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The developing ‘strategic depth’ and ‘full spectrum deterrence’

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The developing ‘strategic depth’ and ‘full spectrum deterrence’
Home / Today's Paper / Islamabad / The developing ‘strategic depth’ and ‘full spectrum deterrence’
By Muhammad Azam Khan
December 03, 2016
https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/169366-The-developing-strategic-depth-and-full-spectrum-deterrence
The Indian Navy has recently conducted major exercise in North Arabian Sea from 2-11th November. The exercise was aimed to test operational readiness of the navy. Approximately over forty warships, submarines, fighters and maritime reconnaissance aircraft from western naval command were involved. Elements of navy’s eastern command also joined in the drills. Reportedly, India’s foremost locally constructed and opertionalised ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) INS Arihant may also have taken part. In fact Arihant might already be prowling in waters close to Pakistan coast gathering operational intelligence and validating command and control systems.

The 22nd meeting of Pakistan’s National Command Authority (NCA) was convened under the chairmanship of prime minister in February this year. The press release issued later had this to say: “-- NCA took note of the growing conventional and strategic weapons’ development in the region. It expressed serious concerns over the adverse ramifications for peace and security on this account. NCA reiterated its determination to take all possible measures to make national security robust; enabling it to effectively respond to the threats to national security without indulging in arms race. Reiterating that nuclear deterrence is the factor of stability in South Asia, NCA expressed the resolve to maintain ‘Full Spectrum Deterrence,’ in line with the policy of Credible Minimum Deterrence.”

Significant changes have taken place in the region since NCA met early this year. In April, India’s first, INS Arihant successfully test fired its long range nuclear capable missile, K-4. A unique aspect of the test firing was that Arihant launched the missile for the first time while submerged. Also inked by India and the United States is a Logistic Support Agreement (LSA) which allows for reciprocal use of bases for military logistics and resupply purposes. As reported in the press, LSA practically amounts to a “war pact.”

Conceptually, “deterrence” is a state of mind brought about by a credible threat of retaliation, a conviction that the action being contemplated cannot succeed, or a belief that the costs of action will far exceed any possible gains. “Strategic stability” on the other hand is a condition in which a country feels confident that the potential adversary will not be able to undermine (weaken) his deterrent capability. As a concept, strategic stability has never been under any doubt. Nuclear powers strive to maintain strategic stability against their perceived adversary through balance in weaponry and employment strategies. In the absence of any measuring instrument, the concept nonetheless remains abstract.

Since their first emergence in the United States navy in 1955, nuclear submarines have continued to play a formidable role in providing nuclear deterrence and strategic stability. Driven by miniature nuclear reactors and with nuclear weapons onboard, a nuclear submarine offers assured second strike. With distinctive characteristics like stealth, global reach and high speed, it becomes the most dependable branch in a nuclear triad. By making nuclear assets harder to find, a nuclear submarine guarantees that even if an incoming first strike was to destroy land-based weapons and attendant command and control system (counterforce strike), the sea-based assets remained available for retaliatory strike against a civilian target (counter value strike) such as major population centre.

All through the cold war, the United States as well as USSR maintained large quantities of nuclear arsenal onboard sea going platforms. But unlike on land where nuclear weapons can be kept de-mated, warheads onboard SSBNs are usually coupled (mated) with the delivery system, ready for launch. For deterrence to be effective, this is indispensable. Today, between 60-70 percent of globally deployable nuclear warheads are sea based.

Some leading western authors have lately questioned the efficacy of India’s sea-based deterrence and its contribution towards the strategic stability in South Asia. They argue that geostrategic and operational realities of South Asian theatre vary significantly from the cold war and these differences, combined with the “bureaucratic inertia, resource constraints, and sharp asymmetries between actors, suggests that the addition of nuclear armed submarines in the Indian Ocean will likely result in increased crisis in stability and fuel the conventional and nuclear arms races currently underway in the region.”

India’s latest maritime strategy of October 2015 however holds a contrary view. The document draws an unambiguous parallel with cold war in justifying India’s development of SSBN and nuclear triad. “Cold war experience has shown that reduction in the first strike and increase in second strike (retaliatory) component stabilises and strengthens deterrence,” expounds the document. Regardless, India’s nuclear submarines will have a serious impact on Pakistan’s maritime security and strategic stability in the region. In fact it fundamentally undercuts the premise of Pakistan’s Full Spectrum Deterrence (FSD).

The potential threat of a limited conventional war by India following development of a proactive strategy led Pakistan to broaden its nuclear force posture. Although officially Pakistan maintains “Credible Minimum Deterrence” (CMD), the posture now embraces “Full Spectrum Deterrence”. According to local scholars and think tanks, FSD is Pakistan’s response to India’s complete spectrum of threat. Theoretically, what Pakistan needed was ‘limited nuclear options to fill the gap between doing too much, such as starting a general nuclear war, to doing too little like acquiescing to enemy’s attack’, they maintain. FSD, it is said, fulfills this very purpose for Pakistan. It aims to plug the gap created by Indian conventional advantage in the deterrence equation in South Asia.

But while FSD strives to plug the gap on land (India’s perceived spatial gains against Pakistan on land and latter’s response through Hatf-IX, short range Nasr missile), it does little to address the developing breach in the Indian Ocean strategic stability. Call it breach, gap or whatever, at sea Pakistan’s conventional and strategic asymmetry continues to multiply.

India aims to expand its existing fleet of 136 warships to 200 within next decade. Indian navy will soon have three carrier strike groups one for each of existing three commands. The carrier force will be backed by five to six Arihant class nuclear submarines. India’s aggressive naval built up, operational integration of SSBNs in nuclear construct coupled with escalating policy of backing proxy warfare inside Pakistan also serves to dent the “stability-instability paradox.” The concept developed during the cold war allowed the two super powers to engage in proxy wars against each other without threatening the equilibrium at the strategic level. But in South Asia, the equilibrium at both levels now grossly favours India.

As most of Asia veers towards sea, Pakistan remains glued to a tried, tested and futile land fixation -- a classic case of “sea blindness.” India’s proactive strategy may never realize on land. The country’s real “strategic depth”, it must be appreciated, now resides in the western Indian Ocean. With a bellicose government in New Delhi, the sooner Pakistan adapts to changed dynamics in the region, the better it would be. The fast maturing CPEC lends further credence to this necessity.

Pakistan’s FSD will remain “incomplete” so long as it does not provide an answer to the ever widening gap in Indian Ocean strategic stability. To all intents and purposes, Pakistan could view its “deterrence” incomplete, and thus, “not assured”. If our AIP fitted submarines cannot hit India’s distant eastward targets or population centres, this only means India’s strategic capabilities (especially with its SSBN now in operation) essentially remain unthreatened.
 
The developing ‘strategic depth’ and ‘full spectrum deterrence’
Home / Today's Paper / Islamabad / The developing ‘strategic depth’ and ‘full spectrum deterrence’
By Muhammad Azam Khan
December 03, 2016
https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/169366-The-developing-strategic-depth-and-full-spectrum-deterrence
The Indian Navy has recently conducted major exercise in North Arabian Sea from 2-11th November. The exercise was aimed to test operational readiness of the navy. Approximately over forty warships, submarines, fighters and maritime reconnaissance aircraft from western naval command were involved. Elements of navy’s eastern command also joined in the drills. Reportedly, India’s foremost locally constructed and opertionalised ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) INS Arihant may also have taken part. In fact Arihant might already be prowling in waters close to Pakistan coast gathering operational intelligence and validating command and control systems.

The 22nd meeting of Pakistan’s National Command Authority (NCA) was convened under the chairmanship of prime minister in February this year. The press release issued later had this to say: “-- NCA took note of the growing conventional and strategic weapons’ development in the region. It expressed serious concerns over the adverse ramifications for peace and security on this account. NCA reiterated its determination to take all possible measures to make national security robust; enabling it to effectively respond to the threats to national security without indulging in arms race. Reiterating that nuclear deterrence is the factor of stability in South Asia, NCA expressed the resolve to maintain ‘Full Spectrum Deterrence,’ in line with the policy of Credible Minimum Deterrence.”

Significant changes have taken place in the region since NCA met early this year. In April, India’s first, INS Arihant successfully test fired its long range nuclear capable missile, K-4. A unique aspect of the test firing was that Arihant launched the missile for the first time while submerged. Also inked by India and the United States is a Logistic Support Agreement (LSA) which allows for reciprocal use of bases for military logistics and resupply purposes. As reported in the press, LSA practically amounts to a “war pact.”

Conceptually, “deterrence” is a state of mind brought about by a credible threat of retaliation, a conviction that the action being contemplated cannot succeed, or a belief that the costs of action will far exceed any possible gains. “Strategic stability” on the other hand is a condition in which a country feels confident that the potential adversary will not be able to undermine (weaken) his deterrent capability. As a concept, strategic stability has never been under any doubt. Nuclear powers strive to maintain strategic stability against their perceived adversary through balance in weaponry and employment strategies. In the absence of any measuring instrument, the concept nonetheless remains abstract.

Since their first emergence in the United States navy in 1955, nuclear submarines have continued to play a formidable role in providing nuclear deterrence and strategic stability. Driven by miniature nuclear reactors and with nuclear weapons onboard, a nuclear submarine offers assured second strike. With distinctive characteristics like stealth, global reach and high speed, it becomes the most dependable branch in a nuclear triad. By making nuclear assets harder to find, a nuclear submarine guarantees that even if an incoming first strike was to destroy land-based weapons and attendant command and control system (counterforce strike), the sea-based assets remained available for retaliatory strike against a civilian target (counter value strike) such as major population centre.

All through the cold war, the United States as well as USSR maintained large quantities of nuclear arsenal onboard sea going platforms. But unlike on land where nuclear weapons can be kept de-mated, warheads onboard SSBNs are usually coupled (mated) with the delivery system, ready for launch. For deterrence to be effective, this is indispensable. Today, between 60-70 percent of globally deployable nuclear warheads are sea based.

Some leading western authors have lately questioned the efficacy of India’s sea-based deterrence and its contribution towards the strategic stability in South Asia. They argue that geostrategic and operational realities of South Asian theatre vary significantly from the cold war and these differences, combined with the “bureaucratic inertia, resource constraints, and sharp asymmetries between actors, suggests that the addition of nuclear armed submarines in the Indian Ocean will likely result in increased crisis in stability and fuel the conventional and nuclear arms races currently underway in the region.”

India’s latest maritime strategy of October 2015 however holds a contrary view. The document draws an unambiguous parallel with cold war in justifying India’s development of SSBN and nuclear triad. “Cold war experience has shown that reduction in the first strike and increase in second strike (retaliatory) component stabilises and strengthens deterrence,” expounds the document. Regardless, India’s nuclear submarines will have a serious impact on Pakistan’s maritime security and strategic stability in the region. In fact it fundamentally undercuts the premise of Pakistan’s Full Spectrum Deterrence (FSD).

The potential threat of a limited conventional war by India following development of a proactive strategy led Pakistan to broaden its nuclear force posture. Although officially Pakistan maintains “Credible Minimum Deterrence” (CMD), the posture now embraces “Full Spectrum Deterrence”. According to local scholars and think tanks, FSD is Pakistan’s response to India’s complete spectrum of threat. Theoretically, what Pakistan needed was ‘limited nuclear options to fill the gap between doing too much, such as starting a general nuclear war, to doing too little like acquiescing to enemy’s attack’, they maintain. FSD, it is said, fulfills this very purpose for Pakistan. It aims to plug the gap created by Indian conventional advantage in the deterrence equation in South Asia.

But while FSD strives to plug the gap on land (India’s perceived spatial gains against Pakistan on land and latter’s response through Hatf-IX, short range Nasr missile), it does little to address the developing breach in the Indian Ocean strategic stability. Call it breach, gap or whatever, at sea Pakistan’s conventional and strategic asymmetry continues to multiply.

India aims to expand its existing fleet of 136 warships to 200 within next decade. Indian navy will soon have three carrier strike groups one for each of existing three commands. The carrier force will be backed by five to six Arihant class nuclear submarines. India’s aggressive naval built up, operational integration of SSBNs in nuclear construct coupled with escalating policy of backing proxy warfare inside Pakistan also serves to dent the “stability-instability paradox.” The concept developed during the cold war allowed the two super powers to engage in proxy wars against each other without threatening the equilibrium at the strategic level. But in South Asia, the equilibrium at both levels now grossly favours India.

As most of Asia veers towards sea, Pakistan remains glued to a tried, tested and futile land fixation -- a classic case of “sea blindness.” India’s proactive strategy may never realize on land. The country’s real “strategic depth”, it must be appreciated, now resides in the western Indian Ocean. With a bellicose government in New Delhi, the sooner Pakistan adapts to changed dynamics in the region, the better it would be. The fast maturing CPEC lends further credence to this necessity.

Pakistan’s FSD will remain “incomplete” so long as it does not provide an answer to the ever widening gap in Indian Ocean strategic stability. To all intents and purposes, Pakistan could view its “deterrence” incomplete, and thus, “not assured”. If our AIP fitted submarines cannot hit India’s distant eastward targets or population centres, this only means India’s strategic capabilities (especially with its SSBN now in operation) essentially remain unthreatened.
Pakistan's Naval offense have and will largely be based on submersibles
in South Asian theater we introduced Submarines and have an exceptional record with them
hopefully coming chinese subs can certainly not turn any tide but might provide some stability
we have to realize the fact that we have extremely limited resources and exceptionally bigger demands
 
There are two components to the naval threat: sub-surface and surface based. Although it doesn't state this explicitly, the article seems to be hinting towards a tit-for-tat procurement of strategic assets such as SSBNs. The reality of the situation is, against three aircraft career groups each accompanied by half a dozen SSBNs, one or two assets would still not make any sense. An extensive strategy needs to be developed to counter the threat.

1. Surround the enemy. China is increasing its influence in Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. Although leveraging this influence in Bangladesh is a far cry, Pakistan should take advantage of this influence in Sri Lanka. Given the wide range of weapon systems that Pakistan now manufactures indigenously, an offer to supply at low cost would further build the strategic partnership. This needs to be taken to a level where Pakistan can keep its bases in Sri Lanka. A similar strategy needs to be adopted with Maldives, Brunei, and Malaysia. A mixture of naval and regular bases to surround India would be a huge strategic advantage for Pakistan.

2. Under the assumption that Pakistan will never equal India in quantity, we need to focus on an offensive strategy. This involves acquisition of highly effective monitoring, targeting, and attack capabilities. As an example, China's anti-carrier missile https://www.bloomberg.com/news/arti...arrier-missile-now-opposite-taiwan-flynn-says is exactly the kind of force multiplier which rubbishes the enemy's huge investment in a naval fleet.

3. Pakistan must not shy away from using nuclear weapons at sea. Such a tactic would basically obviate any advantages of a tightly knit carrier group. The enemy would be forced to spread its forces, which can then be dealt with individually.

4. Pakistan needs to invest in a network of autonomous monitoring drones to cover its entire waters. The beauty of a drone is that it can communicate back to base with impunity. If the drone is attacked, the navy will at once be alerted to enemy presence simply by the lack of communication. This would be a very effective strategy against submarines but it is something which needs research investment.

5. The recent leak of performance characteristics of Scorpene class submarines should be utilized to maximum advantage. The ISI needs to be engaged to gather further intelligence that would provide us with maximum benefit.
 
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An eye opener for our planners ,At the moment if India attacked today (surprised with nuke) do we have a 2nd strike capability from sea ? Answer is No , plugging the gap in FSD should be first priority as Air force is envisioned with its own self sufficient programs ,Military at land can defend well also but sea is the weakest link
 
An eye opener for our planners ,At the moment if India attacked today (surprised with nuke) do we have a 2nd strike capability from sea ? Answer is No , plugging the gap in FSD should be first priority as Air force is envisioned with its own self sufficient programs ,Military at land can defend well also but sea is the weakest link
We have the capability and it was even tested. We don't go on chest thumping campaign that is only issue. Other wise we have the capability and several times mentioned by members on this group. Now in my opinion the submarines we are buying from China we should get those submarines which have at least 4 to 6 VLS system to launch Babur N. Also time to go for at least 2 to 3 nuclear submarines as well as VLS equipped Frigates for launching of cruise missiles.
 
We have the capability and it was even tested. We don't go on chest thumping campaign that is only issue. Other wise we have the capability and several times mentioned by members on this group. Now in my opinion the submarines we are buying from China we should get those submarines which have at least 4 to 6 VLS system to launch Babur N. Also time to go for at least 2 to 3 nuclear submarines as well as VLS equipped Frigates for launching of cruise missiles.

Do you really think 2 or 3 nuclear equipped subs will lead to 'deterrence', i.e., a change in India's calculus which shows a cold start as being fundamentally infeasible? Let us think about it differently. If Pakistan had only a dozen nuclear missiles, would it lead to credible deterrence? To the Hindu fanatical mind, given the size of India, even a few nuclear strikes here and there are not reason enough to avoid confrontation. What is keeping these dogs at bay on our eastern front is the fact that we have nukes in a very large quantity, along with effective delivery mechanisms. The advantage they see in the naval arm is overwhelming numerical superiority. A few nuclear subs would not deter them from a unilateral attack.

What is needed is an equalizing force. Something that proves their numerical supremacy ineffective. In practice, it means Pakistan needs to acquire a very strong offensive capability - something that has the same effect as Nasr, only at sea.
 
Towards the end he mentions about 'eastern targets' which are obviously the Nicbar and Aendoman islands around where they are laying a SOSUS chain network.

We need our own SOSUS chain network and thats one of the tactics to counter the numbers.The solution will always be a tactical one.Our undersea optic cable between Oman and Pakistan can be a good start., East African countries, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Brunei and Malaysia may also join in. Chinese are already assisting a port in Moruoroa Atol(French Polynesia).
 
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We have the capability and it was even tested. We don't go on chest thumping campaign that is only issue. Other wise we have the capability and several times mentioned by members on this group. Now in my opinion the submarines we are buying from China we should get those submarines which have at least 4 to 6 VLS system to launch Babur N. Also time to go for at least 2 to 3 nuclear submarines as well as VLS equipped Frigates for launching of cruise missiles.
Thank you for your response ,I do agree that we have some thing in lines which you have mentioned ,My concern is immediate to near future i.e period of 2017 to 2022 (5 years) till the Chinese subs with all the goodies arrived ,In these 5 years India is being run currently by fanatic and lunatic extremist ,Japan pearl harbour was and is a closest example i can mentioned of surprize attacks but in those days taking out naval bases was time taken activity and always retaliations were some thing calculated ,In case of Nuke strike one can imagine there cant be retaliation as FSD does not exist (or we deny this) this is either a case but a dangerous development .My concern is for these 5 years as If i were a strategist (Enemy) this presented me a unique opportunity to take out my rival before he/she develops into something i can't fight post 5 years or knows the damage inflicted will be more .

Now in my opinion the submarines we are buying from China we should get those submarines which have at least 4 to 6 VLS system to launch Babur N.


I have always believe that our model/even current configuration could be based on torpedo style launch just like our Cousin`s did with there submarines .
http://foxtrotalpha.jalopnik.com/israels-newest-and-most-advanced-submarine-is-their-las-1752459324
Israel's Newest And Most Advanced Submarine Is Their Last Line Of Nuclear Deterrence
The INS Rehav is 220 feet long, displaces 2,400 tons submerged and is crewed by 35 sailors, but it can hold an additional 10 people for special operations. She is capable of reaching a top speed of 25 knots underwater and can operate without resupply for up to 30 days under normal operating conditions.
What makes the Rehav and its predecessor the Tanin so capable and dangerous to its foes is that it uses Air-Independent Propulsion (AIP) to stay submerged for weeks at a time. This opens up an operations envelope that was long only accessible to much more complex and expensive nuclear-powered submarines. Not only that, but the Dolphin 2 class’s version of AIP propulsion uses fuel cell technology, which is extremely quiet even by AIP submarine standards.
The Dolphin boats are equipped with six 533mm standard torpedo tubes and four 650mm jumbo tubes and can carry 16 weapons. The smaller tubes can fire torpedoes and Harpoon anti-ship missiles as well as other conventional weaponry, but its larger tubes are what makes the Dolphin class so special.



From them, frogmen, remotely operated vehicles and especially large cruise missiles capable of carrying nuclear payloads can be deployed.
 

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