Very few armies have been equally competent in the conduct of regular and irregular warfare. The principal reasons that why the regulars are weak in fighting irregular wars are:- 1. Strategy The chief difficulty for regulars is to decide upon a strategy that might work. Military operations and tactics are not the keys to success. However, they can prove to be the keys to political failure. 2. One Army. Every country has one regular army and can not afford to deprogram it as she may need it to perform in a regular way, even in pursuit of counter insurgency. 3. Organizational weaknesses. The conventional armies are organized, equipped, and trained to fight other armies with characteristics similar to theirs. 4. Mind Set. Since soldiers have fighting as their most distinctive core competency, and given that they are best prepared to wrestle with other regular soldiers. They have to change mind-set to deal with problem that is largely, though not entirely, political. 5. Not Trained For. When a regular force is committed to counter insurgency, it is asked to perform in ways, and for purposes, for which it is relatively ill prepared. 6. Traditional Strength. Irregular warfare calls for cultural, political, and non military qualities that are not among the traditional strengths of regular forces, 7. Retaliation. The retaliatory capability of regular forces is not utilized to optimum to avoid collateral damage. 8. Military Defeat. In the theater of irregular warfare military defeat or humiliation of enemy is not the prime objective. This is not to say that such defeat is unimportant, but is not the only winning factor. 9. Variable and Complex. Irregular warfare is highly variable in form and is always complex. 10. Choice of Selection of Time and Target. The choice of selection of target and time of engagement lies with the forces undertaking asymmetric actions. 11. Irregulars Avoid Strength of Regular Forces. Perpetrators avoid the strengths of their adversaries. They endeavor to employ methods that can be neither anticipated nor countered by regulars effectively. 12. Surprise. Asymmetrical attacks and defenses lean toward the counter cultural. It is abhorrent to strategists even to contemplate some of the techniques or weapons of asymmetrical warfare. For these reasons, finally, the perpetrator of asymmetrical warfare will undoubtedly have surprise on its side. 13. Media. Role of media is vital to change the affiliations of locals towards any party and making the environment hostile for any force. 14. Knowledge of terrain. Irregular forces and non state actors mostly being locals enjoy the advantage of having knowledge of terrain over regular forces. 15. Identification of Friend and Foe. As enemy is hidden in masses so it poses a serious challenge to regular forces to identify the threat. 16. Psychological Effects. Regular forces are operating away from their homes. At times they operate even against their own brothers and relatives. Moreover if the cause is not clear they operate under tense moral and psychological pressure of being right and wrong.
Iran is keeping Israel on its toes by working on hard power that is deterrence through showing-off nukes. The unpredictability of aggressive credible response to any aggression is the key aspect of this model. Pakistan can design a similar model. What should Pakistan do to contain Indian influence on Kahsmir? Diplomacy is another important element in the Iranian model, Pakistan needs to engage its allies at least on the scale of OIC to announce travel restrictions for these new illegal settlers. There are many aspects of this model and need extensive study. But through the aforementioned approach, Pakistan could stop annexation of Kashmir.
.Corona virus has forced several countries to rethink their geopolitical nexus and close their borders to neighbors in such trying times. What new challenges does this bring for Pakistan? How well is Pakistan prepared to fight a battle on medical and diplomatic fronts?