Pakistan's 'secret' war in Baluchistan

[ejaz007]

Govt to withdraw cases against Baloch leaders, says Malik

* 35 Frontier Corps camps to be moved from urban parts of Balochistan to bordering areas

QUETTA: The federal government on Thursday announced that it will withdraw all “politically-motivated” cases against Baloch political leaders, remove their names from the Exit Control List (ECL) and said that they would not be arrested on their return to Pakistan.

This was announced by Adviser on Interior Rehman Malik in a press conference at the Chief Minister’s Secretariat.

FC: Malik said he had been informed about the constant harassment the people of Balochistan faced from the Frontier Corps (FC). Therefore, it had been decided that 35 FC camps would be shifted from the urban parts of the province to the bordering areas.

The adviser was on a two-day visit to Quetta was to examine the law and order in Balochistan. He held in-depth discussions with the provincial government and assured them of support from the federal government in counter-insurgency.

Malik added that he had resumed dialogue with the Baloch leaders including the leaders of Marri, Bugti and Mengal tribes.

He visited Talal Bugti’s residence and also telephoned Gazin Marri, Nawab Khair Baksh Marri’s son. Malik assured Marri that all the cases registered against him by the previous regime had been withdrawn and he was free to return to Pakistan whenever he wanted.

“I used my discretionary powers to remove Akhtar Mengal’s name from the ECL. Today, you can see him sitting in Sharjah,” said the adviser, adding, “We have formed a committee which will examine all the cases registered against various people. Headed by Chief Aslam Minister Aslam Raisani, the committee will recommend withdrawal of the cases which are politically motivated.”

Raisani said the government would not unilaterally declare a ceasefire with the Baloch insurgents operating in the province. Until the groups give up their arms and agree to talk, the government will not sit and negotiate with them, he said.

Malik asked the parliamentarians from Balochistan to support Pakistan People’s Party Co-chairman Asif Ali Zardari in his bid to become the president of Pakistan.

During his meetings with Balochistan Governor Zulfiqar Ali Magsi, All Parties Democratic Movement Central President Mehmood Khan Achakzai and other leaders, Malik sought their co-operation in bringing peace and development to Balochistan and told them that the security forces would be answerable to the chief minister of Balochistan in the future.

Separately, addressing a delegation of the Sulaimankhail tribe, he assured them that the government would allocate resources to improve the living standard in the area.

In another meeting, he said, “We have started reconciliation process and are ready to workout a political, administrative and financial structure which would be acceptable to the Baloch”. staff report

Daily Times - Leading News Resource of Pakistan

 

[Neo]

Lessons from Kashmir​

Analysis by Moeed Yusuf

There is simply no room for outsiders to take and test their modern, state-centred development models in Balochistan until political reconciliation is achieved and that too squarely on Baloch terms

Indian Kashmir is yet again in the grip of violence. I see direct lessons from the Kashmiri situation for Pakistan’s quest to normalise Balochistan.

For those who have been following Indian Kashmir closely, the current episode throws up interesting questions. Since the peace process began, the infiltration as well as the violence in Indian Kashmir had come down drastically, a fact that India acknowledged (for New Delhi, the two were directly correlated). Moreover, in recent years, Jammu and Kashmir had also begun to show improvement in its economic indicators courtesy of New Delhi’s emphasis on economic development in the state.

Indian views on what this meant in substantive terms however were starkly different. Analysts and journalists alike — some I have in mind have even written entire books on the Kashmir problem — situated in New Delhi were virtually unanimous in their optimism.

In their view, the improvement in the security situation equated with India’s ‘Kashmir problem’ being brought under wraps. On the economic front, most of them were critical of the Jammu and Kashmir leadership for being ‘ungrateful’ for the support the Centre had provided. Some even thought New Delhi had done too much. There were frequent referrals to Jammu and Kashmir having one of the highest per capita (in some years it was the highest) transfers from New Delhi to any state.

In short, for most experts in New Delhi, the Kashmir problem was one of security and underdevelopment; New Delhi’s efforts to correct these then were considered to have brought the state much closer to normalcy.

Throughout these years, the story within Jammu and Kashmir remained much different. Most residing in the state continued to be dismayed by the situation. A complex narrative flowed whereby the Jammuite Hindus blamed the Valley for the ills (militancy was subsumed under the anti-Valley mindset).

In the Valley, however, the narrative was principally directed at the Centre. They remained bitter about how New Delhi had treated them and argued that the underlying problems continued to simmer. Most of the leadership in Kashmir saw the root cause as political, not economic or security related. And there, New Delhi has remained completely oblivious.

As it turns out, New Delhi’s view has proven to be wrong. It is not that the view from Delhi was misplaced on the Indian government’s achievements, however. They were right in arguing that the militancy had been curtailed as the Indian military had managed to break the code — they had moved from the use of heavy force to boots on the ground and CASOs coupled with ruthless targeting of all dissenters.

Their argument on the economic support was also correct. India has indeed spent exorbitant amounts on Jammu and Kashmir in the hope that the ‘material commercialism’ model — this essentially argues that the ultimate means of pacifying any disgruntled segment of the population is to bring about quick and massive economic development — would bear fruit.

The problem — and this is what the local narrative continued to point to — was the deep-rooted political discontent. While security and development may have been necessary complements, in the absence of political reconciliation, they only continued to benefit those already on New Delhi’s right side.

The Balochistan situation is virtually identical in terms of policy remedies.

The local narrative in Balochistan is vehemently against the military’s presence, let alone building of cantonments in the province. Moreover, they do not want Punjabis to intrude in their space (the military and the bureaucracy are extensions of Punjab’s domination in their view), both politically and economically. Finally, the tribal system, with its inertiatic traditions, is extremely prone to path dependence and thus vehemently opposed to fast-paced changes.

Important to note from the above is the fact that neither the security, nor the economy (in terms of mega-development) feature in this narrative. In its essence, the grievance is very much political.

True, much is made of the lack of economic development in the province. However, interestingly, the economic viewpoint is either presented by mainstream non-Baloch analysts (sitting in Islamabad, Karachi, or Lahore) or is used by Baloch politicians merely as a convenient tool to support their anti-Islamabad political narrative.

The predominant view in Islamabad is that the average Baloch is ‘backward’. Their plight is blamed on the Sardars who have trumped all government efforts at social and economic development in order to retain their political power. This outlook explains the reluctance of successive governments in Islamabad to provide autonomy to the province. Their concern — and to an objective analyst it carries weight — is that the internal divisions and lack of capacity among the Baloch leadership makes autonomy a risky proposition; they prefer bringing Centrally-driven human and economic development before allowing the province to take charge of its destiny.

The Musharraf policy saw this mindset play out in reality. In an ideal world, Musharraf ought to be lauded for his efforts. He realised that previous governments had kept the Sardars pacified by providing them hefty royalties — read bribes. He was also correct in his view (I have referred to this as Islamabad’s view above) that the underdevelopment in Balochistan was more a consequence of the Sardari self-interest than lack of effort from the state. Equally valid was his perception that the intermittent violence in the province was a tool to blackmail the Centre from and keep the government from establishing its writ in the province.

For any neutral observer removed from the local narrative, the answer would be Musharraf’s policy: a shock-and-awe treatment to break the hold of the Sardars, mega-development to provide jobs, and military force to counter the expected dissent from the losers in the deal. Indeed, if the idea was to put the house in order through a modernity lens, the plan was spot on.

The problem: the local narrative was mutually exclusive from this strategy. Shock-and-awe broke path dependence; those who study structural reforms would tell you that this inevitably means chaos in the short- to medium-term. Mega-development meant more Punjabis would come in and secure jobs ahead of the unskilled Baloch labour force. Military force could easily be used by the Sardars to raise the anti-Centre rhetoric and keep people away from engaging in any of the government’s social and economic developmental efforts.

I am not oblivious to the fact that it is no mean feat to break through the Baloch political maze. Nor do I want to pretend that a political solution is likely to be simple. Far from it. In fact, I am the first to admit that there is no guarantee that the Centre’s efforts to resolve the political conundrum would be successful. Yet, this in no way should imply that we can sidetrack the real issue by delivering a heavy dose of development and military force. The problem is political, and so must be the solution.

This view is anti-developmentalist if the benchmark being used is mainstream development literature. It advocates that despite the risks, and virtual guarantee of inefficiency this may induce in government functioning, Balochistan must be granted autonomy and the task of reconciling political differences fast-tracked. This implies that the province’s economic and social development will be of secondary concern for some time.

Moreover, my view also runs contrary to the view that a modern state must command allegiance of the entire populace. In all likelihood, political reconciliation as a policy stop before development would mean that parts of Balochistan will choose to retain their tribal outlook and may want to allow only minimal writ of the state in their areas.

Those who are opposed to this view are missing the salience of the local narrative. There is simply no room for outsiders to take and test their modern, state-centred development models in Balochistan until political reconciliation is achieved and that too squarely on Baloch terms.

The writer is a research fellow at the Strategic and Economic Policy Research (Pvt Ltd.) in Islamabad and a regular contributor to The Friday Times. He can be reached at myusuf@sepr.com.pk

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

Editorial: Baloch ceasefire is welcome
​

After a flurry of “pipeline attacks” in Balochistan that actually increased the load-shedding hours across Pakistan, the Baloch militants suddenly announced a ceasefire last Monday. Everyone thought it was the usual Ramazan ceasefire on the part of the Baloch nationalists fighting the government. Some thought it would not hold. But since Monday there have been no reports of sabotage or bombing from any part of Balochistan. No pipelines have been blown up. No policeman or soldier has been killed.

The announcement of a ceasefire came from Beebargh Baloch and Sirbaz Baloch of the Baloch Liberation Army and Baloch Republican Army. This was unusual even though they denied having entered any deal with the government. That the announcement was unpredicted was proved when political circles in Quetta reacted positively, “albeit with surprise, to the two organisations’ sudden decision to stop militant activities”. For once everyone thought this was a prelude to some kind of binding settlement between the Baloch and the PPP.

This was substantiated by former senator Mr Sanaullah Baloch on Tuesday when he welcomed the ceasefire declaration and termed it “a good omen for the province”. Mr Baloch had resigned from the Senate in despair which he felt at the reaction or lack of it shown by the government to the killing of the Baloch leader Nawab Akbar Bugti. In all his interviews he was at pains to stress the separatist elements in the Baloch argument because he appeared clearly doubtful about the ability of the federation to save the province from its descent into absolute alienation.

Although the PPP had taken the first steps towards improving the situation in Balochistan after the military operation there under President Musharraf, it wasn’t followed up with action. Mr Asif Ali Zardari had “apologised” to the Baloch nation for the killing of Nawab Bugti, and his party had last February called for an end to the military operation in the province, but further movement was so slow that the consensus built by the PPP chief minister of Balochistan, Nawab Aslam Raisani, was fraying at the edges. Then in the last week of August things began to look up even though the release of ex-chief minister Mengal came too late and was considered too little.

Mr Rehman Malik, the prime minister’s adviser on interior, has played a significant role in this. He announced on August 28 that the names of all political leaders of Balochistan had been removed from the Exit Control List (ECL) and 35 checkpoints of the Frontier Corps in the province were being abolished. At the end of his two-day visit to Quetta Mr Rehman stood together with chief minister Raisani and said, “The name of Nawab Khair Bakhsh Marri’s son, Nawabzada Gazain Marri, has been removed from the ECL and a new passport has been issued to him”. Mr Malik said he had also met the sardar-in-exile, Mr Gazain Marri, in Dubai “on the directive of PPP’s co-chairman Mr Zardari” and that he was likely to return to the country soon.

More contacts heretofore not explored seriously were made too. Mr Rehman Malik disclosed in Quetta that he had met the PKMAP chief, Mr Mehmood Khan Achakzai, the JWP leader Nawabzada Talal Akbar Bugti and other leaders and discussed Balochistan with them. He announced that all the detained political workers of Balochistan would be released and cases registered against them would be dropped after a committee formed to investigate their cases had forwarded its recommendations.

Balochistan was put on the back-burner — with lethal effect because of the pipeline blowing — after President Musharraf put India into the equation. He said he was “a thousand percent sure” the money was coming from the Indians ensconced in Afghanistan. The accepted wisdom in Pakistan is: if you want to bring any discussion of reconciliation to a close, make a reference to India. So anybody reaching out to India is contaminated and has to be exterminated like vermin. Most leaders now enjoying the support of the people in Pakistan have been labelled and persecuted thus. But the rational way to tackle India’s penetration is to move closer to the people and work more diligently to remove their grievances even if that means spending a little more from the federal kitty. Paradoxically, it is only when people living inside a federation feel “free of control” that that they become loyal to it.

Mr Rehman Malik is to be praised for the hard work he has single-handedly put into bringing the Baloch to the negotiating table. He must now bring the exiled leaders back into the mainstream. That is the challenge. *

 

[was]

Balochistan top on PPP agenda
Updated at: 2155 PST, Monday, September 08, 2008
Balochistan top on PPP agenda ISLAMABAD: The foremost priority for President elect-Asif Ali Zardari is to resolve the Balochistan crisis which can only be resolved through a political dialogue.

Leader of the Senate Raza Rabbani stated this during Senate meeting here on Monday.

He further said that Frontier Corps (FC) should scale down its operation in the province.

Raza Rabbani said the PPP deems the imposition of emergency in November as unconstitutional and that the pre-November 3 judiciary would be restored.

He pointed out that 58-2(b) would ultimately be done away with in future.

Rabbani stressed that the 17th amendment would be repealed and balance of power between the prime minister and president would be ensured.

He opined that during the amendment of the Constitution, an amendment would also be proposed regarding provincial autonomy.

Balochistan top on PPP agenda - GEO.tv

 

[Omar1984]

How come Pakistan didn't have these kinds of problems like BLA before India set their embassies in Afghanistan?

 

[Spring Onion]

How come Pakistan didn't have these kinds of problems like BLA before India set their embassies in Afghanistan?

BLA has been funded and supported by India since decades.

The Indian counsulates in Afghanistan are more active in terrorist at our western fronts in NWFP.

Whereas the India/Afghanistan nexus on BLA is there since decades. If you have forgotten Daud of Afghanistan who sheltterd both Indian and BLA terrorists in 70s.

 

[Neo]

How come Pakistan didn't have these kinds of problems like BLA before India set their embassies in Afghanistan?

We have had friendly ties and a peaceful border with Iran but things are different in Afghanistan. They've allowed Indian terrorist cells to operate from these socalled consulates, hence the problems in Balochistan.

Just wait a little longer, once PA gets green light from Islamabad to enter Afghanistan or to launch pre emptive strikes guess where the first few Baburs will land?

 

[TOPGUN]

We have had friendly ties and a peaceful border with Iran but things are different in Afghanistan. They've allowed Indian terrorist cells to operate from these socalled consulates, hence the problems in Balochistan.

Just wait a little longer, once PA gets green light from Islamabad to enter Afghanistan or to launch pre emptive strikes guess where the first few Baburs will land?

Yes sir i agree with u fully ! Afgan is a big prob for us and plus it s time we shut this American puppet Afgan 's pres mouth up he really has one big A$$ mouth i am for sure babur can take care of that!

 

[Omar1984]

BLA has been funded and supported by India since decades.

The Indian counsulates in Afghanistan are more active in terrorist at our western fronts in NWFP.

Whereas the India/Afghanistan nexus on BLA is there since decades. If you have forgotten Daud of Afghanistan who sheltterd both Indian and BLA terrorists in 70s.

How come BLA is being stood out just now....why didn't ppl know abt them in the 70s, 80s, 90s.....why so many problems in Balochistan after 2001?

 

[Omar1984]

We have had friendly ties and a peaceful border with Iran but things are different in Afghanistan. They've allowed Indian terrorist cells to operate from these socalled consulates, hence the problems in Balochistan.

Just wait a little longer, once PA gets green light from Islamabad to enter Afghanistan or to launch pre emptive strikes guess where the first few Baburs will land?

Indians are the problem...i agree, but do you honestly think the world will let Pakistan attack a country like Afghanistan, which has nothing. Also will pakhtoons in FATA, who have relatives in Afghanistan, allow you to attack Afghanistan? If we attack Afghanistan, both India and USA will be after Pakistan and thats gonna be really bad for Pakistan.

 

[dr.umer]

The baburs will not even take-off, so forget about landing.

What makes you so sure of that or you just felt like rantling?

 

[Neo]

How come BLA is being stood out just now....why didn't ppl know abt them in the 70s, 80s, 90s.....why so many problems in Balochistan after 2001?

I've got a better question for you: How come BLA is not recognised as a terrorist organisation in CIA's black list?

 

[Neo]

Indians are the problem...i agree, but do you honestly think the world will let Pakistan attack a country like Afghanistan, which has nothing. Also will pakhtoons in FATA, who have relatives in Afghanistan, allow you to attack Afghanistan? If we attack Afghanistan, both India and USA will be after Pakistan and thats gonna be really bad for Pakistan.

We don't have plans to attack Afghanistan, but I can assure you if it comes to confrontation between USA and Pakistan in FATA these terrorist cells in Afghanistan will not be spared. Pre-emptive strikes are not the souvereign right of USA or Nato only, it would be naive to assume so.

And India doesn't have guts to attack Pakistan, she's had her chances in 1987, '98, 2001 but all we got was barks, no bites. Pakistan is much stronger now and has nuclear deterrence.

 

[Neo]

Let me add that any action against Afghanistan will not be an impulsive one but well thought and planned with striking evidence that will justify our military actions.

 

[Neo]

No India will not join. USA will take care.

The baburs will not even take-off, so forget about landing.

Isn't it bed time for you?