GUIDE TO ANALYSIS OF INSURGENCY

COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE

QUETTA

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<u>CONTENTS</u>

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GUIDE TO THE UNDERSTANDING OF INSURGENCY

Preface

The conflicts that ravage the nations which are passing through the slow process of development have both indigenous and foreign roots. Fighting the conflicts ranging from political violence to the insurgency are to remain on the priority is of developing nations as long as the resources remain scarce and the demands continue to remain in abundance. Such like conflicts can not be resolved less we look for an integrated response. To achieve this objective, one has to understand the various facets of societies and their variables in order to determine the right response. The most appropriate response will require a combination of social and political reforms, economic advances, coupled with the military efforts.

In this Booklet, an effort has been made to elaborate firstly the social, political and economic aspects prevailing in a society and the impact of military and strategical aspects, initially in their wider dimensions, and then in terms of specific situation now a days prevailing in most of the developing countries. But it is important to bear in mind two very basic facts about the kind of insurgencies we may have to confront:-

a. They depend on external support, which is substantially are effective when it includes the provision of privileged sanctuaries for the insurgents.

b. They largely depend on the inefficiency of the governments in power, i.e insurgencies get independent momentum.

achieve these intermediate objectives, the objectives themselves are essentially political:-

a. Limit the ability of the government and enhance the capability of the insurgents to provide public services.

b. Obtain the support or neutrality of critical segments of the population.

c. Isolate the government from international diplomatic and material support and increase international support for the insurgents.

d. Increase domestic and international legitimacy of the insurgent organization at the expense of the government.

e. Reduce and, if possible, neutralize government coercive power while strengthening insurgent coercive capabilities.

Stages of an Insurgency

Successful insurgencies usually pass through certain common stages of development. Not all insurgencies, however, experience every stage; the sequence may not be the same in all cases; and the evolution of any stage may extend over a long period of time. An insurgency may take decades to start, mature, and finally succeed. The stages of an insurgency are:-

Stage	Insurgent	Government Response
Preparatory	Leadership emerges in response to domestic grievances or outside influences.	Minimal.
Active	Infrastructure built,	Counterinsurgency

Organisational strategy is determined primarily by the group's operational environment and by the training of its leaders. The operational environment includes the socio-cultural makeup of the target population: the economic, political, and geographic characteristics of the area of operations: the insurgents' initial strength; the role of outside parties; and government capabilities. These factors frequently override training and ideology as a determinant of strategy in successful insurgencies; guerrillas who cannot adjust their strategy to suit local conditions rarely survive.

Many politically, militarily and traditionally organised insurgencies have urban components despite their rural concentration. Insurgent cadres often have strong ties to the cities and many opposition leaders have attempted city-based revolts before adopting rural-based strategies. An urban component aids a rural-based insurgency by tying up government forces and providing financial, intelligence and logistic services. Additionally, insurgent "armed propaganda" in urban areas usually receives better media coverage than that perpetrated in the countryside.

Insurgencies of several types may occur simultaneously within the same country. However, differences in organisational strategy, as well as differences in ideology, motivation, leadership, and cadre background, make unification of insurgencies of different types difficult.

THE FOUR BROAD CATEGORIES OF INSURGENCY

Organization Structure	Objective	Vulnerabilities	Other Characteristics

Politically Organized Insurgency

Organization Structure	Objective	Vulnerabilities	Other Characteristics
Extensive, complex political structure developed before military operations are initiated.	Shadow government created to undermine authority of existing regime; political consolidation precedes military consolidation of contested areas.	Vulnerable to concentrated effort aimed at neutralizing the infrastructure and establishing administrative control in contested areas.	Protracted warfare tendency toward excessive revolutionary zeal.

Military Organized Insurgency

Organization Structure	Objective	Vulnerabilities	Other Characteristics
Small, decentralized structure of armed insurgents serving as a catalyst for mobilizing opposition against existing regime.	Insurgent groups hope to from focus for disaffected population; destruction of regime legitimacy by military action; military consolidation precedes	Vulnerable to aggressive military action during early stages of rebellion because of undeveloped political structure, relatively vulnerable	Hope to demoralize regime and attain power without extensive conventional warfare.

| political consolidation of contested areas. | logistics and communications networks among local population. | | |

Traditionally Organized Insurgency

| Existing tribal or religious organizational structure. | No unique strategy common to all; will adopt strategy of one of the other types. | Limited capacity for absorbing economic and military punishment; leadership conflicts are common; leaders often lack sufficient motivation, experience as insurgents, and political discipline. | Recruitment on basis of ethnic exclusivity. |

Urban Insurgency

| Cellular structure in urban environment. | Threaten regime legitimacy through urban disruption. | Restricted to small area and must hide within population attrition resulting from military/police pressure and the psychological | Often in support of wider insurgency waged in rural area. |

stress	of
clandestinety.	

Incipient Insurgency

The concept incipient insurgency – which encompasses the pre-insurgency and organisational stages of an insurgent conflict-refers to situations ranging from those in which subversive activity by an inchoate insurgent group is but a potential threat to those in which antigovernment incidents occur frequently and display organisation and forethought. Yet not all incipient insurgencies pose a serious challenge to a government. Determining which evolving insurgencies constitute a serious threat involves evaluating a range of signs associated with the development of an insurgency.

A revolutionary group seeking to mount an insurgency must, at a minimum, build an organisation, recruit and train people, acquire supplies, and broadcast beliefs and goals. It may also choose to incite riots or work stoppages, infiltrate the legitimate political apparatus and engage in terrorism – the more serious the threat.

The most alarming signs – those that almost certainly would signal the beginnings of a serious insurgent threat – involve substantial foreign assistance, either from governments or experienced insurgents; extensive guerrilla training; the acquisition of large quantities of guerrilla resources; and the creation of an organisation (with both a political and military arm) capable of substantially increasing its membership. The signs associated with the development of an insurgency fall within the following six categories:-

Organization and Recruitment

a. Sudden departure of large numbers of young or skilled people for some form of training or indoctrination.

b. Defection of a noticeable number of members, especially leaders, from one political party or organisation to a more radical party.

c. Measurable increase in ideological proselytising in rural areas.

d. Increase of "visitors" from pro-insurgency countries or the return of exiles.

e. Reports of "cells" in urban areas.

f. Press "leaks" on guerrilla plans or programmes to change the country.

Note: Well-developed and successful insurgent groups will be organised and divided along functional lines. Their ideology will be well developed, and their goals will be well defined, obtainable, and will reflect long-range planning.

Training

a. Reports of people training with arms or the identification of non government military training sites.

b. Reports of people receiving training outside the country or of travellers to countries sympathetic to insurgents.

Resistance	Guerrillas recruited and trained, supplies acquired and domestic and international support sought.	Organisation created.
Guerrilla Warfare	Hit and run tactics used to attack government. Extensive insurgent political activity both domestic and international may also occur simultaneously during this stage.	Low level military action initiated. Political social and economic reforms; civic action programmes; psychological operations; and amnesty programmes may also be initiated to counteract the insurgent's political activities.
Open offensive	Larger units used in conventional warfare mode. Many insurgencies never reach this stage.	Conventional military operations implemented.

Type of Insurgency

Insurgencies generally fall into one of four broad categories – politically organized, militarily organized, traditionally organized, or urban. Although some insurgencies have characteristics of more than one type. The defining quality of each category is the group's organizational strategy. Differences in organizational approach, in turn, produce differences in the military and political strategies employed by the insurgents at the international, national, provincial, and village levels of the conflict.

Acquiring Resources

    a.   Discovery of arms and material caches, collections of police uniforms or military clothing, stockpiles of explosives.

    b.   Evidence that a group has access to or has stolen special or sophisticated equipment for example multiple thefts of amateur band transceivers, hand-held VHF/UHF radios directional antennas, cassette recorders, calculators, typewriters, and printing presses.

    c.   Evidence of robberies, kidnap ransoms, narcotics income, or protection rackets linked to a radical group.

Outside Support

    a.   Evidence of money, training, arms and material provided by foreign governments.

    b.   Evidence of assistance or cooperation with foreign insurgent groups.

Popular Support

    a.   Evidence that insurgents have connections with legitimate groups political parties and labour unions.

    b.   Growing media coverage of insurgent activities.

    c.   Evidence that the number of sympathisers if growing for example, people who are not formal members but support demonstrations.

    d.   Indications that the insurgents are increasingly sensitive to public attitudes and reactions.

Actions/use of Violence

      a.   Emergence of radical violence, including bombings and attacks against government personnel and buildings, essential utilities, symbolic targets, or foreign-owned properties.

      b.   Reports of infiltration into the government, labour union, political parties.

      c.   Overzealous support of land reform, including non-government-sponsored expropriation of land or the establishment of squatters' encampments.

      d.   Sightings of armed people in rural areas.

      e.   Reports of meetings at which discussions centre on initiating violence.

      f.   Discovery of the capability to produce counterfeit documents.

      g.   Assassination of authority figures or religious leaders.

      h.   Violence in foreign countries directed against the diplomatic community of the country of concern.

      j.   Production and circulation of large quantities of radical propaganda.

      k.   Establishment of front organisations.

Determinants of Control In Insurgency

The ability to measure or assess who has control over an area and its population – the insurgents or the government is an important element in an insurgency or counter-insurgency effort. Who has control is determined not merely by who has more guns and firepower but primarily by who has more sympathisers – informers, food suppliers, messengers, and taxpayers – and

committed supporters – cadres, soldiers, fax collectors, and risk takers. Support of the people is vital to the survival of the insurgents who depend on them for food, shelter, recruits, and intelligence. The government's challenge is to regain the allegiance of a population already alienated by government failures to address basic grievances. Poor peasants and farmers are, however, seldom motivated by abstractions or vague promises. Their willingness to provide support hinges on concrete incentives – material benefits or demonstrable threats. Three factors-attitudes, organisation, and security – are critical to establishing control. One is best able to analyse the contest for control by answering several questions related to each of these factors.

<u>Attitudes</u>

Neither the government nor the insurgents can control an area without the sympathetic support of part of the local population, including at least a small core of individuals willing to undertake risks.

<u>Favourable attitudes among the local populace</u>:-

a. Is the rural population highly receptive to government/insurgent propaganda?

b. Air acts of government repression/guerrilla terrorism perceived locally as indiscriminate or discriminate?

c. Do government/guerrilla combat operations have exclusively military goals? Or, do combat operations consider the psychological and political impact on the local population?

    d.   Are there government/insurgent policies that the peasants feel are particularly unfair?

Ability to motivate individuals to take risks:-

    a.   Are local government officials/guerrilla leaders drawn mainly from the local population, or are they outsiders?

    b.   What percentage of households in a community have members in the local civilian militia?

Organisation

The organisational capabilities exhibited by each side at the local level are vital to mobilising and utilising local resources, orchestrating propaganda activities, and ensuring the effectiveness of local security forces.

Ability to organizations to mobilize and organize people locally

    a.   Do the villagers participate in government or insurgence sponsored civilian activities? Is participation voluntary?

    b.   Are local government/insurgent leaders dynamic personalities capable of injecting vigour into their organisations?

Ability Of Organisations To Provide material Benefits To Supporters At The Local Level:

a. Does membership in government/insurgent organisations provide an opportunity for upward mobility or economic reward?

b. Do government programmes or guerrilla recruitment significantly improve employment opportunities at the local level?

c. Are government services perceived locally as adequate? Or, are there generalised complaints condemning bureaucratic incompetence, red tape, or corruption?

d. Is the rural population supportive of government/insurgent programmes designed for its benefit (such as land reform rent control, co-operatives, and credit)?

<u>Ability of organisations to exploit local resources</u>:

a. How successful are government officials/insurgents in collecting taxes and receiving services and recruits from the local population?

b. Do government officials/insurgent leaders implement national government/ insurgent directives inflexibly or do they adapt them to local conditions?

<u>Security</u>

It is essential hat each side be capable of protecting its local political apparatus, cadres, and supporters from enemy forces and assassins. Failure to perform this function is usually

accompanied by a breakdown in morale and discipline, and occasionally by a complete collapse of one's entire organisation.

<u>Ability to protect supporters and local population:</u>

a.   Do government/guerrilla forces adequately protect local supporters on a 24 hours basis?

b.   Do national army "*reaction forces*" respond quickly and effectively to reports of guerrilla attacks on local civilian militias or progovernment communities?

c.   Do local government officials/insurgent cadres sleep in villages, or do they seek protection of armed camps?

d.   Are national army troops/guerrillas viewed locally as threatening outsiders or as helpful allies?

e.   Is the local militia seen as a source of protection by the rural population or as merely another distrusted police force?

<u>Local military effectiveness:</u>

a.   Are local civilian militias aggressive in small-unit, day and night patrolling, or do they avoid contact with the enemy?

b.   Do government/guerrilla forces have an effective intelligence network at the local level?

c. How disciplined are government/insurgent forces in combat? Do they usually recover the weapons and bodies of fallen comrades before retreating?

d. Are local government/insurgent forces capable of executing coordinated attacks against nearby enemy strongpoints?

Late-Stage Indicators of Successful Insurgencies

An analysis of historical cases indicates that a common pattern of behaviour and events characterises the defeat of a government battling an insurgency. This pattern comprises four categories of developments:

a. Progressive withdrawal of domestic support for the government.

b. Progressive withdrawal of international support for the government.

c. Progressive loss of government control over population and territory.

d. Progressive loss of government coercive power.

The categories include a total of 14 interrelated and mutually reinforcing indicators of prospective insurgent victory. Historically, the indicators have not appeared in any single order. Moreover, while no single indicator can be considered conclusive evidence of insurgent victory, all indicators need not be present for a government defeat to be in progress. While the indicators are designed to identify a progression of events typical of the

final stages of a successful insurgency, this progression is not inevitable. Effective government countermeasures can block the evolution of an insurgency and shift its momentum. Within the four categories, the indicators are:-

Progressive withdrawal of domestic support for the government

 a. Withdrawal of support by specific, critical segments of the population.

 b. Growing popular perception of regime illegitimacy.

 c. Popular perception of insurgents as leading nationalists.

 d. Insurgent co-optation, incorporation, or elimination of other major opposition groups to the government.

Progressive withdrawal of international support for the government

 a. Withdrawal of foreign support by specific, critical allies.

 b. Increasing international support for the insurgents.

Progressive loss of Government Control over Population and Territory

 a. Significant expansion of territory under insurgent control.

b.   Escalation of guerrilla/terrorist violence.

c.   Increasing inability of government to protect supporters/officials from attack.

d.   National economy increasingly weakened by insurgent activity.

<u>Progressive loss of government coercive power</u>

a.   Armed guerrilla forces multiplying in size.

b.   Military plots or coups against the government.

c.   Lack of sufficient government troops for counter insurgency.

d.   Government seriously negotiating sharing of power with rebels.

<u>Analysing an Insurgency</u>

A number of prerequisites exists for success in a situation where political violence has developed into an insurgency. The first is an in depth knowledge of the environment in which the insurgency is occurring. That is the very fabric of the society. By carefully studying the nature of a society, an analyst should be able to determine the causes or the potential causes of political violence that an insurgent can capitalise on. That determination is the first step toward victory for either the insurgent or the incumbent government.

Perceived Relative Deprivation

To make meaningful deductions when examining a society, one must first have an understanding of the theory of political violence. The following short explanation is drawn primarily from Why Men Rebel by Ted Robvert Gurr. Applying Gurr's theory requires a grasp of two fundamental concepts the perception of deprivation and the relative nature of the deprivation.

The importance of the perceived aspect is that as long as an individual believes he is deprived, that is all that matters. Whether or not reality supports the belief is immaterial. Otherwise similar people, because of a range of psychological factors, may be incensed by or may pragmatically accept the same social, economic, or political circumstances.

The importance of the word relative is that the goods or conditions of life Gurr refers to as values are different depending on one's standing in a particular society and on one society versus another. In a traditional rural society, the values of importance to the peasant are essentials of life such as food, shelter, and health services. However, as one progresses up the social ladder, values such as status, power, and prestige are perceived as important.

The root cause of insurgency is an unacceptable discrepancy between that which people think they have a right to expect and that which they estimate they realistically are capable of attaining. Gurr calls the gap between value expectations (Ve) and value capabilities (Vc) relative deprivation. In his definition of relative deprivation, he includes the idea of perception, but because the perception aspect is so important,

Gurr added the adjective perceived. Therefore, we talk about "perceived relative deprivation (PRD)" (See figure 1).


Figure 1

Perceived relative deprivation results from gap between value expectations (Ve) and value capabilities (Vc).

Gurr says that when PRD reaches a certain unacceptable, critical level, political violence is likely. Thus a perceived gap cannot indefinitely remain psychologically unacceptable, and it follows that PRD cannot indefinitely remain critical Psychological accommodation usually enables expectations to come closer to capabilities or action is occasionally taken to bring capabilities more in line with expectations. In other words, when one views society as a whole, various constituent groups should be in some sort of state of equilibrium.

The question for the analyst of insurgency is: How is the equilibrium distributed in such a manner as to bring about critical levels of PRD in various groups? Some generalisations can be made using graphs to illustrate the development of critical levels of PRD. In such graphs, the vertical axis represents value

position, the value of things hoped for or attained. The other axis represents time.

Getting back to Ve and Vc, the discrepancy between them in a traditional society is not much. For most people both are at a very low level, which is what they were reared to expect. Tradition dictates their place and to what they can realistically aspire, so they are adjusted to their life and they do not suffer from an unacceptable amount of PRD. Therein lies stability (see figure 2).

High

Value position

Ve

Vc

Low

Time

Figure 2

Traditional society: long-term equilibrium with little gap between value expectations (Ve) and value capabilities (Vc).

Eventually something happens to change the situation represented in figure 2 and the amount of PRD increases *(see Figure 3)*. An increase in value expectations can come about because of several causes. One cause might be what is called the demonstration effect - where people are exposed to a better

way of life through a variety of media or by seeing relevant groups making improvements.

High

$Value$
$position$

Ve

--------------------------- Vc

Low

Time →

Figure 3

Rising expectations cause increase in PRD.

A sense of perceived relative deprivation can also come about as a result of actual improvement in value capabilities. One part of human nature seems to be that when things do get better, humans expect them to get even better. So although value capabilities may be increasing, value expectations increase even faster *(see Figure 4)*. We have all heard of the *revolution of rising expectations,* a condition that causes a dilemma for many Third World governments. On the one hand, they dearly want development. On the other hand, development itself is destabilising. Development often actually causes more and deeper discontent than had previously existed.

High

Value
position

Ve

Vc

Low

Time →

Figure 4

Value expectations (Ve) tend to rise faster than value capabilities (Vc).

Another situation in which **PRD** can grow is one in which expectations have not risen but capabilities suddenly plummet *(see Figure 5)*. In a traditional society in which capabilities are already quite low, a disaster such as a drought may result in peasant rebellions. Alternatively, a group's high value capabilities may suddenly decrease because of some kind of change.

High

Ve

Value
position

Vc

Low

Time

Figure 5

Value capabilities (Vc) plummet, but value expectations (Ve) do not.

Issues, points in contention, arise out of a sense of **PRD**. Issues are matters about which people disagree. Issues may become focal points of of discontent and even insurgency. A specific issue may be land distribution, government corruption, or lack of opportunity socially, politically, or economically. Issues are conditions that have become politicised. Issues reflect the particular society under study, and a powerful issue in one society may not have the same force or popular support in another.

A given issue does not exist merely on the individual level. Yet that issue is not necessarily relevant to the entire population of a country and everyone who is interested in that issue does not feel the same way about it. Rather, an issue tends to belong to certain groups. A pre-existing group (ethnic, class, occupational, political, and the like) may identify with a particular issue and may feel very strongly that it should be resolved in a

certain way, another group may be completely disinterested. Still another group may feel strongly that particular issue should be resolved in another (perhaps contradictory) way. At the same time, an issue may actually bring new groups into existence.

As members of various groups work together to affect or change the behaviour of others, they become forces. The force may use argument, pressure, appeals to personal and institutional loyalties, and coercion (including physical violence). The term force is not exclusively a military concept. Rather, it refers to the total involvement of people attempting to influence or determine the action of others.

Motivated by its view of how an issue should be resolved, a force makes demands on a system. Demands on a political system involve pressures for economic, political, and social action. Problems of the government thus become: From whom should demands be received? Which demands require fulfilment? Who should be recipients of government actions? To what degree is the government capable of meeting the demands?

If a government adequately addresses demands, the result is simply the normal functioning of the political system. If a government does not adequately address demands, the sense of PRD is likely to intensify. Not only does the sense of deprivation over initial issues still exist, but additional reasons for perceiving deprivation grow out of the system's failure to respond adequately. The consequent frustration, discontent, and anger represent the potential for political violence.

Nature of the Society

When doing an insurgency analysis, commence with the nature of the society, because that is the foundation of all aspects of both an insurgency and the government's counterinsurgency strategy. Anyone who does not understand the social, economic, political, and historic fabric of a nation will treat only the overt symptoms of an insurgency, not the real problems that caused the insurgency in the first place. Insurgencies do not grow from nothing. Causes and conditions that convince people to seek change by violent means must exist. Keep in mind, however, that well - trained and articulate agitators can convince people that conditions are worse than the people may realise.

Whey a society seeks to solve its political problems by mass recourse to violence is also difficult to understand. That is so because the democratic system is probably most flexible political system ever devised, especially from the aspects of:-

a.   Responding to changing needs within societal groups.

b.   Allowing for *political progression* (participation).

The fact in much of the third world is that rulers do not easily acquiesce to being replaced. They will cling to power with all means available to them. Thus a violent struggle develops between disaffected groups on one hand and the government often a non-representative ruling group - on the other.

c.   There are however, no readymade and easy answer for countries like us. There will be no end to our discussion about the best course to follow. We must, nevertheless, vigorously pursue social, political, economic and military approaches based on most accurate kind of analysis of the insurgency.

d.   This Booklet will prove as useful guide to look at the problem in its true perspective. However, it may not provide you with the right answers you are looking for but surely it is going to help determine, the causes and subsequently lead you to the right solution provided you remain objective and pursue with intellectual approach to the problem

Insurgency Defined

Insurgency is protracted political-military activity directed toward completely or partially controlling the resource of a country through the use of irregular military forces and illegal political organizations. Insurgent activity-including guerrilla warfare, terrorism, and political mobilization, for example propaganda, recruitment, front and covet party organization, and international activity is designed to weaken government control and legitimacy while increasing insurgent control' and legitimacy. The common denominator for most insurgent groups is their desire to control a particular area. This objective differentiates insurgent groups from purely terrorist organizations, whose objectives do not include the creation of an alternative government capable of controlling a given area or country.

Common Insurgent Objectives

Most insurgent groups have the same intermediate objectives designed to help them achieve eventual domination of a country. Although both military and political means are used to

After all is said and done, however, the basis of political unrest is disaffection of groups within a society relative to government action. Members of various groups feel denied or deprived of some aspect of life, and they blame the government for the existing state of affairs.

The Linear Model of Insurgency

To further refine the understanding of an insurgency, students are encouraged to trace insurgency from the conditions that lead to PRD through the formation of issues. Next, they should examine the transformation of those issues by groups and forces within the society into demands being placed upon the existing political system. *For illustration see figure 6*.

LINEAR MODEL OF INSURGENCY
(From Conditions to Demands)

Figure 6

Demands when not addressed by the normal political process constitute the potential for political violence. Cultural factors or societal variables, which Militate for or against political violence are included in the analytical process. The government, to the extent that it can capitalise on the favourable and alter the unfavourable variables, can affect the likelihood of insurgency, its intensity, or its duration. See Figure 7.

LINEAR MODEL OF INSURGENCY

(From Demands to Political Vilence)

```
┌──────────┐        ┌──────────┐        ┌──────────┐
│ Demands  │────────│          │────────│ Potenti  │──┐
│    on    │        └──────────┘        │    al    │  │
└──────────┘                            └──────────┘  │
              Unanswered                              │
Government                              Violence      │
    A ┌──────────────────────────────────────────────┘
    n │
    s │
    w │   ┌──────────────┐      ┌──────────────┐
    e └───│   Societal   │──────│   Political  │
    r     │   Variables  │      │   Violence   │
    e     │   Determine  │      └──────────────┘
    d     └──────────────┘
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
- Normal Political Process

Figure 7

Assuming that a government faced with demands cannot or will not meet them, the potential for political violence increases as more groups become disaffected. Add a leadership element to the volatile conditions of a society with significant disaffected elements and the result is an insurgency. *See figure 8*.

<u>LINEAR MODEL OF INSURGENCY</u>
## (From Political Violence to Insurgency)

Figure 8

It is recommended that students should differentiate between spontaneous or unorganised outbreaks of intrasocietal violence on the one hand, and an organised insurgency on the other. Hence the student can conclude that insurgency involves two basic elements. One is a society with various groups who are vulnerable to insurgent appeals because of a high degree of PRD and a belief that the government is unresponsive to their demands. The second is a leadership element to politicise the disaffection and to organise an insurgent movement. Either element alone does not constitute an insurgency.

<u>Analysis Work Sheet</u>

How to prepare an insurgency analysis should be studied by beginning to examine the nature of the society. This examination provides the background for the rest of the analysis and is likely to identify root causes of **PRD**. Some of the factors and likely points for analysis considered in this insurgency analysis worksheet are presented below:-

INSURGENCY ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

a.   *Government objectives (immediate, short - term, long term).*

b.   Nature of Society

   (1)   Social, economic, political, and security conditions.

   (2)   Causes of discontent.

   (3)   Issues.

   (4)   Groups (segments of the population) and forces (groups trying to influence the actions of the others).

   (5)   Variables likely to influence the level of violence (coercive potential, institutionalisation, facilitation, legitimacy of the regime*).*

c.   **Nature of Insurgency**
   (1)   Leadership.

   (2)   Objectives.

   (3)   Organisation.

   (4)   Target groups.

   (5)   External support.

   (6)   Timing.

(7)   Mass support.

(8)   Relationship to legitimate political process.

(9)   Use of violence.

(10) Urban or rural base.

d.   **Nature of Government**

(1)   Objectives.

(2)   Description of counter-insurgency.

(a)   Balanced development, neutralisation and mobilisations programmes.

(b)   Pre-emptive and reinforcing aspects of counterinsurgency strategy.

(c)   Adherence to operational guidelines.

(d)   Evaluation of each counterinsurgency programmes in terms of likely impact on each segment of the population.

e.   **Response**

(1)   Possible courses of action.

(2)   Evaluation of each course of action.

(3)   Recommendation.

Effective Counterinsurgency

Analysing the status or progress of an insurgency - that is, conducting a net assessment - involves a careful evaluation of the major factors determining which protagonist has the advantage and why. It requires a clear understanding of the conflict's setting and origins, an appreciation of each side's

strategy for victory, and an assessment of each side's political and military capabilities and performance in light of their strategy. The definitions and other analytic frameworks contained in this guide help array the building-block knowledge necessary to conduct an overall assessment.

A country faces or soon may face an insurgency. Can its government wage a successful counter insurgency campaign? What variables should be evaluated? At least thirteen factors-six military and seven non-military - are critical to a government's counterinsurgency effort.

Virtually all of these factors influence popular support for the government's cause. They also affect the government's ability to employ the various combinations of persuasion and coercion that are essential to successful counterinsurgency.

Military Factors

a.   **Leadership.**   The degree of professionalism that characterises a country's military force.

b.   **Tactics   and   Strategy**.   The   ability   of counterinsurgent   forces   to   employ   the   various unconventional strategies and tactics required for combating insurgents in the field tactics that de-emphasise the concentration of forces and firepower and emphasise constant patrolling by many small, lightly armed units supported by larger backup forces.

c.   **Military Intelligence**.   The ability of the military intelligence apparatus to collect, analyse, and exploit quality intelligence on guerrilla personnel, modus

operandi, and locations, not just on insurgent order of battle.

d. **Troops behaviour and discipline**. The quality of the relationship between soldiers deployed in the filed and the surrounding population.

e. **Civil-military relations**. The ability of civilian authorities to influence military operations, especially with regard to proper consideration for political objectives.

f. **Popular militia**. A government's ability to establish and maintain a popular militia to assist regular forces in maintaining security.

Non-Military Factors

a. **Police operations**. The ability of the police to maintain law and order and implement population and resources control programmes.

b. **Civilian intelligence**. The ability of the civilian and police intelligence organisations to collect, coordinate, evaluate, and exploit intelligence on the insurgents and their political/military activities.

c. **Psychological operations**. The quality of a government's psychological warfare effort, its information and media activities, and its ability to promote its cause domestically and internationally.

d. **<u>Unified management of counterinsurgency</u>**. The government's ability to establish an organisational infrastructure capable of coordinating a coherent counterinsurgency campaign.

e. **<u>Political framework</u>**. The overall political form and appeal of the government and the validity of its claim that is the legitimate expression of the people's aspirations and of the country's traditions and ethos.

f. **<u>Improvement of rural conditions and administration</u>**. The ability of the government to implement the programmes and reforms necessary to gain popular acquiescence in and support for the government's efforts against the insurgents.

g. **<u>Legal reform</u>**. The ability of the government to implement and administer special laws and regulations specifically designed to counter and suppress the insurgency.

<u>Counterinsurgency Strategy</u>

The Army's strategy for dealing with insurgency, whether in its formative stages or fully developed, should be based on the following three interrelated components:-

a. **<u>Balanced Development</u>**. This element of the strategy aims at reducing PRD, hence the disaffection. It certainly consists of more than the providing of goods and services to the population. It includes political, social, and economic development with emphasis on building the institutions required to sustain the

development effort. Use of the term "balanced" applies to both the requirement for all types of development (political, social, and economic), as well as the need to give due consideration to all elements of society. An unbalanced effort can be counterproductive by increasing PRD between various groups.

b.   **Neutralisation**. If you are fighting an insurgency, the insurgent organisation cannot be ignored in hopes that it will go away once its announced demands have been satisfied. While the insurgent leadership may have originally expressed interest in correcting social or economic injustices (conditions which nurtured PRD), once the insurgency shows prospects for success, political power is the inevitable goal. They are not likely to be supportive of government efforts to alleviate economic or social problems. Military strategy in this case should stress on the value of *indirect approach* in neutralising an insurgent organisation. This approach places emphasis on use of psychological operations, population and resources control measures, and intelligence. Such measure may be of greater value in the long term than a *"shoot out"*. The objective is to render the insurgent organisation inoperative, not simply to kill a few insurgents.

c.   **Mobilisation**. Inherent in the indirect approach and perhaps the key element for success in defeating an insurgency is the final element of counter insurgency strategy (CIS) mobilisation of the population in support of government efforts. Successful mobilisation

allows for the focusing of resources toward neutralising the insurgent organisation and carrying out a balanced developmental effort.

d. **Principles of Counterinsurgency Strategy**. In addition to the three-pronged strategy as discussed earlier, following are some of the guidelines for combating insurgency:-

(1) **Ensure Unity of Effort**. A government dealing with an insurgency faces considerable odds in trying to carry out developmental efforts and simultaneously defeat an insurgent organisation. A unified approach, with all civil and military resources, reduced the chances of wasted effort.

(2) **Maximise Intelligence**. The need to identify the insurgent leaders and obtain information on insurgent operations is obvious. Less obvious, but of equal importance, is the need for intelligence to identify what issues are leading to disaffection and how the insurgent organisation is using those issues to generate support. A centralised intelligence organisation to aggregate information from all agencies is essential.

(3) **Minimise Violence**. While the government's coercive potential is a major factor in dealing with an insurgency, the way a government applies coercive forces can be self-defeating.

(4) **Improve Administration**. An effective administration, relatively free from corruption, provides a means for identifying grievances and providing institutional channels for their redress. Thus the vulnerability of the population to insurgency as a means of redress is reduced.

Glossary of Definitions

a. **Insurgency**. A form of rebellion in which a dissident faction that has the support or acquiescence of a substantial part of the population, instigates the commission of widespread acts of civil disobedience, sabotage and terrorism, and wages guerrilla warfare in order to overthrow a government. A state of insurgency implies that the insurgents have control of sizeable areas of the country and that it will almost inevitably be on the communist pattern.

b. **Internal Security**. Any military role which involves primarily the maintenance and restoration of law and order and essential services, in the face of civil disturbances and disobedience, using minimum force. It covers action dealing with minor civil disorders with no political undertones as well as riots savouring of revolt and even the early stages of rebellion.

c. **Insurgent**. The terms guerrilla, revolutionary, terrorist, dissident and rioter are used on occasions to indicate differences in the opposition. When it is not necessary to indicate specific differences, however, insurgent has been used to cover all the roles implied.

d. **<u>Insurrection/Revolt and Rebellion</u>**. When subjects revolt they openly express their dissatisfaction with the established government or its policies. When such an expression is armed and organised, it becomes a rebellion. When rebellion has a large measure of support and aims to overthrow the government, a state of insurgency exists.

e. **<u>Guerrilla</u>**. A combat participant in guerrilla warfare. When used in the context of insurgency or communist revolutionary war, the word describes the communist/tribal/local militia, to differentiate it from the regional and regular soldier of the insurgent forces. Guerrillas will invariably have a measure of support from the populace/locals.

f. **<u>Counter-Insurgency</u>**. Military, para-military, political, economic, psychological and sociological activities undertaken by a government, independently or with the assistance of friendly nations, to prevent or defeat subversive insurgency, and restore the authority of the central government.

g. **<u>Civil Disobedience</u>**. Active or passive resistance of the civil population to the authority or policies of government, by such means as unlawful strikes.

h. **<u>Civil Disturbance</u>**. Group acts of violence and disorder prejudicial to public law and order. These will necessitate police, and possibly, military intervention.

j. **<u>Sabotage</u>**. An act or an omission calculated to cause physical damage in the interests of a foreign power of subversive organisation.

k. **<u>Subversion</u>**. Action taken to undermine the military, economic, psychological, political strength or morale of a nation and the loyalty of its subjects.

l. **<u>Terrorism</u>**. A resort violence by a dissident faction in order to intimidate and coerce people for political ends. This may manifest itself in sabotage and assassination by individuals or small groups, or in the form of ambushes or attacks on civilians or police by large bodies of terrorists. It can take place in either urban or rural areas.

<u>A Framework for Analysis</u>

<u>The Government Role</u>

Professor Walter Sunderland has argued that the government's response to an insurgent challenge is the major variable determining the outcome of an insurrection. As he put it: "As soon as the challenge is in the open the success of the operations depends not primarily on the development of insurgent strength, but more importantly on the degree of vigour, determination and skill with which the incumbent regime acts to defend itself, both politically and militarily".

Carrying his argument a step further, one might suggest that whether a given insurgency can succeed by confining itself to low-level activity or will have to take on the dimensions of a protracted internal war is largely determined by the nature of the insurgents. Because of this, the counter insurgency aspects merit closer and extended examination.

Government facing an insurrection may confront one or more of the political challenges or forms of violence, namely: (1) propaganda organisational activity, (2) terrorism, (3) guerrilla warfare, and (4) mobile conventional warfare. Since each type of threat involves different techniques and poses a unique problem for the government, effective and appropriate countermeasures are heavily dependent upon the willingness and ability to differentiate among them. This is because each type of insurgent threat compels the government to emphasise a particular facet of counterinsurgency. McCuen has pointed out that to cope successfully with the organisational challenge the government will have to stress civic action, administration, and low-level police activity whereas a terrorist threat will necessitate intensified police work. Guerrilla warfare calls for a low - level military response, while mobile-conventional warfare will require conventional operations by the military.

The creation and implementation of a counterinsurgency programme along these lines is complicated by the fact that, in practice, insurgent threats not only overlap and are cumulative, but they often very in regions of the country being contested. In view of this, an effective government response is associated not with a single purpose strategy applied indiscriminately in all sectors, but rather with the adoption of a flexible policy that co-ordinates a variety of countermeasures in different areas, depending on the nature of the threats. For example, it would be a mistake for a government facing a substantial mobile-conventional threat in one sector and low level guerrilla activity in another to extend its search and destroy operations against conventional formations to the guerrilla area, inasmuch as such a move would constitute a costly, and perhaps counterproductive, overreaction. The reason for this is that guerrillas can easily blend back into the population, and thus raise the possibility of

regular military units striking out against the people, many of whom may be quite innocent. Past experience suggests that under such circumstances it is more appropriate to conduct mobile-conventional operations in one area and patrols in the other.

The execution of a multifaceted and sophisticated counter-insurgency programme obviously requires co-ordination of political, administrative, military, police, and intelligence efforts; this is essential if the various counterinsurgency agencies are to avoid working at cross-purposes. The problem here, however, is that optimal organisational conditions - ie, an effective existing administration, a tradition of civilian primacy, and an adequate number of good leaders - are often missing; in fact, their very absence may be one of the reasons for the insurgency. While the question of civilian leadership is perhaps the most difficult to resolve in the short term, improvements can be made in the areas of administration and leadership recruitment and training.

A critical ingredient for an effective government organisational effort is the provision of a common purpose and policy guidelines for its officials. This, in turn, places a premium on the articulation and communication of an overall programme for the future.

Since the national programme is also instrumental in gaining the support of the population, ascertaining the people's aspirations-which vary from one insurrection to another and from one region to another within the same country-be-comes important. Land reform, for instance, may be a basic grievance in some circumstances but not in others. History provides a number of cases sustaining the proposition that benevolent treatment of the population and reforms designed to meet the basic needs of

the people can go a long way towards undermining support for the insurgents.

The behaviour of the German administration in the Ukraine during world War II was a striking example of the government's being its own worst enemy, especially since the Ukrainians had no love for Stalin and seemed ready to help the Germans. As it happened, German executions against and repression of the Ukrainians eventually turned the latter against the Third Reich. Benevolent administration and effective reforms, which were carried out by the Germans in other sectors and which proved effective in harnessing popular support, were few and far between and were undercut by general Nazi policies.

A classic case of the government's gaining popular support would be the actions of the Philippines regime against the Huks. In that instance, Ramon Magsaysay's election to the presidency led to a number of social and military reforms that mobilised popular support and combined with the use of force against the insurgents to bring victory.

Devising a programme to satisfy the grievances of the population is, of course, no easy undertaking, especially for a developing nation with a paucity of resources. In light of this, it is frequently necessary for the governments of such states to seek economic assistance from external sources. Demands for redistribution of existing economic or political power, on the other hand, are largely internal matters that can be accommodated by the government from within, albeit not without political resistance from privileged classes or groups.

The most difficult demand for a government to meet is that it abdicate in favour of insurgent rule at the central level.

Nevertheless, since popular support for an insurgent organisation with such a totalistic objective is usually based on lesser socio-economic needs, the government can seek to undercut the basis of such support by attenuating the concrete grievances of the masses. In other words, the material demands of the people are distinguished from the political power aims of the insurgent leadership. While the government cannot accommodate the latter, it may well be able to deal with the former, and by so doing, deprive the insurgent movement of its main source of strength and resources- the people.

Clearly, it will be more difficult to design an effective counterinsurgency programme in colonial situations where not only the insurgent leadership but also the people are motivated by the nationalist aim of independence. Faced with such circumstances some regimes have sought to contain the situation by improving the well-being of the population in the hope that the latter would support the existing political order in return for short-term benefits. Where the population is divided into rival ethnic groups, the government may also seek to sustain or exacerbate societal cleavages in order to keep the insurgent movement divided (the well-knows strategy of divide and rule).

The execution of a general programme to deal with the needs of the people depends upon an effective administration, staffed by local personnel if possible. History is replete with cases wherein governments forfeited their presence to insurgent forces that were quick to exploit the administrative vacuum by establishing their own organisational apparatus, however rudimentary. The initial British inattention to the Chinese squatters in areas bordering the jungles during the Malayan Emergency exemplifies this point.

An essential component of any organisational effort by a government is forging a sense of loyalty between itself and the people. To facilitate this task, potential groups and leaders that can serve the government and provide personnel for the auxiliary police and militia forces are identified and organised. The role of the police and militia is to isolate the people from infiltrators prevent exactions from being made on the people by the insurgents, and provide security against terrorism and low- level guerrilla operations. In view of the fact that most people place the highest value on individual security, the government's success in gaining their co-operation has been closely associated with its ability to provide personal protection.

Along with the political and administrative action outlined above, effective counterinsurgency invariably involves a number of security measures-detention without trial, resettlement of sections of the population, control of the distribution of food, curfews, restrictions on movement, the issuance and checking of identification cards, and the imposition of severe penalties for the carrying of unauthorised of unauthorised weapons-in order to separate the population from the insurgents. While such sanctions may be undesirable from an ideal or moral standpoint, they have proven effective, especially when applied consistently, fairly, and judiciously.

Resettlement, for example, has sometimes been used to sever the links between the insurgents and the populace, particularly when terror an/or guerrilla attacks persisted and were attributed, at least partially, to support rendered the insurgents by portions of the population. Civic action and political organization have been extremely important during resettlement; indeed, they are often viewed as concomitants of that technique. The Briggs Plan for moving the Chinese squatters in Malaya, the

Kitchener resettlement scheme during the Boer war, and the relocation programme during the Mau uprising are examples where transpositioning segments of the population was instrumental in denying insurgents support of the population. Conversely, the resettlement carried out by the regime of Ngo Dinh Diem in South Vietnam failed, largely because it was overextended, too rapid, procedurally deficient, and inadequately supported by the police establishment. Much of the same was true of the Rhodesian government's ill-fated "protected villages" during the mid 1970s.

Whenever the government invokes security measures directed at individuals or the collectivity, it can expect the insurgents to make use of the legal structure in an attempt to portray the regime as a violator of civil and human rights, and to protect their personnel. Essentially, the insurgents will seek to have those under detention treated as peacetime offenders. This ploy, which will make it even more difficult for the government to avoid alienating the population, is another reason for imposition of such measures in a judicious and limited manner.

A primary requisite for fair security measures is accurate information about the insurgent organization, including the identification and location of its members and intended activities. Traditionally, the easiest way for the government to obtain the necessary information has been the creation of effective rapport with the people by means of good administration and prudent and diligent police work. This, in turn, has required well-trained interrogation experts, who can minimize violence by knowing the right questions to ask, and agents who can penetrate the insurgent apparatus.

Since insurgents themselves are a potential valuable source of intelligence, their treatment by government forces is important. While it is unlikely members of the hard core will defect, it is possible that less dedicated insurgents may be induced to surrender, especially if insurgent prospects are not bright. Psychological warfare efforts designed to increase the number of defectors by promising them amnesty, security, and material benefits have often been used to exploit such situations.

As far as military measures designed to deal with insurgent threats are concerned, there are number of prescriptive propositions based on previous cases.

MacCuen, for instance, argues that to cope with an insurgent organizational threat and the low-level terrorism and sporadic guerrilla attacks which often accompany it, the military must be oriented toward population contact. Armed units should be positioned in a large number of small posts, allowing for protection of and mixing with the local people. If there is a small-scale guerrilla threat, the territorial defense force must make extensive use of ambushes and patrols in an effort to intercept insurgent bands. Moreover, the government ordinarily must provide backup mobile air, naval, and ground forces to assist ambush patrols that engage the enemy, and to conduct harassment operations against insurgent units in under populated hinterlands. But, in no case can the mobile forces be considered a substitute for territorial defense forces.

Where the insurgent movement ahs been able to mount a substantial internal terrorist campaign, the government must consolidate its own areas and then, operating from these secure bases, seek to destroy the political military structures of the insurgent organization by locating and detaining its members.

|Police forces that have received quasi, military training for operations in the contested areas and the hinterlands can concentrate on this while lesser duties are performed by the auxiliary police.

If transnational terrorism becomes a threat to officials and civilians abroad, the government may resort to a combination of defensive and offensive measures. Defensively, the government can take steps to enhance the security of embassies, consulates, airline offices, airliners, and the like by assigning armed guards to them cooperating with national and international police and intelligence agencies, and providing information on personal security measures for individuals located in areas outside the country. Offensively, it can undertake intensive diplomatic efforts to acquire international support for antiterrorist sanctions. In the event such steps prove unsatisfactory, the government may consider punitive military attacks against countries that provide sanctuary for terrorists and special operations against insurgents located in such countries. Violent ripostes in third countries, however, risk international opprobrium and an expansion of war. Despite this, as the Israelis demonstrated in 1970-73, they may be successful in blunting an upsurge in transnational terrorism.

When insurgents have begun to conduct large-scale guerrilla actions, the government normally faces a more serious threat. In response, it must first consolidate the areas it does hold, and then gradually expand from those areas with the objectives of gaining control of the population, food and other resources, while inflicting losses on guerrilla units and defending vital lines of communication. An essential component of the anti-guerrilla campaign is a nomadic territorial offensive that emphasizes the use of sophisticated detection technology, patrols, attacks, and ambushes by small dispersed units during

both day and night hours. Once an area has been cleared of guerrilla bands, experience counsels that the government should establish an administrative presence, if only initially by civic action teams.

To further deprive the guerrillas of the initiative, the government can employ mobile forces, commandos, airpower, and artillery to harass insurgents in remote and thinly populated hinterlands where they are likely to have established bases. Eventually these areas should also be organized by the government. If forbidden zones (I.e, areas that can be fired into at will) are to be created, experience suggests great care be taken to assure innocent civilians are not located in them otherwise such military actions may create more insurgents than are eliminated.

If the government finds itself confronted by mobile-conventional warfare, it is near defeat, a reality that may require a call for outside assistance. McCuen argues the first countermove by the government should b e to consolidate base areas, even if this means sacrificing large areas of the country. After securing base areas and expanding from them, mobile strike forces are used against insurgent bases in the same manner as the assaults on the Greek guerrilla strongholds during the Greek civil war. If the government is luckily, the guerrillas may choose to defend their bases, thus violating a cardinal guerrilla principle that warns against engaging a superior force. In the event insurgents decide to revert to guerrilla warfare, the government should respond likewise, taking appropriate steps summarized above.

If the government concludes sanctuaries across the border are playing an important role in sustaining the insurgent

activities at any time, it can attempt to create a cordon sanitare. Should jungle and mountain terrain make this task impossible or difficult, the government may opt to establish forbidden zones, conduct a nomadic territorial offensive, implant detection devices, build barriers, infiltrate counter-guerrillas across the border, or directly strike the sanctuary country. Since the last mentioned tactic can be a casus belli that might widen the conflict, the government must weigh its aims, possible costs, and risks carefully.

Although the insurgent threat is largely a political administrative one this does not mean military success is unimportant. Besides inflicting material personnel losses on the insurgent movement and in some cases forcing the insurgent from familiar operating terrain, military victories can enhance government morale undermine the insurgent image, and impress the population. It must be remembered the insurgents are trying to establish an image of strength in order to convince the people they will succeed; when most of the victories got to the government side, the insurgents' the insurgents' credibility suffers.

One caveat here however, if military victories are achieved at the expense of the local population in terms of casualties and property losses they may prove to be counterproductive in that the alienation engendered may increase the ranks of the disaffected. This leads to the inexorable conclusion that all military operations must be planned and executed in such a away as to minimize civilian losses, for as Richard Clutterbuck has pointed out one misplaced bomb or artillery shell can undo countless hours of political effort.

In summary the government faced with an insurgency must combat our different types of threat with four different types of response. Insurgent organisational and propaganda efforts must be countered by both government counter-organisation and psychological warfare actions and police operations designed to uncover insurgent political cadres; terrorism must be countered by security measures and intensified police and intelligence operations; guerrilla warfare must be dealt with by low llevel military action (the nomadic territorial offensive) that puts a premium on small unit patrolling mobile operations against hinterland guerrilla bases, and the defense of vital lines of communication; and mobile conventional warfare must be neutralized by conventional military operations on the part of the governments mobile units. Furthermore, the government must be prepared to deal with all of these threats simultaneously.

Regardless of how one looks at it, the effort by a counterinsurgency programme is substantial. The demands in terms of morale, patience, and determination become greater as the insurgent movement progresses. To be successful the counterinsurgency forces need the firm backing of their government and people. Whether or not such support is forthcoming will be partially determined by the strategy the regime uses and the way it is implemented. Indicators that things are not going well are serious dissent supporting the insurgent objective (explicitly or implicitly), desertions from government forces general lack of combativeness a poor of local law enforcement guerrilla operations carried out by increasingly larger lack of information from the people and a low surrender rate. Conversely the opposite of each of these indicators would suggest the government is succeeding.

As the foregoing commentary suggests an effective counterinsurgency effort depends primarily on the political and military adroitness of the government. Although moral political and material support from friendly states may be an important asset to the government in specific cases, there is always a danger as the United States found in Vietnam of over-reliance and a failure on the part of indigenous authorities to fulfill their responsibilities. When this occurs the outside power may end up assuming the major burden of the conflict especially in the military area, while the essential political tasks necessary to undercut the insurrection are either not performed or poorly effectuated.

Where threatened governments eschew an inordinate reliance on external powers and where they devise and apply the types programs suggested earlier insurgents will have little chance of success. Moreover even if the government does a mediocre job it may still succeed depending upon how insurgents perform in relation to other major criteria for successful insurgency. Which of those factors is important and how the insurgents will perform is in large part a function of the particular strategy they adopt the final consideration in this chapter.

Insurgent Strategies

There are a myriad of insurgent strategies in the real political world. In terms of conceptual sophistication such schema range from the carefully articulated to the inchoate. We shall focus on four general patterns of strategic thought that have attracted many adherents: the Leninist, Maoist, Cuban and urban. It should come as no surprise, by the way, that proponents have proclaimed the widespread, if not universal, applicability of each.

The Leninist Strategy

Those insurgents who adhere to a Leninist strategy believe that a small, tightly knit, disciplined, and highly organized conspiratorial group that has obtained support from major discontented social groups – such as the military and working–class provides the most effective means for achieving the goal of the movement. For the most part, insurgent activity takes place in those urban centres with the major concentrations of political and economic power. Wile the purpose is normally revolutionary, there is no logical incompatibility with the other types of insurgent goals discussed earlier. The Leninist approach assumes a government that is alienated from its population; hence, it will capitulate when confronted by low–level terrorism, subversion of the military and police, and the final seizure of radio stations government offices, and other state institutions. However, where the regime and authorities retain substantial legitimacy and exercise effective control over structures such as the army and police, this strategy does not appear promising as far as revolutionary goals are concerned, a fact which partially explains the tendency of many communist parties in relatively stable states like France, Italy, and Portugal to opt for political participation. Prospects are similarly unencouraging where the regime is threatened by other types of insurgents (reactionary, restorational, and secessionist). Nevertheless, a Leninist approach might prove successful where the aims are reformist or conservative, because under such circumstances the insurgents are interested in either maintaining the regime or changing policies rather than seizing the reigns of political power. The reasoning here is that since the regime and authorities are not threatened they may choose to cut their losses by making the necessary political concessions.

As far as the five strategic factors are concerned, political organization is clearly the most important. In practical terms, this means a limited group of activists; there is no intention to mobilize the general populace within the framework of a shadow government. At best, one might find ad hoc workers' councils or other such groups whose purpose is to proselytize selected segments of the populace via exoteric appeals. If they are successful in this undertaking, the insurgents will have a reservoir of supporters who will engage in demonstrations and riots chosen by the leadership.

The elite cadre of such a movement is often recruited on the basis of esoteric and/or exoteric appeals. The former, in particular, looms very significant in revolutionary movements. Although there may be limited violence (usually some form of terrorism), primary importance is not accorded to terror tactics, provocation of government counterterror, or guerrilla warfare. Thus, it is not surprising the external support receives but moderate emphasis. This is not meant to suggest, however, that moral and political backing as well as financial inputs and limited cross-border sanctuaries – are unwelcome. To the contrary, they may be quite helpful, but, in the final analysis, they are secondary assets. Indeed, there is simply no gainsaying the fact that the quintessential aspect of Leninist strategy is conspiratorial organisation combined with active support from selected social groups.

The Maoist Strategy

No doubt the most elaborate insurgent strategy is articulated by Maoist theoreticians who ascribe great significance to popular support, extensive organizational efforts, and the environment as resources necessary for a prolonged conflict with

an enemy perceived as being in a superior position prior to hostilities. What is more, the Maoist approach is par excellence, a sequential strategy ie it unfolds in distinct steps each of which is designed to partially achieve the goal and is dependent on the outcome of the step before it. Both scholars and practitioners have identified these steps or stages as political organization terrorism, guerrilla warfare, and mobile conventional warfare.

In the organizational stage, cellular networks are created around which the guerrilla builds political propaganda groups to win popular support and trains teams of terrorists to engage in selective intimidation of recalcitrant individuals. At this point fronts may be organized along with pressure groups and parties in order to facilitate the acquisition of popular support. Simultaneously insurgents usually try to infiltrate enemy institutions foment strikes demonstrations and riots: and perhaps carry out sabotage missions.

During the first stage, the insurgents stress esoteric and exotic appeals as well the social services and mutual help aspects associated with demonstrations of potency. One key objective at this time is the recruitment of local leaders who once in the organization will then go forth and attempt to detach the people from the government.

In order to institutionalize support, insurgents begin to construct parallel hierarchies. It the regime fails to react it will lose by default; if it responds successfully the insurgents may suffer a fate similar to that suffered by the Tudeh insurgents in Iran.

Terrorism during this period serves many functions, including acquisition of both popular and external support. It may

be very significant where the insurgent organization and/or terrain are insufficient for guerrilla warfare. In situations where regime strength has been the key reason for the use of terror, the insurgent movement is worse off than where organizational deficiencies are the problem. Organizational failings can conceivably be rectified and the insurgency may then evolve towards guerrilla warfare.

Guerrilla warfare is the second stage in the Maoist scheme. The earliest part of this stage is characterized by armed resistance carried out by small bands operating in rural areas where terrain is rugged and government control weal. If the guerrilla face significant government opposition they have the option of reverting to stage one. Considerations most likely to be involved in the decision-making calculus are: vitality of the incumbent regime, its projected capability against guerrilla warfare, and external political military factors.

The insurgent aim in the incipient part of stage two is to isolate the people from the government. The organizational apparatus established in stage one begins to supply small guerrilla units and full and part time personnel play a more prominent role. Yet during the early part of stage two, there is still a lack of organization above village level, and groups operate from shifting and remote bases. Military actions in early stage two are small hit and run attacks against convoys military and economic installations and isolated outposts. These scattered attacks are intended to goad the enemy into adopting a static defensive posture that stresses the dispersal of forces in order to protect many potential targets.

If there is satisfactory progress during the early phase of stage two, insurgents normally move into the second half of that

stage and expand their organization in the regions they control. In addition, regional forces emerge which along with the full time forces enable the insurgents to join villages together into a political network that constitutes a major base area. At this point the guerrillas step up the mobilization of the population by exploiting and satisfying (as best they can) popular aspirations. Meanwhile there is usually a stress on ideology, which is designed to supplant whatever type legitimacy sustains the existing regime.

During stage two the parallel hierarchy is more visible than during stage one. Besides resembling state apparatus it also includes auxiliary organizations controlled by revolutionary cells linked to the central political structure. Moreover, a government in exile may be created.

The organizational evolution in late stage two includes the establishment of arsenals, arms production facilities and hospitals. The logistics operation encompasses activities that range from procurement of basic foodstuffs and war supplies to acquisition of material aid from external sources. Once base areas are set up the delivery of supplies from nearby friendly states becomes less risky and more likely.

In the military realm, recruitment of full time guerrillas, establishment of an extensive system and creation and training regular army units are emphasized. If voluntary recruits are insufficient, there may be abductions. Since abductees often make poor fighters voluntary enlistment's are stressed.

Three operational levels often comprise the military organization in late stage two, district, and local. The regional

troops the best armed and trained, from the strike forces that are the backbone of the movement. At the next level, the district battalion is led by full time cadres, though the subordinate companies are themselves composed of part time soldiers. Local forces are made up of both full and part time guerrillas with the latter predominant. All three levels are coordinated by a central headquarters in pursuit of common military and political objectives.

Even though the parallel hierachy and military organization may be relatively secure in late stage two, the guerrillas usually do not elect to fight positional battles or even defend their base areas. Instead, the insurgents avoid large government sweeps and patrols in order to demonstrate the government's 'nobility to destroy them and to contrast the regime's ephemeral authority with the guerrillas permanence

While base areas are being constructed, the insurgents will continue to establish bands and send agents into contested or government controlled areas with the purpose of implanting new cells, networks, and bands in these sectors. A major effort is made to deceive the government in the hope its response will be tardy, insufficient, and tactically misdirected. Military actions in stage two are basically large scale guerrilla attacks carried out from secure base areas in addition to operations designed to acquire additional supplies and reduce areas of government control, armed propaganda teams are dispatched to further undermine the enemy. Considerable attention is devoted in the terminal period of this stage to seizing and securing large areas and preparing the physical battlefield for mobile conventional warfare. Thus, military considerations receive as much attention as political calculations when it comes to target selection.

The third and final stage of a Maoist type insurgency is civil war, characterized by regularization of guerrilla forces and mobile conventional warfare. The objective at this point is displacement of the regime and authorities. Regular units conduct conventional operations, with small bands supporting the main effort in an ancillary role. Ordinarily external support is important at this time, unless the regime has totally collapsed from with-in.

It should be readily apparent from the preceding discussion that the Maoist insurgent strategy is a multifaceted one, which emphasizes several interrelated elements: popular support organization and the environment. Whereas the first two factors can be directly affected by the conscious decisions and skills of the insurgents, the environment is a given to which the latter must adapt. Through a combination of propaganda efforts and organizational dexterity, the insurgents prepare the people for prolonged conflict with the government and once conflict has commenced sustain and gradually expand their support to the point where they control the country side thereby isolating the urban centres. Since such an enterprise requires flexibility and coordinated efforts on the part of many activists, it is vulnerable to government psychological organizational and military police countermeasures at many points. In a very real sense the outcome will be determined by the side manifesting superior political and military skills as well as emotional commitments. Despite copious external inputs to both parties in the final analysis it was these ingredients that prevailed in China, Cambodia and Vietnam.

Environmental characteristics are also important in the Maoist strategy. In the three cases just mentioned, the insurgents were able to build and expand their organization and

base of popular support in relative security because of favorable topographical and demographic patterns. By contrast if the contested country is small and relatively open, if the population is concentrated in a few areas that can be isolated and if the road and communications systems are developed the insurgents will find it very difficult to organize and gain support.

External support has a rather ambiguous place in the framework of Maoist strategy. Although self reliance is said to be the overriding consideration, in practice, moral political material, and sanctuary support have played key roles, especially in offsetting similar assistance to the government.

The Cuban Strategy

An alternative to the Maoist protracted warfare strategy is provided by the Cuban model. Che Guevara, a much publicized figure in insurgent folklore, opened his book, Guerrilla warfare, with the following comments:-

We consider the Cuban revolution contributed three fundamental lessons to the condcut of revolutionary movements in America. They are:-

a.   Popular forces can win a war against the army.

b.   It is not necessary to wait until all the conditions for making revolution exist; the insurrection can create them.

c.   In underdeveloped America the countryside is the basic area for armed fighting.

While one may debate the originality of point (1) and (3), the second claim merits attention because Guevara seems to give more scrutiny to the initial phase of insurgency than does Mao. John Pustay has suggested one reason for this may be that Castro and Che had to start by recruiting at the grass-roots level, whereas Mao did not have to start from scratch. In his words:-

Castro, Guevara, and their eleven cadre men on the other hand were forced to form guerrilla insurgency units by drawing upon recruitment sources at the grass-roots level. They had to start essentially from noting and build a revolutionary force to achieve victory. It is reasonable, therefore, for Guevara to discuss in detail the initiatory steps in creating a viable guerrilla force. Of priority is the assembly of revolutionary leaders and cadre guerrilla fighters in exile or in some isolated spot within an object country "around some respected leader fighting for the salvation of his people". Gueara then calls for elaborate advanced planning, for the advanced establishment of intelligence networks and arsenals and above all for the continued maintenance of absolute secrecy about the potential insurgency until overt resistance is actually initiated. Thus Guevara fills in the details, overlooked by Mao and only slightly covered by Giap, of the initiatory phases of the first general stage of Maoist insurgency warfare.

While one may interpret this as little more than an effort by Che to refine and elaborate the Chinese leader's scheme, a closer look at the Cuban case reveals substantive divergences from the Maoist strategy.

It was Guevara's contention that insurgent leader did not have to wait for the preconditions of insurgency to appear, since they could act to catalyse existing grievances required for

positive action. Thirty to fifty men, he believed, were adequate to start an armed rebellion in Latin American countries, given "their conditions of favourable terrain for operations, hunger for land, repeated attacks upon justice, etc". In other words, Guevara was arguing that the mere fact of taking up arms in situations where grievances existed would create suitable conditions for the Cuban revolution, according the guerrilla force to the party in favour of placing primary emphasis on the army as the nucleus of the party. Putting it another way, he suggested the guerrila force was a political embryo from which the party could arise. Whereas Mao stressed the leading role of the party and the need for political preparation before military struggle. Debrary argued the Cuban case made it clear that military priorities must take precedence over politics. "Psychological warfare," he asserted, "is effective only if it is introduced into war itsefl".

Debray contended it was an old obsession to believe revolutionary awareness and organization must and can, in every case, precede revolutionary action. Rather than wait for the emergence of an organisation, it is necessary to proceed from what he calls the guerrilla foco, nucleus of the popular army. This foco was referred to as "the small motor" that sets "the big motor of the masses" in action and precipitates formation of a front, as victories of the small motor increase. Debray's belief in the widespread applicability of this strategy was obvious in his remarks that:-

"The Latin American revolution and its vanguard, the Cuban revolution, have thus made a decisive contribution to international revolutionary experience and to Marxism–Leninism. Under certain conditions, the political and the Leninism. Under certain conditions, the political and the military are not separate, but form one organic whole, consisting of the people's army,

whose nucleus is the guerrilla army. The vanguard party can exist in the form of the guerrills foco itself. The guerrilla force is the party in embryo. This is the staggering novelty introduced by the Cuban Revolution".

For insurgents who see the Cuban experience as analogous to their situation and believe the Vietnamese and Chinese models are inapplicable because of unfavourable circumstances – poor chances of substantial external support and small country – there is another way, the way of Fidel, wherein the key ingredients are violence in the form of small to moderately sized guerrilla attacks, limited organization, popular support, and – perhaps most important a weak government. Indeed, it is questionable whether Castro could have achieved his aims if the Batista government had not been in a state of profound decay. As a matter of fact, in any of the types of insurgency that threaten either the political community or regime, a reasonably strong government could be expected to take resolute steps to eradicate the insurgents. On he other hand, where conservative or reformist insurgents are operating, the Cuban approach might prove effective even in the face of a strong government,, for the latter might decide to reduce its losses by initiating policy changes that do not threaten the integrity of either the political community or the regime.

Urban Strategy

A fourth strategy, which many insurgents in the 1960s and 1970s have found attractive, is the urban terrorist model (sometimes referred to as the urban guerrilla model). As in the case of the Maoist and Cuban schemes, emphasis is placed on popular support and erosion of the enemy's will to resist, rather than on defeating the enemy in classical military engagements.

Unlike the Maoist and Cuban examples, the locus of conflict during initial phases is in the cities rather than in the countryside, because of the assumption that the increased size and socio-economic differentiation of urban centres make them especially vulnerable to terrorism and sabotage. Closely related to this is the notion that the concentration of people in the cities renders government assets, such as aircraft, artillery, mortars, and the like, unusable.

The essential strategy of the urban terrorist, according to the late Carlos Marighella, one of its foremost proponents, is to "turn political crisis into armed conflict by performing violent actions that will force those in power to transform the political situation of the country into a military situation". That will alienate the masses who, from then on, "will revolt against the army and the police and thus blame them for this state or things". To effectuate this transformation, urban terrorists stress organisation, propaganda, and terrorism as technique. Organisationally, they rely on small cells, with a linkman in each. Although this has the advantage of limiting exposure and police penetration, it severely undercuts the insurgent ability to mobilise significant sectors of the population. The aim of terrorism is to create havoc and insecurity, which will eventually produce a loss of confidence in the government.

For such a strategy to be successful, however, it would seem the regime would already have to be on the brink of collapse. It not surprising, the therefore, that Marighella himself acknowledged the function of urban terrorists was to tie down government forces in the cities so as to permit the emergence and survival of rural guerrilla warfare, "which is destined to play the decisive role in the revolutionary war". Accordingly, the major question is how effective urban terrorism is in undermining the

government and in gaining popular support, not whether urban terrorism alone can be successful. And this, in turn, brings us back not only to the Maoist and Cuban examples, but to the criteria for successful insurgency discussed earlier.

The perceived need to transfer the conflict to the rural areas stems from the belief that widespread popular support will be required to defeat an adversary that controls the state apparatus and that is unlikely to remain passive in the face of a challenge to the political community or the regime. Although such reasoning certainly makes a good deal of sense, it overlooks the possibility that urban terrorism might serve the aims of reformist and conservative insurgents quite well. Again, the point to be made is that its is easier for the authorities to make the concessions when demands focus on maintenance of the regime or on alteration of policy outputs, rather than displacement of the regime and authorities.

Political Dominance

1.   In LIC ops, political objs drive mil decisions at every lvl from the strategic to the tactical. All comds and SOs must understand these political objs and the impact of mil ops on them. They must adopt courses of action which legally sp those objs even if the courses of action appear to be unorthodox or outside what traditional doctrine had contemplated.

Unity of Effort

2.   Mil ldrs must integrate their efforts with other govtal agencies to gain a mutual advantage in LIC. Mil planners must consider how their actions contribute to initiatives which are also political, economic, and psychological in nature. Unity of effort calls for interagency integration and coord to permit eff action within the framework of our govtal system. Comds may answer

to civ chiefs or may themselves emp the resources of civ agencies.

Adaptability

3.   Adaptability is the skill and willingness to change or modify structures or methods to accommodate different sits.   It req careful msn analysis, comprehensive int, and regional expertise. Adaptability is more than just tailoring or flexibility, both of which imply the use of the same techniques or structures in many different sits.   Successful mil ops in LIC will require the armed forces to use adaptability not only to modify existing methods and structures, but to dev new ones appropriate to each sit.

Legitimacy

4.   Legitimacy is the willing acceptance of the rt of a govt to govern or of a gp or agency to make and enforce decisions. Legitimacy is not tangible, nor easily quantifiable. Popular votes do not always confer or reflect legitimacy. Legitimacy derives from the perception that authority is genuine and eff and uses proper agencies for reasonable purposes. No gp or force can create legitimacy for itself, but it can encourage and sustain legitimacy by its actions. Legitimacy is the central concern of all parties dir involved in a conflict. It is also imp to other parties who may be involved even indir.

Perseverance

5.   LICs rarely have a clear beginning or end marked by decisive actions culminating in victory. They are, by nature, protracted struggles. Even those short, sharp contingency enctrs which do occur are better assessed in the context of their contribution to long-term objs. Perseverance is the patient, resolute, persistent pursuit of national goals and objs for as long as necessary to achieve them. Perseverance does not preclude

taking decisive action. However, it does require careful informed analysis to sel the rt time and place for that action. While it is imp to succeed, it is equally imp to recognize that in the LIC environment success will gen not come easily or quickly. Developing an attitude of disciplined, focused perseverance will help comds reject short-term successes in favour of actions which are designed to accomplish long-term goals.

Op Cats

1.   Mil ops in LIC gen fall into four broad cats. The cats are:-

a. Sp for insurgency and ctr insurgency.

b. Combating terrorism.

c. Peacekeeping ops.

d. Peacetime contingency ops.

2.   LIC ops may involve two or more of these cats. Understanding the similarities and differences between these helps the mil planner estb pris in actual sits.

Sp for Insurgency and Ctr Insurgency

3.   An army will almost always side with the govt in a ctr insurgency role.   At times, however, a   country's security interests (and therefore, of it's mil) may lie in supporting an insurgency, either in close proximity of one's borders or even far off i.e. once operating as part of a UN Peace Keeping Force.. Both insurgencies and ctr insurgencies are concerned with mobilizing the sp of the people. How the army distributes it's efforts between building sp for themselves and undermining the sp and legitimacy of their opponents is perhaps one of the central focus of any such involvement..

Combatting Terrorism

4.   The aim of combatting terrorism is to protect instls, units and indls from the threat of terrorism.   Combatting terrorism

comms both anti terrorism and ctr terrorism actions, throughout the entire spectrum of conflict. The combatting terrorism program is designed to provide coord action before. during, and after terrorist incidents.

Peacekeeping Ops

5.   Peacekeeping ops are mil ops which maint diplomatic efforts. A peacekeeping force supervises and implements a negotiated truce to which belligerent parties have agreed. The force ops strictly within the parameters of its terms of ref, doing neither more nor less than its mandate prescribes. A distinguishing feature of these ops is that the peacekeeping force is normally forbidden to use violence to accomplish its msn. In most cases, it can use force only for self def.

IACP

6.   Peacetime ctgy ops incls such diverse actions as disaster relief, certain types of ctrr-drug ops, and land, sea and air strikes. The unifying feature of these actions is the rapid mob of effort to focus on a specific problem, usually in a crisis and guided, at the national lvl, by a crisis action system . Frequently, these ops take place away from customary facilities, requiring deep pen and temporary estb of long lines of comm in a hostile environment. IACP may req the ex of restraint and the sel use of force or conc violent actions.

TGTS

1.   **Comm/Media**. Attks on comm systems (if not narrowly targeted, such as specific switching points or towers) and the media are ctrproductive; they are necessary for smooth functioning of org and comm of the messages and actions of terrorists. Reliable relationships with the media, are a force multiplier when used correctly and to advantage. Understanding

of the media process/techniques (media'hot' and 'cold') and media markets are essential.

2.   **Power Infrastructure**.   Generating plants and delivery systems for the power grid are not exceedingly robust, and trigger their own scale-back or shut-down once outside of stringent tolerances.   Denial of attks on such vital svs are indirect, but have the virtue of being simple to effect.

3.   **Water**.   Given the scares of drugs in the water sup the processing plants in the adv countries are relatively secure; yet nature has found the weakness with extremely resistant microbial organisms which are not difficult to obtain/culture, and once introduced into the system, have considerable direct and collateral effect. In our environment, the almost negligble security arrangements for water reservoirs adds to the threat.

4.   **Fuel**. Numerous, reasonably accessible targets are available--tankers, pipelines, storage, petrol pumps, propane storage, tanker trucks, etc. Not difficult to ignite, such sources provide considerable fire and explosive hazard; planned effort to attk numerous sites could have frightening effect.

5.   **Banks/Markets/Exchanges**.   An essential part of the currency cycle, these are harder targets from security and surveillance standpoints. Also potentially susceptible to info W attks, whereby malfuntioning of computer systems etc can cause panic amongst the eff lot.

7.   **Air Travel**.   Circumvention of air/airport security continues on a regular basis; only the non-functioning airport can be considered secure! X-ray/metal detectors rely on personnel, and can be fooled by devices with little or no metal; bomb

detection devices look for chemical trails which only changes the selection of the weapon, from nitrogen-based explosives to chemical Wpns for instance; cargo containers to withstand explosions can be obviated by binary packages, combining therinite to bum through the container with a device to explode after a delay. Security procedures securing airports have little effect; too much traffic, ease of obtaining false ID cards, etc. make airport security procedures an exercise in wishful thinking.

8. **<u>Rail</u>**. Highly attractive targets, rail travel is poorly controlled, easily accessible across the railsystem, and unable to be eff monitored..

9. **<u>Gr Tgts</u>**. Free access with minimal effective control makes the delivery of car and trucks bombs relatively simple; large blds and bridges are particularly vulnerable. Bus terminals and crouded markets are similar targets for explosive devices or Wpns of mass destruction.

10. **<u>Schools/Religious Institutions/Adm Facilities</u>**. Ease of Pub access and the trust of those using the facilities makes them targets for disguised bombs, booby traps, and Wpns of mass destruction--toys with explosives on a playground, or an attk on a mosque etc.

11. **<u>Emergency Management Systems (Police, Fire, Ambulance)</u>**. These gps are particularly susceptible to attk, and provide high-profile media coverage; antipersonnel booby-traps or firestorm mechanisms could overwhelm these personnel.

12. **<u>Business (Food, Medical, Misc.)</u>**. The dependence on such large no of suppliers makes the products liable to tampering with say explosive devices, or Wpns of mass destruction (boilogical and chemical agents). Shopping malls

have near perfect target profiles for such Wpns or explosive packages.

13.   **Pub Events**.   Concerts, conventions, sporting events, etc. are venues with existing media coverage, large crowds, and easy access for explosive devices, Wpns of mass destruction, or other attks. The famous Palestinian highjacking of athletes during Munich Olympics being a case in pt.