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The poor performance of Gulf armies in Yemen
AST XXI > MAGAZINE > PIERRE-JACQUES TEISSEIRE > MAY 26, 2016
March 26, 2015, the Saudi army formed a coalition with the majority of members of the Gulf Cooperation Council and other Arab countries for an offensive in Yemen in order to restore power to Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi, hunted by rebels Houthi allied to former president Ali Abdullah Saleh. Fourteen months later, the objectives are not achieved Riyadh and losses are sensitive. Setbacks that highlight the structural weaknesses of these armies, yet richly endowed.
.
March 26, 2015, the Saudi army, taking with it many of its counterparts in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC ) and some other " sister states " 1 agrees to Yemen in support of President Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi who has just 'being driven out by the Houthi rebels allied to former President Ali Abdullah Saleh and the Republican Guard, elite Yemeni army remained loyal to him.
Fourteen months later, while continuing painstakingpeace talks in Kuwait , the Riyadh war aims: resume Sanaa and reestablish President Hadi, are not achieved 2 , while the losses of the two major players in the response, Saudi Arabia and the UAEare sensitive. Moreover, the collateral damage by coalition aircraft harshly affect civilians. At this point, the credit of the Gulf armies is affected.
Given the secrecy of operations and the hard work of propaganda from both sides, it is not necessarily easy - and surely premature - to already draw a detailed and accurate assessment, especially as doubts remain about the number of committed military and foreign mercenaries under the flag of any particular Gulf state. However, these setbacks highlight the structural weaknesses of these armies, yet among the most richly endowed in the world.Volume forces, military skills and command of coalition capabilities are primarily involved.
STAFFING PROBLEM
The crucial problem of the armed affected the GCC , excluding Saudi Arabia, is that of numbers.Historically small countries with small populations, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar and the UAE there were long face by recruiting foreigners from other Muslim countries such as Oman, Pakistan, Sudan and Yemen. After the Kuwait war in 1991, nearly all proceeded to the " nationalization " of their troops.So how to replace these foreigners by local recruits while limiting the enrollment of women and refusing naturalization ? The equation is unsolvable and deleterious results: battalions incomplete or ghosts - or, conversely, a few units are too favored, affecting the overall cohesion ; Non-maintained equipment ;insufficient training ; etc. In 2014, after decades of hesitation, the UAE and Qatar decided to imposecompulsory military service that can replenish the ranks, but requires devote a significant proportion of managers in the training of conscripts.
As the ground forces are not engaged in numbers, it is always possible to find workarounds formulas drawing on all the resources of the army. However this time for Abu Dhabi in particular, the human challenge of engagement in Yemen is considerable, and probably explains the decline observed in the number of Emirati soldiers since January 2016. In fact, Mohammed bin Zayed al-Nabyane " MBZ"Crown Prince and strong man of the federation, initially refused to settle for a symbolic contribution as those of Bahrain, Qatar and Kuwait, all less than a thousand men. The UAE has thus provided the bulk of the Gulf of units engaged from the south of Yemen, with an armored brigade Leclerc 3 and special forces. These have mentored and trained the militias pro-Hadi, while tanks hunted during the summer 2015 off Aden Houthi then to Marib and Taiz. However, as to hope to win the offensive balance of power must always be at least three forwards against a defender, these proportions have not been met - first probable explanation for the stagnation of the coalition before these two locations in eight months. The likely addition of mercenaries, including Colombians, does not solve the problem of manpower. The same goes for possible support provided by the new Senegalese and Chadian participants of the coalition.
On 4 September 2015, shot by rebels of a ballistic missile SS -21 on a logistics area east of Marib causes the death of at least sixty soldiers, including forty five UAE nationals. Abu Dhabi is the turning point of the conflict, as the country is hit on its most sensitive resource: people. Moreover, victims are almost all citizens from the five northern emirates of the federation, the least favored. Faced with this loss rate - the highest since independence - the leaders then reluctant to engage more vigorously with their ground troops and repatriate those soldiers involved in Yemen who were from the compulsory military service. Mohammed bin Salman, the Saudi defense minister, is yet pressure on the coalition to come and support the UAE. Answers are below expectations: a Sudanese infantry battalion thousand Qataris, a group of Kuwaiti artillery ...: no basis to start vigorously on the offensive.
LOW OPERATIONAL TROOPS
These shortcomings lead troops in the coalition increased use of air power. Less demanding in terms of numbers, they allow to dominate the enemy, but it is very rare that they outweigh the decision alone.Moreover, the opposing air defense, although decimated by bombing, still represents a potential threat. It is likely that the aircraft while operating at high altitude to reduce the risk and thus lose accuracy. The numerous collateral damage are probably the consequence.
For their part, the Saudi land forces do not have these human resource issues and have committed 150,000 soldiers from the province of Asir border with Yemen. However, they fail to Sanaa attack by the north, their primary mission, and experience high losses 4 . Certainly conquer the stronghold of Houthi, starting with that of the city of Saada in the north, is a very ambitious goal, but here is the operational level that is in question.
Unlike the Houthi rebels who not only are fighting on their own ground, and have more extensive experience of armed struggle, the soldiers of the Gulf armies seem little able to prevail against such an adversary. No doubt the oil windfall and frequent outsourcing basic tasks to foreign labor in the civil-they eventually affect the training and ability of soldiers and military officers. From societies where, for decades, thanks to oil revenues, all elementary tasks are performed by an immigrant servants, citizens of these countries have been won by idleness. Logically enough, these behaviors are spreading in their armies. The field training and "rusticity " of soldiers and officers as a result. For example, in most units, the daily work is completed after praying the midday. No night activities, some dynamic exercises and low physical effort are the common lot. Many officers have a second job in the civilian and show little appetite for the profession of arms.
In addition, the regular purchase of new equipment requires structural changes and learning new techniques. Often the time spent on it is insufficient to obtain a minimum operational level.Furthermore, automatic promotions or assigned by favoritism and the considerable increase in remuneration does not encourage the effort.
INEFFICIENT COMMAND
The absence of a real body of NCOs in the army - as in almost all those in the Arab world - is a serious shortcoming. Indeed, a master's level is essential for the relationship between senior management and performers. But for many of the Gulf military as a concept between too contradicts the principle of head of omniscience ; NCOs, contact managers with the company, are then limited to the role of "enhanced soldiers ."
This must be added the inadequacy and lack of overall coherence of various contingents deployed.Qatar has committed Guard units of the emir ; gold, since 2010, it will spend more than internal security missions. What can be its role in this conflict ?
Finally, the command has to motivate his troops permanently to that distant civil war. Losses, the hardness of the ground and fighting and finally the military stalemate, are losing much from the coalition, leaving the pro-Hadi forces engage the front line.
Of course there are notable exceptions to this table, such as Leclerc or the Presidential Guard Emirates composed of special forces and efficient units. But it lacks overall coordination that could use local success to disrupt the Houthi forehead and disorganization. This deficiency shows low suitability of operational command of coalition forces.
Act coalition 5 involves adjusting the overall action of several nationalities units. It is a work of craftsmanship as it should be spared susceptibilities, suspicions and jealousies. In the case of Gulf armies, these feelings are often insurmountable barriers.Thus, small monarchies still they fear the hegemony of the great Saudi neighbor disputes while between them are many and regularly impede any union.This is particularly the case of the joint force Shield of the peninsula, military component of the Council including forty thousand, established in 1984. The rule that Riyadh always seeks to impose, mutual distrust and an immoderate taste for military secrecy undermine regularly efforts to form a united force. Shield as the peninsula has not been used to conduct operations in Yemen is revealing.
TWO OPPOSING CONCEPTIONS OF AUTHORITY
Another obstacle to effective command is the existence within two rival conceptions of how to lead armies into battle. The first, inspired by Soviet doctrine, was relayed by the Egyptians in the Arab staffs after their ' 1973 victory . " Based on excessive centralization of authority, it induces inflexibility, discouragement and initiatives regularly manipulation of information. It has deeply influenced the armies of the High Command GCCand is still operative among the least trained in Egyptian English academies officers.
The second appeared in the 1990s, inspired the contrary concepts that exist in the Western staffs: networking, integration of all weapons systems, continuous information sharing, collaborative process 'decision support, etc. The exponential development of computerized command, which the Americans describe under the acronym C4i (for command, control, communication, computer & information, that is to say, command, control, communications, computers and intelligence) designating all computerized systems to exercise command of forces in operations, made inevitable the adoption of these methods.
A PATCHWORK-LIKE COALITION
Yet despite the many exercises conducted by the Gulf armed with its Western allies, despite the acquisition of the ultimate of C4i systems, despite the impetus of some leaders, especially Mohammed Bin Zayed in the UAE, the reluctance to abandon old patterns is obvious everywhere, including in Saudi forces whose weight hinders the overall developments. The cause is probably to be found in the collection of reporting relationships in these societies which induces customs and behavior, previously described Why Arabs lose wars " American (...)" id="nh6" style="color: rgb(26, 64, 161); font-weight: 400;">6 , detrimental to efficiency.
Despite these shortcomings, it is undeniable that the logistics business operation during the conflict, including the Emirates 7 , has been remarkable but insufficient to change that.
The patchwork of nations involved, the absence of an external arbitrator accepted by all, as can the Americans when they lead a coalition, explained that the sharing of intelligence, coordination or the mix of resources among allies rarely the norm. How, then, to imagine " concentrate " key strategic principle for hope to defeat ?
PIERRE-JACQUES TEISSEIRE
1 Of the six countries of the GCC (Saudi Arabia, Oman, UAE, Qatar, Bahrain and Kuwait), only Oman has remained aloof.Egypt, Sudan, Jordan, Morocco and Pakistan provide various contributions.
2 The recent decision of the Port of Moukalla (April 25, 2016) held by Al-Qaeda, in addition it is not proven that it has resulted in actual combat, made a little figure of victory substitution or attempt justification of the merits of this war to Western views.
3 A UAE Armoured Brigade consists of two battalions each of 35 Leclerc tanks and a mechanized infantry battalion of armored personnel carriers BMP -3 Russian-made.
4 The figure of a minimum of three hundred killed in the Saudi ranks is quoted by The Independent , read Bill Law " Yemen war Rapidly Becoming as messy as complicated as the conlict in Syria " , March 18, 2016).
5 For the first time since the Arab-Israeli war in 1973, these armies are a coalition ad hoc without integrate into Western structures of command and support.
6 See especially: Norvell B. De Atkine, " Why Arabs lose wars ", American Diplomacy (americandiplomacy.org), d. 2000.
7 The delivery by sea of a full armored brigade from the UAE to Aden with only national resources is itself a performance.Moreover, Abu Dhabi has set up in a few weeks, an air and naval base in Assab (Eritrea) from where its fighters, helicopters and drones can easily act in the Yemeni sky (see International Crisis Group, " Horn of Africa States into the Yemen follow Gulf War " , International Crisis Group (crisisgroup.org) January 25, 2016).
Former senior officer of the French army, a graduate of St. Cyr and the National Institute of Oriental Languages and Civilizations (Inalco), he served in several embassies of France in the Middle East and the Gulf
.PIERRE-JACQUES TEISSEIRE
AST XXI > MAGAZINE > PIERRE-JACQUES TEISSEIRE > MAY 26, 2016
March 26, 2015, the Saudi army formed a coalition with the majority of members of the Gulf Cooperation Council and other Arab countries for an offensive in Yemen in order to restore power to Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi, hunted by rebels Houthi allied to former president Ali Abdullah Saleh. Fourteen months later, the objectives are not achieved Riyadh and losses are sensitive. Setbacks that highlight the structural weaknesses of these armies, yet richly endowed.
.
March 26, 2015, the Saudi army, taking with it many of its counterparts in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC ) and some other " sister states " 1 agrees to Yemen in support of President Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi who has just 'being driven out by the Houthi rebels allied to former President Ali Abdullah Saleh and the Republican Guard, elite Yemeni army remained loyal to him.
Fourteen months later, while continuing painstakingpeace talks in Kuwait , the Riyadh war aims: resume Sanaa and reestablish President Hadi, are not achieved 2 , while the losses of the two major players in the response, Saudi Arabia and the UAEare sensitive. Moreover, the collateral damage by coalition aircraft harshly affect civilians. At this point, the credit of the Gulf armies is affected.
Given the secrecy of operations and the hard work of propaganda from both sides, it is not necessarily easy - and surely premature - to already draw a detailed and accurate assessment, especially as doubts remain about the number of committed military and foreign mercenaries under the flag of any particular Gulf state. However, these setbacks highlight the structural weaknesses of these armies, yet among the most richly endowed in the world.Volume forces, military skills and command of coalition capabilities are primarily involved.
STAFFING PROBLEM
The crucial problem of the armed affected the GCC , excluding Saudi Arabia, is that of numbers.Historically small countries with small populations, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar and the UAE there were long face by recruiting foreigners from other Muslim countries such as Oman, Pakistan, Sudan and Yemen. After the Kuwait war in 1991, nearly all proceeded to the " nationalization " of their troops.So how to replace these foreigners by local recruits while limiting the enrollment of women and refusing naturalization ? The equation is unsolvable and deleterious results: battalions incomplete or ghosts - or, conversely, a few units are too favored, affecting the overall cohesion ; Non-maintained equipment ;insufficient training ; etc. In 2014, after decades of hesitation, the UAE and Qatar decided to imposecompulsory military service that can replenish the ranks, but requires devote a significant proportion of managers in the training of conscripts.
As the ground forces are not engaged in numbers, it is always possible to find workarounds formulas drawing on all the resources of the army. However this time for Abu Dhabi in particular, the human challenge of engagement in Yemen is considerable, and probably explains the decline observed in the number of Emirati soldiers since January 2016. In fact, Mohammed bin Zayed al-Nabyane " MBZ"Crown Prince and strong man of the federation, initially refused to settle for a symbolic contribution as those of Bahrain, Qatar and Kuwait, all less than a thousand men. The UAE has thus provided the bulk of the Gulf of units engaged from the south of Yemen, with an armored brigade Leclerc 3 and special forces. These have mentored and trained the militias pro-Hadi, while tanks hunted during the summer 2015 off Aden Houthi then to Marib and Taiz. However, as to hope to win the offensive balance of power must always be at least three forwards against a defender, these proportions have not been met - first probable explanation for the stagnation of the coalition before these two locations in eight months. The likely addition of mercenaries, including Colombians, does not solve the problem of manpower. The same goes for possible support provided by the new Senegalese and Chadian participants of the coalition.
On 4 September 2015, shot by rebels of a ballistic missile SS -21 on a logistics area east of Marib causes the death of at least sixty soldiers, including forty five UAE nationals. Abu Dhabi is the turning point of the conflict, as the country is hit on its most sensitive resource: people. Moreover, victims are almost all citizens from the five northern emirates of the federation, the least favored. Faced with this loss rate - the highest since independence - the leaders then reluctant to engage more vigorously with their ground troops and repatriate those soldiers involved in Yemen who were from the compulsory military service. Mohammed bin Salman, the Saudi defense minister, is yet pressure on the coalition to come and support the UAE. Answers are below expectations: a Sudanese infantry battalion thousand Qataris, a group of Kuwaiti artillery ...: no basis to start vigorously on the offensive.
LOW OPERATIONAL TROOPS
These shortcomings lead troops in the coalition increased use of air power. Less demanding in terms of numbers, they allow to dominate the enemy, but it is very rare that they outweigh the decision alone.Moreover, the opposing air defense, although decimated by bombing, still represents a potential threat. It is likely that the aircraft while operating at high altitude to reduce the risk and thus lose accuracy. The numerous collateral damage are probably the consequence.
For their part, the Saudi land forces do not have these human resource issues and have committed 150,000 soldiers from the province of Asir border with Yemen. However, they fail to Sanaa attack by the north, their primary mission, and experience high losses 4 . Certainly conquer the stronghold of Houthi, starting with that of the city of Saada in the north, is a very ambitious goal, but here is the operational level that is in question.
Unlike the Houthi rebels who not only are fighting on their own ground, and have more extensive experience of armed struggle, the soldiers of the Gulf armies seem little able to prevail against such an adversary. No doubt the oil windfall and frequent outsourcing basic tasks to foreign labor in the civil-they eventually affect the training and ability of soldiers and military officers. From societies where, for decades, thanks to oil revenues, all elementary tasks are performed by an immigrant servants, citizens of these countries have been won by idleness. Logically enough, these behaviors are spreading in their armies. The field training and "rusticity " of soldiers and officers as a result. For example, in most units, the daily work is completed after praying the midday. No night activities, some dynamic exercises and low physical effort are the common lot. Many officers have a second job in the civilian and show little appetite for the profession of arms.
In addition, the regular purchase of new equipment requires structural changes and learning new techniques. Often the time spent on it is insufficient to obtain a minimum operational level.Furthermore, automatic promotions or assigned by favoritism and the considerable increase in remuneration does not encourage the effort.
INEFFICIENT COMMAND
The absence of a real body of NCOs in the army - as in almost all those in the Arab world - is a serious shortcoming. Indeed, a master's level is essential for the relationship between senior management and performers. But for many of the Gulf military as a concept between too contradicts the principle of head of omniscience ; NCOs, contact managers with the company, are then limited to the role of "enhanced soldiers ."
This must be added the inadequacy and lack of overall coherence of various contingents deployed.Qatar has committed Guard units of the emir ; gold, since 2010, it will spend more than internal security missions. What can be its role in this conflict ?
Finally, the command has to motivate his troops permanently to that distant civil war. Losses, the hardness of the ground and fighting and finally the military stalemate, are losing much from the coalition, leaving the pro-Hadi forces engage the front line.
Of course there are notable exceptions to this table, such as Leclerc or the Presidential Guard Emirates composed of special forces and efficient units. But it lacks overall coordination that could use local success to disrupt the Houthi forehead and disorganization. This deficiency shows low suitability of operational command of coalition forces.
Act coalition 5 involves adjusting the overall action of several nationalities units. It is a work of craftsmanship as it should be spared susceptibilities, suspicions and jealousies. In the case of Gulf armies, these feelings are often insurmountable barriers.Thus, small monarchies still they fear the hegemony of the great Saudi neighbor disputes while between them are many and regularly impede any union.This is particularly the case of the joint force Shield of the peninsula, military component of the Council including forty thousand, established in 1984. The rule that Riyadh always seeks to impose, mutual distrust and an immoderate taste for military secrecy undermine regularly efforts to form a united force. Shield as the peninsula has not been used to conduct operations in Yemen is revealing.
TWO OPPOSING CONCEPTIONS OF AUTHORITY
Another obstacle to effective command is the existence within two rival conceptions of how to lead armies into battle. The first, inspired by Soviet doctrine, was relayed by the Egyptians in the Arab staffs after their ' 1973 victory . " Based on excessive centralization of authority, it induces inflexibility, discouragement and initiatives regularly manipulation of information. It has deeply influenced the armies of the High Command GCCand is still operative among the least trained in Egyptian English academies officers.
The second appeared in the 1990s, inspired the contrary concepts that exist in the Western staffs: networking, integration of all weapons systems, continuous information sharing, collaborative process 'decision support, etc. The exponential development of computerized command, which the Americans describe under the acronym C4i (for command, control, communication, computer & information, that is to say, command, control, communications, computers and intelligence) designating all computerized systems to exercise command of forces in operations, made inevitable the adoption of these methods.
A PATCHWORK-LIKE COALITION
Yet despite the many exercises conducted by the Gulf armed with its Western allies, despite the acquisition of the ultimate of C4i systems, despite the impetus of some leaders, especially Mohammed Bin Zayed in the UAE, the reluctance to abandon old patterns is obvious everywhere, including in Saudi forces whose weight hinders the overall developments. The cause is probably to be found in the collection of reporting relationships in these societies which induces customs and behavior, previously described Why Arabs lose wars " American (...)" id="nh6" style="color: rgb(26, 64, 161); font-weight: 400;">6 , detrimental to efficiency.
Despite these shortcomings, it is undeniable that the logistics business operation during the conflict, including the Emirates 7 , has been remarkable but insufficient to change that.
The patchwork of nations involved, the absence of an external arbitrator accepted by all, as can the Americans when they lead a coalition, explained that the sharing of intelligence, coordination or the mix of resources among allies rarely the norm. How, then, to imagine " concentrate " key strategic principle for hope to defeat ?
PIERRE-JACQUES TEISSEIRE
1 Of the six countries of the GCC (Saudi Arabia, Oman, UAE, Qatar, Bahrain and Kuwait), only Oman has remained aloof.Egypt, Sudan, Jordan, Morocco and Pakistan provide various contributions.
2 The recent decision of the Port of Moukalla (April 25, 2016) held by Al-Qaeda, in addition it is not proven that it has resulted in actual combat, made a little figure of victory substitution or attempt justification of the merits of this war to Western views.
3 A UAE Armoured Brigade consists of two battalions each of 35 Leclerc tanks and a mechanized infantry battalion of armored personnel carriers BMP -3 Russian-made.
4 The figure of a minimum of three hundred killed in the Saudi ranks is quoted by The Independent , read Bill Law " Yemen war Rapidly Becoming as messy as complicated as the conlict in Syria " , March 18, 2016).
5 For the first time since the Arab-Israeli war in 1973, these armies are a coalition ad hoc without integrate into Western structures of command and support.
6 See especially: Norvell B. De Atkine, " Why Arabs lose wars ", American Diplomacy (americandiplomacy.org), d. 2000.
7 The delivery by sea of a full armored brigade from the UAE to Aden with only national resources is itself a performance.Moreover, Abu Dhabi has set up in a few weeks, an air and naval base in Assab (Eritrea) from where its fighters, helicopters and drones can easily act in the Yemeni sky (see International Crisis Group, " Horn of Africa States into the Yemen follow Gulf War " , International Crisis Group (crisisgroup.org) January 25, 2016).
Former senior officer of the French army, a graduate of St. Cyr and the National Institute of Oriental Languages and Civilizations (Inalco), he served in several embassies of France in the Middle East and the Gulf
.PIERRE-JACQUES TEISSEIRE
