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AN INTRODUCTION TO STRATEGY

*With particular Reference
To Problems of
Defense, Politics, Economics,
and Diplomacy in
the Nuclear Age*

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PREFACE

By Captain B. H. Liddell Hart

No one in modern times has come to write a book on strategy with a wider practical experience than General Beaufre. No general of his high grade has written such a full and masterly theoretical study of the subject.

When I first met him, in 1935, he was the youngest officer serving on the General Staff, but even then he impressed me so much by his penetrating mind that I made a note of him as one of the four most promising officers I came across during that visit to France—and out of those four the three who survived the war all rose to the top level of the French Army. By the last year of the war, Andre Beaufre became Chief of Operations on the staff of the First Army.

When I met him again in 1950 he was Deputy Chief of Staff, Land Forces, Western Europe, and then went to the Far East as Deputy to the Commander-in-Chief, Marshal de Lattre de Tassigny. On returning to Europe he was appointed to be head of the Interallied Tactical Studies Group, where he did much to formulate new concepts for meeting the possibility of a Russian invasion of Western Germany, as I found in the course of visits to him at his headquarters in Bad Neuenahr. After that he became commander of the mechanized 2nd Infantry Division, with which he successfully developed the new pentagonal organization—of subdivision ‘in fives’—which I had long been advocating, and which the French Army was the first to adopt for trial. In 1955 he was sent to Algeria to command an operational zone, and the following year he was chosen to command the French corps employed in the Suez expedition, after which he was appointed Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the French Forces in Germany. In 1958 he became Deputy Chief of Staff, Logistics and Administration, at SHAPE, and two years later the French representative on the NATO Standing Group in Washington.

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This extraordinary variety of experience provided an unrivalled background and opportunity for a deep-thinking soldier to study the planning and the application of strategy in actual situations and operations. So it is of the greatest potential value that since his recent and regrettable retirement, and while at the peak of his mental energy, he should have turned it into the production of a book on this far-ranging subject.

He calls his book *An Introduction to Strategy*, but that is much too modest a title, as becomes evident to any knowledgeable reader and student of the subject. His book is, in fact, the most comprehensive and carefully formulated treatise on strategy, brought up to date, that has appeared in this generation—and in many respects surpasses any previous treatise. It is likely to become a classic, as a textbook on this branch of knowledge. While there are some points where I differ from his interpretation or formulation, there are far more points on which I emphatically agree with him—and I greatly welcome the advent of such an outstanding contribution to thought about the fundamentals of war.

March 1963

INTRODUCTION

Anyone who produces a book on strategy in this day and age (1963) may seem bold to the point of foolhardiness. No one today believes in strategic genius. Great strategists have been swept away by the cataclysm of two wars and the pressure of day-to-day events; they have gone the way of the old coloured prints with their naive simplicity and staring colours, pictures of an ancient civilization in process of disintegration.

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Ours is an age of pragmatism, industrialization and popular movements in which problems of peace and war seem to depend on ever more complex *techniques*; on the one hand are those associated with the scientific technology now calling the tune in the nuclear arms race started by the United States; on the other those more mysterious techniques springing from the psychological technology which was the child of the Soviet revolution. The word strategy may still be used often enough, though frequently in a false or distorted sense, but the science and art of strategy have become museum pieces along with Frederick the Great's snuff-box and Napoleon's hat. Clausewitz alone still has a certain prestige though very few people have actually read him; but the fact that there are still some intellectual worshippers at his shrine is due primarily to the tributes paid him by Lenin.

Nevertheless the world of today is the crucible of great events. As we watch, the slow majestic march of history is unfolding one of the greatest upheavals in human existence since the fall of Rome. Happily for them ordinary folk do not realize what is happening—no doubt a kindly provision by Nature to help us through this long and difficult period. There are signs that some people are beginning to try to understand the phenomenon and, if possible, exert some influence on it, but even they are still panting behind the march of events. After a Rip van Winkle period, economics, proclaimed by Marx as the governing factor, is coming out of limbo and developing into a science (or at any rate a technique) capable of producing more reliable forecasts. The social sciences are developing rapidly and are thirsting to clear the undergrowth from their vast field of activity. In this revolution the importance of defence problems is obvious and, primarily in America, a growing number of analysts are devoting themselves to the question and trying to assemble that fund of learning which must be the basis of progress. But in this slow, painful advance made by the social sciences the guiding principle, a philosophy, and the operational concept, which means strategy, are missing; these are two fields of intellectual activity which, though some attention has been paid to them recently, are still out of fashion and neglected.

For forty years now I have been either in the audience or on the stage

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for the majority of the great happenings of the day and I have become convinced that it is the lack of these two guiding lights which has led to our being checkmated with such regularity. Lacking a way of life, a philosophy, we have had to run before the wind of change and yield in the face of attack by the more dynamic philosophies ranged against us. In themselves they may have had little validity, as has often been obvious; but this has mattered less than the fact that they have appeared on the surface as coherent entities. Similarly, lacking a strategy, we have throughout been unable to understand the manoeuvres by which our opponent has been trying to bring us down and we have constantly directed our own efforts down blind alleys. In March 1936 Hitler demonstrated our incapacity to react and from that year up to 1939 he moved forward in a series of bounds. We let him go until we had had enough and then replied by unleashing a catastrophe which could not but prove fatal to us, all the more surely because our entire military system was based on false premisses, for it was founded on tactics alone—and out-of-date tactics at that! France went down, taking Europe with her. It was the Anglo-Saxons who staged the come-back from 1942 to 1945 because they had a philosophy and a strategy. No sooner had victory arrived, than we were thrown off course once more by the great process of decolonization. Indo-China was lost because, though our tactics may have been excellent, we were defeated by an enemy strategy to which we had no strategic answer worthy of the name. In spite of this experience, in Algeria we merely made the same mistakes on a larger scale. Suez was a tactical victory which led to a fearful political defeat because we had not even an inkling of the strategic prerequisites essential to the success of such an undertaking. I have given here a list of French reverses only but I could paint a similar picture, black or white, for Korea, Cuba, Berlin and NATO: For me the inescapable conclusion is that in most cases ignorance of strategy has been our fatal error.

The reasons for this ignorance are of interest and I shall be drawing attention to them in this book. The important fact is, however, that the victors of 1918 lost interest in strategy because they had been taught, not strategy as such, but a strategy which was held up as the be-all and end-all of the art. This particular strategy proved false. The idol was therefore torn

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down; no one realized that it had failed them simply because they themselves had betrayed it.

The point, as we shall see, is that strategy cannot be a single defined doctrine; it is a *method of thought*, the object of which is to codify events, set them in order of priority and then choose the most effective course of action. There will be a special strategy to fit each situation; any given strategy may be the best possible in certain situations and the worst conceivable in others. That is the basic truth.

As regards choice of method, I naturally do not intend to imply that this will be limited to the military field only. Everyone knows that war today is total; that is an acknowledged fact; in other words it will be carried on in all fields, political, economic, diplomatic and military. Such, with all its varying shades of emphasis, is the pattern of the cold war (which I referred to as 'War in Peacetime' in 1939.) Equally therefore strategy must be total. This requirement raises in an acute form the problem of the relationship between policy and strategy; at the same time it will help us to understand what is the true field of activity of each. A further result is that strategy can no longer & the preserve of the military. Personally I welcome this, for only when strategy has ceased to be an esoteric, specialized activity can it fall into line with the other thought processes and become what it should always have been—a fund of learning growing continuously with each generation, not a continuous haphazard process of rethinking coloured by the events of the moment.

Our age is too difficult and man has attained too great a mastery over nature for us to go on working by the light of nature as we have already done for too long. War, once the sport of kings, has today become an undertaking too pregnant with mortal danger. Our civilization requires a science of taking action or to use the word coined by Raymond Aron, a 'praxeology'. In such a science, strategy could and should play a key role; it should be strategy which ensures that decisions taken to further a certain policy are conscious, fully thought-out decisions. That is the object which any examination of strategy should seek to attain and it is the object I have set myself.

The reader may be surprised that, unlike most works of this type, my

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book makes little use of history. References to past events are frequently no more than a single word—the name of a general or of a war. My primary reason is that I have tried to reduce the problem to its essentials which are in fact *ideas*; moreover, though I do not go so far as Paul Valery, I believe that history can be used to substantiate almost any conclusion. Similarly, although I have laid great emphasis on the importance of the psychological factor, I have passed somewhat lightly over the emotional aspect of war which, since Clausewitz and Foch, has become almost a classic subject of study. I have tried to get at the algebra which underlies the manifestation of violence

1 ‘La Paix-Guerre ou la Strategie d’Hitler’, Revue des Deux-Mondes, 15th August 1939.

known as war; the irrational element, which admittedly plays a considerable part, must itself be considered rationally.

The subject is vastly complex, so complex that I shall probably not be able to present as clearly as I should wish those ideas which seem to me the essential basis for logical action. This book should be regarded only as a preliminary clearing of the ground. I have undertaken to write it in the hope that, rash though it may be, it will be the forerunner of other works designed to resuscitate and rejuvenate the undying art of strategy so badly needed in the present age.

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CHAPTER 1

A GENERAL SURVEY OF STRATEGY

Justas Moliere's M. Jourdain used good prose without realizing it, there are many today who practise strategy without realizing it. Where they differ from M. Jourdain, however, is that it is more difficult to produce good strategy than write good prose; this is all the more true in that, though the word strategy may be used often enough, comparatively few people know what it actually means. It is undoubtedly one of those phrases which we use often but understand little.

There are many different reasons for this failure of comprehension. The much-used word long denoted simply the science or art practised by a Commander-in-Chief, something which was obviously the business of only a very small number of people. The secret was passed from one generation to the next by the more or less esoteric process of following the example set by famous commanders—rather like the 'sleight of hand' of the masters in other trades. Developments in warfare were slow and this somewhat empirical procedure seemed to fill the bill, even though war was an infinitely more complex business than, say, architecture.

During periods of evolution, however, the traditional 'sleight of hand' method proved inadequate. The conduct of operations seemed then to present apparently insoluble problems and the resulting bankruptcy of ideas brought the entire upper crust of society, instead of merely some Prince or Marshal, face to face with the strategic problem of the moment. In each case the result was an intellectual effort in the field of strategy. Basically this followed the intellectual current of the period. The Renaissance period, for instance, looked for the secret of contemporary warfare to Vegetius and the ancient historians; the eighteenth century produced by pure reasoning those processes of thought later to be used in so masterly a fashion by Napoleon; the nineteenth century was still blinded by Napoleon's success and thought that he could provide the solution to its problems. The nineteenth century, primarily in the person of Clausewitz, nevertheless produced a great body of partly sociological philosophical theory standing somewhere between Kant and Karl Marx; overromanticized interpretation of

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this theory was one of the main causes of the exaggerated form of the twentieth-century warfare.

The twentieth century has been one of the great change: yet at this vital moment strategy has been in the shadows. The static warfare of 1914-18 was held to be proof of the 'bankruptcy of strategy', whereas in fact it demonstrated only the bankruptcy of one particular strategy. It was primarily in France (but France was very influential at the time) that strategy was held to be an outdated science, a thought process concerned with war but no longer abreast of developments; evolution appeared to give pride of place to material over ideas, to war potential over operational manoeuvre and to industry and science over philosophy. This view wore the cloak of realism; as a result 'strategists' were held to be pretentious and behind the times; all efforts were concentrated upon tactics and equipment. Yet in view of the speed of developments this was precisely the moment when foresight of a particularly high and perspicacious order was required - and only strategy could have produced it. The result was the military defeat of France in 1940 but equally Germany's failure to consummate her victory; both were due to mistaken appreciations of the situation because both had appreciated on too narrow a basis. There followed the collapse of European world hegemony leaving two giants face to face, the United States and the Soviet Union. The clash between the two, all the more terrifying owing to the existence of the nuclear weapon, now overshadows the real problems of peace and war but does not conceal the fact that there exists no concept likely to solve them. We say that it is all the fault of the new atomic weapon but fail to realize that in reality it is the lack of an overall concept which prevent us foreseeing and being masters of the process of evolution. On the Soviet side some attempt was made early on to use Marxism as a starting point and a theory of total war was evolved under Stalin, the basis of which was sociological; it was invalidated by technical developments. On the American side, while paying lip-service to Clausewitz, people launched themselves headlong an attempt to solve a whole gamut of technical problems, all based on tactics. The importance of the subject, however, was such that intellectual circles eventually became interested and, following the modern scientific trend, began to base their

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search for a solution upon system of analysis. It was not long before every American University had its research institute with ample funds at its disposal. Mountains of paper accumulated and an abstract body of thought of almost scholastic complexity was built up. Nevertheless it was this which little by little began to throw up some of the essential ingredients of the overall strategy so much needed at the present stage. This feverish ferment of ideas, however, made hardly an impact on Europe. Some of the material was read casually but in general it was thought to be enough to adopt American terminology and American equipment - because, though no one admitted it, people still believed equipment to be more important than ideas. In spite of Raymond Aron in France and Liddell Hart in England questions of strategy made no impact either on the general public or indeed on the military, who continued to think merely in terms of technical progress and tactics. Nevertheless both the overwhelming importance of the appearance of the nuclear weapon and the depressing results of the campaigns in the Indo-China, Egypt and Algeria produced a somewhat misty realization of the need for a better understanding of the phenomena connected with war. It seems natural therefore to hope that strategy, which was sentenced to death in 1915, will be resurrected and have its heyday again.

ANALYSIS OF STRATEGY*The Meaning of the World*

What does the word strategy mean?

According to the traditional concept of military strategy it should mean the art of employing military forces to achieve the ends set by political policy. This definition was formulated by Liddell Hart in 1929 and it hardly differs from that of Clausewitz. Raymond Aron in his recent book follows it almost word for word.

In my view this definition is too restrictive because it deals with military forces only. I would put it as follows: the art of the applying forces so that it makes the most effective contribution towards achieving the ends set by political policy. This definition, however, is applicable to the whole

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art of the war-awkward because by tradition the art of war is divided into strategy and tactics and a third sub-division has recently appeared-logistics. If strategy is neither tactics nor logistics, what is it ? Tactics is obviously the art of using weapons in battle in such a way that they make the maximum impact. Logistics is the science of supply and movement. Both are concerned with the interplay of materials factors; both are therefore more in the nature of a material science, like engineering for instance.

Lloyd has drawn the contrast between 'the divine spark' and the 'interplay of material factors' and in Napoleon's vocabulary the 'divine spark' was strategy. From this it is but a step (and a step often taken) to equate strategy with the spark of genius. But genius is said to be an infinite capacity for taking pains, so whether the divine spark is there or not, strategy must be based on thought and reasoning. If therefore it is neither a material science nor an aspect of policy, what is it?

In my view the essence of strategy is the abstract interplay which, to use Foch's phrase, springs from the clash between two opposing wills. It is the art which enables a man, no matter what the techniques available with maximum efficiency. It is therefore the art of the dialectic of force or, more precisely, *the art of the dialectic of two opposing wills using force to resolve their dispute.*

This definition will justifiably be characterized as highly abstract and very general in terms. But it is on this plane that strategy must be considered if we are to understand the thought processes involved and the rules which emerge therefrom.

The Aim of Strategy

As soon as one begins to examine the aim of strategy, the importance of the definition given above becomes clear.

It will be agreed that the aim of strategy is to fulfil the objectives laid down by policy, making the best use of the resources available. Now the objective may be offensive in character (e.g. conquest or the imposition of severe terms), it may be defensive (e.g. the protection of certain areas or interests) or it may merely be the maintenance of the political *status quo*. It is therefore obvious straight away that formulae such as that attributed to

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Clausewitz, 'decision as a result of victory in baffle', are not applicable to all types of objective. There is only one general rule applicable to all: disregard the method by which the decision is to be reached and consider only the outcome which it is desired to achieve. The outcome desired is to force the enemy to accept the terms we wish to impose on him. In this dialectic of wills a *decision is achieved when a certain psychological effect* has been produced on the enemy: when he becomes convinced that it is useless to start or alternatively to continue the struggle.

Naturally this outcome may be achieved by military victory but it is by no means the only way. Military victory may be unattainable (e.g. against the rebels in Algeria); other methods may be more effective, as has frequently been proved. If the problem is looked at from the right angle, that of the enemy's psychological reaction, a correct appreciation can be made of what the decisive factors are—and by the same token, we shall have embarked upon a thought process applicable equally to straightforward military victory in the field and to the (so-called) new strategy of nuclear deterrence.

In his analysis of Clausewitz, Lenin produced a much-quoted dictum which shows clearly that the decisive factor is the psychological; he said: 'the soundest strategy in war is to postpone operations until the moral disintegration of the enemy renders a mortal blow both possible and easy'. He was, however, thinking as a revolutionary and regarded political action as a sort of psychological artillery preparation—the exact opposite of Clausewitz's classical military concept in which the morale of the enemy was to be broken by military victory. A general rule can therefore, in my view, be formulated as follows: the *decision is obtained by creating and then exploiting a situation resulting in sufficient moral disintegration of the enemy to cause him to accept the conditions it is desired to impose on him*. That is the guiding principle in the dialectic of opposing wills.

Means Available to Strategy

The correct process of reasoning becomes even clearer when we come to consider the means to be employed by strategy.

To reach the decision required, strategy will have available a whole

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gamut of means, both material and moral, ranging from nuclear bombardment to propaganda or a trade agreement. The art of strategy consists in choosing the most suitable means from those available and so orchestrating their results that they combine to produce a psychological pressure sufficient to achieve the moral effect required.

To choose the most suitable means the enemy's vulnerable points must be set against our own capabilities. To do this it is necessary to analyse the decisive moral effect required. Whom do we wish to convince? Ultimately it must be the enemy Government but in some cases it may be easier to work on leading personalities (e.g. Chamberlain at Bad Godesberg or Munich), choosing the arguments to which they are most susceptible. Alternatively it may be best to work directly on a certain section of public opinion which has some hold over the Government or on an influential Allied Government or through UNO. If the issue at stake is minor, pressures of this nature may be enough. If the stake is more important action involving the use of force may be necessary; but here again the choice of means must take full account of the enemy's vulnerable points and of our own capabilities; for instance a military victory of the traditional kind may be either unattainable or involve too great a risk. If this is so, there are numerous alternatives available: a revolutionary uprising with the object of bringing about international action (e.g. the Sudeten Germans prior to Munich): a revolutionary uprising with the object of bringing down the Government (e.g. Prague in 1948): economic pressure (e.g. economic sanctions against Italy in 1935): a prolonged guerrilla campaign combined with international pressure (e.g. the Viet Minh or the Algerian rebels). Which of all the possible alternatives are those best calculated to exert a decisive influence on the thinking of the enemy leaders? If finally military action has to be undertaken, what is its objective to be? 'Destruction of the enemy armed forces' according to Clausewitz' doctrine? Will this be possible? If not, would some local success (e.g. the Crimea in 1854) be enough? If so, where? What parts of his armed forces are vital to the enemy (e.g. the navy and air force in England, the army in France)? What geographical area is vital to him? Will it be essential to capture his capital or will that be valueless? Will it be enough to threaten to destroy it? And so

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on and so on. This type of analysis must continue until we have isolated those means which we have the capacity to use and which at the same time are adequate to produce the decision we require.

The Strategic Plan

The strategic plan can now be worked out. We are dealing with a problem of dialectics; for every action proposed, therefore, the possible enemy reactions must be calculated and provision made to guard against them. His reaction may be international or national, psychological, political, economic or military. Each successive action planned, together with the counter to the corresponding enemy reaction, must be built up into a coherent whole, the object being to retain the ability to pursue the plan in spite of the resistance of the enemy. If the plan is a good one, there should be no risk of set-backs. The result will be a 'risk-proof' strategy, the object of which will be to preserve our own liberty of action. Naturally strategy must have a clear picture of the whole chain of events leading up to the final decision—which, be it noted in passing, was not the case with us in France either in 1870 or in 1939 or in Indo-China or in Algeria. It must also be remembered that the dialectic struggle between two opponents will be further complicated by the fact that it will be played out on an international stage. Pressure by allies or even neutrals may prove decisive (as at Suez). Germany has lost two wars as a result of failure to grasp this point; she brought England in against her by the invasion of Belgium and the United States by the U-boat war. A correct appreciation of the influence of the international situation upon our own liberty of action is therefore a vital element of strategy; this is all the more important now that the advent of the nuclear weapon has so strikingly emphasized the interdependence of all nations.

Patterns of Strategy

Strategic plans can in general be classified into a number of differing patterns depending on the relative resources available to the opposing

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sides and the importance of the issue at stake. The following are the most typical:

(1) If the objective is only of moderate importance and the resources available are large (or if the action proposed is likely to bring into operation powerful allied resources), the mere threat of the use of these resources may lead the enemy to accept the conditions it is desired to impose on him; it will be even easier to force him to abandon some effort to modify the established *status quo*. This pattern of strategy, *the direct threat*, is much in vogue at the moment as a result of the advent of the nuclear weapon; it is the basis of the imposing structure of deterrent strategy.

(2) If the objective is still of only moderate importance but the resources available are inadequate to exert a decisive threat, an attempt to attain the objective desired must be made by more insidious methods; these may be political, diplomatic or economic. This pattern of strategy, *indirect pressure*, has been frequently used both by Hitler and the Soviet Union, not so much because they lacked the resources necessary for coercion but primarily because of the deterrent effect of the direct threat from their opponents' forces. This pattern of strategy is most suitable in cases where freedom of action is limited.

(3) If freedom of action is restricted and the resources available limited but the objective of major importance, an attempt will be made to attain the objective by a series of successive actions in which the direct threat and indirect pressure will be combined with a limited application of force. This pattern of strategy, a *series of successive actions*, was employed by Hitler from 1935 to 1939; he only succeeded, however, so long as his objective was apparently of minor importance. As soon as the 'nibbling process' appeared likely to affect vital objectives, he found himself inevitably launched into major conflict. Her insular position has in general led Great Britain to adopt this strategy of the indirect approach; it has been very clearly restated by Liddell Hart. It is particularly suited to those nations which are in a strong defensive position (or well protected by nature) and which desire to achieve important results without committing more than minor offensive resources and are content to proceed slowly. This method of the indirect approach by successive stages was frequently a feature of

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the eighteenth-century wars in Europe owing to the fact that resources employed were relatively small.

(4) If freedom of action is large but the resources available inadequate to secure a military decision, recourse may be had to a strategy of protracted conflict; the object here is to wear down the enemy's morale and tire him out. To ensure that the struggle can be maintained over a long period, the resources employed will be extremely primitive but the technique by which they are applied (usually total war employing primarily widespread guerrilla tactics) will force the enemy to deploy an effort so great that he cannot maintain it indefinitely. This pattern of strategy, *a protracted struggle, hut at a low level of military intensity*, has in general been employed with success in the wars of colonial liberation. Its chief theorist is Mao Tse-tung. It is worth noting that this strategy demands considerable moral endurance on the part of those initiating it and that its prerequisites are a strong emotional element in the struggle and a highly developed sentiment of national solidarity. It is therefore most suitable for wars of liberation. But it can only succeed if the issue at stake is of far greater importance to one side than to the other (as in the wars of colonial liberation) or if it receives assistance from regular armed forces to which it acts as an auxiliary (e.g. the wars of liberation in Europe in 1944-5 and Spain in 1813—14).

(5) If the military resources available are of sufficient strength, a decision will be sought through military victory; the clash will be violent but an attempt will be made to keep it short. The destruction of the enemy armed forces in battle may be enough, particularly if the issue at stake is not completely vital to the enemy. If not, the whole or part of his territory will have to be occupied in order to bring the fact of defeat home to public opinion and cause it to accept the conditions imposed. Naturally the loser is all the more likely to admit defeat if the victor has a fifth column on his side, as was the case with the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic victories. A fifth column can of course also play an important role in assisting military operations. This pattern of strategy, *violent conflict aiming at military victory*, is the classic strategy of the Napoleonic era. Its principal theorist is Clausewitz, though the well-nigh Wagnerian romanticism of many of his disciples has frequently distorted his theories.

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This was the dominant European strategy of the nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth centuries. Wrongly it was held to be the only orthodox strategy and therefore gave birth to the two great World Wars of 1914—18 and 1939—45, both of which showed up the limitations of the Clausewitz-Napoleon strategy. The surgical operation which is military victory can only be successful in obtaining a decision if the military capabilities of the time make it possible for that military victory to be both rapid and complete. This situation (as we shall see later when dealing with operational strategy) obtains only for limited periods in the tactical and operational evolutionary process. Apart from these exceptional periods the Clausewitz strategy can result only in the opponents being ranged opposite one another in a gigantic military struggle leading to stalemate (e.g. the position warfare from the end of 1914; Germany 1940 failing, in spite of victory on the Continent, to cross the Channel and getting bogged down in a hopeless campaign in Russia). In this event a decision is reached only after a prolonged period of mutual attrition out of all proportion to the issue at stake, at the conclusion of which both victor and vanquished emerge from the conflict completely exhausted. It is of interest to note that this sequence of events had already been seen in the case of Napoleon, who failed in face of both England and Russia. Clausewitz and his disciples, however, were so blinded by the Emperor's victories that they failed to recognize the limitations of his strategy. It was in all probability this error of reasoning which cost Europe its world hegemony.

Conclusions

The five patterns of strategy described above should be considered more as examples than as an exhaustive categorization.

They are of interest mainly as showing the variety of possible courses of action from which strategy has to choose; they should therefore help towards a better understanding of the *nature and originality of the process of strategic thinking*. The thought processes applicable to tactics or logistics are almost entirely methodistic, their object being the rational employment of the military resources available in order to produce a given

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result; the political thought process must be capable of appreciating what public opinion wants or can be made to accept; both psychology and intuition will therefore play a considerable part. Strategic thinking, however, is a mental process, at once abstract and rational, which must be capable of synthesizing both psychological and material data. The strategist must have a great capacity both for analysis and for synthesis; analysis is necessary to assemble the data on which he makes his diagnosis, synthesis in order to produce from these data the diagnosis itself—and the diagnosis in fact amounts to a choice between alternative courses of action.

Our five examples also serve to show how wrong the numerous strategists have been who prescribe only one form of strategy. Each of the patterns referred to above has its protagonist and has been built up into a theory propounded as the sole, or at any rate the best, solution; in fact each of them may be the best solution, but only in certain defined circumstances. Without adequate analysis of the factors governing strategy, the choice of a course of action has all too often been made out of habit or following the fashion of the moment. As a result governments have not been in control of events and clashes of purpose have led to fearful international catastrophes. The world of today is passing through an unparalleled crisis of readjustment and at the same time science, industrialization and psychological action are making an increasing impact on the military art. More than ever before, therefore, is it vital that we should develop a method of thinking which will enable us to control, rather than be at the mercy of, events. That is why strategy is of such importance and such a problem of the moment.

SUB-DIVISIONS OF STRATEGY

Strategy may be a single entity in so far as object and method are concerned but when it comes to applying it, it must necessarily be subdivided into specialized categories of strategy each applicable only to a certain field of conflict. The fact is that strategy must to a large extent be governed by material factors and the material factors characteristic of each field of activity differ, producing therefore a different chain of consequences applicable only to that field; for instance, naval strategy has

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always been distinct from land strategy.

We are therefore faced with a veritable pyramid of differing, though interdependent, forms of strategy; these must be clearly defined if they are to be welded into the best series of co-ordinated actions, all aimed at the same overall object.

At the top of the pyramid and *under* the direct control of the Government—i.e. of the political authority—is *total strategy*, whose task is to define how total war should be conducted.' Its task is to lay down the object for each specialized category of strategy and the manner in which all—political, economic, diplomatic and military—should be woven in together.

This level of strategy is clearly the prerogative of Heads of Government assisted by a Chief of the Defence Staff and some high-level Defence Committee or committees. The five patterns-

1 The term total strategy as applied to 'total war' seems to me clearer than 'grand strategy' as sometimes used by the British (particularly Liddell Hart) or 'national strategy' as used by the Americans. The term 'national defence' means nothing and achieves nothing except confusion of thought.

-of strategy discussed above were all at the 'total strategy' level; it was there shown that the relative importance of the different fields (political, economic, diplomatic or military) may vary considerably according to the circumstances. The military aspect was in fact only in the lead in one of the patterns discussed (No. 5).

Below the level of total strategy there must in each field (military, political, economic or diplomatic) be an *overall strategy*, the function of which is to allot tasks and co-ordinate the various forms of activity within the field concerned. It should be noted here that in the military field the notion of overall strategy already exists; its object is to co-ordinate action on land, in the air and on the sea. There is however no such thing as overall strategy in the political field (e.g. co-ordination of general political policy, internal policy, external policy and propaganda) nor in the economic field (e.g. co-ordination of production, financial policy and overseas trade)

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nor in the diplomatic field, Yet in these fields of activity strategy is employed almost daily—without anyone realizing it. Because people do not realize this, actions are not based on any concept worked out through any orderly process of reasoning and many opportunities are therefore missed. In fact for every field of activity there should be an overall strategy implemented by the Minister concerned assisted by his Chief of Staff or Permanent Secretary.

Within each main field each branch of activity will have its own distinct category of strategy. This is the level at which concept and implementation meet, when the optimum must be adjusted to the possible in the light of technical limitations. In the military field this vital process of articulation has been termed by the Germans *operational strategy* (operativ). Whether it is realized or not, each branch of activity does in fact have an operational strategy. Its purpose is not only to harmonize the objectives laid down by overall strategy with the capabilities of the tactics and techniques in use in the branch concerned, but also to ensure that those tactics and techniques are developed in the directions which will best fit them to meet future strategic requirements. Operational strategy therefore has a vital part to play; it is one about which there have often been misconceptions. Take for instance the classic strategy of land warfare, it is at this level that tactical and logistic factors must be taken into account (e.g. the size of force in relation to the area of operations, strategic and tactical mobility, offensive and defensive capacity). It is the impact of these factors which will dictate the form the war will take (static warfare or war of movement, a rapid military decision or a battle of attrition, etc.); it is therefore these factors which determine what the strategic possibilities are. Because neither the importance nor the mechanics of this aspect of strategy were understood, we were taken by surprise by the static warfare of 1914 and by our defeat in 1940; it should have been possible to foresee and so to avoid both. There is, moreover, a peace-time strategy at the operational level; it is primarily concerned with the production of new equipment to outdate that of an opponent. With the advent of the nuclear weapon this form of strategy has become of almost vital importance; it has been termed 'logistic' strategy. Until it is accepted as a true strategy

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(rather than a conglomeration of budgetary and financial programmes) and until it has been accorded its rightful place in the strategic pyramid, it will not be conducted efficiently and we shall therefore not pay the lowest price for the maintenance of our deterrent.

The foregoing analysis of the different categories of strategy clearly does not simplify the problem; rather it illustrates the complexity of the subject. It must be admitted, however, that, although strategy is necessarily an abstract art, it leads to practical conclusions and that these conclusions, as they are unearthed, make it easier to understand the interplay between the various factors. Unless we do understand, we shall be incapable either of making war or keeping the peace.

THE PRINCIPLE OF STRATEGY

Are there rules of strategy which can be used as guide-lines for thought when choosing a course of action? Classic military strategy formulated such rules; they were even thought to be laws of general application and lasting validity; strategy was consequently considered to be an unchanging art in contradistinction to the continual changes *in* tactics resulting from the evolution of equipment. Today there are good reasons for doubting whether strategy is unchanging. Nevertheless if rules could be evolved they would form a fixed point around which strategic thinking could revolve and only the method of application of the rules would be subject to the evolutionary process.

It is very difficult to deal with this important subject concisely. I propose however to try to run over quickly the main ideas on this question but the reader will soon see that the conclusions which can be drawn are somewhat meager.

Theory

The rules put forward by the best-known writers on strategy differ considerably. The resume of them which follows is so short that I may in some instances have distorted them; at least, however, it shows that they fall into three classes. According to *Clausewitz* there are three primary

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rules: concentration of effort, action in strength against the main enemy forces and decision in baffle in the main theatre of operations, the tactics being defensive-offensive if possible. These rules relate both to overall strategy and operational strategy—military in each case. They are applicable principally to my Pattern No. 5 above. As against this Liddell Hart puts forward six positive and two negative rules, the substance of which can be reduced to the following four: force the enemy to disperse by an indirect approach, achieve surprise by selecting unforeseen courses of action, action in strength against the enemy's weak points, achievement of a decision by action in secondary theatres if necessary. These rules relate to the same levels of strategy as those of Clausewitz but in general they are applicable to Pattern No. 3 above. *Mao The-rung* laid down six rules: concentric withdrawal in face of an enemy advance; advance if the enemy withdraws; strategically one to five suffices; tactically five to one is needed; live off the enemy; close cohesion between the army and the civil population. These still relate to overall and operational military strategy but in this case are relevant to Pattern No. 4. Lenin and Stalin laid down three main rules in total war the country and the army must be closely knit together psychologically; the rear areas are of vital importance; psychological action must pave the way for military action. These relate to total strategy, a level which means that they are applicable to a number of patterns of strategy. Modern American Strategic Thinking has at the moment evolved two rules : those of the graduated deterrent and the flexible response. This again is total strategy but the emphasis on deterrence and limitation of armed conflict makes them primarily applicable to Pattern No. 1. Going further back, Mahan evolved his well-known rule of the overriding importance of the high seas. Mackinder on the other hand gave pride of place to the continental theaters. During the thirties Douhet forecast that air power would be decisive. Lastly the French school of traditional strategic thought represented by Foch summarized strategy in two highly abstract rules: economy of force and freedom of action. These are so abstract that they may be applied to all patterns of strategy.

*The Main Concept***RESTRICTED**

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It will be seen that these rules are more in the nature of general guide-lines for particular situations than laws of universal applicability; this explain their diversity. The only real strategic rules are those of Foch they are in such general terms that at first sight it is difficult to draw concrete conclusion from them. As we shall see, however, they are no bad framework for an analysis of strategic problems.

But first we must be clear as to exactly what they mean. As a start it is worth reverting to our definition of strategy: 'the art of the dialectic of two opposing wills using force to resolve their dispute'. In this battle of wills two broadly similar system will confront each other ; each will try to reach the other vitals by a preparatory process, the object of which will be to strike terror, to paralyse and to surprise- all these objects are psychological, be it noted in passing. In any strategy, therefore, there are two distinct but equally vital components: 1. Selection of the decisive point to be attacked (this depends on the enemy's vulnerable points). 2. Selection of the preparatory manoeuvre which will enable this decisive point to be reached. Since each of the opposing sides will be doing the same thing, there will be a clash between the two preparatory maneuvers. Victory will go to the side which succeeds in blocking his enemy's manoeuvre and carrying his own through to its objective. This is what Foch in classic strategic terms called 'preservation of freedom of action'. The battle of wills therefore comes down to a struggle for freedom of action, each side trying to preserve freedom of action for itself and deny it to the enemy.

If we are much stronger than the enemy, preservation of freedom of action will be easy; we merely have to use sufficient force to paralyse the enemy's manoeuvre, while keeping in reserve adequate resources to strike the decisive blow. But this is an extreme case and will occur only very seldom. As a rule it will be necessary to divide our resources intelligently between protecting ourselves against the enemy's preparatory maneuver, carrying out our own preparatory manoeuvre and the decisive blow. This optimum allocation of resources is known in classical strategic terms as *economy of force*.

This analysis in abstract terms of the anatomy of conflict can therefore be

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reduced to the following formula for the object to be achieved: 'to reach the decisive point thanks to the freedom of action gained by sound economy of force'. To be useful this somewhat elliptical expression must be broken down and we must discover by what methods economy of force and freedom of action can be achieved.

This opens up a field of inquiry which has seldom been approached systematically—the explanation perhaps why these problems have remained shrouded in a kind of mysticism. What we now have to do is to *analyse the various possibilities which are the raw material of a strategic decision*.

Components of a Strategic Decision

It may be accepted that any strategic decision must be taken within the framework set by the three 'main co-ordinates' governing any situation at any given moment—time, space and the size and morale of forces available. There is in addition a more complex factor which I shall call 'maneuver'; it is this which governs the order and inter-relationship of successive situations:

(a) *The Factor of Manoeuvre*. To some extent this governs the other factors; it is the direct product of the dialectic of the conflict, or in other words of the abstract Counterplay between the two opponents. Taking fencing as an analogy, it is clear that there are a number of possible forms of action and reaction: *offensively* there are eight postures—'attack' which may be preceded or followed by 'threat', 'surprise', 'feint', 'deceive', 'thrust', 'wear down', 'follow-up'. *Defensively* there are six postures—'on guard', 'parry', 'riposte', 'disengage', 'retire', 'break— off'. As far as the actual forces are concerned there are five possible types of decision—'concentrate', 'disperse', 'economize', 'increase', 'reduce'.

This gives a total of nineteen components to be arranged and combined in the light of the time and space factors. They constitute the keyboard on which the game of strategy is played.

Table One (pp. 37—39) sets out each of these types of action, defines them, gives the situations to which they are applicable and an indication of the results to be expected. It will be seen that all are aimed ultimately at

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freedom of action, the object being either to gain it, regain it or deprive the enemy of it. It will also be clear that to ensure freedom of action it is essential to retain the *initiative which is a fundamental factor in manoeuvre*.

This analogy with fencing may at first sight appear to have little to do with modern strategy. But not at all Table Two (pp. 40—41) gives a series of examples of the types of action resulting from each of these decisions, those in one column being taken from the military strategy of the 1939—45 war and those in the next from the present-day deterrent strategy. A similar table could be made for total strategy, 'indirect' strategy and even for the strategy of finance, diplomacy and politics. For instance, from this table it emerges that the Ardennes offensive in 1944 is, in deterrent strategy, analogous to the Soviet inter-continental rocket programme and that Allied naval operations in the Mediterranean in 1943—4 are analogous to the development of the tactical atomic weapon. Security, which in classic strategy implies a judicious distribution of forces, *hi deterrent strategy* means the gaining of some technical advantage over the *enemy*. Liberty of action, which in classic strategy springs from the possession of the initiative, in deterrent strategy depends on superiority of potential (=security) together with survival capacity and uncertainty regarding the likelihood of escalation (= threat).

It is of the utmost importance that we should realize that these analogies exist if we are to conduct our strategy with a clear idea both of what the manoeuvre in progress is and what the possible reactions are.

TABLE ONE: FENCING ANALOGY

ACTION	DEFINITION	CONDOTIONS AND COMMENTS	POSSIBLE RESULT
Attack	Attempt to reach enemy vulnerable point	The vulnerable point must be of vital or near-vital importance. Adequate resources must be available.	Decision of } with capture of } object of } the initiative } gaining

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			freedom of action
Surprise	Attack an undefended vulnerable point.	The vulnerable point must be undefended and sufficiently sensitive.	Disorganiza- tion of the enemy's disposition As and break in above his morale. Capture of the Initiative.
Feint	Threaten a vulnerable point chosen so as to ensure that the enemy's parry uncovers the true object of the attack.	The vulnerable point threatened must be ill protected and of great importance to the enemy.	Force the enemy to protected the vulnerable As point above threatened. Capture of the initiative.
Deceive	In the narrow sense: Appear to threatened one vulnerable point and then attack another.	As above but the object of the threat is not to elicit a certain parry but to keep up the atmosphere of uncertainty.	Preparatory With measures to object of capture of gaining the freedom initiative. of action

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	In the broad sense: Appear to be in a posture which is not the real one.	Uncertainly may be so increased as to generate a false sense of security.	As As Above above
Thrust	Reach a vulnerable point in spite of the opposition of the enemy.	Resources must be adequate to enable sufficient force to be used. A method of exploiting the initiative once gained.	Deprives the enemy of his freedom of } As action or above. wears him down.
Wear Down	Force the enemy to expend his energy and resource in defending vulnerable points.	As above but the wearing down process is always reciprocal. Of value only for the side which has greater resources or can wear the enemy down quicker than it is worn down itself.	Object to } deprive the } enemy of his } reserves of } energy and } As } resources } above } and there- } fore of the } possibility of } seizing the } initiative.
ACTION	DEFINITION	CONDITIONS AND COMMENTS	POSSIBLE RESULTS
Follow-up	Return to a position to attack enemy vulnerable points.	To be carried out if the enemy disengages in order to regain the freedom of action he has lost.	Retention of } the } initiative. } As above

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On Guard	Be in a position which enables one to defend vulnerable points in good time.	Depends on an estimate of forces available and timing.	Object is to secure one- self against seizure of As the initiative above. by the enemy.
Disengaged	Change dispositions in order to draw the enemy into attacking defended vulnerable points.	Adequate resource must be available. Disengagement changes the direction of the conflict.	Object is to With re-establish object of security. gaining freedom of action.
Parry	Protected a vulnerable point being attacked.	Protection must be effective and must not entail uncovering other vulnerable points.	Object is to re-establish As security. above.
Rispote	Strike a vulnerable point thus forcing the enemy to abandon his attack.	The vulnerable point must be vital or at least highly important to the enemy.	Object is to regain the As initiative. above.
Retire	Move the vulnerable point being attacked out of range of the enemy.	Must force the enemy to make fresh dispositions. Must not uncover other vulnerable points.	Re-establish- ment of As security. above

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Break-off	General withdrawal involving abandonment of some limited objective.	The objective abandoned must not be vital.	Re-establishment of } As security. } above
Threaten	Take up dispositions which make it possible to attack an enemy vulnerable point.	Adequate resources must be available. The vulnerable point threatened must be of sufficient importance.	Object is to } Reduce the } enemy's } As } freedom of } above } action.

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**TABLE TWO: PARALLELS BETWEEN
 TYPES OF STRATEGY**

ACTION	PARALLEL FROM MILITARY STRATEGY 1939-45	PARALLEL FROM DETERRENT STRATEGY	
		DEFINITION	EXAMPLES
Attack	Overlord 1944. Ardennes 1940.	Achieve some technical break through which outdates the enemy defence system.	US followed by Soviet thermonuclear weapons. Soviet rocket programme for Cuba 1962.
Surprise	German Ardennes offensive 1944. Allied landing in North Africa.	Achieve some technical break through far greater than anticipated.	Soviet rockets, atomic and thermonuclear weapons.
Feint	German attack in Holland 1940.	Lead the enemy on in the technological race in a direction different from that one is oneself in fact following.	Soviet bombers in 2955(?).
Deceive	Allied threat against Straits area before the landing in 1944.	Lead the enemy to believe that one has made some breakthrough or conceal some technical advance actually made.	Outer space (?)
Thrust	Battles in Normandy, St. Lo, El Alamein.	Outstrip the enemy in some field in which he is making a major effort.	Increase in the speed and ceiling of US aircraft in 1955.
Wear Down	Verdun (1916). Stralingrad and the	Force the enemy into vast	The whole technological

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	Russian campaign. Air bombardment of Germany.	expenditure, greater than one's own, in an important field in the arms race.	race.
Follow-up	Germany campaign in France 1940. The seesaw in Libya.	Exploit some technical advance to gain a limited political advantage.	Soviet protection of Egypt and Cuba. The Lebanon operation.
Parry	German operations in Normandy 1944.	Re-establish the effectiveness of some defensive system by readjustment or technical achievement.	DEW Line. Atomic submarines and Polaris. Reinforcement of shield forces.
Riposte	German Ardennes offensive 1944.	Trump some technical advance by the enemy by a similar advance which outdates his.	US response to the Soviet rocket programme in Cuba.
Retire	German withdraw to Lorraine after the battle of Normandy.		
Break-off	French Armistice 1940.	Arms agreement or political withdrawal to avoid a showdown.	Soviet withdrawal from Cuba 1962.
On Guard	Defence of Great Britain 1940.	To be ahead of the enemy.	The technological and intelligence race.

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Disengage	Naval operations in Mediterranean 1942 in order to isolate Rommel in Libya.	Achieve a breakthrough which forces the enemy to change his posture.	Tactical atomic weapons.
Threat	Allied threats of landing in France prior to 1944.	A measure which could lead to the start of escalation.	The force of frappe. Tactical atomic weapons. Survival tactics.

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- (b) *Doctrine of Manoeuvre* When faced with a choice as to how to react, we are equally faced by a number of conflicting doctrines.

The first I shall call the doctrine of 'the rational application of force'; it takes as its starting point the strength of the forces available and chooses the solution which will permit those forces to exert their maximum effect. The object *will* be to concentrate effort on the defeat of the enemy's main forces which itself will automatically entail the defeat of the remainder. The main body of our forces will be concentrated against the enemy's strongest point and the decisive battle will take place in the main theatre of operations. This is the strategy which emerged from Clausewitz' theories at the end of the nineteenth century; it was the basis of the famous French Plan 17 in 1914.

The second doctrine I shall call the doctrine of *guile*. Its basis is the psychological effect of the action proposed. The solution chosen should be that best calculated to throw the enemy off balance, disorientate him and deceive him. It will usually be necessary to disperse our own forces (or effort) in order to induce the enemy to do likewise. The object will be to gain victory by acting in strength against the enemy's weak points, if necessary in secondary, perhaps even remote, theatres of war. This strategy has been brilliantly expounded in our time by Liddell Hart in *The British Way in Warfare and Strategy*; he there puts it forward as an antidote to the Clausewitz strategy and as something typically and traditionally British.

There are other doctrines, now outdated; for instance the '*geometric*' which the Prussians evolved from Frederick II's echelon order of battle, or Jomini's '*geographic*' doctrine based on an interpretation of Napoleon's victories.

In fact none of these doctrines are of universal validity. Leaving out of account the geometric doctrine which really is dead (though some may ask whether the French theories in the thirties had not resurrected it in another guise), each of these doctrines may lead to a course of action which will be the best possible in some circumstances and the worst conceivable in others. The 'application of force' doctrine fits the case where we are stronger than the enemy (though in that case why bother about

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theory?), or the case where the enemy is the stronger but is dangerously dispersed. The 'guile' doctrine is imperative if we are the weaker and will invariably be of value in gaining local superiority, provided of course that we do not succeed in dispersing ourselves more than the enemy. The 'geographic' doctrine is of much importance in military strategy if communications in the theatre of operations are poor (as was the case in Europe in Napoleon's day) and therefore form a well-defined chessboard. (Nowadays the chessboard consists of continents and oceans.)

The choice of the course of action must therefore be based solely upon study of the situation at the time. It will frequently be necessary to follow several of these doctrines one after the other.

(c) '*Modes of Strategy*' When studying a plan of operations it will usually be necessary to decide upon a *general posture*; this will emerge from whichever doctrine is most closely applicable to the relative position of the two sides. This brings us back to the problem of choosing one of the 'patterns' dealt with above (p. 26); in the light of the doctrines we have examined these 'patterns' fall into two 'modes'—direct strategy and indirect strategy.

In the *direct strategy* 'mode' are Patterns Nos. 1, 3 and 5, the basic concept being that military force is the principal weapon and that victory or deterrence will be achieved by its use or maintenance. This is the Clausewitz strategy which in fact was no more than a statement in general terms of the concept on which the 'rational application of force' doctrine is based. It was the strategy on which commanders of the 1914—18 war worked and it was that followed by the German and American leaders in 1939—45. It is the strategy which now governs the potential clash of nuclear forces. Direct strategy may also make use of the 'guile' doctrine particularly if employing the indirect approach.

In the *indirect strategy* 'mode' are Patterns 2, 3 and 4. This is the strategy on which are based all forms of conflict in-

1 The word 'mode' is used here in its musical sense.

-which a decision is sought, not directly by means of a clash between

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military forces but by less direct methods. These may be political or economic in nature (e.g. a revolutionary war) or they may use military force but proceed in a series of bounds interspersed with political negotiations (e.g. Hitler's strategy from 1936 to 1939). This strategy is coming increasingly into fashion now that any possibility of all-out war as postulated by direct strategy seems likely to lead to an unacceptable level of mutual destruction. This theory is both complex and subtle and is still little understood. It is continuously being employed in the cold war and it may be that it is the only feasible strategy now that direct strategy has been paralysed by the threat of the nuclear weapon.

In fact both 'modes' of strategy still exist and are complementary. There are two facets to the dialectic struggle in the world today; in the direct strategy 'mode' is the nuclear dialectic, the result of which is to neutralize the great economic and industrial potentials on each side; at the same time in the indirect strategy 'mode' the political dialectic in progress, with all its multifarious manifestations, seeps through the cracks in the system of deterrence. Strategy, like music, can be played in either a major or a minor key.

(d) *The Variability Factor* But this is not all. There is a further factor of great importance in working out a strategic concept—the variability both of resources available and the circumstances surrounding their employment.

The world is evolving very rapidly, particularly in this day and age. Everything is subject to a continual process of transformation. Germany in 1963 for instance has nothing approaching the same prospects as the Germany of 1938. World opinion is not inspired by the same beliefs and does not react in the same way. The tools which strategy must use are also changing with frightening rapidity; the aeroplane of 1945 was obsolete by 1950, that of 1950 by 1960, etc.

As a result the strategist can place no reliance on precedent and has no permanent unit of measure to hand. Strategic thought must continuously take the facts of change into account, not only those of the foreseeable future but probable changes many years ahead. Strategy can no longer proceed by a process of firmly based objective deduction; it must work on

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hypotheses and produce solutions by truly *original thought*.

This aspect of strategy is one which was hardly grasped at all up to recent years. For a long time evolution was so slow that it seemed reasonable to base decisions on past experience. History still has value today but alone it is inadequate; Paul Valery was far-sighted enough to appreciate its dangers some time ago. Now that it has been driven back upon hypothesis, strategy must play with time as it has come to do with space; it must discard rigid and dangerous hypotheses like some recent theories, mostly of American origin, which are based on a mathematical evaluation of *probabilities*. Instead it must be based on a whole gamut of *possibilities* and there must be organization to ensure that these possibilities are kept under review so as to sort out in good time those which are growing and turning into fact from those which are disappearing. Here is another factor in manoeuvre; there must be forecasts to guard against surprise and keep us abreast of evolution.

There can be no rules for the inventive ability required to work out a future solution to meet an estimated future situation using new or readapted tools. All that can be said is that there must be no routine about it (military existence, being governed by 'regulations', is unfortunately rooted in routine). It must draw on imagination and be the fruit of meditation.

These are undeniable facts. Modern strategy, like our civilization, is being carried along by the galloping advance of science. The consequence must be a fundamental change in our thinking habits. It is the future, not the present, which matters. The time-lag for any operation (whether production of new equipment, change in the psychological climate, or alteration of the international balance of power) must now be reckoned in terms of years; yet these are the factors which will govern the future.

Preparation is now of more consequence than execution. In other words it is useless to spend millions on a defence system, the future effectiveness of which is doubtful, whereas it is essential to be *well informed* and *exercise foresight*. These two requirements imply that emphasis (and expenditure) today should be concentrated upon the creation of highly effective intelligence and research organizations. It is through them that it will be possible to follow developments and to control the

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process of evolution of force by fully-thought-out decisions arrived at in good time.

To conclude this short examination, here is a simply analogy, not overdrawn: the strategist is like a surgeon called upon to operate upon a sick person who is growing continuously and with extreme rapidity and of whose detailed anatomy he is not sure; his operating-table is in a state of perpetual motion and he must have ordered the instruments he is to use five years beforehand.

Summary

It is dear that the strategic chess game is a complex one. At each of the various levels of strategy, all of which must be brought together as the background to a decision, the same game is being played out simultaneously with the same number of alternatives available. An electronic brain might help but would not be able to forecast all the possible actions and reactions more than a few moves ahead. This is why hardly any attempt has been made to work out strategy 'scientifically'. When this was done— particularly during the Napoleonic period—it was feasible only because, due to the special conditions of the time, the factors which had to be considered were comparatively few.

As a rule the strategist has to select by a process of calculation the governing factors, of which there may be many, and base his reasoning on these factors alone. It is for this reason that strategy is an art and not a science. No artist has ever painted a picture by following a complete set of theoretical rules. All that he may sometimes do is to check his work against certain rules to ensure that it will 'do'.

It is the same with strategy. That is perhaps why it has been possible to make so many mistakes.

1 See the analysis of the Italian campaign of 1800 by Pierre Vendryes in 'De la probabilite en histoire'.

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THE APPLICATION OF STRATEGY

Napoleon, when discussing the common-sense rules of strategy, said that 'there was nothing difficult about the art; the problem was to practise it'. This underlines the importance of the implementation of strategy. It is clear that the following are essential: firm resolve, a cool head to ensure that decisions are always calculated ones and grim determination to ensure that effort is always bent towards attainment of the objective selected. These are qualities not often found in one man; hence the fact that true leaders in war are few; they must be both thinkers and men of action.

As regards thinking, implementation raises a major problem, a problem which, because it was not understood, has been at the root of many catastrophes—including that of France in 1940; I refer to the relationship between strategy and tactics. Strategy is the method by which a policy of force is implemented; similarly tactics is the method by which strategy is implemented. This means that tactics must be the servant of strategy, not vice versa.

A number of writers, Fuller, Rougeron and Toynbee for instance (to mention the moderns only), have tried to show that the evolution of strategy depends on that of tactics. In their view the great changes have been brought about by (e.g.) the phalanx, the legion, the cataphract, the Mongol archer, gunpowder, the quick-firing rifle, the machine-gun, the railway, the tank and motorization, the aeroplane, the atomic weapon, etc. Their conclusion is that efforts should be concentrated upon the invention of new techniques and the perfection of the consequential tactics. Although strategy must direct tactics, it should be subordinate to it, they said.

This is a dangerous misconception, all the more dangerous because it contains a considerable element of truth—but a partial truth only.

The truth is that technical superiority is now a vital factor in the balance of power. It is obvious that a tank cannot be stopped with a rifle or an aircraft brought down with a bow and arrow; everyone knows that the Romans conquered the greater part of the then known world thanks to the superiority of the weapons and tactics of their legions. It is clear that the side which is technically and tactically ahead has a considerable

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advantage— an advantage due primarily to the fact that superiority in these fields gives to strategy additional, or at any rate more efficacious, material with which to work.

Technical and tactical superiority may however be rendered nugatory if it is used to further an erroneous strategy. This is the vital point which must always be borne in mind. Think of our recent experiences in Algeria; we had modern armament and equipment but did that bring us any nearer success? There are in fact no optimum tactics as such; tactics are good only in so far as they are better than those of the enemy. For instance the aircraft and the tank have proved ineffective in guerrilla warfare; in spite of possessing the nuclear weapon, the United States could not get more than a compromise peace in Korea. This means that there must be something which governs tactics; in fact it is the choice of tactics. If you decide to fight tanks with infantry, as we did in 1940, you will be beaten; you will equally be beaten if you try to fight a guerrilla movement with a system of strong points, as Chiang Kai-shek did for a time. *But choice of tactics is in fact strategy.* It is strategy which decides the form in which the conflict is to be waged, whether it is to be offensive or defensive, whether it will use force or subversion, whether force is to be used directly or indirectly and in stages, whether the main battle is to be political or military, whether atomic weapons are to be used, etc., etc. It would have been ludicrous for the Algerian rebels to try to win by means of a financial or industrial trial of strength or by a full-dress battle on the 1940 or 1945 model. They acted perfectly logically in opting for guerrilla tactics aimed at getting a decision by wearing the French down and relying on the pressure of world opinion. That is what strategy is and it is strategy which must be in charge.

The choice of tactics is not however the only task of strategy. It must also direct the evolution of tactics so that they can play their proper part in reaching a decision. For instance, the tactics of the offensive in 1918 were too ponderous to achieve a breakthrough; although, therefore, they were 'possible' tactics, they were not the tactics required to achieve a decisive result. From the point of view of operational strategy the tactics required at that moment were something which would make more rapid movement possible—which the Germans achieved in 1940 with their armoured

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divisions. By accepting tactics which did not meet the needs of the moment we condemned ourselves to a sterile strategy. Strategy must therefore lay down the aim which the inventions of the technicians and the research of the tacticians should strive to achieve. Only then shall we be able to direct evolution into profitable channels, channels which lead towards the objective of any conflict—a decision.

CONCLUSIONS

In Giraudoux's play *Siegfried*, German generals appear from time to time searching for a universal formula, which, like the philosopher's stone, will solve all the problems of ;var. Such a picture is a caricature of strategy, just as alchemy is a caricature of science. War is a social phenomenon too complex to be governed by any simple formula—unless it be so simple as to be a statement of the obvious. All the same modern science has eventually achieved the transmutations for which alchemy was searching, but by methods quite different from those of alchemy. Modern science now includes the social sciences and it is therefore its duty to search for ways and means of guiding the destiny of humanity, something which has hitherto been left to the most crudely empirical methods.

Strategy will be one of the most important mental exercises in this search. It is through strategy that international politics act and it may therefore well be that the thought processes of strategy will be applicable to the realm of pure politics or indeed to any field in which there is a clash of opposing wills.

Only by understanding the methods and procedures employed by strategy will it be possible to avoid in any future conflicts (which there will inevitably be) the mistakes which have been responsible for the ruin of Europe. If we can master the principles of strategy, perhaps we shall be able to avoid these conflicts altogether. Perhaps (who knows?) knowledge of the art of war will lead to the birth of an art of peace, based not on ideological trends but on concrete facts—such as the present-day deterrent strategy.

But strategy is no more than a means to an end. It is for policy to lay

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down the aims to be achieved by strategy, and policy is governed basically by the philosophy which we wish to see prevail. The destiny of the human race depends upon the philosophy which it chooses and upon the strategy by which it tries to ensure that that philosophy shall prevail.

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CHAPTER 2**TRADITIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY****THE EVOLUTIONARY NATURE OF MILITARY STRATEGY**

The traditional military strategy should be the best understood but in fact it is not. The rules of strategy have too often been driven into the background by various developments of the moment which at the time appeared to have lasting validity whereas in fact there were other more important factors. In this chapter I propose to deal only with the evolutionary aspect of strategy and highlight its main points. Only thus can we understand its true nature.

Traditional military strategy has always to a certain extent had to be set in the context of total war. There has, for instance, always been an important economic and financial element (if you had no money you couldn't hire Swiss mercenaries). There has always obviously been an important diplomatic element (neutrality, coalitions, etc.). There has often been an important political element, usually ideological in nature (the Armagnacs and the Burgundians, the Huguenots and the League, the 'Patriots' of the revolutionary and Napoleonic period, democracy versus Nazism, etc.). There has rarely been a conflict in which these factors did not play some part, although the influence they exerted obviously varied considerably.

This was the overall framework and it was the business primarily of the government or the king. The part played by the army within this framework has varied. Although it has as a rule been the most important factor, it has been the really decisive factor at certain favourable periods only; at others it has been reduced almost to the role of an auxiliary. These differences in the role of the army have clearly to a great extent stemmed from the relative competence of the commanders on each side; but whatever the qualities of the commanders, the role of the army has depended upon the capacity, sometimes greater sometimes less, of the

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armed forces as a whole to achieve complete military victory. At any given period total strategy has been forced to use whatever methods proved to be the most effective and these might be economic, diplomatic, political or military. It is for this reason that the role of the armed forces has been overriding only when they have been able of themselves to bring about a decision.

The capacity of the armed forces to produce a decision has varied fundamentally throughout history depending upon operational capabilities at the time and these in turn depended upon the armament, equipment tactics and supply procedures of the opposing sides. Only very seldom has adequate weight been given to this variation in the capacity of armed forces. The process of evolution has as a rule taken both sides by surprise and they have had to grope for new solutions which would enable a decision to be reached. On rare occasions a military leader of real genius (Napoleon is of course the shining example) has been able to assert a temporary superiority because his thought processes and therefore his grasp of developments were ahead of those of his adversary. The enemy, however, then generally learnt from his example and made the necessary adjustments. After a time therefore it became level pegging once more.

One of the essential factors therefore in traditional military strategy has always been the capacity to grasp changes in the art of war more quickly than the enemy and so be in a position to foresee the effect which new factors will have. These changes have sometimes facilitated, sometimes prevented (e.g.) the successful defence of fortresses, decisive pitched battles or blitz-type operations. There have been long slowly developing phases in which war has been either 'short and sweet' or long and exhausting or incapable of producing any worthwhile result. At each change of phase the men of the time have been thrown off balance because the old recipes lost their validity. Even new recipes which on the surface appeared to be the complete answer, were generally found to be effective only for a time. The main key to military strategy, therefore, is to understand the process by which the capacity of armed force to achieve a decision evolves.

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STRATEGY IN BATTLE

A military decision in the strict sense of the word is the result of a victorious battle.

There have been many different types of battle but the mechanics of battle as such can be reduced to a relatively simple formula. The main characteristic of battle on land is that two human barriers formed of fighting men are drawn up one against the other.

This linear formation stems from the necessity for each man to have his flanks and rear covered by his neighbours. Since each therefore must both cover and be covered, the inevitable result is that ranks are formed, in more or less close order and in greater or smaller depth according to the tactics of the time. When you get to the end of the rank, however, there is no more flank protection and as a result the flanks are obviously the most vulnerable part of the layout. As a result of this vulnerability of the flanks people were led to search for victory by outflanking and then enveloping the enemy flank and therefore to try to present a battle front longer than that of the enemy. Unless, however, the difference in numbers between the two sides was great, this extension of the front meant that at some point the line of battle had to be weak; this opened up the possibility of exploiting the situation by breaking the enemy line, thus artificially creating new enemy flanks, which of course were vulnerable. The object in battle therefore became to disorganize the enemy by disrupting the cohesion of his wall of fighting men and this disorganization could be achieved either by enveloping his flank or breaking his line.

Once the enemy line had been broken, the defence became disorganized. The danger which then threatened each soldier produced a psychological shock resulting in the loosening of those moral ties which held the men together. Thus disorganized, an army turned into a mob of individuals. In the old days this mob was an easy prey for the victor. This was the moment of the 'caedes', the phase of massacre, in which the vanquished were put to the sword while the victor's losses were very small. In modern times, when hand-to-hand combat is rare, this phase has become one of rout, flight and pursuit, the object being to prevent the enemy army

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being reformed into a cohesive entity.

An outflanking movement requires mobility greater than that of the line of battle. For this reason the wings have usually been formed of cavalry and in more recent times of motorized and armoured formations. The side carrying out a break-through manoeuvre must have offensive capacity superior to that of the enemy; this is achieved by a judicious combination of assault troops (e.g. heavy cavalry, elephants, tanks) and supporting fire (e.g. arrows, the pilum, the catapult, infantry and artillery supporting fire); the whole must be sufficiently mobile to break through the enemy front quickly.

The choice between these two methods of attack has in the past to a great extent depended on the ground and upon the relative size of the opposing forces, but it has also been dictated by the effectiveness of the offensive technique employed as compared with the defensive tactics of the enemy—and defensive capacity has been continually increasing. Initially defence was based on the dexterity of each man in the line in using his weapon, though he might perhaps be protected by a shield and sometimes by an obstacle such as a ditch or a line of stakes. Very soon the defence began to use numerous types of projectile, starting with the arrow or the catapult and moving to the ballista, the pistol, the cannon-ball and the explosive shell. The attack was forced to meet these problems by adopting appropriate tactics bringing into play ever more powerful fire-producing methods in order to neutralize the enemy's fire (in other words reduce its effect to an acceptable level) or even to destroy the wall of enemy fighting men at the point where it was intended to break the line. As armaments developed, the defence was on top

at certain periods, the attack at others; this led to wide variations in procedure.

The design of a battle is not of course quite as simple as this; as preparation for the manoeuvre of envelopment or breakthrough there will be the counterplay of feints and harassing action. The main object of this counterplay period is to tie down the enemy forces, shake their morale by fear, fatigue and losses and then to concentrate against the decisive point on a flank or in the centre. The enemy, however, will normally have

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available reserves with which to parry the decisive blow. During the preparatory period, therefore, the enemy must be caused to expend his reserves, either by committing them in a false direction as a result of a feint or by frittering them away in local actions. A battle therefore consists of a preparatory phase of greater or smaller length followed by a decisive phase.

In essence therefore the strategy of a battle is simple. It is made complex only because its tools are men and not machines, even though the men may be serving machines. An army is an organized mob and the cement which binds it together is discipline and mutual confidence. More therefore than all plans and schemes based on material factors, the art of battle consists in maintaining and strengthening the psychological cohesion of one's own troops while at the same time disrupting that of the enemy's. *The psychological factor is therefore all-important.* It is at the basis of the most varied techniques and stratagems ranging from war-paint, battle cries or the Stuka's screaming bombs to feints and surprise attacks designed to produce in Napoleon's phrase 'the climax', the point at which the enemy's morale cracks. There can be no rule for the strategy which aims at this 'climax'. Sometimes its target will be the man in the ranks, sometimes it will be the enemy commander, the object being to destroy his confidence in his own dispositions.

A decision has therefore sometimes been achieved by military means alone as a result of superior strategy and without a major battle in the strict sense of the term.

This scheme of things is applicable only to land warfare. On the sea or in the air the psychological factor is of less importance since the men are held together by their equipment—you cannot abandon your ship or your aircraft. As a result the equipment factor has as a rule been all important in naval and air strategy—such questions as speed, manoeuvrability, range, protection, weight of salvo, have generally been decisive. Moreover, whereas on land the object is to disorganize the enemy, on the sea or in the air it is to destroy him physically. The navy reckons in numbers of ships sunk, the air force in numbers of aircraft destroyed. The corollary of this is that, unless the two sides are evenly balanced, one or the other will refuse

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battle. As a result superiority in equipment will constitute an important deterrent merely because it is 'in being'. Naval and air strategy also differ from land strategy in that there is in their case no equivalent to the factor of 'ground' with all the various complications that implies. Battle on sea or in the air can be more preplanned and diagrammatic since it takes place on a uniform surface or in the air, the only hazards being the wind, the sun and the clouds. Moreover the concept of fighting in ranks which has been so all-important on land, has been no more than a passing phase in naval warfare and has never been applicable to air warfare. An air battle is the sum of a number of individual engagements and its object is to wear down the enemy by destroying his equipment either on the ground or in the air. Its concept is therefore fundamentally different from that of the land battle.

It should be noted here that this fundamental difference is of considerable importance today in relation to our overall concept of war. Land strategy, the object of which is to disorganize the enemy, seeks a decision by planning and manoeuvre. Air strategy aims solely at physical destruction and therefore bases its calculations to a large extent upon industrial potential. These two concepts both conflict and combine in our thinking on modern warfare. I shall be reverting to this point later.

STRATEGY OF OPERATIONS ON LAND

In war conducted by military forces the act of battle is a phase limited in time, a culminating point. The forces to be engaged must first be brought within range of each other and naturally each side will try to go into battle in conditions most favourable to itself. The sum total of the dispositions and manoeuvres which go to make up this process is known as 'operations'.

The Mechanics of Operations

Like battles, perhaps even more than battle, operations have been subject to a vast process of evolution as the armament and equipment of troops have changed. There are other factors which tend to give operations an even greater diversity; for instance the ground and the size of the theatre in relation to that of the forces employed and their mobility.

First Phase: Operations and the Act of Battle

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as distinct and independent Phases

During the first phase, which covers a period from ancient times to the end of the eighteenth century, operations and battle were two entirely different things. The reason was that throughout this period equipment was such that an isolated detachment had only a limited ability to resist. If it was to move in security the army had to remain concentrated. Since armies were comparatively small, they constituted no more than a point in space which was endeavouring to bring itself up against another point in space represented by the enemy army. Moreover, the army could only be used after it had been drawn up in 'battle order', i.e. after a certain delay ranging from several hours to a complete day; when two armies met, therefore, one or both could always refuse battle by withdrawing. An army either offered battle or it accepted battle offered by the enemy or it made off. This was known as 'battle by mutual consent'.

Under these circumstances the object of operations was to force the enemy to accept battle in conditions unfavourable to him. This was done by invading and ravaging his country. In order to defeat this method of operation the defence took refuge in a system of strong points forming a chequer-board across which armies had to move. The result was that the attacker then had to force the defender to give battle by laying siege to important cities and threatening to capture them. This method of campaigning, based on a network of fortified towns, became the ultimate expression of the art of operations particularly in the seventeenth century. This strategy was later held up as being pusillanimous but in fact that accusation is unfounded. It was quite clearly the only solution possible given the conditions of the period. Moreover, the outcome of battle, always a risky proceeding, might well affect the results of the entire campaign and also reduce the major asset which the army itself represented; a General therefore made every effort to ensure that he only accepted battle when it seemed to him that either great numerical superiority or a highly advantageous position on the ground offered him near certainty of victory. The result was that campaigns were long, indecisive and punctuated by sieges. This concept—and let us be clear it was a perfectly logical one—

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was put very lucidly by Marshal de Saxe in his 'Reveries': 'I am not in favour of battle and I am convinced that a competent general can make war for a lifetime without being forced to fight a battle. There should be frequent local engagements to wear down the enemy little by little. This is the most effective method of bringing the enemy to his knees and furthering our cause. I do not intend to imply that one should not attack the enemy if an opportunity of crushing him presents itself but I do say that it is possible to make war without incurring the risk which a battle presents. If he can do this a general has reached the acme of perfection and competence.' Such was the nature and such the object of operations in old days; many have thought that this was a milk-and-water method of making war and that the caution of the pen-pusher was the controlling factor. How wrong they were!

*Second Phase: Operations and Battle
as distinct but interconnected Phases*

Towards the end of the eighteenth century, however, it began to dawn on the best military brains (Puységur, Folard and particularly Guibert) that the new weapons would make a more decisive form of operations possible. What had happened was that the development of the musket had led to greatly increased fire power; this made possible the 'thin red line' order of battle (three ranks) and this in turn had led to a greater and greater extension of fortified lines of defence, ultimately resulting in the paralysis of all operations. Wars dragged on interminably. The increase in fire power now meant that an isolated detachment might well put up a prolonged resistance. The army could therefore now be split up for movement or to enable it to live off the country. This was the 'divisional principle' worked out by the generation of great theorists and the prospects it offered were destined to produce a revolution in the art of operations. Guibert called for 'a new Alexander' to put his theories into practice. The answer to his prayer was Napoleon, who was the first to understand all the possibilities offered by the new development.

The basis of his system of operations was to draw a firm distinction between the loose-knit network of dispersed formations, the layout he

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adopted for operations, and the concentration required for battle. His enemies, manoeuvring in time-honoured manner, remained more or less concentrated. Napoleon's widespread layout prevent his enemy seeing where he intended to concentrate, blinded him and paralysed him. He could thus surround him if he remained static (as at Ulm) or better still get round behind him and astride his line of communications, thereby forcing him to fight back to front (as at Jena). Whatever happened, the enemy could not make off and was forced to accept battle, even under disadvantageous conditions. In this phase, therefore, operations rather than battle were the governing factor. War had once more become a decisive, overwhelming act.

The technique of operations in the Napoleonic period was kinetic but nevertheless based on logistics. Its basic was a series of movement calculations (whether a concentration was possible, whether formations were mutually supporting, whether the enemy could be enveloped) together with the logistic calculations which made these movements possible. In addition Napoleon's army was practically fully 'run in' and therefore adept at engaging or disengaging rapidly; his operational strategy therefore gave him victory after victory.

Little by little, however, his enemies learnt the rules of the game. They danced less and less to Napoleon's tune and ended by adopting on their side also a loose-knit operational layout covering a large part of the theatre of operations. Manoeuvre on the classic Napoleonic model therefore became more and more difficult and finally the overall inferiority of French resources led to Napoleon's defeat.

The lessons drawn from Napoleon's operational strategy have frequently been false lessons because people thought they saw in his manoeuvres a repertoire of universally valid solutions, when in fact they were valid only under the conditions of the time. We must not be deceived by the mathematical exactitude of the Emperor's calculations; he had other advantages; his thinking was far in advance of that of his enemies and this advantage was increased by the political halo surrounding the French Army which was fighting under the banner of the revolutionary ideal. Almost everywhere (e.g. in Italy and in Germany) 'patriots' lent us aid and comfort. When there were no more patriots, as in Spain and Russia, the risks

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involved in this type of operation became too great. No one since Napoleon has been able to work his system.

Third Phase: Operations and Battle merged

There was a further even more decisive reason for the disappearance of the Napoleonic system; fire power, to which for a time that system seemed to be the answer, continued to increase and so made Napoleonic strategy ineffective. During the nineteenth century the increase both in fire power and in the size of armies meant that the dispositions adopted for movement could be transformed with greater and greater rapidity into those required for battle. The old dispositions for movement, a widespread network of parallel columns, now became a 'front'; whether disposed for movement or for battle, troops were sufficiently thick on the ground to constitute an almost continuous barrier of fighting men. In this final phase of evolution operations and battle merged. The old art of operations in the sense of that word as used by Marshal de Saxe and Napoleon disappeared. The strategy of the battle on the other hand became as important as the strategy of operations had previously been. The increase in fire power had greatly increased the defensive capacity of a continuous front and a break-through operation had therefore become difficult. Consequently the vital operation became the envelopment of an unprotected flank (e.g. Woerth, Sedan, Mukden or the Schlieffen Plan) by extending the front beyond that of the enemy. As arms became cheaper to produce and conscription and the advent of the railroad made it possible to raise and maintain larger and larger armies, fronts became ever wider and more thinly manned.

This produced a development which was not grasped by those of the time: the envelopment of a flank could only be decisive if it could be carried out rapidly, i.e. before the enemy had time either to withdraw or to bring up his reserves. This situation obtained as long as the fronts remained comparatively small and reserves were no more mobile than the forces carrying out the envelopment. But by 1914 this manoeuvre also proved ineffective; the front extended for two hundred miles and the Schlieffen Plan aimed at envelopment of a flank using infantry on foot. The front which

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was outflanked saved itself comparatively easily by withdrawal; reserves were moved by rail to the Paris area and there formed a force capable of outflanking the enemy outflanking movement. This was the baffle of the Maine; but the enemy now in his turn saved himself by withdrawal. True to the teaching of the period he replied by a new outflanking movement which was itself once more outflanked. This was the Race to the Sea and it set the final seal of bankruptcy on the tactics of envelopment. The front now stretched from Switzerland to the North Sea and congealed. The kinetic period of operations was at an end.

*Fourth Phase: The Fighting Front Co-terminous
with the Theatre of Operations*

The stabilization of the front across the entire theatre of operations came as a complete surprise to both sides. It was nevertheless a situation which had already been seen both in the American Civil War and in Manchuria; there field fortification had been employed on a large scale but there were still open flanks which meant that an outflanking movement was still possible. The phenomenon of a continuous immobile front sprang from two facts: the defensive capacity of infantry was now very high since they were armed with machine-guns and protected by barbed wire and trenches; at the same time the numbers employed were vast. Since outflanking manoeuvre was no longer possible, operations or battle were reduced to attempts to break through the front in the hope of subsequently resuming mobile operations.

War therefore now appeared to be a question not of movement but of fire power; the problem was to assemble enough equipment (guns and ammunition) to pulverize the enemy front and then exploit the breach thus created, using infantry in mass. But just as enveloping movements had failed because the outflanking wing lacked adequate mobility, so the break-through operation now failed because the attack, made on foot, could not move forward as fast as reserves could come up by rail and lorry. The attack therefore got bogged down in 'pockets' to the great disappointment

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of the staffs who had grasped neither the importance nor the possible effects of tactical mobility. The breakthrough proving unattainable, operations degenerated into a war of attrition (Verdun, the Somme), people comforting themselves that they were wearing down the enemy reserves. Foch finally conceived the idea of operating by a succession of limited offensives with the object of creating mutually supporting pockets. These tactics of the baffle in France, however, necessitated the employment of enormous resources. Operations, or 'strategy' as it was called at the time, became nothing but a ponderous competition in material resources. It was with this doctrine that we went to war in 1940.

Fifth Phase: Battle as the Preparation for Operations

The campaign of 1940 saw the collapse of this doctrine. The new factor in tactics was the combination of aircraft and tanks and against our static, linear fronts they achieved a rapid breakthrough everywhere; the reason was that the tactical mobility of the attack had at last reached a satisfactory level as compared with the strategic mobility of the reserves. Thus a war of movement was possible once more. Operations consisted of a short violent phase during which the break-through forces were brought into position and put into the attack; it was followed by an exploitation phase of deep penetration and enveloping movements and this proved decisive. Oddly enough this was the eighteenth-century system in reverse: decisive operations were preceded and prepared by the act of battle. The factor of movement regained its position of prime importance.

In the later stages of the war this development was shaded off somewhat since the tactics of the defence made the break-through less easy. Both in Russia and on the Western Front operations consisted of a series of baffles followed by exploitation, the prime factor being at one stage offensive power and at another mobility. There were no operations involving purely movement on the eighteenth-century model, except perhaps in Libya where the forces were very small in relation to the size of the theatre. Operations and battle were still a single phase.

During the 1939—45 war, moreover, a new operational concept was

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put into practice for the first time: the possibility of a decision being achieved by the attrition produced by air forces. This concept had been developed simultaneously but independently both in Great Britain and in Italy during the thirties; it was based on the premise that land forces were incapable of achieving a decision. In fact, looked at from Douhet's point of view, land forces were impotent in the light of the tactics of the period combined with the strength of the Alpine frontier. The R.A.F. aimed at the achievement of a decision by air action alone, in spite of the fact that 1940 had just proved that decision on land was possible. Bomber Command, later reinforced by the Americans, set itself to crush Germany by bombing. The resources employed were vast and the attrition terrific but of itself it was not decisive. As in 1918, the decision was the product of a series of land or land and air battles assisted by the attrition caused by the blockade and air bombing.

Sixth Phase: The Front smatter than the Theatre of Operations

After the war came the atomic weapon which I do not propose to discuss here. As far as conventional warfare is concerned, however, there was a further development: the size of armed forces became considerably smaller because of the greater expenditure required not only to provide modern equipment but to prepare for nuclear warfare. At the same time forces were far more mobile than in the past and land forces therefore found themselves once more faced with the problem whether to disperse to cover an area really too large for them or to remain relatively concentrated on a narrow front and accept the resulting gaps and unprotected flanks. So far it would seem that this problem has been only partially solved; it is technically not yet possible to keep large areas under observation day and night without employing considerable forces; some dispersion therefore seems inevitable but the result is that the areas which can be adequately defended are too small. There are also dangers in accepting a front which does not cover the entire theatre of operations owing to the high mobility of motorized or air-transported forces. There will no doubt have to be some compromise between these two alternatives.

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One conclusion can be drawn from this study of evolution in the past: the present situation means that in conventional, i.e. non-nuclear, warfare stabilization of the front on the 1914—IS model will be impossible; the strategic situation will therefore be very fluid. Manoeuvre will become of greater importance owing to the great mobility conferred on modern forces by motorization and high-speed communications. It may be possible to achieve a decision very rapidly.

Lastly the availability of air and air-transported forces will give great depth to the land battle. Battle will take place over an area not along a front.

Conclusions

The following conclusions may be drawn from this short analysis:

(1) Basically the prime factor in operations has alternated between movement at one end of the scale and force at the other; sometimes the one has been all-important, sometimes the other; in the intervening periods both have been of importance in varying degree.

(2) This evolutionary process has to a large extent been governed by tactical factors.

These tactical factors, which have been dependent upon armament, equipment and battle procedures may be reduced to the following:

Offensive capacity.

Defensive capacity. -

'Strategic' mobility (i.e. mobility when not in battle).

'Tactical' mobility (i.e. mobility in battle).

The number and diversity of the answers produced to the operational problems of the moment have been due to the constant change in the ratio of importance between these four factors.

(3) The size of forces available in relation to space has been a further factor governing evolution.

(4) During periods when operations in the true sense of the word have been incapable of producing a decision, attention has been diverted to the concept of attrition; the result has been enormous military effort and the

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mutual exhaustion of the combatants.

(5) Depending on the relative importance of the above factors operations have been either mobile but indecisive, mobile but highly decisive, long drawn out or static. Every change has come as a surprise to people at the time because during each period it was thought that the principles of the operational strategy then in vogue would remain immutable, whereas in fact they were constantly changing.

This last point shows how important it is to understand the mechanics of operational strategy so that its changes shall not take us by surprise and so that, if possible, we can appreciate these changes more quickly and more accurately than the enemy.

OPERATIONS AND STRATEGIC POSTURE

During each phase of evolution the game of strategy has had to be played within certain limits; these limits have been set by the operations which it was technically feasible to carry out. Within these limits the military commander had to decide the type of) manoeuvre he intended to use in order to carry out the task laid down for him by the political authority.

The type of manoeuvre chosen depended obviously upon the inter-relationship between the task assigned, the relative strength of the enemy and his own forces, and the ground. The tasks which can be given to armed forces can be reduced to the following:

Conquer territory or deny territory to the enemy.

Destroy the enemy forces or wear them down.

Act with rapidity or gain time.

After taking into account the limitations placed upon tactical and operational plans by the conditions and armament of the time, the action to be undertaken will be more or less difficult or easy but it will be confined to a strictly limited spectrum of possibilities. The analysis of strategy in Chapter One showed that the choice of a course of action which the commander must make is an aspect of strategy. It is this choice which will determine the strategic posture to be adopted during a campaign.

I do not propose to recapitulate the complex problems involved in a strategic decision since they have been dealt with above. There is no need

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to do more than look briefly at the main gambits which have hitherto been employed in the game of strategy.

(1) When our resources are superior to those of the enemy and striking capacity is adequate, the campaign will be conducted offensively and its aim will be decisive baffle. This is offensive strategy using the direct approach; its object will be to concentrate the maximum resources against the enemy main body.

(2) If our superiority is not so dear or if, as a result of the tactical conditions of the time, offensive action is less likely to produce results, there are two possible alternatives:

(a) Wear the enemy down by defensive action followed up by a counter offensive. This is direct offensive/defensive strategy.

(b) Throw the enemy off balance by a diversionary offensive prior to the main action. This is direct strategy using the indirect approach.

(3) If the military resources available are inadequate to achieve the desired result, military action will play only an auxiliary role; the manoeuvre will then be one of total strategy in the indirect 'mode', the decision being achieved by a suitable combinations of political, economic and diplomatic action. In this event military forces may be used either for a local trial of strength by mean of limited operations or to wear down the enemy using guerilla tactics or to contribute to the decision by the mere threat of there existence.

OPERATION IN REALATION TO THE STRATEGIC COUNTERPLAY

Once the general strategic posture has been decided we are left with the successful execution of the plan. Since the enemy will equally be trying to make his own plan work, the result will be a dialectic clash in which each side attempts to ensure that his own will prevails. We have already dealt in Chapter One with the doctrines governing this clash. The application of these doctrines, however, will be different in each period and the forms of strategic counterplay will be so diverse that they may be almost unrecognizable as such.

Depending on the conditions of the moment, this clash may be likened either to a nimble duel between two fencers armed with rapiers, or to a duel

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using heavy sabres, or to a duel using maces so heavy they can hardly be lifted, or to a struggle between two unarmed men. Moreover in this duel the combatants, like the old-time gladiators, need not be equipped alike; the rapier (Napoleon) may be opposed by the heavy sabre (Mack); the unarmed man (a colonial population) may be opposed by a man armed a dagger (colonial wars). As a film can be shown fast or slow, the combatants may appear at one moment to hop and skip, at another to move in majestic slow time. Each change in the character of the struggle will be the direct result of the operational and logistic capabilities of the moment and of the intelligence with which the opposing commanders use them.

In a preface to book written in 1934 General Gamelin stated that an exactly similar concept was at the basis of the final phase of the battle of France in 1918 and of the plane 17 offensive into the Ardennes in 1914. He went on to explain that in the intervening period methods had been brought into line with the requirements of strategy and that strategy therefore at last had available the resources necessary to make the manoeuvre desired feasible. This point of view is based solely upon similarities of graphy and shows up clearly the fallacy of seeking to compare two military actions which, though apparently similar in type and taking place on the same area of ground, occurred at different phases of evolution and in different circumstances. The offensive into the Ardennes in 1914 was madness for three reasons:

- (a) the limited offensive capacity of the period meant that the action was foredoomed to failure;

- (b) the ground was unfavourable;

- (c) by advancing in the centre leaving an inadequate force to hold the German right wing, we left ourselves open to an enveloping movement.

In 1918 the situation as regards two of these three factors was the reverse; the ground was still unfavourable but:

- (a) the capacity of the offensive had developed considerably;

- (b) the enemy was held everywhere and his reserves had been used up; by advancing in the centre therefore we threatened to envelop the entire right wing of the German Army.

A further point emerges from this comparison between 1914 and 1918:

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the remarkable mobility of the 1914 forces and the extreme ponderousness of those of 1918. In other words, during these four years the rules of the strategic counterplay had changed completely. There were even more fundamental changes between 1918 and 1940 and still more between 1940 and 1945.

All this shows the basic difficulty of the military art: it is subject to continuous change. Past happenings can always be explained by an orderly process of reasoning, though there may well be a considerable admixture of conjecture. In the immediate future, which must necessarily be the main concern of strategic thought, we have got at one and the same time to base ourselves on the experience of the past and by a process of original thinking adjust this experience to the new methods available. Any innovation may be a major hazard but all routine is foredoomed to failure.

In this highly conjectural and somewhat frightening game the key to the thought processes required lies in understanding the changes in operational strategy.

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CHAPTER 3

NUCLEAR STRATEGY

Nuclear strategy—or rather the application by strategy of the consequences of the development of the nuclear weapon—has resulted in a major upheaval in the entire concept of the use of force, whether for the conduct of war or the maintenance of peace. It is of importance to dissect the process by which the change has come about. It will thus be possible to judge the scale of the upheaval and perhaps try to foresee where the process of the evolution now taking place is leading us.

THE IMPORTANCE AND ORIGINALITY OF THE NUCLEAR WEAPON

The nuclear weapon, allied to modern means of delivery, is not, as it has sometimes been termed, 'a weapon similar to the rest, merely more powerful'. Its power alone puts it in a category different from anything we have known hitherto. An average-size atomic bomb of 20 KT produces an explosion equivalent to a salvo from four million field-guns. An average-size thermonuclear bomb (one megaton) is equivalent to a salvo from two hundred million field-guns!¹ The effect of the explosion is augmented by the fall-out;² and this vast explosive capacity can be launched and directed by a very small number of men. This is nothing less than a complete revolution.

1 With very high-altitude explosions the area affected by the fireball may be in hundreds of square miles.

2 In the case of low-altitude explosions fall-out may produce a contaminated area of several hundred square miles.

Moreover, the range of the delivery weapons is approaching half the
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circumference of the earth and it will therefore be possible to attack any point on the earth's surface with a considerable degree of accuracy; even now range has reached ninety degrees of latitude or longitude, which means that the threat from a single weapon covers an entire hemisphere.

As a result of these two characteristics (power and range) the atomic weapon has produced an entirely new phenomenon: there is now no relationship between power and size of forces. Only a few years ago a thousand aircraft were required to destroy Hamburg and the guns of an entire army to destroy Berlin; today each of these cities could be destroyed by a single aircraft or missile.

Furthermore, in contrast to the ponderousness of great armed forces, this vast destructive power is almost totally mobile and can reach any point of a nation's territory. Defence by a barrier of men along the frontiers, hitherto provided by armies, is now incapable of protecting a country against either physical destruction or nuclear contamination. Conventional armed forces would therefore appear to be completely useless—at least at first sight.

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FORMS OF NUCLEAR STRATEGY

As protection against this unprecedented threat there would appear to be only four possible courses of action:

(a) Preventive destruction of enemy weapons (the direct offensive method).

(b) The interception of enemy nuclear weapons in transit (the defensive method).

(c) Physical protection against the effects of nuclear explosions (a further defensive method).

(d) The threat of retaliation (an indirect offensive method).

These four forms of reaction have been used concurrently with varying success and have ultimately been combined into a most complicated strategic theory.

(1) Initially the best solution appeared to be that of preventive destruction, aimed not necessarily at the nuclear weapons themselves, which were difficult to locate, but at the enemy's production and launching bases. The Americans had considerable superiority; the enemy had no means of delivery other than aircraft and they were restricted to bases which could easily be pinpointed; it was therefore reasonable to assume that enemy resources in nuclear weapons could be destroyed almost *in toto*. Annihilation tactics were worked out, the essential feature of which was a sound nuclear fire plan providing for every known objective to be attacked.

This favourable situation lasted only a very short time. As enemy resources increased and he adopted dispersion tactics, the number of targets rose; moreover an increasing number of targets could not be preplanned since the enemy had made preparations to disperse on an alert to a number of rudimentary airfields which could only barely be located or not located at all. Finally the defensive policy enunciated by NATO made it difficult to take the initiative in launching nuclear warfare. An atomic offensive could therefore only be visualized as retaliation, which meant conceding the first strike to the enemy. This in turn meant that destruction of the enemy nuclear weapons could no longer be preventive and therefore the other forms of protection, interception in transit, physical protection and

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threat of retaliation, became of vital importance; these will be dealt with later.

At the same time study of the problem of destruction led to the conclusion that ability to deliver a surprise attack was of overriding importance; once the enemy had reached a certain level, a surprise attack might result in damage so great that our ability to retaliate would be questionable. For years staffs were haunted by the prospect of 'an atomic Pearl Harbour'. The result was the development of 'anti-surprise tactics' which will be dealt with under other headings and which have reached a high level of efficiency.

If a policy of retaliation was to be effective, retaliatory capacity had to be maintained at a level sufficient if possible to eliminate, or at least considerably to reduce, the enemy's destructive capacity. At this point the diversification of delivery systems and the advent of the rocket greatly increased the difficulty of the problem and a school of thought appeared which maintained that 'counter force' tactics¹ were doomed to failure. The fact is that it is now impossible to destroy everything but, on the other hand, it is highly dangerous to leave any sizeable portion of the enemy nuclear force still in existence. As a minimum it should always be possible to destroy the more vulnerable elements of the enemy force, such as the obsolescent types of aircraft and the radar chains and these do in fact constitute a considerable proportion of his resources. There is general agreement today that 'counterforce' tactics can be only partially effective; they are still thought to be necessary, however, and as a result we are led continually to try to increase our means of delivery. On the other hand a large number of the targets are in the satellite countries, where every effort must be made to restrict destruction to military installations; in 'destruction tactics' therefore, a high degree of accuracy is essential and very high yield explosions cannot be used. All this means that the resulting programme is heavy expensive.

This phase of evolution therefore culminated in resurrection of the notion of truly preventive action; it was urged that results would be all the greater not only because we should not be suffering from the effects of the enemy first. strike, but because the enemy, who would be neither alerted nor dispersed,

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would as a result suffer far greater destruction. In order to reconcile this concept of preventive action more or less convincingly with the political thesis of non-aggressive intent, preventive action was christened 'pre-emptive', emphasis being placed on the fact that it would only be initiated if and when completely reliable intelligence had been received that an enemy attack was imminent.

In any event it seems highly doubtful whether complete protection can be achieved by preventive destruction of the enemy

1 Currently known as 'counter force *strategy*'. It is in fact a method of applying strategy and therefore a form of tactics.

nuclear resources.' In the event of war this policy would have to be implemented, but no more than partial results could be expected from it. The other methods of protection are therefore essential.

(2) It soon became clear that the interception of nuclear weapons in transit might well be the key factor in the new strategy. If we could develop a fully effective interception system there would be no further requirement for preventive action (which was politically dangerous) nor for physical protection; the enemy threat of reprisals would then lose its effect.

This is an ideal solution, which, however, from the technical point of view, is extremely difficult both to achieve and to maintain at an adequate level of efficiency. A gigantic technological race is in progress between interception and penetration and each time capacity for interception makes progress it is answered by a new advance in capacity for penetration. Thus a new form of strategy is developing in peacetime, a strategy of which the phrase 'arms race' used prior to the old great conflicts is hardly more than a faint reflection.

There are no battles in this strategy; each side is merely trying to outdo in performance the equipment of the other. It has been termed 'logistic strategy'. Its tactics are industrial, technical and financial. It is a form of indirect attrition; instead of destroying enemy resources, its object is to make them obsolete, thereby forcing upon him enormous expenditure. As an example, during the Battle of Britain radar made possible the first

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defensive air victory in history. The next step was that very high-altitude aircraft made all existing radar and anti-aircraft guns obsolete. Then ground-to-ground missiles, which could not be intercepted, made all aircraft obsolete since they were tied to fixed and therefore vulnerable bases; at the same time ground-to-air missiles made interception of high-altitude aircraft possible. Air-to-ground-

1 This conclusion appears inescapable, particularly now that atomic submarines have been developed; it does not, however, invalidate the recent American theory that it is preferable publicly to announce counter-force rather than counter-city tactics. This point will be referred to again when dealing with the deterrent.

-were then developed which made it possible for aircraft to attack their target while themselves remaining out of range of the enemy ground-to-air missiles; at the same time interception of the ground-to-ground missiles began to appear possible. And so on and so on.

A silent and apparently peaceful war is therefore in progress, but it could well be a war which of itself could be decisive. This race will never be finished, but fully effective interception, though it may have its ups and downs, seems likely to remain problematical.

(3) The next problem, therefore, is whether it is possible adequately to reduce the effect of nuclear attack by physical protection. Before the advent of the thermo-nuclear weapon, it seemed as if there were certain possible solutions: underground protection, dispersion, mobility, protection by concrete, etc. None of these methods provided absolute protection, but they held out the hope of reducing the effect of nuclear attack considerably (in the best case by a factor of almost 25). Now that the thermonuclear weapon is available, however, although protection still has the same relative value, the power of the attack has so far increased that it hardly seems possible even to hope for effective physical protection. Moreover, expenditure would be astronomical and many have therefore concluded that all efforts should be devoted to the development of offensive weapons and

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their penetration capacity.

(4) The fact is that the efficacy of all these methods of defence is both changeable and uncertain and that the only true protection consists in the threat of retaliation. For this purpose there must be a 'striking force' (or better an offensive force) sufficiently powerful to deter the enemy from employing his own striking force. This is the first and simplest form of the deterrent strategy: the object is to exert a direct effect upon the will power of the enemy without having to proceed to a trial of strength in order to do so. This is the general idea at the basis of the strategy now developing; it is becoming more and more complex and more and more subtle.

THE DETERRENT STRATEGY

(a) The Nuclear Deterrent

The basis of deterrence is a material factor: there must be great destructive capacity, a high degree of accuracy and adequate ability to penetrate. When dealing with protection by interception, we have already seen how important is this permanent struggle to retain adequate penetrative capacity. But since war is not actually being waged, the exact relative levels of capacity to intercept and to penetrate remain a matter of conjecture—as indeed does the enemy's capacity for destruction. This explains why the U2 flights were of such importance, since they made possible an estimate of the enemy's capacity for interception; it equally explains why the Soviet Union protested so violently when they realized the experiments their opponent was making.

There are therefore sufficient uncertainties already surrounding this material factor, but the situation becomes even more complicated when account is taken of the various hypotheses as to which of the two opponents would fire the first shot. This factor was of no great importance in the day when aircraft were still slow, because the warning time was such that attack and retaliatory attack passed each other in the air. Now that rockets are available, however, deterrent effect is nil if the destructive capacity of the first enemy strike is so great that our response would be considerably affected. The deterrent effect therefore depends not upon the

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capacity of the striking force, but upon its residual capacity after it has absorbed the first strike, in other words on its survival capacity. This has led to the development of survival tactics which are very expensive and very complicated; their object is first to cut the alert period practically to nothing (by high-power radar, satellites, automatic communications, electronic computers, etc.); second, to ensure that aircraft are in the air and missiles fired before the arrival of the strike (aircraft on airborne alert or at fifteen minutes notice, solid-fuel rockets, etc.); thirdly, to protect firing platforms either by mobility (atomic submarines) or by dispersion or by concrete, with the object of forcing the enemy to expend a large number of weapons on each target. The colour of the balance sheet of results from the first enemy strike and our retaliation will depend on the relative efficiency of the survival tactics on each side, on the estimated efficiency of the interception tactics and on the prognosis regarding the accuracy of the attack. The end result therefore becomes more and more a matter of conjecture.

Compared however to the psychological factor, which is both far more important and far more imponderable, all this is as simple as a geometrical theorem. The object is to produce an effect upon the enemy's thinking such that he will be prevented from employing his striking force. In the first place therefore, we must possess destructive capacity such that he is adequately afraid of it; secondly he must be caused to believe that in any given set of circumstances we are capable of launching a retaliatory attack either in response to his attack or as a first strike.

There have been many widely divergent appreciations of what, from the psychological point of view, is 'adequate' destructive capacity. Based on the precedent of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, some people believe that the destruction of a few major cities? would be enough to make any modern state capitulate. Others go/ further and reckon upon the proportion of the enemy economic potential which must be destroyed in order to cause him 'grave damage' and so inflict upon him such a reduction of capacity as to constitute a permanent and unacceptable handicap. Some American theorists hold that destruction of the enemy's nuclear weapons is the only effective method, because the enemy will thereby be disarmed. Destructive

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capacity must therefore be great enough to permit initiation of a very highly developed counter-battery action, the effects of which will be enhanced by the enemy's expenditure of his stocks of weapons in attacking our own launching points. These differing ideas are summarized in two conflicting tactical doctrines known as 'counter-force' tactics and 'counter-city' tactics. The choice between these two solutions to the problem is a difficult one; as we have seen, 'counter-force' tactics would be highly effective if we could be sure that its object would be nearly 100 per cent achieved. But apart from the fact that it is inevitably extremely expensive, its results become more and more incalculable as survival tactics improve. One is therefore tempted to take refuge in the 'counter-city' tactics which are easier and less expensive to operate and which have been called 'the strategy of the minimum deterrent'. It then becomes obvious however, that if we have not attacked—and therefore not destroyed the main enemy striking power, we shall be at the mercy of fearful retribution for each destructive strike we make. As the exchange proceeds we get nearer and nearer to a state of total mutual destruction; the balance may even be in our disfavour, in which case the whole procedure is senseless and we shall obviously be deterring ourselves at Yeast as effectively as the enemy. Moreover there is clearly no exact balance of deterrent effect; for instance, the United States would be more affected by the destruction of their major cities than would the Soviet Union. This may explain why the Americans favour the 'counter-force' tactics and the Soviet Union probably the 'counter-city' tactics.¹ The choice between these two forms of tactics brings out into the open certain highly important but unavowed motives. He who plays the 'counter-city' game must believe in the absolute validity of his deterrent, since if it does not deter and war results, he can fall back on nothing but mutual suicide; he who plays the 'counter-force' game must have certain doubts about the validity of his deterrent, since he admits that nuclear war is possible involving more or less full employment of the strategic striking forces—a fact which immediately increases his capacity to deter. For the second-rank nuclear powers (Great Britain, France and soon China), there is no choice, for they have no prospect of possessing the forces necessary

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to carry out 'counter-force' tactics. It is a pertinent question how far 'counter-city' tactics employed by one

1 'The estimated number of Soviet ICBM (which is relatively small) may indicate either that they have opted for 'counter-city' tactics or that they have encountered some difficulties preventing them from achieving a counter-force' programme, the latter being the theory to which the Soviets publicly adhere. One of the objects of the Cuba try-on in 1962 may have been to achieve a 'counter-force' capacity earlier.

of the second-rank powers, necessarily on a limited scale, is capable of deterring, in other words neutralizing, one of the two super powers. In this case the destructive capacity of the two sides being very different, the balance can only be restored by a second form of moral pressure—fear that, weak though it may be, one of these powers may nevertheless put its retaliatory force into action.

The first step in this operation is to ensure that the strike capacity is on a sound rational basis and as a result gives an impression of verisimilitude. This is known as credibility. Credibility depend not merely upon the material balance between the two sides, which we have just dealt with and which each side will maintain is in his favour, but also on the magnitude of the risk as compared with the issue at stake. If Sweden, for instance, had to defend her independence, the stake in her case would be limitless, whereas the advantage accruing to the U.S.S.R. by the conquest of Sweden would be limited. If Sweden committed suicide it would be like the captain of a ship blowing himself up rather than surrender to pirates. The damage which the U.S.S.R. might suffer would be disproportionate to any advantage she might gain. This is the logical justification for the smaller national deterrent. It is clearly a most dangerous game and presupposes a certain measure of confidence in the deterrent. If the enemy can be persuaded that we have made up our mind that in certain circumstances it will pay us to use our deterrent forces, he will be the more likely to believe in the threat they pose. It should be noted that the game

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can be played by both sides and that if two deterrents of equal credibility are used for a stake of the same importance, they tend to cancel each other out.

At this point a further factor in raising the pressure comes into play—that of irrational action. If you are dealing with a madman you must not drive him too far into the corner! Dulles' rigidity, Khrushchev flying into a rage and banging the table with his shoe, de Gaulle's haughty obstinacy are all part of this psychological game and it may be a more important factor than all the calculations based upon material considerations. The point is that the really decisive factor is the will to let loose the cataclysm. More important than anything else is to make others believe that you have this will. Everyone will be bluffing of course, but just how far?

All this adds up to an extraordinarily subtle exercise in dialectics. What we have to do is to estimate the enemy's probable reactions based on our appreciation of his resources and his will to use them, but also on an appreciation of what his estimate is of our resources and our will to use them, and even taking into account his estimate of our estimate of his resources and his will to use them. Estimates which must necessarily be conjectural, hypotheses and appreciations which must be based on intuition rather than reasoning, are therefore piled one on top of the other, and only one certain factor emerges from all this—uncertainty. In the final analysis the essential factor in deterrence is uncertainty. Uncertainty must therefore be the aim of a special form of tactics, the object being to increase or at the least to maintain uncertainty. Our dispositions on the ground must be such that they open up varied possibilities and this fact must be known to the enemy. Doubt must be cast upon anything which would help the enemy to estimate what our real intentions are. Obviously nothing must be done or said which would remove one of the hypotheses of which the enemy might stand in fear. For instance, campaigns to abolish tactical atomic weapons run completely counter to the established rules of deterrent strategy. The same applies to American statements on the 'missile gap' and abandonment of the strategy of massive retaliation.

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RESTRICTED(b) *Complementary Forms of Deterrent*

The resources at present available therefore, added to the factor of uncertainty, produce a certain level of deterrence; now that both sides have nuclear weapons, however, the nuclear deterrent is no longer absolutely effective. This amounts to saying that there is an area in which the deterrent is not effective, in other words that each side still has a certain freedom represented by the whole range of action starting from minor adventures through action on the periphery and ending with limited war; the criterion in each case is that the stake must be too small to justify use of the threat of nuclear retaliation. The effect of such actions, like most other things, must remain highly conjectural, be it noted in passing, but the result of all this is to open up a new area within the strategy of the deterrent, the aim of which is to use other methods to round off the deterrent effect of the threat of nuclear weapons; the object is to reduce and if possible eliminate the enemy's freedom of action.

There are two methods of achieving this deterrent effect. The first is a concrete one; it consists of facing the enemy with a complex of military forces adequate to defeat any operation he may undertake within the area of freedom of action which he believes he has. This is the basis of the 'shield' forces, i.e. tactical land and air or naval and air forces defending vulnerable areas. It is also the reason for the maintenance of mobile reserves capable of movement to threatened areas. The existence of these forces on the ground frees us from the famous 'all or nothing' dilemma, i.e. from the necessity to choose between embarking on a mutual holocaust or accepting a *fait accompli*. The second method is psychological; it consists of creating and maintaining a threat of retaliation in the event of a local conflict. This threat of escalation means that the importance of the issue at stake is once more clouded by uncertainty, even though initially it may have appeared small. This being so, the existence of tactical atomic weapons, with all the risks of escalation which their use would imply, plays a most important part in the strategy of the deterrent. Many regard this risk of escalation as a danger. It is so, if the deterrent is not effective. On the other hand, as part of the deterrent strategy it is an additional factor of

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safety. This aspect of the matter should not be forgotten.

This field of strategy, complementary to that of the nuclear deterrent, increases in importance the more the main nuclear deterrents cancel each other out. Nuclear retaliation becomes less and less 'credible'; so does the threat of escalation. The strategy of the deterrent, with all its vast expenditure, can do no better than reach an impasse; we are in fact tempted to revert to a non-nuclear strategy which would imply that on top of the exorbitantly expensive effort made in the nuclear field must come a comparable effort in that of conventional equipment— just as if the nuclear weapon did not exist. This is the present trend now that the striking forces have, or shortly will have, considerable survival capacity.

This is not to say, however, that we must go right back to the beginning, in other words to a situation similar to that obtaining before nuclear weapons existed. The mere fact that nuclear weapons do exist means that the risk remains, its magnitude of depending basically upon the factors of uncertainty and irrational action which we have dealt with above. So long as these factors still exert some influence, it is for instance inconceivable that there could be another great conventional war on the lines of 1939—45, since no one could be sure that in that case escalation would not take place. It is for this reason that conventional forces, even though small in size, can exert a considerable deterrent effect; the size of force it will be necessary to employ and the risks it would be necessary to run in order to defeat these forces would produce so serious a situation that there could be little hope of avoiding escalation. It would seem, therefore, as if there is now an almost complete deterrent system: the striking forces balance each other and therefore act as a deterrent against an all-out nuclear struggle; the conventional forces act as a deterrent against limited war, since the ever present risk of escalation will be a deterrent against entering upon limited war for any too important a stake. The effectiveness of these three forms of action depends to a great extent on the factor of uncertainty but, complementing each other and welded into a unified system, they make an overall balance possible.

Even in this situation, however, as experience has clearly shown, there remains a certain area of freedom of action; it is small but important

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and it is that exploited on the world chessboard by the Soviet indirect strategy. The deterrent, at least that in the form in which we have been studying it, has no power to prevent action in the political and economic field, or utilization of revolutionary movements in foreign countries, or even war conducted by proxy. As a result of logical thought we have succeeded in constructing a conventional deterrent complementary to the nuclear deterrent; the same process must be used to construct a deterrent system in the indirect field.

The West has been trying to find an effective solution; it has not yet found it, primarily because it has not really understood the problem. This is a highly important subject, but it is too complicated to be summarized here and will be dealt with separately. It is quite clear however that any small crack in the deterrent system opens up for a clever enemy possibilities of action which in the long run might endanger the entire security system of the West.

STRATEGY IN WAR

However hard we may try to deter, there can be no certainty that war will not break out, particularly in view of the factors of uncertainty and irrational action emphasized above. It may be accepted that unless someone goes mad (which is always possible—we had Hitler not so long ago), war is likely to break out only as a result of 'miscalculation'. In other words one side must have made an over-optimistic estimate of the enemy's probable reactions; someone must have thought that they could do something with impunity and found that they had in fact unleashed the catastrophe. In that event what should strategy in the nuclear age be?

Initially, when deterrent strategy was based primarily on the doctrine of massive retaliation, war strategy and deterrent strategy were the same thing; the fire plan worked out in order to deter would have been put into operation. The result would have been colossal destruction on each side; one side (presumably the enemy) would be put out of action and the phase of finishing the enemy off undertaken with 'what was left'; this was known as 'the broken back strategy'. The first phase of a war was therefore a gigantic fully planned exercise in destruction; this was to be followed by an

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exploitation phase, the details of which were difficult to forecast because of the manifold imponderables resulting from what was euphemistically termed 'the nuclear exchange'.

This was a somewhat over-simplified concept, to say the least, but it still has much influence on military thinking, not only because it has become a habit, but also because all peacetime exercises designed to test and improve the quality of the deterrent have been centred round 'the nuclear exchange'; this has tended to make people believe that such will be the pattern of a future war.

Fortunately this is not the case, or at least this pattern is purely hypothetical and the hypothesis that the highest stakes will be played for at the start of the game is among the least likely. As the threat of the enemy's nuclear weapons became more formidable, the notion gradually began to gain ground that strategy in war must differ from the strategy of the deterrent. The object of deterrent strategy is to instill fear; it must therefore clearly have the capacity to inflict the most horrifying destruction, precisely with the object of not having to use that capacity. If destruction is going to be mutual, however, who gains anything out of it? He who initiates an action the response to which will entail his own death, is merely indulging in a form of harakiri. This is no strategy. On the contrary, we must do all in our power to avoid this extreme situation. This is logical reasoning and it must be assumed that it will be followed by both sides; it is therefore highly unlikely that the enemy will start the conflict by a massive nuclear attack, Such a policy could only be justified if he had a considerable technical advantage and therefore could be reasonably sure that he could put us out of action with the first strike— an unlikely contingency if the striking forces -possess adequate survival capacity. This being so, it is more likely that the enemy will open hostilities by a more or less limited action. The question then is: what should the response be.

Surprisingly the question of the response has been the subject of prolonged controversy. Common sense would seem to indicate that an attempt should be made to limit the conflict; many have, however, contested this theory, pointing out that any declared intention to limit the conflict could only reduce the value of the deterrent and that a real massive attack

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is the only method of stopping the enemy launching his limited attack. Whether explicitly or by implication the argument continued that the destruction achieved by a massive attack would be such that the enemy's response would be reduced considerably, i.e. to a tolerable level. This is a most weighty argument in the context of the deterrent and I will deal with it later. The deciding factor in the argument, however, is that it has recently become clear that, whatever happens, the effect of the enemy's response will be terrible. For this reason President Kennedy was a supporter of the school which wished to revoke the principle of response by massive retaliation. General Maxwell Taylor has set out the new war strategy very clearly; he called it the 'flexible response'.

The strategy of the flexible response means that for each enemy action there should be an appropriate response employing sufficient force to defeat the enemy but no more than is necessary for that purpose. This does not imply that we must model our procedure on that of the enemy (for instance the response to a conventional attack might be defence using tactical atomic weapons or even a limited strategic nuclear attack); what it does mean is that each case will be treated on its merits and that one will only be driven to use massive retaliation in the last resort. The aim of this strategy is to produce an effective response while at the same time keeping the conflict limited.

The original feature of this strategy is that it combines local military action with the overall deterrent, the object being to keep the conflict within defined limits. By holding in reserve the threat of massive retaliation, the 'peacetime' deterrent retains much of its validity. Since the deterrent effect will be mutual, both sides will aim to keep the conflict limited. If neither side breaks the rules and if the issue at stake is sufficiently limited, the bout will be decided on points and there will be no escalation.

This is a highly dangerous game but there seems to be no alternative; to keep it as safe as possible, there must be a highly developed system of control to ensure that escalation does not take place spontaneously as a result of action on the spot and so turn a local incident into all-out war. The result is a special form of tactics; a certain number of ascending thresholds are laid down which must not be crossed without special political

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authorization; there must also be safeguards to ensure that no threshold will be crossed if that authorization has not been given. War therefore takes on the form of a ladder with a number of rungs (local incident, conventional war, use of tactical atomic weapons, limited strategic nuclear offensive, full-scale strategic nuclear offensive, etc.). The hope is that any trial of strength, once started, can be decided at one of the lower levels.

This strategy may appear inevitable but there are two serious objections to it. The first comes somewhat naturally from those countries likely to be the scene of a 'limited' conflict. They do not find the idea of playing the role of battlefield—perhaps an atomic battlefield—very attractive. If the disaster was of world-wide proportions, the sacrifices they may be called upon to make would appear less unfair. Is not their security being sold off cheap, they say, for the benefit of the vital areas which could have been used to force the enemy to disperse his effort. I have already referred to the second objection; it is concerned with the deterrent. If it is accepted that a conflict must be kept limited, is not this tantamount to an invitation to start one and thereby to a reduction in the effect of the deterrent; and if a limited conflict should start, will not the risks of escalation be all the greater?

There is a certain truth in both these objections; the two risks exist. But we must not over-estimate their validity. It is true that there is some conflict between the methods employed by the deterrent strategy (the threat of escalation) and those employed by the war strategy (limitation of the conflict). But the two problems are not coincident in time; the deterrent strategy is in operation during the period preceding the war strategy. Moreover, both have two factors in common, those of uncertainty and the possibility of irrational action, which we have already emphasized; this to some extent reduces the contradiction between them because you can never be sure that escalation will not take place, even if the purpose of strategy is quite clearly to keep the conflict limited. The effect of the deterrent can therefore be maintained and the 'reserved' areas cannot play fast and loose with the security of those areas in which the initial battles would take place. In fact the security of all areas and the continued validity of the deterrent are indissolubly linked. There are, moreover, certain

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actions, in themselves of a limited nature, which can be used to reinforce and underline the interconnection between the two; for instance a certain enemy target can be declared a hostage which will be destroyed by the strategic forces if such and such a forward area on our side is attacked; it can further be stated that if the enemy replies by a limited strategic offensive, such and such additional enemy targets will be destroyed. This limited employment of the strategic forces on an ascending scale is the method whereby those nations whose territory may possibly be a battlefield may be brought to feel that they are not being abandoned.

This limited-liability concept of war strategy does not however lead, as some people state that it must, to laying down beforehand 'theatres of operations' on the one hand and 'sanctuaries' on the other, in other words areas in which aggression would not lead to retaliation and where we should be prepared to accept the outcome of the struggle between the forces on the spot, and on the other hand areas protected by the threat of massive retaliation. To divide the deterrent in this way, *a priori* and on a geographical basis, would result merely in reducing the security of the theatres of operations and considerably increasing the ever-present risk of escalation should a conflict occur in the 'sanctuaries'. A threat of automatic massive retaliation would not, in fact, increase the security of the 'sanctuaries' (any more than it would that of the theatres of operations) since in the present state of affairs retaliation would merely produce a devastating enemy response; one would therefore merely have the somewhat sour satisfaction of having wreaked upon the enemy approximately equivalent destruction to that which we ourselves would have suffered. The truth is that the deterrent must be operative both for the theatres of operations and for the 'sanctuaries' and that in both cases the deterrent must be 'graduated', in other words it must have the capacity for 'flexible' response, which in order to keep intact the precious factor of uncertainty must be to some extent incalculable.

It would seem, therefore, that in the nuclear age the use of force will as a rule be limited to two types of war: in vital areas action is likely to be limited, probably extremely violent but very short, the object being to produce *a fait accompli* followed immediately by negotiation; in peripheral

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areas conflict is likely to take the form of prolonged wars of attrition at a low level of intensity and using conventional or guerrilla methods. An example of the first type is the Israeli campaign in Sinai and of the second the wars in Korea, Indo-China and Laos. Any other form of war would inevitably lead rapidly to escalation.

It would be unsafe to think, however, that the deterrent effect of the existence of nuclear weapons is enough to stop all armed conflict; the last ten years have proved that, even when the West had considerable nuclear superiority, such conflicts were still possible. Now that there is a balance between the striking forces on each side, there may in future be a considerable increase both in the violence of such conflicts and in the importance of the issues at stake; to reduce this possibility we must take adequate measures considerably to reinforce the deterrent effect of our nuclear forces by adequate shield forces and we must ensure that our deterrent is maintained at a high level by the use of appropriate tactics, the importance of which can hardly be exaggerated.

THE EVOLUTION OF STRATEGY IN THE NUCLEAR AGE

The preceding paragraphs have been no more than an analysis in logical order of the principal ideas governing strategy in the nuclear age. This is a sufficiently complex subject in any case and in order not to complicate it further, I have not dealt with the various forms of tactics though they have an important bearing upon the problem of strategy (e.g. interception, penetration, survival, arms control, shields, uncertainty, etc.)

The best way of getting a general idea of the problem and of the interplay of the various factors is to run over the development during the last fifteen years of the struggle between the Soviet Union and the United States. I have somewhat arbitrarily divided this into four phases; each opens with some technical advance on the Soviet side having important strategic consequences, the sequel being a corresponding strategy on the American side resulting from some particular technical achievement.

(1) During the first phase the U.S.S.R. had not really demobilized after the war and still had very large land and air forces. Using an operational strategy which was partly military and partly revolutionary, she

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was in a fair way to being able to subvert and take over Europe. At this stage the nuclear capacity of the U.S.A.F. was still in embryo; the United States therefore replied to the threat by a deterrent strategy based on European reconstruction (the Marshall plan) and conventional rearmament of Europe for defence (the NATO Treaty and the Lisbon Plan); at the same time an offensive nuclear air striking force was formed to implement the policy of massive retaliation. Financial assistance was given to the European economy, M.A.P. equipment was shipped to Europe, atomic bombs and the aircraft to carry them were developed and a complete network of bases was established on the periphery based on the radius of action of the B.36. This strategy check-mated the Soviet political and military machine. The deterrent was therefore effective and the Soviet drive in Europe was halted.

(2) During the second phase the U.S.S.R. could reply only by a defensive deterrent strategy combined with a counter-offensive in the field of indirect strategy (Korea, Indo-China). Since initially material resources were not available, the Soviet deterrent was primarily psychological, the main feature being the antinuclear campaign conducted by the Peace Congresses; this in fact achieved certain results at least in Europe and in the uncommitted world. Very soon, however, thanks to an unprecedented scientific and espionage effort, the U.S.S.R. had managed to construct a small number of atomic bombs and to build up a rudimentary striking force by copying the B.36. At the same time she stepped up her air defensive system by installing a radar chain. For the United States this was the first indication of a nuclear threat and the existence of any effective air defence; she kept up the validity of her deterrent strategy by increasing the threat of retaliation. This was all the more necessary because European rearmament was slow and inadequate, partly because French forces had been drawn off by the Indo-China war and in spite of the anticipated formation of West German armed forces. The air threat had therefore to be maintained at a level enabling the shield forces to be no more than a tripwire for the strategic forces. Just at this moment the effectiveness of the retaliatory force was considerably increased by the advent of the thermonuclear bomb. In spite of the Soviet air defences penetration capacity was maintained by

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the development of high-altitude aircraft flying above the enemy radar ceiling and capable of out-pacing his fighters. During the period 1954—5 American superiority was unchallenged. Not only was the deterrent fully maintained but the Soviets were forced to call off their indirect campaigns in Indo-China and Korea and to accept compromise solutions should be noted that at this point the United States could, as General MacArthur demanded that it should, have obtained considerably greater advantage from its position.

(3) During the third phase the Soviet Union began to catch up the Americans in the field of deterrent strategy. They also now had the thermo-nuclear bomb, together with a not inconsiderable striking force and they stepped up the effectiveness of their air defence system; this enabled them to resume their indirect counter-offensive in the Middle East and in North Africa. The fact that the Soviet Union was now in possession of the thermo-nuclear weapon was a considerable danger and, faced with several alternative courses of action, American strategy faltered. There were many questions: should the deterrent be maintained by further reinforcement of the threat of retaliation or should an air-defence system be set up in America partially to neutralize the enemy threat? Could the threat of retaliation be made so credible that it could be used under all circumstances, even in minor incidents; if not must recourse be had to other forms of deterrent and must the tactical shield forces therefore be reinforced in order not to be forced to choose between capitulation and an all-out response? A great debate thus opened in 1955; it ended with the defeat of the offensive school of thought which wished to initiate a large-scale programme of non-interceptible rockets. General Gavin, the protagonist of this solution, resigned.

The decision was: first to construct a gigantic anti-aircraft defence system covering the American Continent; second the development by S.A.C. of anti-surprise tactics (aircraft on alert, etc.) and the evolution of inter-continental bombers which, being based in Fortress America, would be out of range of the initial Soviet strike; third to reinforce the European shield forces, which still had inadequate conventional strength, with tactical atomic weapons allocated in large numbers to the members of NATO but

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retained under strict American control (the policy known as the MC.70 policy). This 1955 decision achieved a certain temporary stabilization,¹ but was clearly too conservative. It proved to be an error and its results were seriously felt during the subsequent phase.

(4) During the fourth phase the Soviet Union was successful with a rocket programme which was ahead of the Americans and on lines which the latter had thought they need not pursue. By 1957 the Soviet Union was in possession of an inter-continental missile and had launched the first satellite. Shortly thereafter they reached the moon and demonstrated in trials that both their accuracy and the yield of their explosions were high. They were thus on the point of catching up and overtaking the Americans in deterrent strategy because the American air-defence system, just set up at such great cost but effective only against aircraft, was no protection against the threat of the Soviet rockets. At the same time the Soviet Union reinforced their air defences and equipped their land forces to fight an offensive war by providing them with tactical atomic weapons and completely motorizing them including a high proportion of amphibious vehicles; they were thus in a position to get the better of American strategy in all fields. This was a strong position and from the psychological point of view it was reinforced by the spectacular

It did make it possible to halt the Soviet drive in the Middle East by action in Lebanon and Jordan in 1957.

results of the Sputniks. The Soviet Union thereupon reopened the problem of Berlin, thus calling in question the whole position of Germany within NATO and challenged the United States directly in the Congo and in Cuba.

Fortunately for the United States, Soviet superiority could not become effective with a flick of the fingers. When Kennedy came to power at the beginning of 1961 the 'missile gap' was still in the future, but there was not a moment to lose. The President was surrounded by a whole school of intellectuals who had given much thought to these problems and they produced a well-thought-out strategy developed during the third phase, i.e. while the strategy of massive retaliation was still valid. As a first step this

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latter strategy was officially abandoned. Strategy was now to be that of the 'graduated deterrent', the object being to obtain a balance in all fields—nuclear, conventional, and indirect; should war break out efforts were to be made to keep it limited by means of the 'flexible response', the theory of which we have already dealt with. As a result the nuclear striking force became part of the defensive 'shield' rather than the 'sword' but its capacity for powerful response had at all costs to be maintained. With this in view rockets such as Polaris and Minuteman, which had fortunately been kept under study during the preceding phase, were developed and survival tactics were adopted (atomic submarines, concrete emplacements, mobile launching pads, etc.) to ensure that the delivery system would not be destroyed by the first enemy strike. In the conventional field, the main step was to demand from the NATO allies reinforcement of their tactical shield forces which had now become an essential element of strategy. To meet the indirect threat, a strong air—transported reserve of conventional forces was formed. Finally, to prevent automatic escalation in the event of war, more effective tactics for the control of nuclear weapons were developed and efforts were made to indicate to the Soviet Union.(which pretended not to understand) methods by which conflicts could be kept limited.

This readjustment came just in time to fill the 'missile gap' which had appeared imminent and at the same time it proved that the Soviet advantage in the rocket field was not as great as had been feared. All intelligence sources agreed that the Soviet inter-continental striking force was still of limited capacity and adequate only for 'counter-city', not for 'counter-force' tactics. The United States had made a very considerable effort and appeared once more to be in a position of clear superiority. In this situation, Mr. McNamara felt able to announce his strategy of the graduated deterrent based on the flexible response.

At this point apparently, the Soviet Union attempted in their turn to bridge the 'missile gap' by installing medium-range missiles in Cuba; this would have made it possible for them to adopt 'counter-force' tactics against the United States and thus presented an extreme danger for Strategic Air Command aircraft. They would thus have been able to reach in a few months, and using J.R.B.M. only, a position which they could not

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have achieved for several years using I.C.B.M. This was a highly risky operation since the Soviet Union was in a position of local inferiority and Cuba was within easy invasion range for the Americans; it seems to have been partially camouflaged by an anaesthetizing propaganda campaign proclaiming the Soviet determination to restrict themselves in Cuba to defensive installations only. The Americans, however, realized the danger in time. Their reaction was firm and immediate but restrained. Being in a position of inferiority the Soviet Union had to give way. This was the first passage of arms in the potential war of nuclear deterrence; it was conducted on both sides accurately, realistically and coolly and ended in success for the Americans. From this point, therefore, the Soviet Union was forced to match the headlong pace of American rearmament at the risk of exhausting an economy considerably less powerful than that of their rich opponent.

(5) There are, however, already indications of a fifth phase; the Soviet Union is still spectacularly ahead in space techniques; this may result in the production of new type weapons and it is impossible to tell where it may lead us. Moreover their nuclear policy, based on the principle of the 'biggest big weapon', may, with a smaller number of weapons, balance off the American system of a large number of smaller weapons, clearly a more expensive policy. As space techniques develop and the neutron bomb (for instance) is produced, we may well see new developments in the field of deterrent strategy.

At the same time, however, there is a new school of thought, represented primarily by Kissinger; this would put the emphasis of deterrent strategy on reinforcement of the shield forces. The theory is that since the dangers inherent in strategic nuclear war are unacceptable, we should fall back upon a deterrent based on direct protection of threatened territory, if necessary using tactical atomic weapons. This idea represents a swing back from air strategy towards the more time-honoured land strategy, and there is certainly a considerable element of truth in it. If it were proved effective, it would go a long way to re-establishing some military stability in the world.

Certain thoughts emerge from this rapid review of developments during the last fifteen years.

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In the first place each situation reached has been remarkably precarious and each defensive system developed of temporary validity only. Both equipment and tactics have become more obsolescent in a period of five years than they would previously have done during a whole inter-war period. This vast expenditure of wealth appears less and less justified when the uncertainty of the security it achieves is considered. The result must one day be either a war or economic bankruptcy or some agreement on the limitation of armaments; peace cannot be maintained for ever by this level of tension.

A further important comment is that, although the Soviet Union has almost succeeded by a masterly feat of energy in climbing the ladder of deterrence, the reason is that the United States has twice, when in a position of considerable advantage (during the first phase and even more during the second), failed to take full advantage of it. This shows that, although the contest may be close, errors are not necessarily immediately punished. The Soviet Union may play a tougher game than the Americans, but it seems improbable that they would have the courage to push any advantage too far, unless it would quite clearly be of lasting value. The underlying reason for this caution is the factor of uncertainty as a result of which no one as a rule knows exactly where he stands.

Although there has been no major action in this continuous struggle, it is clear that since the beginning of the third phase, the general graph of deterrent capacity has moved in favour of the Soviet Union. The strategy of massive retaliation was an offensive strategy. That of the graduated deterrent is defensive and its effectiveness against the Soviet indirect strategy has yet to be proved.

As far as the mechanics of strategy are concerned, the evolution of this period shows clearly how close is the relationship between new equipment and the resulting new tactical possibilities, which in turn may lead to a change in the strategic balance. A reverse process then starts: in order to re-establish the strategic balance a strategic choice must be made (as in 1955 for instance); the result is that the tactics which it is desired to employ are defined (interception, penetration, survival, etc.); from these will be deduced the new equipment which must be developed (radar,

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rockers, submarines, etc.). Some writers such as Rougeron have stated that the only strategy which now exists is that of resources. This is correct to the extent that one must have the resources necessary for the strategy desired. This is not to say, however, that new equipment must govern strategy. On the contrary, logically inventors must be guided by strategic requirements, or at least strategy must choose from the inventions available those which best meet its requirements. There may be circumstances in which one side is without the necessary resources (as was the Soviet Union as long as it had no nuclear force); in that case it is the job of strategy to find the corrective (e.g. the psychological campaign of the Peace Congresses) and to select a course of action capable of defeating the enemy's strategy but employing the resources available. It is all a question of intelligence and imagination.

CONCLUSIONS ON NUCLEAR STRATEGY

It is clear that a very large number of very different conclusions can be drawn from any study of strategy in the nuclear age. I shall do no more than indicate the most important.

(1) 'Nuclear' strategy is inevitably conducted on the level of total strategy. There is too much psychology, finance and economics in it for it to be anything else. It is therefore a specialized form, the modern form if you like, of 'total strategy' in the direct category.

Any successful strategy has always been total, even when it was apparently primarily operational as in the case of Alexander and Napoleon. But the panache of famous battles has often obscured the fact that it was total, so much so that even the historians have been deceived. The nuclear weapon has so far produced no battles; what it has done is to force us to realize how total the art of strategy must be and how powerful is the influence exerted by the various factors. Total strategy is no longer something which can be taken for granted and conducted haphazardly and more or less intuitively by Heads of Governments; total strategy must now be thought out scientifically. Total strategy has therefore become a process of thought of which any leader must be master. Cuba was a good example of that.

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(2) The total strategy of the nuclear age has swept away the strategic ideas of the nineteenth century, in particular those of the Clausewitz school which had exerted so baleful an influence by misconstruing the teachings of its master. This cannot but be to the good; but we now have to construct a new system and we must try this time not to build up too specialized a theory which might lead us into even more serious errors. What we must not do, therefore, is to work out a 'nuclear strategy' valid for the present particular situation; there must be a total strategy capable of covering not merely the phenomenon of the nuclear weapon and its possible successors (outer space, biological warfare, etc.) but also the more limited problems and indirect warfare.

(3) This new strategy must also cover the vast changes which have resulted from the application to defence of the resources of science and industry.

The whole scope of defence problems has changed, not only because of the range and power of the new weapons but also because of the enormous expenditure they entail. The increased scale of these problems must inevitably very soon affect the size of a viable State. It was the problem of security which brought about the city state and the kingdoms of the sixteenth century; so once again it is likely to be the security problem which will play a decisive role in the formation of international entities.

The nature of defence problems has also changed as a result of the impact of the industrial factor. Preparation for action is now more important than action itself, since the *fact* of the possession of superior resources is more decisive than the manner in which they are employed. This is the complete opposite of the art of strategy of Napoleon's day; he said that 'it was all a question of putting it into practice'. Security which formerly depended upon the direct protection of armed forces, is now a more abstract notion, depending upon being in a more advanced state of preparation than your enemy. Instead of the affair of outposts, we now have scientific espionage. The concept of manoeuvre is becoming more and more abstract; instead of forces manoeuvring over an area of ground and shown in blue and red on the map with circles and arrows, we now have the opposing scientific and industrial potentials manoeuvring over a period of

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time—something which it is quite impossible to represent graphically. In any estimate of potential, quality (moral and technical) has become far more important than quantity and any appreciation of the situation has therefore become more and more of a subjective exercise. In the old days the time scale was small (a nineteenth-century campaign might last a month, a battle a few hours); in the great wars of the twentieth century the time scale was longer, first because of the size of the theatres of operation and secondly because of the lead time required for production of the material resources found to be essential (because the requirement had not been foreseen). In the logistic war now in progress in time of peace, the production lead time is of the order of five years. Calculations must therefore be made for a period five years ahead based upon a future situation which can only be highly conjectural. But this forecasting has become an absolutely vital thought process.

The continuous employment of political and revolutionary techniques has produced similar consequences but on an even longer time scale; it was only from 1948 onwards, for instance, with the victory of Mao Tse-tung in China that the U.S.S.R. reaped the dividends of the Congress of Baku in 1921.

(4) Since in essence therefore any struggle will be decided 'beforehand' and 'in peacetime', each side will normally try to reach a decision without having recourse to war, war being now little more than a mathematical check on the efficiency of the preparations made. This is the logic upon which the deterrent strategy has been built and the process is no doubt not yet finished.

The evolution of the deterrent strategy illustrates the growing importance of additional forms of deterrent complementary to that of the threat of nuclear retaliation. Like all its predecessors, therefore, the nuclear weapon is an addition to the family of older weapons and does not supplant them. The armoury now ranges from cold steel to the H-bomb. Cold steel may now be little used but it has not disappeared altogether. It is the same with the less outdated forms of weapons known as 'conventional'. A new balance has been reached but, contrary to the prognostications of some of our modern prophets, the existence of large-scale conventional

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forces is still an essential element of this balance. The deterrent system will no doubt have to be rounded off in the realm of indirect strategy by other methods which we as yet hardly understand.

(5) The development of the deterrent strategy tends more and more to reduce the area of freedom of action in which force can be used. The effort of mutual deterrence already absorbs an enormous proportion of national energies and resources and it may therefore be that actual open conflict will be limited to peripheral action on an apparently very modest scale. The object of such peripheral action may well be to allow each side to take the measure of the resources and the fund of determination which the other has in reserve; if therefore war were to break out, there should be a good chance that it could be kept limited and decided 'on points'. At all events this is how the crises have been resolved which have so far been produced by the manoeuvres and threats of the indirect strategy struggle. This was how the Cuba crisis was settled and that was in the direct nuclear strategy field. We are getting further and further away, therefore, from the type of all-out conflict which the highly-coloured theories of the nineteenth century envisaged. The modern game is essentially a strategic game, more closely controlled than ever by the political authorities.

The fact, however, that there is still an area of freedom of manoeuvre for the use of force, however small that area may be, means that the minor actions which are thus possible take on a new importance. Old-style war with its battles was a sort of bloody surgical operation. The new-style war with all its nuances is more analogous to the creeping infection of an illness. We must not be deceived by the fact that it acts more slowly and less dramatically; the changes in the power complex which little by little it may produce, will later be seen to constitute a worldwide cataclysm. It is vital, therefore, that we should discover and know how to use a 'medicine' so as to nip in the bud those conflicts, apparently of minor importance, which exploit, not only the decolonization fever but the crisis of readjustment to the demands of modern production and to the population explosion which the miracle of modern scientific medicine has produced. This is the problem which I have called 'indirect strategy' and it is the most urgent problem facing us today. I shall deal with it in the next chapter.

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(6) It may well be, moreover, that a real technique for keeping the peace may emerge from the strategy of deterrence. If one looks at the progress we have made in this matter over the last ten years there are perhaps grounds for thinking that there will be further progress and that we shall one day arrive at a more rational and more efficient organization of the peace than the attempts made so far which have been over-weighted by emotion and moral principles. A strategy of keeping the peace may ultimately lead us to a stable balance of power under which real arms control will be possible, or to the formation of an international force which could swing the balance against any disturber of the peace. Such an ideal may still be over the horizon but it is not out of range of thought. If our search for peace is conducted intelligently, we may eventually find solutions which in favourable circumstances could be effective in practice.

(7) In short—are we moving towards mutual suicide or peace? There can be no certain answer to this basic question. We should have to be sure that peace or war depended only upon the will of man. Since the beginning of time, however, war has been the plaything, first of the will of the Gods and then of the inexorable march of history and in modern times of the pressure of population.' If it can be accepted that the choice between peace and war is something to be decided by man and subject to the laws of reason, then it may be that the nuclear weapon, by increasing out of all proportion the risks of war, may have brought a greater stability to peace. Unless fate plays a trick on us or some physical catastrophe overtakes us, the probability is that force will be employed in a more and more civilized manner as an adjunct to more and more sophisticated politico-strategic schemings. There will be no more leaps in the dark based on emotion—or at least there will be far fewer. As a result there will be no more 'great wars' such as those which have plagued the twentieth century and which have undoubtedly been at the root of Europe's premature decline.

But will this be true peace? Certainly not. Man's thirst for power will persist and, allied to those forces which we still only vaguely understand but which govern the economic and biological evolution of the human race, will invariably find a battlefield on which will be decided the relinquishment of power and possessions by one side and their acquisition by another as

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the pendulum of power swings. War in the old style by military forces with drums beating and colours flying may become a curiosity or disappear altogether. Its disappearance will be balanced by the development of revolutionary war, by endemic-

1 See Bouthoud: 'Les Guerres. Elements de polemologie.' Payot 1951.

-struggle, by repeated crises, by unremitting scientific endeavour in the industrial and military field.

The human race of the twentieth century, haunted by the two fruitless catastrophes of 1914—18 and 1939—45 and now armed with all the resources of modern science, may perhaps at last have found a method of preventing a repetition of these catastrophes. But the irony of fate will make man pay a price and it will not be that for which he hoped: the struggle may be continued in a minor key but it will be continued for ever.

War on the grand scale and peace in its true sense may be buried side by side.

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RESTRICTED**CHAPTER 4****INDIRECT STRATEGY****MEANING OF THE TERM**

The term indirect strategy may appear ambiguous and confusing. Liddell Hart has brilliantly developed a theory of the indirect approach which he holds to be the strategy. In the operational sphere the essence of this is not to take the bull by the horns in other words not to challenge the enemy to a direct trial of strength but to attack him only after he has been shaken surprised and thrown off balance by an approach from an improbable direction, which he therefore did not expect. Examples are Alexander who captured Palestine and Egypt before marching on Persia; Scipio who conquered Spain before attacking Carthage, and so on. The allied landing in North Africa in 1942 and the Serbian campaign in 1918 come into the category of the indirect approach.

In fact the strategy of the indirect approach is a 'must' for the side which cannot be certain of being strong enough to beat the enemy in battle on ground of the enemy's choosing. Liddell Hart rightly points out that no one can ever be certain of being strong enough and that, even if the strength is there, victory will be gained at reduced cost. For this reason he recommends systematic use of the indirect approach. In the majority of cases he is no doubt right; the fact remains, however, that the central feature of his theory is to redress the balance between the opposing forces before the test of battle and to do so by manoeuvre and not by fighting. Instead of confronting the enemy direct, he would play a more subtle game, the object of which is to compensate for inferiority in numbers.

In terms of conventional military strategy, this central thesis is translated into manoeuvre on the ground (the indirect approach); in terms of total strategy it has been applied in a somewhat different form whenever one side wished to achieve some result with military resources which for one reason or another were inferior to those by which it was likely to be opposed (resources available might be smaller overall or there might be

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some deterrent to the use of anything larger). For this reason I propose to give this strategy the general title 'indirect strategy'.

Because of the existence of the nuclear weapon and the agitation for decolonization, there is a wide field open to this strategy and, as we shall see, it has become extremely complex and frighteningly effective. Because it is indirect its insidious nature is frequently not understood, and it is for this reason that we have suffered a continuous series of defeats in this field. There can therefore be nothing more important than to try to understand how it works.

The essential difference between the indirect approach and indirect strategy is not merely that the former has a geographical connotation, as pointed out above. The object of the indirect approach is the attainment of military victory; it is only the preparatory manoeuvring for this victory which is indirect. I therefore place the indirect approach in the category of direct strategy. The essential feature of indirect strategy is that it seeks to obtain a result by methods other than military victory.

A further characteristic of indirect strategy is that in it freedom of action appears in a very special guise. In this day and age (and this was the case even before the advent of the nuclear weapon) there is a definite area of freedom of action within which any conflict must be kept confined; the boundaries of this area are set by the repercussions which the course of the conflict may have upon the international situation. In 1912 for instance, the Balkan powers were prevented from pushing through to Constantinople lest Russia install herself there; in Morocco, France had to keep an eye on the interests of England and Spain and so on; in a previous chapter I have shown what an error the Germans made by invading Belgium in 1914 and initiating submarine warfare in 1916. The restraining factor in those days was fear of what Clausewitz meant by 'escalation to the limit', in other words fear that a conflict about an issue of limited importance might light up a conflagration out of all proportion to the object in view. Between 1936 and 1939 Hitler's object was to reach his objectives without starting a world war. Now that the nuclear weapon exists, the danger of escalation has become so great that the area of freedom of manoeuvre is considerably reduced. That it still exists however, is proved by the number of limited

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conflicts which have taken place since 1950 (Korea, Indo-China, North Africa, Israel, Hungary, Suez, the Congo, Cuba, Berlin).

The more restricted the area of freedom of action becomes, the more important it is to make the best use of it, since it is then the only means of assaulting the *status quo* which the nuclear deterrent is supposed to *maintain*. The more restricted the area of freedom of action has become therefore, the more delicate have been the processes by which use was made of it, until these processes have become *scarcely* recognizable as aspects of warfare. The results achieved have nevertheless been great, greater than would have resulted from a major war: the West has been bundled out of China and almost all of South East Asia, there have been upheavals in the Middle East and Africa is in turmoil, even Central America and South America have been affected. All these events are not merely the inevitable product of historical evolution; they are the result of a very definite strategy which uses meticulously worked out manoeuvres making judicious use of natural tendencies; I propose to call it indirect strategy. It is this strategy which has proved the best antidote to what has been called 'the nuclear paralysis'.

Indirect strategy is therefore the art of making the best use of the limited area of freedom of action left us by the deterrent effect of the existence of nuclear weapons and of gaining important and decisive victories in spite of the fact that the military resources which can be employed for the purpose must in general remain strictly limited.

Starting from this definition, we will now try to see what are the rules of this extremely delicate game.

THE CONCEPT OF INDIRECT STRATEGY

The first essential in indirect strategy is to decide how great, in the existing situation, the area of freedom of action is and then to make sure that the extent of this area can be maintained or if possible increased, while at the same time reducing to the minimum that available to the enemy.

We come back here to the principle emphasized when analysing strategy in general. Any dialectical contest is a contest for freedom of action. The truly original feature of indirect strategy, however, is that the freedom of action

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available is dependent only to a small degree upon those operations which may be undertaken within the geographical area in question; it will be determined almost entirely by factors outside this area, e.g. an estimate of the validity of the nuclear deterrent, an estimate of international reactions, of the enemy's moral fiber and of his sensitivity both to external pressure and to any action which it is proposed to take and so on.

The likelihood of success of any particular operation is therefore dependent upon the success of action on the world-wide plane. I propose to call this the 'exterior manoeuvre'. All too often its importance has not been realized; people have not perceived that the focal point of the struggle was not in the area where fighting was taking place but outside it. It has been this serious misappreciation which has been at the root of the grave defeats we have suffered.

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Concept of the 'Exterior Manoeuvre'

The central feature of the 'exterior manoeuvre' is to assure for oneself the maximum freedom of action while at the same time paralysing the enemy by a multitude of deterrent checks, somewhat as the Lilliputians tied up Gulliver. As with all operations designed to deter, action will of course be primarily psychological; political, economic, diplomatic and military measures will all be combined towards the same end.

The procedures employed to achieve this deterrent effect range from the most subtle to the most brutal: appeal will be made to the legal formulae of national and international law, play will be made with moral and humanitarian susceptibilities and there will be attempts to prick the enemy's conscience by making him doubtful of the justice of his cause. By these methods, opposition from some section of the enemy's internal public opinion will be roused and at the same time some sector of international public opinion will be whipped up; the result will be a real moral coalition and attempts will be made to co-opt the more unsophisticated sympathizers by arguments based upon their own preconceived ideas. This climate of opinion will be exploited at U.N.O. for instance, or at other international gatherings; primarily, however, it will be used as a threat to prevent the enemy undertaking some particular action. There will be threatened or actual indirect intervention by the despatch of arms, specialists and volunteers, If necessary, play will be made with the threat of political and economic retaliation and finally there will be the threat of direct action, possibly even including the use of nuclear weapons. This is no exhaustive list but the reader will recognize many well-known examples from recent history.

But procedures of this nature can only be successful if two conditions obtain: first the military deterrent force (whether nuclear or conventional) must pose a sufficient overall threat to prevent the enemy reacting on a major scale: second, all the actions envisaged must be in consonance with a definite line of policy so conceived that it forms a logical thesis. When, for instance, the United States, which is liberal by tradition, became involved in Cuba even though indirectly, as in the Bay of Pigs operation,

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they struck a psychologically false note; this would have been of little consequence in direct strategy (particularly if the operation had been successful),¹ but in indirect strategy they had to pay dearly for it.

When France gave up her colonies in Black Africa and voluntarily evacuated Morocco and Tunisia, she struck a false note by clinging on to Algeria (alternatively the evacuation was the false note). Choice of the political line to be followed is therefore a decision fundamental to the success of the entire operation.

It is a point worth noting that, just as in military operations one captures a position on the ground and thereby denies it to the enemy, on the psychological plane it is possible to take over abstract positions and equally deny them to the other side. The Soviet Union for instance has succeeded in getting everyone to accept that the Iron Curtain is a water-tight political barrier in a West to East direction but that it presents no obstacle in an East— West direction; they have turned into their own preserve the peace platform, that of the abolition of atomic weapons (while themselves continuing to develop them) and that of anti-colonialism while themselves ruling the only colonial empire still in existence. There is no doubt that this phenomenon exists but it is in the realm of psychological tactics and will not be dealt with here. Be it noted in passing, however, that these 'conquests' are in most cases based upon principles fully accepted by the other side, It may therefore be that these ideological positions occupied by the forces of Marxism may one day be 'conquered' by the West; but this presupposes that the latter in their indirect strategy have learned the value of thinking and calculating instead of merely trying to apply juridical or moral principles which their enemy can use against them at every turn.

In choosing the political line to follow, account must of course be taken of the psychological urges of the moment (e.g. the longing for peace, decolonization, determination to raise living standards, etc.); additional factors are the enemy's vulnerable points and those of any allies of whom it is wished to make use. In most cases the result will be that the conflict will be conducted-

1 'As proved by the Cuba incident in 1962,

indirectly or 'by proxy'. This fiction deceives no one but psychologically it is important. In addition, of course, the possible reactions of the enemy must be forecast and effective counters to them prepared. The political line is in the psychological field; it must be worked out with the same precision as an operational plan in military strategy.

Concept of the 'Interior Manoeuvre'

Having thus made sure of a degree of freedom of action, the next step is to work out the manoeuvre to be employed in the geographical area where it is desired to obtain certain results. This I propose to call the 'interior manoeuvre'.

The main components of this problem are three variable but interconnected factors; material forces, moral force and time. If the material force available is considerably superior to that of the enemy, moral pressure becomes less necessary and the operation can be completed in a very short time. If, on the other hand the material forces available are small, moral pressure must be very great and the operation will inevitably be prolonged. There are therefore two forms of strategic procedure, one at each end of the scale.

In the first the object is to reach, very rapidly and using considerable superiority of material force, some intermediate objective within the limit of the external freedom of action available; a halt then appears to be made before proceeding to a further operation. This form of action therefore consists of a series of operations to capture relatively limited objectives, interspersed with negotiations; it may be called the 'piecemeal, method'.¹ Hitler gave a remarkable demonstration of this method between 1936 and 1939. The U.S.S.R. has tried it on several occasions with varying success (Czechoslovakia, Korea). The various Israeli campaigns in Sinai have been of the same type, though with a defensive objective.

In the second the idea is to reach the objective (which may be of considerable importance) not so much by military victory as by-

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1 The German term for it is 'salami' tactics.

-keeping up a prolonged conflict so designed and organized that it becomes more and more burdensome to the enemy. This is the 'enervation' or 'erosion' method and its main characteristic is protracted conflict; Mao Tse-tung is both its leading theorist and its most successful commander; the latest and perhaps the most complete example is Algeria; Berlin is in the same category, though the manoeuvre there is far more insidious.

There are, of course, any number of gradations between these two extremes. Korea was initially intended to be a 'piecemeal' operation and ended in a struggle of attrition. The Indo-China campaign was based primarily on a strategy of erosion but almost ended in a military 'piecemeal' operation.

The Erosion Method

The concept of erosion is of great interest because it is in fact highly subtle. The problem is to cause an enemy who is far stronger than yourself to accept conditions which may be extremely severe, while employing only very limited resources against him. This is where full use must be made of the variable but interconnecting factors mentioned above: the longer the action continues, the more must moral pressure be brought into play in order to make up for inferiority in military force. The operation must therefore be conducted in two spheres at the same time, the material sphere, i.e. that of military force, and the moral sphere, i.e. that of psychological action.

The Material Sphere. The most important requirement in the material sphere is to hold out. In Raymond Aron's view this is the ultimate object of all strategy,' but in any case it is clearly that of any operation based on erosion tactics. If one side is at a considerable material disadvantage it can only hope to survive by refusing battle and using harassing tactics to keep the conflict going; this means guerrilla action which is as old as the hills

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but which each generation has nevertheless forgotten and had to learn afresh. In the last forty years, however, a most important set of strategic rules has been developed for this method of opera-

1 See chapter entitled 'Survivre c'est vaincre' in 'Paix et Guerre entre les nations' by Raymond Axon, Calmann Levy, 1962.

-tion;' as a result action on these lines can now be conducted on well-thought principles and therefore with considerably increased efficiency, thereby in large measure compensating for the disparity in material forces. Mao Tse-rung laid down seven rules as the basis for guerrilla operations: close co-operation between the population and the guerrillas; withdraw in face of an enemy advance in force; harass and attack if the enemy withdraws: strategically one to five suffices, tactically five to one is needed, the latter being achieved primarily by what he terms 'converging withdrawal', i.e. concentrating during withdrawal (he had ample space available in China); his final rule was that for supply and equipment guerrillas must live off the enemy. These seven rules are the essential minimum for successful conduct of this form of warfare but it is frequently not recognized that they are a minimum; for instance, the O.A.S. thought it could establish a 'redoubt' in Algeria, the Americans approved the idea of a landing in Cuba in the form of a conventional 'bridgehead'.

In addition to these minimum desiderata there are two further basic concepts essential for the maintenance of freedom of action for guerrilla operations. The first originated with the Soviets, though it had earlier been employed by the Irish; it consists of systematic terrorism with the object of deterring the population *from* giving any information to the enemy, thereby hamstringing the security forces. We have seen both in Indo-China and in Algeria how efficient this method *is*; the savagery with which it was conducted nevertheless raised no protest on the part of world opinion. The second concept was brilliantly exploited by Lawrence on the Hejaz railway; its principle is to extend the guerrilla threat over the widest possible area without provoking any enemy reaction but consequently facing him with a

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more and mere difficult security problem. The result is that the enemy is forced to use far greater force guarding an ever-growing number of points and this can to a great extent redress the balance of forces-

1 'Particularly by Lawrence, in Soviet official instructions and by Mao-Tse-tung.

-available. In Algeria for instance more than 300,000 men were kept at full stretch by less than 30,000.

Lastly the number of guerrillas (whose expendability is very high) must be maintained and continuously increased so that the pressure mounts. For this purpose there must in the first instance be a system for arms smuggling (or parachuting as in France in 1944); this must be followed as soon as possible by the establishment of bases close to the territory to be attacked secured by the deterrent effect produced by the 'exterior manoeuvre'. This was the function of bases in China during the war in Indo-China, of the bases first in Egypt and then in Tunisia and Morocco during the war in Algeria, and of those in the ex-Belgian Congo during operations in Portuguese Angola. Some writers consider that the organization of these bases is the decisive factor in a war of this type. Even if it is not decisive, it is certainly of the greatest importance; it should be noted that the guerrilla movements which have failed, e.g. in Kenya and Malaya, were in fact those which were isolated. This last point also shows that the 'exterior manoeuvre', in addition to its key role in assuring overall freedom of action, has a vital operational part to play.,

The Psychological Sphere. In the psychological sphere the general concept is equally to hold out. To do this it is essential that the morale both of those fighting and of the population should be raised to and kept at a high level. Control of morale is therefore of vital importance. The object is still to cause the enemy to give up by a process of erosion. Psychological action will be essential in this case also, in order to draw the maximum advantage from any successes achieved.

This psychological action is a complex affair, since it is aimed at one

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and the same time at the men in the field and at the civil population, both friendly and enemy. It must be guided by two main factors: the basic 'political line' and the psychological tactics selected.

The basic political line must be in consonance with that used in the 'exterior manoeuvre'. It must be capable of rousing in support of the struggle the dormant emotion of the population which it is desired to spur into action. These emotions (whether patriotic, religious, social, etc.) must be whipped up by arguments which at the same time should serve to show the righteousness of the cause they are being called on to support. Equally the success of the operation must be presented as assured—not, as in 1940, 'because we are the stronger' (which is never the case initially in this type of war) but because 'God (or some current of history) is on our side'. The determinism of history should be presented as guiding events inexorably in the direction desired; it will thus fulfil the function which visions or sacred images played in whipping up enthusiasm for the crusades; it will produce a fatalistic attitude of mind but a fatalism coloured by optimism—conversely that of the enemy will be coloured by pessimism; it is an attitude of mind not unlike the fatalism of the Moslems, who alternated between being conquerors and slaves.

This last point is of major importance. We have never really realized how important a factor in the rapid conquest of the world by the white race was the feeling among the conquered peoples that we were borne on the wings of destiny and that nothing could stop us being the dictators of their future. That this was an illusion was proved to them by the reverses suffered by the West during the early part of the Second World War; we lost face and those moral factors which had previously worked in our favour now operate against us.

Psychological tactics clearly include the well-known techniques of today—propaganda, indoctrination, and organization of the civil population, all carried out by a close-knit and closely controlled cadre. It is essential in this type of war to grasp the fact that the only true successes are psychological successes and therefore action in the field is of value only in so far as it serves to raise the morale or the prestige of the fighting force or of the population. In general therefore guerrilla operations must be

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conducted with this end in view. On the other hand, if success eludes them or is very small, its place can be taken by bluff or, if necessary, complete falsification of the truth (think of the 'heroic' defence of Port Said, the sinking of the *Suffren* by the Vietnamese or of the *Jean-Bart* by the Egyptians, the landing of an Egyptian Army in Kabylia, etc., etc.). Similarly the enemy will be able to double the psychological effect of any action he may take, even though it may be unoriginal and on a small scale, by issue of a stream of sensational news items such as the Western press loves to print. It should also be noted here that, although the political line must form a coherent whole, propaganda intended for external and internal consumption may be very different things.

Provided that there is full co-ordination between the exterior and interior 'manoeuvres', the conflict, which may start as a small-scale affair, will fester, grow and continue. Provided environmental action produces the necessary minimum deterrent effect and provided local action is not stifled at birth, there is every chance that the operation will ultimately be successful. At best the result will be that the enemy will give up the struggle (as in Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria). If the 'exterior manoeuvre' fails to prevent the intervention of other powers, a compromise will be reached in the form of a partition (Israel and Indo-China). If the 'exterior manoeuvre' does not give adequate support to the 'Interior manoeuvre', and if the enemy is sufficiently determined, the operation will be defeated (Kenya, Malaya). Nevertheless the seed sown during the struggle will grow later and at the very least the enemy will have been forced to make a very considerable effort for an insignificant expenditure of resources on our side.

This last point highlights the full importance of the erosion method; if the operation is well thought out and well conducted the risks involved are infinitesimal, whereas the possible dividends are high; even if the operation is defeated, the enemy will have been forced to expend considerable effort against an insignificant effort on our side. Twenty-three years ago, taking Hitler's tactics as the example, I forecast that this type of conflict was bound to develop in the future. Facts have more than borne out my prophecy. Today I believe that under the umbrella of the nuclear weapon

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this type of warfare will grow and go on growing until an effective counter to it has been developed and until there is some possibility of creating in this field a deterrent similar to that which we possess in others. We shall deal with this problem later, but first we must look at the 'piecemeal' manoeuvre.

The 'Piecemeal' Manoeuvre

'Piecemeal' tactics are simpler in that, as far as action on the spot is concerned, they are based primarily upon military strategic calculations. The part played by the 'exterior manoeuvre', however, is just as important as in the case of the erosion method. This was clear in the case of Suez and Sinai; there military operations were completely successful but could not prevent the final defeat of the operation since it was completely without external cover.

This is not to say, however, that in a 'piecemeal' operation military strategy is not subject to certain limitations. Freedom of action will invariably be small and, even if the 'exterior manoeuvre' has been well thought out, there will be considerable risk either of defeat or escalation unless the local action achieves surprise and quickly produces an unarguable *fait accompli* which can serve as the basis for subsequent negotiations. The reason for the Soviet failure in Korea was that the operation did not produce a rapid result and got bogged down in a protracted campaign. If there had been no bridgehead at Fusan, the Inchon counteroffensive would never have taken place, nor would there have been any other subsequent American reaction. The Soviet plan did not provide for adequate speed or adequate strength. Similarly at Suez it was folly to carry out a 'softening-up' air operation over the ten days prior to the landing; it merely presented the enemy with an opportunity to produce a *fait accompli* in his favour before the landing took place. As against this, Hitler's seizures of the left bank of the Rhine, of Austria and then of Czechoslovakia were in each case completed in forty-eight hours, the minimum reaction time for international diplomacy.

The local operation in this case must therefore be in the nature of a large-scale *coup de main*; its main features will be surprise, speed, rapid

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action in strength against weak points and immediate exploitation in force. It is eminently the job for airborne, motorized or armoured formations. Rapidity of action will of course be ensured not merely by accuracy of information and' vigour of execution, but by the most careful preparation in all fields. An operation of this nature cannot be improvised.

The liberty of action gained by the 'exterior manoeuvre' may be the vital prerequisite for success but there is another external factor almost equally essential; the objective must appear to be of a sufficiently limited nature to be acceptable to international opinion. Hitler was fairly successful in presenting each of his objectives as his sole and final demand. This game succeeded three times (up to and including Munich) but after Czechoslovakia no one was taken in by his 'piecemeal' strategy. The next bite, Poland, started the escalation which ended in the Second World War, although there were many in the West who thought even then that there would be a further limited phase. This shows the limitations of this strategy; it is no good trying to use it to attain over-important objectives by a series of bounds, though possibly this might be done by spreading the operation out over a very long period of time. Since its methods are necessarily violent and it is naturally of a somewhat sensational character, it is far more dangerous to use than the erosion method. But in certain particular well-defined circumstances it may still be feasible and possibly extremely rewarding—particularly if, as Israel has done on several occasions, it can be presented as being defensive in character.

THE COUNTERS TO INDIRECT STRATEGY

Ever since 1935 indirect strategy has been used almost continuously and almost invariably with success. Between 1936 and '939 it was used by Hitler, employing primarily 'piecemeal' tactics. From 1939 to 1945 there was a direct strategy interlude but indirect strategy then took up the running once more, the protagonist being the Soviet Union with emphasis this time more upon erosion tactics.

The fact that indirect strategy has been in fashion for so long and is apparently becoming even more fashionable stems from the conditions of modern war. Ever since 1918, but even more since Hiroshima, everyone has

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been clear that all-out war is an evil and everyone has tried to avoid it. Those, however, whose policy involves some change in the established order of things continue to use force to obtain their objectives. This leads inevitably to the delicate game of indirect strategy, which each of the great actors on the stage plays in accordance with his individual quirks of character; Hitler alternated over-rapidly between subtlety and violence; the Soviet Union has used the method of slow creeping diffusion of chaos under the umbrella of an insidious threat.

This is an ancient form of strategy (the Hundred Years War was in reality nothing but a very long guerrilla campaign, the final scene of which was the psychological miracle of Joan of Arc) but each new manifestation of it has as a rule left people surprised and disconcerted. Men were blinded by the black and white theories of the nineteenth centuries and therefore believed that peace and war were two totally different things; in many cases they regarded indirect strategy as a game intimately connected with politics. Since people saw no alternative between all-out war or nothing, Hitler was allowed to go on unchecked for four years and then a world-wide conflict was let loose leading to the ruin of Europe; no one realized in time that Hitler could have been beaten by the very methods he was himself employing. After 1946 the Stalinist drive seemed to revive the danger; the United States reacted with a strategy which had certain indirect strategy aspects (particularly the Marshall plan); their conscious effort, however, was in the direct strategy field and centred round the nuclear weapon. This produced the deterrent strategy, the result of which was to drive the Soviet Union (and others) to raise the tempo of their indirect strategy operations. The sequence is impressive: when blocked in Iran in 1946 they pushed forward in Greece, whence they were only ejected in 1948; in 1948 they scored a victory in China, in 1949 at Prague; in 1950 came Korea and intervention in Indo-China, in 1953—4 an indirect drive towards the Middle East; in 1954 North Africa went up in flames; in 1959 came Cuba; in 1960 the Congo and in 1961 Angola; and all the while Germany was kept under the pressure of a succession of Berlin crises. In fifteen years with certain ups and downs, the USSR has achieved results greater than she could have obtained by any major military victory.

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Faced with this situation, the Western reaction has been disjointed and therefore ineffective, because the realities of the problem were not generally appreciated; the solutions adopted have usually only been palliatives and frequently actually played into the enemy's hands. It is vital that we should realize the true nature of indirect strategy and act accordingly.

I am not, of course, presumptuous enough to think that I can produce here a complete solution for the problem of developing a defence against indirect strategy. All I can hope to do is to point to some general ideas which may perhaps help us to find an effective answer to the challenge we face in these peculiar years of so-called 'peace', during which so far all we have been able to do is to give up greater or smaller slices of territory. In the following pages the reader must not expect to find more than a first attempt and an initial outline, based on our recent experiences, of certain possible solutions.

The 'Exterior Counter-Manoeuvre'

In strategy more than in any other field of activity, one must be able to sort out essentials from secondary factors. The essential element of direct strategy is force, in other words material resources which, depending on their size, will enable us to obtain with greater or less ease the essential freedom of action. In indirect strategy freedom of action remains the essential feature but our main concern is with the indirect methods designed to ensure that we have it. The most important of these is the 'exterior counter-manoeuve'. The overriding factor here is of course direct nuclear strategy with its global deterrent and there can therefore be no relaxation of effort in this field. But if this was all—as certain American theorists tend to say—the enemy would be left with complete freedom of action in indirect strategy. The converse is that if counter-action were completely successful all indirect strategy problems would be solved. It is the 'exterior manoeuvre' therefore which is decisive and it is here that our priority effort must be made.

The counter to the enemy's 'exterior manoeuvre' consists of creating

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the largest possible number of deterrents to supplement the overall nuclear deterrent, Just as the original enemy action was based upon our vulnerable points, the choice of these deterrents must be based upon the vulnerable points in the enemy's system (public opinion at home, economy, the situation of the satellites and fellow-travellers, psychological taboos for the Marxist, for the Moslem or the black man, etc.). From these can be deduced the political line; in other words a choice can be made of those ideological and geographical positions which are to be defended and those which are to be threatened. Clearly a purely defensive line of policy would have little deterrent effect since the key to deterrence is the capacity to threaten. The political line must therefore definitely be offensive.

In the realm of ideology an offensive line of policy necessarily implies a capacity effectively to attack the weak points in the enemy's ideological system. It is therefore these weak points and not our own moral or philosophical ideas which must be the starting point. Our plan of attack, moreover, must take account of the requirements not of ourselves but of those we wish to convince. For instance we are at present completely without a 'psychological striking force' because there is no body of liberal thought concentrated on the immediate requirements of the newly emerged states in the uncommitted world (their economy, social organization, political constitution, etc.). It must be admitted moreover that our ideas could well do with being adjusted, rejuvenated and co-ordinated to bring them into line with the facts of the present age (planned economy, social legislation and so on).

In the psychological sphere the essential component of deterrent capacity is to re-establish the prestige of Western civilization. Prestige is a complex compound of the present-day power and efficiency of the Western world together with an estimate of the power and efficiency it is likely to have in the future. The decline of the West sprang from the fact that it was blind enough to allow itself to be divided and its present inability to present a united front has merely confirmed this impression. The first essential in the re-establishment of the prestige of the West is to get it to agree that a closely co-ordinated overall strategy or in other words a common policy, is a necessity. This is impossible so long as the system consists merely of

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NATO on the one hand, the aim of which is strictly military, and the United Nations on the other which is nothing but a sounding board for international disagreement. It is essential that there should be a Western organization responsible for working out global strategy. Some solution such as that proposed by France (a global study by the World Powers and regional studies by the Powers concerned) might be the answer, but one thing is certain—if we cannot overcome the very real difficulties which exist in this matter, we have no hope of winning the struggle. The second essential factor in reviving our prestige is to re-establish world confidence in the future of our civilization. More use could be made for this purpose of the extraordinary economic progress made by Europe in recent years. But still more important is it to possess a dynamic and therefore a rejuvenated philosophy. Lastly prestige springs partly from the fear one is capable of instilling; particularly when dealing with emergent nations ‘face’ plays a considerable part. This means that we must arrange not to lose face again (as we did at Suez or the Bay of Pigs). We must try to regain face by efficient action based upon a carefully worked out programme. The Cuba crisis in the autumn of 1962 demonstrated the effects which can be produced by doing so.

Turning to the geographic aspect, a choice must be made of those areas which we wish either to defend or to threaten or to attack. This choice will therefore be concerned on the one hand with those areas which protect points vital to us, on the other with those which threaten the enemy’s vulnerable points, and if possible those in which action would be comparatively easy. We should try to choose areas which can form bases for further action (e.g. Cuba). We should not allow ourselves to be drawn into areas where the enemy can deploy considerable effort at little cost to himself while we are forced to expend resources on a large scale (e.g. South East Asia). Finally, difficult though this may be, high priority should be given to eliminating those peripheral bases from which the enemy can carry out indirect aggression.

The ‘Interior Counter-Manoeuvre’

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Turning now to the area in which indirect aggression has taken place, there are a number of differing forms of response. If aggression takes the form of a stage in a 'piecemeal' operation and uses a considerable weight of armed force, it will be essential to have tactical forces available in the area to ensure that we are not rapidly -faced with a *fait accompli*. The mere existence of these forces will usually be an adequate deterrent. If, on the other hand, the necessary forces are not available on the spot, we shall be forced to rely upon the effects of our 'exterior counter-manoevre'. The cases of Suez and Sinai showed that if there is lack of determination on the part of the aggressor, an 'exterior manoeuvre' is quite capable of cancelling out any local success. Alternatively by speedy intervention, as in the case of the Americans in Korea, it -may be possible to stop any decision being reached on the spot and so to checkmate the enemy's entire plan. This illustrates the valuable deterrent effect of highly mobile strategic reserves.

In the case of indirect aggression using 'erosion' strategy, a number of alternative courses of action are open. The best, if it can be implemented, is to ensure retention of governmental control (the essential factor) without the use of large-scale resources and then to stifle the outbreak by efficient 'exterior manoeuvre.' If, however, this fails (as in the case of France in Algeria) we are forced back on to local counter-action, i.e. a direct counteroffensive.

In this case also the essential factor is the political line, the object of which must be to deprive the enemy of his trump cards. There are two facets to this: we must first maintain and increase our prestige, not merely by showing that we have adequate force available but also by showing that the future we hold out has possibilities (progress of our civilization, international aid, etc.); secondly by thorough-going reforms we must cut the ground from under the feet of the malcontents.

On the military side the essential is to foil the enemy's guerrilla strategy. In the first place there must be strict economy of force to avoid being swamped by any 'Hejaz railway' type of manoeuvre. Only strictly limited areas will therefore be strongly garrisoned and only in these will persons and goods be fully protected; the areas must be carefully chosen having regard to their political and economic importance. In the rest of the

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country a certain degree of insecurity will have to be accepted; the task of the outposts left in these latter areas will be no more than to maintain an intelligence network to enable us to launch a series of operations to prevent the enemy establishing organized bases. In certain instances it may be right to allow the enemy to establish himself in these areas at his leisure in order to be able the more easily to destroy him later. The frontiers on the other hand must be hermetically sealed by barriers on the lines of those used in Libya by Fascist Italy and in Algeria. However well they may be carried out, these operations inevitably eat up considerable resources and this is their great disadvantage in a war which will inevitably be long. It will be the task of strategy to find the most economical solution and that of organization to devise a system (reliefs, etc.) which will enable the effort to be kept up long-term. In exceptionally favourable circumstances it may be worth while trying to force a decision against the guerrilla movement by the use of force on a large scale, always provided that the results are likely to pay off quickly. If they do not (as in Algeria in 1956) all that will be achieved is to reduce one's own ability to last out, in other words to play into the hands of the enemy's erosion strategy.

Finally, of course, all operations must be conducted with an eye to their psychological effect both on the enemy and on the civil population. In the heavily garrisoned areas, the latter will be completely protected and one ought therefore to be able favourably to compare its enviable existence with that of the population in the areas more or less controlled by the enemy. The protected areas will thus become refuge areas; in order to instil confidence they must under no circumstances be reduced¹ and if they are

1 This means there must be a long-term policy for the forces in the area; they must be maintained at a steady level.

extended there must be no subsequent withdrawal. Any reverses suffered must either be concealed¹ or balanced by more spectacular successes on which suitable emphasis should be laid.

These are measures which must be taken. As they were listed the reader will have been reminded of many of the mistakes we have ourselves

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made, particularly in Algeria. However good these measures may be, it must always be remembered that in this type of warfare it is an exception for the defence to be successful; as pointed out above, this has only happened when there were no bases outside but adjacent to the theatre of operations from which the guerrillas could be supplied. An attempt to respond to an indirect strategy attack by direct defence is as foolish as the bull charging the red cloak rather than the toreador. It is the toreador, in other words the 'exterior manoeuvre', which must be our target.

CONCLUSIONS ON INDIRECT STRATEGY

Indirect strategy is therefore total war played in a minor key; it has in fact existed throughout the ages—as indeed has direct strategy. The forms it has assumed in the modern world and the frequency with which it is employed stem from the fact that all—out war today has for all thinking men become impractical. Indirect strategy is therefore truly complementary to direct nuclear strategy and is in many respects its antidote. The further nuclear strategy develops and the nearer it gets to establishing a balance, however precarious, of overall deterrence, the more will indirect strategy be used. Peace will become less and less peaceful and will get nearer and nearer to what in 1939 I called 'war in peacetime' and which we now know as the Cold War.

The relationship between cold war and hot war is analogous to that between medicine and surgery. Instead of the bloody business of hot war we now have 'infections' which are none the less Lethal for being insidious. Surgery is not as a rule effective against

1 Instead of sensational headlines in the press.

infection; there must be inoculation and counter-infection and the disease must be taken early. This is an incubator war; psychological infection is not unlike that produced by biological warfare and in just the same way, once launched, it is difficult to control; one of the principal causes of Germany's defeat in 1918 was that the virus of Bolshevism, which she had been largely instrumental in introducing into Russia a year earlier, rebounded upon her.

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Ever since 1921 the Soviet Union has made much play with the rush for decolonization but the process has often gone faster than she calculated and faced her with problems in Africa to which she had no ready response. Although it has been employed for centuries, we are not used to this clinical type of war.

Though its outward manifestations are of a specialized and frequently disconcerting nature, indirect strategy is no specialized form of strategy entirely divorced from direct strategy. The key to it, as with all strategy, is freedom of action; it is only the method by which this freedom is obtained which is different. It must be obtained by initiative combined with security and it is different because the area of freedom of action (and therefore the limits of security) depends upon what is done outside, not inside, the area at issue. This is its special feature and it is this which gives it its indirect character.

We must be quite clear on this point—that security depends upon the ‘exterior manoeuvre’, the vital factors in which are the vulnerable points on each side. Any vulnerable point on our side offers the enemy a target; any vulnerable point on his side offers us an opportunity to threaten retaliation. This is the level on which the problem of security must be considered. Moreover some vulnerable points, particularly if created by a revolutionary movement, take a very long time to develop (the Congress of Baku was held in 1921 but decolonization only became a factor from 1945 to 1967; Cuba began to be a problem in 1956, etc.); both the indirect counters to ensure security and actions designed to counter the enemy’s threats must therefore be initiated very early. The vital phase in indirect strategy takes place when the first symptoms appear. Anything later is too late.

Indirect strategy, therefore, is no more than a method ‘of applying the universal strategic formula by raising to the nth degree certain of the variable factors; the factor of force being reduced to a minimum and the factor of time being largely increased. Strategy can in fact be reduced to universal Einstein-type formula as follows:

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K is any specific factor applicable to the case concerned; F stands for material force, Ψ for the psychological factor and t for time. In direct strategy the predominant factor is F , the *factor* Ψ of considerably less importance and the factor c comparatively small in indirect strategy the exact reverse is the case, the dominant factor being Ψ .

In fact the psychological factor, which invariably plays some part in any form of strategy, in indirect strategy becomes dominant. Material force not being available, its place must be taken by the force of some well-reasoned ideology and by the effectiveness of intelligently and meticulously worked out plans. Grey matter in fact takes over from brute force—and that is no bad thing.

It must not be forgotten, however, that in the game of indirect strategy the availability and the use of force are just as necessary as in direct strategy. Force may be used on a very reduced scale but this must not mislead us as to the importance of the part it plays. The nuclear force may be unseen, but it is always there and it is this which sets the boundaries of the battlefield, i.e. determines the touchlines of deterrence within which the game of indirect strategy must be played. Secondly, within indirect strategy itself, force is required to exploit (or threaten to exploit) the situations created by psychological manoeuvre. This is true even if the forces in action are no more than a few United Nations troops or some Katanga apes. The factor F may be very small but it is never zero. Without the factor F strategy would no longer exist.

Some people have felt that in this delicate game, often so far removed from war on the traditional model, the use of force is a mortal offence. This is both dangerous and wrong. In itself force is neither good nor bad. It depends upon the cause for which it is used, in other words upon the policy which brings it into action. Throughout history force has played a cardinal role in conflict and to deplore this fact is simply to shut one's eyes to reality.

This delicate use of force is often thought to lie more in the realm of politics; people say that indirect strategy of the type I have just described is not 'strategy' but 'policy'. This terminological argument is of little

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importance in itself, particularly since it is clear that indirect strategy will be conducted at Heads of Government level. The choice of the word, however, will reveal how far the problem is understood. Those who think indirect strategy is a form of policy are muddling up two different species of thing. The role of policy is to lay down objectives and decide the resources to be allocated to their attainment; it must therefore also decide if any particular objective is to be attained by indirect methods or not. The conduct of indirect strategy, however, is not policy; it is strategy; in other words within any policy there must be the most carefully worked out plans for the use of force.

The history of the last ten years has shown what fatal errors result from trying to deal with these problems empirically and by guesswork when faced with enemies fully conversant with the rules of the game. We must now learn to use these rules as they do—with the same realism, with the same alert intelligence; only thus can we avoid either seeing the successive collapse of all our positions or being forced to unleash as a last resort the catastrophe which the use of direct strategy would today inevitably bring in its train.

We must learn to live in this so—called peace and save what remains to us of true peace.

We must master the art of indirect strategy.

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CHAPTER 5

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS ON STRATEGY

In war the loser deserves to lose because his defeat must result from errors of thinking, made either before or during the conflict. Strategy is not some intellectual game played around the hard facts of war nor is it some self-important or pedantic method of applying reasoning to the problems thrown up by war. This short book will, I hope, have convinced the reader of this fact; I hope too that it will have shown him what strategy is—a thought process which, complex though it is, should be able to point the way in practice towards achievement of the ends desired by policy and, even more important, eliminate those glaring errors of which there are so many examples in recent history.

* * *

In trying to describe what strategy is, I decided to start with total strategy, because it is that which must direct the contest, whether it be violent or insidious, whether it be conducted in the political, economic, diplomatic or military field, or in all at once—because in fact it is total. Indeed strategy is almost unintelligible if looked at through military spectacles only, for that leaves too many vital factors out of account. Even under the most favourable circumstances (as in the case of Napoleon's strategy) a purely military viewpoint is an incomplete one and therefore misleading.

For the same reason, I have not felt it right to differentiate between strategy and diplomacy as for instance does Raymond Aron,' because this means that one is arbitrarily dividing a problem which is essentially one and the same (and which in any case has more than these two facets). I do not feel that such a vertical division can be right; I would make a horizontal division, putting policy above the line and total strategy below; this draws the correct distinction between the various levels of responsibility and the thought processes involved at each level can then be viewed as an entity.

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Below the level of policy, however, there is of course the complete pyramid of different levels of strategy; at the top is total strategy which co-ordinates the various overall strategies peculiar to each field; they in turn co-ordinate the operational strategies within the field concerned. Below the whole pyramid of strategy come tactics and techniques. Military strategy is only one form of overall strategy; depending upon the circumstances, it may play a vital role or be merely an auxiliary.

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As we have seen, the game of strategy can, like music, be played in two 'keys'. The major key is direct strategy in which force is the essential factor. The minor key is indirect strategy, in which force recedes into the background and its place is taken by psychology and planning. Naturally any strategy may make use of both these keys in varying degree and the result is a large number of 'patterns' of strategy, the most important of which we have dealt with.

What must be realized, however, is that these 'keys' and 'patterns' are no more than different solutions within the same general framework; they all have the same object, a decision arrived at through the psychological surrender of the enemys they use the same methods, the basis of which is the struggle for freedom of action. Where they differ is in the procedures they employ. Each is a specially selected amalgam of procedures, selected because they are best suited either to the resources available or to the enemy's vulnerable points which it is desired

1 In "Paix et Guerre entre les nations", see p. 114.

to strike. This choice of the best procedure is perhaps the most important function of strategy; the choice is very wide, ranging from suggestion to physical destruction. It is strategy which makes it possible to deal with difficult situations and it is strategy which often enables the weaker side to emerge as the victor.

Both in this choice and in the subsequent direction of operations, the

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touchstone is freedom of action. The essence of strategy, in fact, is the struggle for freedom of action. The basis of the game of strategy, therefore, is the preservation of one's own freedom of action (security) and the ability to deprive the enemy of his freedom of action (by surprise or initiative). But at this point again we meet two theories; either we try to work out the most logical employment of the forces available (computer strategy) or we aim for the counterplay most likely to deceive the enemy (strategy of guile). These two methods of applying strategy may be used in either of the main strategic 'keys', whether in direct or indirect strategy; which of the two to use or how to combine them, will however depend upon the particular conditions governing the operation in question. Dien Bien Phu was a 'computer' incident during a campaign conducted primarily by indirect strategy methods; conversely, French Resistance was a 'guile' aspect of Operation Overlord which itself followed entirely the principles of direct strategy.

By analysing the processes of strategic reasoning, we can appreciate the situation in which the two opponents are placed within the dialectic; their freedom of action is determined by the following our limiting factors (material force, moral force, time and space we can also appreciate the changes in the situation as regards both time and place brought about by the dialectic for freedom of action. This kaleidoscope of dialectic situations, not unlike the frames in a film of the struggle, is what I have called the 'manoeuvre factor'; it is this which weaves together the 'computer' and the 'guile' strands into a counterplay designed to achieve a decision.

The problem in this counterplay is not so much to parry the thrusts of the enemy (though clearly this must be done) as to prevent the enemy keeping the initiative, to snatch the initiative oneself and to retain it until a decision is reached. In manoeuvre therefore, we must look well ahead and try to ensure that all openings are guarded and that the plan is a cohesive amalgam of forecasts leading up to the final decision.

Strategy, however, is not like chess; its pieces have no permanent, defined value. It must therefore produce its solutions by a sort of cookery, fusing together constantly changing ingredients. War (or any contest) uses material force, the capabilities of which are determined by the material

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equipment available at the period. It also uses moral force; the latter is, bound up with the ideas governing the civilization of the time. As a result strategy must be a continuous process of original thinking, based upon hypotheses which must be proved true or false as action proceeds; it is a process in which any mistakes of appreciation will reap the bitter reward of defeat. Herein lies strategy's great difficulty, especially in eras of rapid evolution like the present.

The fact that strategy is an evolutionary process was only realized in recent years, primarily because some theories went so far as to lay down that strategy had the advantage of working upon unchanging factors and that only tactics were subject to evolution. Today the advent of the nuclear weapon has forced us to realize that, though there may be a small number of unchanging principles, strategy has necessarily to choose between a large number of varying and conjectural courses of action; it is this which gives rise to the large number of different 'patterns' of strategy, as opposed to the restricted number of orthodox principles laid down in the old theories. To reduce the possibility of error with all its fearful consequences, we must have the best possible organization for studying any situation in all its aspects. Our traditional lines of thought must go overboard, for it is now far more important to be able to look ahead than to have large-scale forces whose effectiveness is problematical. There can be no modern strategy unless we possess well-found research organizations, unless we have a sound method of analysing any situation and unless we have accurate knowledge of developments in progress and of the opportunities offered by inventions of every description. We are still a long way from that happy situation!

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There are many aspects of strategy which have still been only partially explored, or not explored at all. Political and diplomatic strategy is still largely inchoate, although it has been employed from time immemorial. The peacetime employment of economic strategy is now fairly well understood, but little thought has been given to it as a method of exerting

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pressure. These are tasks which must be tackled urgently.

More important than all, however, is study of the psycho-logical element in strategy. It is essential that we should be able to isolate the factors governing the psychology of a mob, of an army, of a commander, of a minister, of a people, of international opinion and so on. We cannot go on working from hand to mouth in this field; we have made too many mistakes in it recently and they have all stemmed from faulty appreciation of the differing levels at which strategy must be conducted. Psychology has recently become a popular subject for rather elementary study but the result has been merely the elaboration of certain techniques which at best are no better than at tactical level. These tactics are valueless unless they are practised within the framework of a sound psychological strategy. The problem is that referred to above—definition of an overall line of policy. It is undoubtedly one of the most difficult problems and it can only be solved by a specialized method of reasoning which partakes of the dialectic.

* * *

Can any overall conclusion be drawn from a body of analysis as complex as that which even a cursory study of strategy demands?

Strategy is an art as old as the hills, but until recent times it was an esoteric art; it was then relegated to the museum of ancient arts and in recent years exhumed as a result of the pressure of events; now it seems to be entering a new phase of youthful energy. Strategy may be everlasting but if it is to become master of such overwhelming and differing phenomena as the cold war, total war, revolutionary war and nuclear war, strategy must undergo considerable change; it must be widened in scope and fundamentally revised.

It is this that I have tried to demonstrate, for I am convinced that in strategy, as in all human affairs, it is ideas which must be the dominant and the guiding force.

But that brings us into the realm of philosophy.

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