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Officer Leads Old Corps in New Role in Pakistan

fatman17

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Officer Leads Old Corps in New Role in Pakistan

Tyler Hicks/The New York Times

By ERIC SCHMITT

Published: March 6, 2009

PESHAWAR, Pakistan — Maj. Gen. Tariq Khan, commander of Pakistan’s Frontier Corps paramilitary force, got some bad news the other day: The Pakistani Army needed its two helicopters back for a more urgent mission.Trouble was, they were the only two helicopters General Khan had that day — or any other day — to combat Al Qaeda and the Taliban in the country’s lawless tribal areas. “If the army needs their assets, we don’t get priority,” General Khan said of the transport and attack aircraft that the army lends him because his forces have none of their own.

So it goes for the Frontier Corps, a stepchild of the army that has to borrow most of its heavy weaponry, even as it increasingly finds itself on the front lines fighting Qaeda and Taliban operations that threaten American troops in Afghanistan and are increasingly destabilizing Pakistan.

Still, with the 500,000-member Pakistani Army focused on its archenemy, India, and reluctant to embrace serious counterinsurgency training, the Frontier Corps, long maligned as poorly trained, ill equipped and at times in league with the insurgents, may yet be the country’s best immediate hope for countering a fast-spreading militancy.

Unlike the Punjabi-dominated army, the 60,000 troops in the Frontier Corps are largely drawn from Pashtun tribesmen who know the language and culture of the tribal areas, making it the most suitable force to combat an insurgency there, Pakistani and American military officials say.

Enter General Khan, a portly, 52-year-old tank commander who made his name last year battling the Pakistani Taliban leader Baitullah Mehsud in South Waziristan. He took command of the corps seven months ago and has sought to drag it from its 19th-century border-patrol past into the 21st-century world of counterinsurgency.

The general, who once was Pakistan’s military representative at the United States Central Command headquarters in Tampa, Fla., has already improved morale by raising salaries and expanding medical care to dependents. He has drafted a detailed plan to overhaul the corps, aiming to transform it into a more agile lightly armed force while also swelling its ranks by more than 10,000 to allow home leaves.

He is an unusually progressive officer, a trait that has ruffled some feathers among his army brethren. In this conservative society, General Khan plans to offer women jobs as medics in rear-area field hospitals, freeing up male orderlies to fight.

Pakistani and American officials say the Frontier Corps is already more effective now. The corps’s forces, fighting alongside regular army soldiers, have largely wrapped up operations against the Taliban in the Bajaur, Mohmand and Khyber areas of the tribal belt, the general said.

A new commando unit within the Frontier Corps has used information from the Central Intelligence Agency and other sources to kill or capture as many as 60 militants in the past seven months, a senior Pakistani military official said. “The results speak for themselves,” Owais Ahmed Ghani, the governor of the North-West Frontier Province, which includes the tribal areas, said in an interview.

General Khan has strong support from the army chief of staff, Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani. But many military analysts question whether General Khan will get the resources and backing to continue carrying out his changes. Moreover, some critics say, the recent Frontier Corps operations have not eliminated the Taliban threat, but just shunted it to neighboring areas.

“The Frontier Corps has shown improvement, but there’s still a long way to go,” said Hasan Askari Rizvi, a military analyst in Lahore. “The Taliban are entrenched and move quickly from one area to another.”

The United States has thrown its support behind the corps. The Pentagon has spent more than $40 million to equip it with new body armor, vehicles, radios and surveillance equipment, with more in the pipeline. Over all, American officials have said that the United States could spend more than $400 million in the next several years to enhance the corps, including building a training base near Peshawar.

A United States Army Special Forces officer is assigned to the corps’s headquarters here to help share intelligence and coordinate operations with American forces across the border in Afghanistan.

Last fall, about 30 American and British military instructors spent three months training some 120 senior enlisted corps troops in new weapons, combat tactics, communications and other technical skills. Those Pakistani troops will in turn train additional corps forces.

But a review of policy on Afghanistan and Pakistan by the National Security Council this year, under former President George W. Bush, concluded that the “train-the-trainer” approach was so indirect that it would take about 12 years to field an effective counterinsurgency force. “They’ve got a long way to go before you can rely on them,” Representative John F. Tierney, a Massachusetts Democrat, said of the corps. Mr. Tierney’s oversight subcommittee has conducted several hearings on Pakistan.

In an interview here at his headquarters, a massive 19th-century brick fortress built by the British, General Khan said that a relatively modest investment — say, $300 million — in sensors, night-fighting equipment, sniper rifles and helicopters would enable the corps to respond to specific threats within 90 minutes and “to go independently anywhere it wanted to go.”

“It would change the dimension of the combat capacity of the Frontier Corps,” he said. “In the long run, it would reduce expenditures because you wouldn’t need so many troops.”

In the end, General Khan said the only long-term solution was to rebuild the tribal leadership structure that has been decimated by Taliban attacks, and then provide local tribal communities economic assistance and job training. “I consider the front-line force against the militants to be the tribes themselves,” General Khan said. “By bringing back tribal leadership, we’d be able to control this. But we have to have the wherewithal to protect those tribes.”
 
Great stuff Fatman. The FC ought have more effective special services units and certainly gen Tariq is not asking for much -- it would be interesting the response to these requests - it may give us some indication as how serious the powers that be are about combatting the scourge of Islamist terrorism.
 
General Khan was complaining in the ABC report that he hadn't seen this aid. I'm unsure when it was filmed but I'd guess January.

If $300 mil will gitterdun' and both the threat and urgency are so great, this is a job for yourselves. Do it and scream at us for reimbursement after-the-fact but get on with it and remove any basis for complaint by the good general.

Finally, I disagree with the general and (probably) most Pakistanis here-

“I consider the front-line force against the militants to be the tribes themselves...By bringing back tribal leadership, we’d be able to control this. But we have to have the wherewithal to protect those tribes.”

Whatever the past, the future must be different. FATA and Baluchistan must become fully integrated into the nation under one set of laws-and not Shariah. The tribes must be removed from the political equation at every level. Their leadership is now decimated in any case and half of the young emerging leaders are doing so on the wrong side of the fence.

This is a major impediment to Pakistan's national writ of sovereignty and a lesson that General Khan and others should have learned. An educated electorate will expect and demand "one man, one vote". If the intent is to educate FATA then anticipate this expression of individual power and freedom now and establish your government's power and authority.

Yup! You're correct. The next thing is your gun laws. Time to take these out of everybody's hands. Half the war is really one tribe against another with a ton of dope money and weapons floating around.

Should be a nice laundry list from which to get started. The Lord helps those who help themselves.:agree:
 
If $300 mil will gitterdun' and both the threat and urgency are so great, this is a job for yourselves. Do it and scream at us for reimbursement after-the-fact but get on with it and remove any basis for complaint by the good general.

we're still screaming about the USD 1 Billion reimbursement (double-billing notwithstanding) due to us! wink!wink!
 
K,

We both know that these things will work themselves out or not as the accountants see fit. In the interim, how's that help you? I personally think that Tariq Khan is a bit of full of himself.

I'm unsure of the "success" in Waziristan upon which his appointment to the F.C. was made but that's irrelevant if he's truly good. Here's what I think, though-

Good COIN acumen begins with basic soldiering-individual skills and fieldcraft straight through to small unit collective training and rehearsed battle-drill. It includes marksmanship (both day and night) and extensive night operations to include the following patrols-reconnaissance, counter-recon, security, and combat.

Nothing is said there about body armor or NVGs. Would it help? Of course. What are you going to do, though? Wait? Would you wait for such equipment were it the Indians? Of course not? Do your forces now facing the Indians possess such equipment? If so, the answer there for General Khan is obvious. If not, why should battle with the taliban be different than fighting the Indian army in the dark and without body armor?

I ask these questions rhetorically for one simple reason-COIN begins with the willingness to seek out the enemy...and the people. Successful COIN operations have long been conducted without use of these aids and life-saving devices. The technologies enhance good practices but cannot act as substitutes for such.

Your General Khan must train a very capable light infantry force. Your army must augment it's forces with heavy elements, to include composite mechanized task forces. Your engineers must be brought to the fore-both during and after battle as they might need to lead the reconstruction effort.

Then you must go to Waziristan and fight your enemies.

Heed the words of Horace Greeley- Go west young man.:agree:
 
I support his idea, FC must have its own air wing, least few cobra and trans copters. Cobra is the most effective in this terrain for ground troops cover...
 
If the army and frontier corps are achieving good success in those areas as mentioned particularly tribal areas its a pity they couldnt achieve the same success in SWAT only time will tell how long this ceasfire will last but if does collapse Im sure the army will not fail this time.
 
"If the army and frontier corps are achieving good success in those areas as mentioned particularly tribal areas"

What success? Bajaur? This was an operation that was anticipated to take about a month when initiated in mid-September. They THINK it's just now finishing up. I'm here to tell you it isn't. Why? Nothing's sure as hell finished in Konar. The Korengal is as hot as ever. So Bajaur isn't done yet either.

Worse-you'll leave...and they'll come back. That's why it's not done.

Have you LOOKED at your success in Bajaur, btw? 500,000 refugees and a leveled Loe Sam still. That's an entire winter of living in tents for half a million people. Can you predict how much longer that shall remain the case? What's their opinion of your "success"?

Now, tell me about all the other successes. I remember the battalion which surrendered enmasse. I remember the fort over-run for lack of support. I DON'T remember any resounding successes in Waziristan, Kurram, nor Khyber. Not then nor now.

Oh!! You did fight off a siege a couple of months back at a fort. That was good. Of course that the fort in question stayed besieged so long probably wasn't but why rain on your small parade?

Anything west of Peshawar is now part of the Islamic Republic of Pashtunistan. You're afflicted with a political leprosy that's eating you away from within.
 
I personally think that Tariq Khan is a bit of full of himself.

arnt they all - seriously i understand completely. unfortunately the COIN trg is a bit like on-the-job-training which is unfortunately stop and go due to the (you guessed it) mistrust factor!. having said that, large numbers of body-armour, army boots and NVG's were distributed recently to the FC. equipment like wheeled APCs, helos-transport and CAS are anyway in short supply and there we need help of the US (we dont make our own). the one's we have are fast running out of spares - what i mean there are limitations and it dosnt have to do with formations on the eastern border. all cobras are deployed in the west (even though they are part of the strike corps package).

lets see what happens on the ground after the visit of Gen. Kiyani to the US, which i believe has been a success. there is stronger rapport "at the top" (Mullen/Kiyani) and this should cascade down quickly into tangible strategy and actions.

the "peace deals" are going to un-ravel as it is not being handed properly and then its back to the "ops".

i have already fore-warned that N&S Waziristan is where the final battle will take place.
 
I really don't Know Why FC is Neglected and Ignored by Pakistan Army but they are Given the Most Difficult Task.

Just Recently FC Modernization Program was Initiated and FC Personnel are getting Training from American Instructors. Modern Weapons, Latest Equipment, Better Training, Good Pay (just Like other services) and High Morale will Enhance the Capabilities of FC and Better Capabilities of FC means Peace in Tribal Region and Peace in Pakistan.
 

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