufficient effect to spur the U.S. Navy to pursue a BMD capability. Initial studies by APL verified the feasibility of modifying the Aegis Combat System, including the AN/SPY-1 radar and Standard Missile-2 Block IV, to add an Area BMD endo-atmospheric engagement capability to protect ports and forces ashore against ballistic missile threats such as the Scud variety seen in Desert Storm.

Key AN/SPY-1 advances necessary to support the new Area BMD mission included the ability to respond to cues from offboard sensors, increased sensitivity, new surveillance approaches for early detection of threats, new tracking approaches, and new functionality to discriminate ballistic missile warheads. APL worked closely in the early to mid-1990s with the Aegis prime contractor, Lockheed Martin, and the Naval Surface Warfare Center Dahlgren Division to incrementally design and field-test each of these capabilities."
- O'Haver et al (2018)







What do you think Common Source Library is? Meaningful (classified) information about a wide range of (Foreign) offensive applications* is stored in there to help INFORM intercept possibilities against them.

TERMINAL PHASE DEFENSES

Terminal phase defenses of AEGIS have come a long way since 1983 as one of the outcomes of continuous modernization drive (see above).

Different types of targets were introduced to stress-test terminal phase defenses of AEGIS in passing years:



However:


Capability to intercept (maneverable) hypersonics was FIRST demonstrated in the FTM-27 E2 live-intercept test which was carried out in 2016. The target in this case was capable of replicating Flight performance and characteristics of the Chinese DF-21D ASBM*, and it was defeated in Terminal phase via SM-6 class interceptor(s). The target is assumed to be (very impressive) MRBM-T3c2 with classified MaRV.

*USA is remarkably well-versed in Rocket Sciences. They have developed some of the most sophisticated ballistic missiles and commercial-purpose rockets in the world. Just check the brochure of Northrop Grumman for instance - this company have produced numerous rocket motors (different types and specifications). And Northrop Grumman is but one American company involved in this business. Multiple American companies are involved in this business in fact. They can develop (any) kind of missile for "target practice." Keep this fact in mind.

Key enablers:

1. Very impressive sensor fidelity of AEGIS of AN/SPY-D(v) radar system

"The Aegis Combat System is controlled by an advanced, automatic detect-and-track, multi-function three-dimensional passive electronically scanned array radar, the AN/SPY-1. The SPY-1 is a 6 megawatt radar that is able to perform search, tracking, and missile guidance functions simultaneously with a tracked object capacity of well over 100 targets at more than 100 nautical miles."


2. Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC)


NOTE: USN is the only naval force in the world with credible CEC; all claims to the contrary are merely semantics of fanboys in Public discourses (bewakoof bana rahey hain). CEC is completely another level of sensor-netting in comparison to standard network-centric considerations in which all (enabled) assets can share and see the same battlefield picture. This is very expensive and difficult undertaking and majority of the countries do not have funds for the needful.

3. Rapid interceptor launch capability of AEGIS-based platform (see above)

"The Defense Department is eyeing Raytheon's Standard Missile-6 as a counter-hypersonic interceptor, a weapon already effective against "advanced maneuvering threats" and now slated for a flight test against a hypersonic boost-glide target in fiscal year 2023."


HGVs are incredibly difficult to intercept but SM-6 class interceptors have (unspoken) potential against these threats.

If their are capability gaps in the present, these will be bridged in passing years.


*INTEL FACTOR

USN did not reach the stage of having countermeasures for a wide range of increasingly sophisticated threats out of the blue. There is decades worth of background research* and surveillance techniques** involved in this matter (courtesy of the pressures of the Cold War), which helped shape industries and INFORM development of incredibly sophisticated A2/AD solutions which could make it possible to defeat a wide range of increasingly sophisticated threats in modern times.

*To achieve in-house capability to develop sophisticated missiles of all shapes and sizes.

**To monitor (and document) flight characteristics of all types of ballistic missiles tested and/or fielded by other countries in passing years with support of incredibly sophisticated Spaceborne assets such as DSP and SBIRS.

"In 2019, the SBIRS satellites were able to detect almost 1,000 missile launches, according to the company. McCormick said this is a two-fold increase as compared to the past two years."


SOFT-KILL TECHNOLOGIES

AEGIS-compliant interceptors are not like bullets which are cheap to mass-produce; these are expensive technologies in short and simple terms.

Soft-kill technologies create a separate layer for defeating a wide range of increasingly complex threats as well, and significance of these technologies is vastly understated in Public discourses. There are numerous pointers in FIRST post of this thread. Do give it a read as well.

I am providing some pointers as well.







NEXT LEAP

AEGIS-based platforms will receive a significant sensor package upgrade in the form of AN/SPY-6 radar systems.



Word is that AN/SPY-6 is much more sensitive than the already very impressive AN/SPY-1D(v) radar system.

THE BOTTOM LINE

This discussion is focused on AEGIS-mediated defensive applications of USN in large part but scope is limited to surface combatants. Following bloc diagram provided an overview of AEGIS-mediated functions and payload on surface combatants such as destroyers and cruisers.



There is much to say about offensive options of well-equipped surface combatants, incredibly sophisticated submarines and incredibly sophisticated aircraft (bringing different types of payload to the equation) but this discussion is for another time. There is much to say about tactics and exposure levels as well. There is much about USN that is not made public and will not be made public anytime soon; this is often mentioned in American military sources and talks.

I would simply say that picking fights with USN is (very) bad idea.
Thanks for sharing such a detailed analysis however my opinion is still the same. There is always a difference between controlled testing environment and actual war situation. There r lots of its and buts involved. Just for AEGIS can take down HGV but whats the limit of maneuvring that can be incorporated and at what ranges ? Remember when a system is tested it is always tested within the limit of its capabilities but r the enemy missile systems are within that performance range ? HGV is anything that have a Mach 5 plus speed and is maneuvrable question is whats the limit of SM6? Which speeds it can take on and how much changes in path it can incorporate and what angles of attack it can incorporate ?
 

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Some of the full-stealth design planes, helicopters and drones.



Panait, A. M. (2010). General principles of passive radar signature reducing: Stealth technology and its applications. INCAS Bulletin, 2(1), 49-54.
 

LeGenD

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USAF B-52 bomber conducts simulated hypersonic kill chain employment
11 May 2021 (Last Updated May 11th, 2021 12:23)
The US Air Force’s (USAF) B-52 Stratofortress bomber has demonstrated a simulated hypersonic kill chain employment.
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USAF B-52 bomber conducts simulated hypersonic kill chain employment
A B-52 Stratofortress from Barksdale AFB sits on the ramp at Eglin AFB. Credit: US Army / Sgt Michael Parnell.
Carried out during the ongoing Northern Edge 21 exercise, the missile strike involved the use of targeting data from sensors positioned more than 1,000nm away.
During the nearly 13-hour sortie from Barksdale Air Force Base (AFB) to Alaska, US, and back, the B-52 was able to receive target data from sensors through the All-Domain Operations Capability experiment (ADOC-E).
Upon receiving the data from the ADOC-E, B-52 Stratofortress was then able to take a simulated shot of the target from 600nm using an AGM-183 Air Launched Rapid Response Weapon (ARRW).


The AGM-183A ARRW is a long-range hypersonic missile designed by Lockheed Martin for the USAF.
53rd Test Management Group deputy commander lieutenant colonel Joe Little said: “We were really exercising the data links that we needed in order to complete that kill chain loop, and then get the feedback to the players in the airspace that the simulated hypersonic missile was fired and effective.”

According to USAF, the missile strike was a successful showcase of beyond line of sight (BLOS) Kill Chain employment.
49th Test and Evaluation Squadron commander lieutenant colonel Matt Guasco said: “The team did an outstanding job effecting this event both in planning and execution.
“This is a win for the US Air Force and greater DOD as a whole but make no mistake, we are just getting started.”

USAF noted that the ADOC-E is a ‘joint team representing the operational-level “blue” training audience designed to experiment with synchronising joint functions in forward locations’.
Northern Edge 21 is a US Indo-Pacific Command exercise designed to provide ‘high-end, realistic warfighter training’ and is aimed at enhancing joint interoperability.
The exercise, which started on 3 May, is being conducted on and above the Joint Pacific Alaska Range Complex, the Gulf of Alaska, and temporary maritime activities area.
 

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