Iran's Mosaic Doctrine - An Unrestricted Army
http://thearkenstone.blogspot.de/2010/03/irans-mosaic-doctrine-unrestricted-army.html4
For Iran, friction between its neighbors, the US and Israel have created a situation ripe for conflict. But desperately outmatched in conventional terms, Iran has raced to come up with a solution to offset this disparity. This comes in the shape of what has been come to be termed as the "Mosaic Doctrine". The Mosaic Doctrine is at it's heart a reorganization of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) into an army optimized for fighting net-warfare, small, agile fighting units that operate autonomously toward overall objectives rather then wars of maneuver fought by divisions and brigades. It also encompasses the transition to the idea of fighting a conventional war unconventionally. These reforms are also unique as it sets itself as one of the first cases of nation-states codifying "unrestricted warfare" as a primary doctrine rather then adopting asymmetric warfare as an accident as with many of the insurgencies across the world.
This doctrinal shift within the Iranian military can be seen as a response to the threat is faces from its enemies, specifically from the US or Israel. Most visible is the clashes with the West over their domestic nuclear program. An Israeli or US strike on Iranian nuclear infrastructure remains the most likely military threat to Iran in the foreseeable future. With the Israelis being far more likely to initiate conflict then the US due to the perceived existential threat from the Iranian nuclear program. The Israeli Air Force is heads and tails above anything the region has to offer against it, while the IRIAF does the best they can with what they have, it is not up to the task of being reliably counted on to intercept an IAF strike package. Any IAF attack would consist of F-16I and F-15I fighters which carry the best weapons and electronics available. (Cordesman, 2009) The IRIAF on the other hand is under armed in comparison; the only aircraft capable of posing a threat is the F-14 which is still outmatched in terms of electronic warfare and air-to-air capability. Air defense infrastructure is the same, the coverage is sparse at best, and the radar and SAM combos that do exist are antiquated and could easily be bypassed.
The reason the nuclear program is of such importance is that it is emblematic of Iran’s larger ambitions to become a major world player; it seeks legitimacy by gaining access to an exclusive club. The move is as much emblematic as it is technologically valuable.
There is also the risk that this conflict wouldn't be a simple quick battle over the fate of Iran's nuclear facility, but would escalate into a regional conflict fighting over battlegrounds in Afghanistan and Iraq as well as fighting over the worlds oil artery, the Persian Gulf, even drawing in Gulf Arab states or spreading into border skirmishes with US forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. The same technical inferiority that plagues its inability to protect against an air strike conventionally also affects its control of the Persian Gulf, the Islamic Republic of Iran Navy (IRIN) is equally antiquated, maintaining a few small frigates, patrol boats and submarines. Essentially nothing compared to a USN carrier battle group, or even against it's GCC neighbors. Thus, as the Israeli and US threats of a strike has escalated, so to has a demand on the part of the Iranians to form a model to deter an attack, or to mitigate its effectiveness.
The question then is, how can Iran form a credible defense in face of overwhelming military inferiority. The answer lies in The Mosaic Doctrine, a complete reorganization of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps and its associated reforms. The program was initiated by General Mohammad Ali Jafari when he assumed role of chief commander of the IRGC in 2007. The reforms center around a reorganization of the IRGC, transformed from a conventional military with full-sized divisions, and brigades located in various bases throughout the country, to a total network with 31 regional “corps”, 30 per province with an extra one in Tehran, each with regional autonomy, each is then subdivided further into municipalities and towns, in the words of Fariborz Haghshenass of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy: …it is creating a decentralized command structure that will allow for more autonomous district and sector operations. Small, autonomous, mobile, and agile combat units form the basic building block of this new “mosaic” defense strategy. (Haghshenass, 2008) The obvious advantage to this organization is that it allows the body to survive conventional surgical strikes that would otherwise decapitate a hierarchical organization. As Haghshenass said, the very nature of these corps are to provide maximum agility and initiative to each unit. The lesson here ostensibly comes from Hezbollah's success with it in the 2006 war. This comparison draws from the close historical cooperation between the IRGC and Hezbollah. Particularly during the 2006 war. It was the IRGC operatives that were advising the use of Hezbollah's most deadly weaponry such as UAV's and anti-ship missiles. (Cordesman, 2008) These units place a high premium on agility and speed within small units who carry impressive firepower through weapons like anti-tank missiles and mines as well as being extremely technically proficient carrying advanced weaponry usually reserved for 1st world armies.
While the reorganization itself is impressive, alone it would be of trifle importance for the same reason a gun is only as accurate as the person shooting it. For Iran, the strategy behind it being as every bit refined as the organization itself. The drive to adopt asymmetric warfare as their central principle was again led primarily by Gen. Jafari. He declared, soon after being appointed head of the Revolutionary Guards: Given the enemy's numerical or technological superiority, the IRGC would use asymmetrical warfare capabilities, such as those used by Hezbollah in its 2006 war with Israel in Lebanon. Iranian strategy would also reflect the strengths and weaknesses of the U.S. forces in Afghanistan and Iraq. (Sahimi, 2010) This strategy was aimed at using often low tech means to defeat an enemies superior technology while using economic and social warfare to win the political war, even if the military battle remains winnable. This was a strategy of what has been come to be known as 'unrestricted warfare'. The notion of unrestricted warfare was officially coined in a 1999 book by two senior Chinese Colonels, Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui. While it unknown whether Jafari actually read the book, it is clear that the ideas at least involved in parallel. The book presented a vision of the future of war that read as a manual for small, otherwise-weak actors to defeat larger and more powerful enemies by expanding warfare beyond the traditional realm, by using full spectrum warfare. Iran is a prime case study of this concept in action; they have devised strategies based on nullifying opponent’s high-technology advantages while exerting counter-pressure through military, political, economic and other “non-combat military operations”. Unrestricted warfare for Iran focuses around the core concept that in order to win the war, they won’t have to win the battles, but rather, they will only have to win the political representations the conflict creates. To accomplish this, they are focusing on a few critical aspects. First is the denial of enemy objectives, because after all, it doesn’t matter if you win so long as the enemy can’t either. This has resulted in heavy investment in defensive technology, both passive and active, such as hardened shelters, SAM’s, and naval mines. This is a true example of 'classic' unrestricted warfare, perfectly embodying the principle that one should always present a foil to the enemies strongest side, in this case, air supremacy, while using your other forces, in this case, ballistic missiles, to strike your enemies flanks. Second is the need to create coercive pressure upon the enemy, and this has manifested itself in all kinds of manners, such as the threat of sinking US aircraft carriers, disrupting oil supplies, or using missiles to strike critical military targets.
How does the IRGC measure up on their attempt to integrate the Chinese advice into their military. Luckily for us, the criteria is relatively straightforward, the first is the effective use of technology. This is particularly interesting given that Iran's foes, the US and Israel, are two of the most militarily advanced nations on earth, it seems foolish to think Iran could beat them at their own game.
And one would be correct, however the key here lies not in the expectation that Iran would develop 5th generation fighters or nuclear powered submarines, but rather that they would be able to successfully negate the advantages of the US or Israel. This is the result of successful integration of different weapons systems, both low and high tech to negate the opponents technical advantage. Iran not only does this, but also integrates another important theory from Unrestricted warfare, they do this in such a way as to present a foil to their enemies strengths, while striking at their weaknesses. (Liang and Xiangsui, 1999) No where is shown as perfectly in the field of air space. The US and Israel might be more advanced in every other realm, but it is truly the Air Force that they shine in, entire doctrines being framed around the total air supremacy relying on air support to win the war, as such billions of dollars are invested in platforms such as the F-22 or the F-15. Iran's response has been to seek better and better radar and SAM systems in recent years with rumors abounding concerning the acquisition of the S-300 SAM system from Russia, or the HQ-9 from China as well as a litany of internal rumors concerning domestic air defense projects. Another strategy of beating air power lies in denial of objectives, because, it doesn't matter if you win, so long as your enemy cant either. This takes the form of passive defenses such as hardening critical targets such as the ballistic missile storage bases located near Khorromabad and Kermanshah, both located in valleys between steep mountains, and buried in concrete and dirt, strategically placed to defeat cruise missile and aerial bombardment. (Wright, 2009) This is an extremely low-tech solution that is really nothing more then a glorified bunker, but has the power to defeat the Israelis primary strategy. Anti-ship missiles and mines are another good example, unable to afford the carrier battle groups of the United States Navy, Iran has instead chosen to invest in some of the worlds most advanced AShM's as well as incredibly cheap naval mines that have the power to deny the free use of Persian Gulf waterways. These are but a few of many examples existing within the IRGC including the use of satellite phones, anti-tank missiles, fiber optics, and ballistic missiles.
Another piece of advice the Iran seems to have heeded is that war no longer exists purely in the military realm, but has now spread into every facet of society, from economic to social. Iran's believes that the US and Israel are uniquely vulnerable to coercion, whether it be actual violence in a shooting war, or through economic concerns. In the social sphere their strategy rests on exploiting our fear of another long, drawn out war, seemingly without end where we are being bled of personnel and equipment, to prevent escalation of the war, keeping it on their terms allowing them to dictate the terms of the intensity of the war. Economically, they control an even more powerful info-weapon, the threat of closing the Straits of Hormuz. The Persian Gulf region provides the world with a substantial portion of their petrochemical needs and is home to their largest producers. Given the worlds insatiable thirst for oil, they would be averse to taking any action that could risk that supply. It would also prevent the GCC from entering on the side of the US, for fear of losing the revenue they are wholly dependent on. This battleground also proves the importance of the info-weapon to Iran's battle strategy. Realistically, they are not betting their strategy on their ability to actually starve the US of oil for its army, this is a rather unrealistic option, reserves and rationing can stretch out supplies longer then Iran could close the Gulf. What Iran is really betting on is the fear that they are able to close it, this is really the beautiful part of their strategy, they don't even have to do anything, there just has to be fear of it, if they even so much as injured a tanker, insurance rates would skyrocket, causing panic in a very fragile global economic state. (Stratfor, 2009)
While any type of aerial or naval combat in any hypothetical battle between Iran and any adversaries. Land battles are not out of the question, notice i said land battles, not wars. The latter is a near impossibility, with two of its potential enemies, Israel and the GCC, lacking land borders with Iran and the US overstretched with two wars already and a populace that would no sooner tolerate an invasion of Iran then they would spontaneously sprout wings and fly. That being said, in a war with Iran, one would be hard pressed to imagine a situation where there weren't cross-border raids and skirmishes between Iran and US forces in Afghanistan or Iraq. As such, the IRGC has built its ground forces as a foil to this threat. For instance, we see the wide-spread adoption of small independent garrisons in any population center, consistent with the Mosaic Doctrines principle of disaggregated command and control. Up until very recently these were Basij militia, but since late-2009 they have been integrated directly into the IRGC network. (PressTV, 2009) While there isn't as much written about these units as the more famous naval warfare, we can still infer quite a lot from the small amount of information available, mostly what can be gleaned from media coverage of events like wargames, as well as military parades. What we see during these events and parades are units that have high mobility, using vehicles like motor bikes, light cars and para-gliders, but still heavily armed, carrying a wide array of anti-tank rockets, mines, and surface-to-air missiles, operating in self-contained units.
The above concepts all deal with what would happen in a shooting war with Iran and the possibilities for Iran to use asymmetric warfare to their advantage. But this perspective still approaches it from the basic idea that war is still restricted to a war between nations, that, even if Iran is able to utilize economic warfare or coercion, it still remains within the realm of a war. While this is absolutely true and we shouldn't diminish this threat, another facet exists, the strategic posturing going on right now. It is my opinion that Iran’s greatest asymmetrical weapon is not anything that shoots or that blows up, but rather the threat itself from these weapons are in-and-of-themselves the most dangerous weapon. The constant veiled threats, announcements of weapons productions as well as the wargames are orchestrated and choreographed so well that it is impossible for them to be the ravings of madmen that they occasionally look to be on the surface. Instead, they are part of a carefully orchestrated plan to tell their enemies that “we might not be able to stop your attacks, but we can make you regret it”, hoping to deter them from ever having to take that chance because at the end of the day, no matter how good Iran’s asymmetric battle strategy is, they would still suffer heavily in the event of any conflict, risking economic collapse, loss of a nuclear program and destruction of the military they have painstakingly building for the past 20 years. Because of this, Iran’s most powerful weapon is it’s power of deterrence. Because, after all, it's often better to prevent a war then to win one.
One crucial aspect to the deterrence strategy is the Iranians stock of missiles and artillery rockets, ranging from the 355 mm unguided Nazeat-6 rocket up to the multi-stage Sejil ballistic missile. These are strategic weapons in the truest sense of the word, their accuracy means they cannot be used for precise strikes and their inefficiency means they can't be used willy-nilly against battlefield targets (for comparison, the F-4E fighter-bomber used by the IRIAF can carry tens of times more explosives then one rocket). However, they do have a strategic power in the sense that they allow Iran to have an air force without actually having one. They give Iran the power to inflict devastating blows against strategic military targets like bases and airfield both in Israel and against US assets that would otherwise be out of reach, acting dissuading any would be attackers. But again, the targets won't just be military, there are fears that Iran would strike downtown Tel Aviv or Saudi oil fields. Nuclear deterrence also plays a large role, but the possibility of it, or lack thereof is beyond the scope of this paper, and it will suffice to say that it doesn't play a large active role as of now, however this will be very likely to change within the next few years depending on how events play out. The threats of their use by Iranian leaders are almost comedic having the air of the stereotypical mobster shaking someone down for protection money: 'Would you look at that, our missiles have a 2,000 km range, and that just happens to be how far Israel is from us, what a coincidence'.
Like deterrence, the next logical jump takes us away from the battlefield with Iran to a number of proxy actors. Groups like Hezbollah, and the Mahdi army. In fact, this highlights that the war is going on as we speak as Iran seeks to undermine our position within the region. It has been said that there has been no greater victor in the US war with Iraq then Iran, this still holds true as Iran is able to gain the cooperation of former enemies, both in Iraq and Afghanistan, to build coalitions against regional enemies. A war the US is definitely losing in Iraq, and while Iran isn't winning in Afghanistan, neither is the US, and for Iran, thats better then pre-2001. (Kagan, 2007) Current activities aside, in the event of a war with Iran, these entities would not sit idly by, while it is important to note that groups like Hezbollah and the Mahdi army are not directly controlled by Iran, and at the heart of it only have their interests at stake, it would be unlikely that they would sit by and idly watch as their greatest enemies (Israel and the US respectively) attack their greatest ally.
Wrapping things up i'd like to emphasize one point. Namely, these are all guesses, 50% of which are probably wrong. This too is in Iran's strategy, the thick fog of disinformation that surrounds the IRGC and the rest of the Iranian armed forces is by ever means a deliberate attempt to impede their enemies decision making. While it might seem foolish to us to make grandiose statements every other week about the new production of a stealth drone, or a new submarine, or another round of war games, they create doubt and uncertainty, sure we can pass off the idea of a stealth bomber as lies, but what about a smaller stealth drone or a new class of tank? The leaders of the military such as Gen. Jafari or his predecessor Gen. Safavi who is now advisor to Supreme Leader Khamenei are simply too smart to be making these decisions without knowing what they're doing. So whenever we hear about how the IRGC Navy are conducting a new round of war games practicing infiltrating tactics we must remember that not only to these war games help train in the use of unrestricted warfare, but even the announcement itself serves a very concrete political purpose.
Citations
-Arasli, J. (2007). Obsolete weapons, unconventional tactics, and martyrdom zeal: how Iran would apply its asymmetric naval warfare doctrine in a future conflict. GEORGE C. MARSHALL EUROPEAN CENTER FOR SECURITY STUDIES, 10.
-Cordesman, A. (2009). Iran as a nuclear weapons power. Burke Chair in Strategy Reports.
-Cordesman, A. (2008). Security Challenges and Threats in the gulf : A Net Assessment. Burke Chair in Strategy Reports. Burke Chair in Strategy Reports.
-Sahimi, M. . (2010, January 21). A Hardliner's hardliner. Retrieved from A Hardliner's Hardliner - Tehran Bureau | FRONTLINE | PBS
-Interview with Gen. Mohammad Ali Jafari. (2008, January 26th). Qatar. Al Jazeera.
-Wright, G. (2009, October 9th). Image analysis - Kermanshah missile storage. Retrieved from The Arkenstone -
-Haghshenass, F. . (2008). Irans asymmetric naval warfare. Policy Focus, 87.Cordesman, A. (2008). The Lessons of the Israeli-Lebanon War. Burke Chair in Strategy Reports.
-Iran and the strait of hormuz: part 1 a strategy of deterrence. (2009). Stratfor Special Series.
-Irgc changes aimed at confronting new threats . (2009, February 18). Retrieved from No Operation
-Kagan, K. (2007, August 20). Iran’s proxy war against the united states and the iraqi government. The Weekly Standard.
-Liang, Q., & Xiangsui, W. (199). Unrestricted warfare. Beijing: PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House.
-Also, it would be important to note the vast litany of image galleries i have viewed in the past years that show the Iranian military on parade and at war games, one of the few reliable first-hand sources available.
http://thearkenstone.blogspot.de/2010/03/irans-mosaic-doctrine-unrestricted-army.html4
For Iran, friction between its neighbors, the US and Israel have created a situation ripe for conflict. But desperately outmatched in conventional terms, Iran has raced to come up with a solution to offset this disparity. This comes in the shape of what has been come to be termed as the "Mosaic Doctrine". The Mosaic Doctrine is at it's heart a reorganization of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) into an army optimized for fighting net-warfare, small, agile fighting units that operate autonomously toward overall objectives rather then wars of maneuver fought by divisions and brigades. It also encompasses the transition to the idea of fighting a conventional war unconventionally. These reforms are also unique as it sets itself as one of the first cases of nation-states codifying "unrestricted warfare" as a primary doctrine rather then adopting asymmetric warfare as an accident as with many of the insurgencies across the world.
This doctrinal shift within the Iranian military can be seen as a response to the threat is faces from its enemies, specifically from the US or Israel. Most visible is the clashes with the West over their domestic nuclear program. An Israeli or US strike on Iranian nuclear infrastructure remains the most likely military threat to Iran in the foreseeable future. With the Israelis being far more likely to initiate conflict then the US due to the perceived existential threat from the Iranian nuclear program. The Israeli Air Force is heads and tails above anything the region has to offer against it, while the IRIAF does the best they can with what they have, it is not up to the task of being reliably counted on to intercept an IAF strike package. Any IAF attack would consist of F-16I and F-15I fighters which carry the best weapons and electronics available. (Cordesman, 2009) The IRIAF on the other hand is under armed in comparison; the only aircraft capable of posing a threat is the F-14 which is still outmatched in terms of electronic warfare and air-to-air capability. Air defense infrastructure is the same, the coverage is sparse at best, and the radar and SAM combos that do exist are antiquated and could easily be bypassed.
The reason the nuclear program is of such importance is that it is emblematic of Iran’s larger ambitions to become a major world player; it seeks legitimacy by gaining access to an exclusive club. The move is as much emblematic as it is technologically valuable.
There is also the risk that this conflict wouldn't be a simple quick battle over the fate of Iran's nuclear facility, but would escalate into a regional conflict fighting over battlegrounds in Afghanistan and Iraq as well as fighting over the worlds oil artery, the Persian Gulf, even drawing in Gulf Arab states or spreading into border skirmishes with US forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. The same technical inferiority that plagues its inability to protect against an air strike conventionally also affects its control of the Persian Gulf, the Islamic Republic of Iran Navy (IRIN) is equally antiquated, maintaining a few small frigates, patrol boats and submarines. Essentially nothing compared to a USN carrier battle group, or even against it's GCC neighbors. Thus, as the Israeli and US threats of a strike has escalated, so to has a demand on the part of the Iranians to form a model to deter an attack, or to mitigate its effectiveness.
The question then is, how can Iran form a credible defense in face of overwhelming military inferiority. The answer lies in The Mosaic Doctrine, a complete reorganization of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps and its associated reforms. The program was initiated by General Mohammad Ali Jafari when he assumed role of chief commander of the IRGC in 2007. The reforms center around a reorganization of the IRGC, transformed from a conventional military with full-sized divisions, and brigades located in various bases throughout the country, to a total network with 31 regional “corps”, 30 per province with an extra one in Tehran, each with regional autonomy, each is then subdivided further into municipalities and towns, in the words of Fariborz Haghshenass of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy: …it is creating a decentralized command structure that will allow for more autonomous district and sector operations. Small, autonomous, mobile, and agile combat units form the basic building block of this new “mosaic” defense strategy. (Haghshenass, 2008) The obvious advantage to this organization is that it allows the body to survive conventional surgical strikes that would otherwise decapitate a hierarchical organization. As Haghshenass said, the very nature of these corps are to provide maximum agility and initiative to each unit. The lesson here ostensibly comes from Hezbollah's success with it in the 2006 war. This comparison draws from the close historical cooperation between the IRGC and Hezbollah. Particularly during the 2006 war. It was the IRGC operatives that were advising the use of Hezbollah's most deadly weaponry such as UAV's and anti-ship missiles. (Cordesman, 2008) These units place a high premium on agility and speed within small units who carry impressive firepower through weapons like anti-tank missiles and mines as well as being extremely technically proficient carrying advanced weaponry usually reserved for 1st world armies.
While the reorganization itself is impressive, alone it would be of trifle importance for the same reason a gun is only as accurate as the person shooting it. For Iran, the strategy behind it being as every bit refined as the organization itself. The drive to adopt asymmetric warfare as their central principle was again led primarily by Gen. Jafari. He declared, soon after being appointed head of the Revolutionary Guards: Given the enemy's numerical or technological superiority, the IRGC would use asymmetrical warfare capabilities, such as those used by Hezbollah in its 2006 war with Israel in Lebanon. Iranian strategy would also reflect the strengths and weaknesses of the U.S. forces in Afghanistan and Iraq. (Sahimi, 2010) This strategy was aimed at using often low tech means to defeat an enemies superior technology while using economic and social warfare to win the political war, even if the military battle remains winnable. This was a strategy of what has been come to be known as 'unrestricted warfare'. The notion of unrestricted warfare was officially coined in a 1999 book by two senior Chinese Colonels, Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui. While it unknown whether Jafari actually read the book, it is clear that the ideas at least involved in parallel. The book presented a vision of the future of war that read as a manual for small, otherwise-weak actors to defeat larger and more powerful enemies by expanding warfare beyond the traditional realm, by using full spectrum warfare. Iran is a prime case study of this concept in action; they have devised strategies based on nullifying opponent’s high-technology advantages while exerting counter-pressure through military, political, economic and other “non-combat military operations”. Unrestricted warfare for Iran focuses around the core concept that in order to win the war, they won’t have to win the battles, but rather, they will only have to win the political representations the conflict creates. To accomplish this, they are focusing on a few critical aspects. First is the denial of enemy objectives, because after all, it doesn’t matter if you win so long as the enemy can’t either. This has resulted in heavy investment in defensive technology, both passive and active, such as hardened shelters, SAM’s, and naval mines. This is a true example of 'classic' unrestricted warfare, perfectly embodying the principle that one should always present a foil to the enemies strongest side, in this case, air supremacy, while using your other forces, in this case, ballistic missiles, to strike your enemies flanks. Second is the need to create coercive pressure upon the enemy, and this has manifested itself in all kinds of manners, such as the threat of sinking US aircraft carriers, disrupting oil supplies, or using missiles to strike critical military targets.
How does the IRGC measure up on their attempt to integrate the Chinese advice into their military. Luckily for us, the criteria is relatively straightforward, the first is the effective use of technology. This is particularly interesting given that Iran's foes, the US and Israel, are two of the most militarily advanced nations on earth, it seems foolish to think Iran could beat them at their own game.
And one would be correct, however the key here lies not in the expectation that Iran would develop 5th generation fighters or nuclear powered submarines, but rather that they would be able to successfully negate the advantages of the US or Israel. This is the result of successful integration of different weapons systems, both low and high tech to negate the opponents technical advantage. Iran not only does this, but also integrates another important theory from Unrestricted warfare, they do this in such a way as to present a foil to their enemies strengths, while striking at their weaknesses. (Liang and Xiangsui, 1999) No where is shown as perfectly in the field of air space. The US and Israel might be more advanced in every other realm, but it is truly the Air Force that they shine in, entire doctrines being framed around the total air supremacy relying on air support to win the war, as such billions of dollars are invested in platforms such as the F-22 or the F-15. Iran's response has been to seek better and better radar and SAM systems in recent years with rumors abounding concerning the acquisition of the S-300 SAM system from Russia, or the HQ-9 from China as well as a litany of internal rumors concerning domestic air defense projects. Another strategy of beating air power lies in denial of objectives, because, it doesn't matter if you win, so long as your enemy cant either. This takes the form of passive defenses such as hardening critical targets such as the ballistic missile storage bases located near Khorromabad and Kermanshah, both located in valleys between steep mountains, and buried in concrete and dirt, strategically placed to defeat cruise missile and aerial bombardment. (Wright, 2009) This is an extremely low-tech solution that is really nothing more then a glorified bunker, but has the power to defeat the Israelis primary strategy. Anti-ship missiles and mines are another good example, unable to afford the carrier battle groups of the United States Navy, Iran has instead chosen to invest in some of the worlds most advanced AShM's as well as incredibly cheap naval mines that have the power to deny the free use of Persian Gulf waterways. These are but a few of many examples existing within the IRGC including the use of satellite phones, anti-tank missiles, fiber optics, and ballistic missiles.
Another piece of advice the Iran seems to have heeded is that war no longer exists purely in the military realm, but has now spread into every facet of society, from economic to social. Iran's believes that the US and Israel are uniquely vulnerable to coercion, whether it be actual violence in a shooting war, or through economic concerns. In the social sphere their strategy rests on exploiting our fear of another long, drawn out war, seemingly without end where we are being bled of personnel and equipment, to prevent escalation of the war, keeping it on their terms allowing them to dictate the terms of the intensity of the war. Economically, they control an even more powerful info-weapon, the threat of closing the Straits of Hormuz. The Persian Gulf region provides the world with a substantial portion of their petrochemical needs and is home to their largest producers. Given the worlds insatiable thirst for oil, they would be averse to taking any action that could risk that supply. It would also prevent the GCC from entering on the side of the US, for fear of losing the revenue they are wholly dependent on. This battleground also proves the importance of the info-weapon to Iran's battle strategy. Realistically, they are not betting their strategy on their ability to actually starve the US of oil for its army, this is a rather unrealistic option, reserves and rationing can stretch out supplies longer then Iran could close the Gulf. What Iran is really betting on is the fear that they are able to close it, this is really the beautiful part of their strategy, they don't even have to do anything, there just has to be fear of it, if they even so much as injured a tanker, insurance rates would skyrocket, causing panic in a very fragile global economic state. (Stratfor, 2009)
While any type of aerial or naval combat in any hypothetical battle between Iran and any adversaries. Land battles are not out of the question, notice i said land battles, not wars. The latter is a near impossibility, with two of its potential enemies, Israel and the GCC, lacking land borders with Iran and the US overstretched with two wars already and a populace that would no sooner tolerate an invasion of Iran then they would spontaneously sprout wings and fly. That being said, in a war with Iran, one would be hard pressed to imagine a situation where there weren't cross-border raids and skirmishes between Iran and US forces in Afghanistan or Iraq. As such, the IRGC has built its ground forces as a foil to this threat. For instance, we see the wide-spread adoption of small independent garrisons in any population center, consistent with the Mosaic Doctrines principle of disaggregated command and control. Up until very recently these were Basij militia, but since late-2009 they have been integrated directly into the IRGC network. (PressTV, 2009) While there isn't as much written about these units as the more famous naval warfare, we can still infer quite a lot from the small amount of information available, mostly what can be gleaned from media coverage of events like wargames, as well as military parades. What we see during these events and parades are units that have high mobility, using vehicles like motor bikes, light cars and para-gliders, but still heavily armed, carrying a wide array of anti-tank rockets, mines, and surface-to-air missiles, operating in self-contained units.
The above concepts all deal with what would happen in a shooting war with Iran and the possibilities for Iran to use asymmetric warfare to their advantage. But this perspective still approaches it from the basic idea that war is still restricted to a war between nations, that, even if Iran is able to utilize economic warfare or coercion, it still remains within the realm of a war. While this is absolutely true and we shouldn't diminish this threat, another facet exists, the strategic posturing going on right now. It is my opinion that Iran’s greatest asymmetrical weapon is not anything that shoots or that blows up, but rather the threat itself from these weapons are in-and-of-themselves the most dangerous weapon. The constant veiled threats, announcements of weapons productions as well as the wargames are orchestrated and choreographed so well that it is impossible for them to be the ravings of madmen that they occasionally look to be on the surface. Instead, they are part of a carefully orchestrated plan to tell their enemies that “we might not be able to stop your attacks, but we can make you regret it”, hoping to deter them from ever having to take that chance because at the end of the day, no matter how good Iran’s asymmetric battle strategy is, they would still suffer heavily in the event of any conflict, risking economic collapse, loss of a nuclear program and destruction of the military they have painstakingly building for the past 20 years. Because of this, Iran’s most powerful weapon is it’s power of deterrence. Because, after all, it's often better to prevent a war then to win one.
One crucial aspect to the deterrence strategy is the Iranians stock of missiles and artillery rockets, ranging from the 355 mm unguided Nazeat-6 rocket up to the multi-stage Sejil ballistic missile. These are strategic weapons in the truest sense of the word, their accuracy means they cannot be used for precise strikes and their inefficiency means they can't be used willy-nilly against battlefield targets (for comparison, the F-4E fighter-bomber used by the IRIAF can carry tens of times more explosives then one rocket). However, they do have a strategic power in the sense that they allow Iran to have an air force without actually having one. They give Iran the power to inflict devastating blows against strategic military targets like bases and airfield both in Israel and against US assets that would otherwise be out of reach, acting dissuading any would be attackers. But again, the targets won't just be military, there are fears that Iran would strike downtown Tel Aviv or Saudi oil fields. Nuclear deterrence also plays a large role, but the possibility of it, or lack thereof is beyond the scope of this paper, and it will suffice to say that it doesn't play a large active role as of now, however this will be very likely to change within the next few years depending on how events play out. The threats of their use by Iranian leaders are almost comedic having the air of the stereotypical mobster shaking someone down for protection money: 'Would you look at that, our missiles have a 2,000 km range, and that just happens to be how far Israel is from us, what a coincidence'.
Like deterrence, the next logical jump takes us away from the battlefield with Iran to a number of proxy actors. Groups like Hezbollah, and the Mahdi army. In fact, this highlights that the war is going on as we speak as Iran seeks to undermine our position within the region. It has been said that there has been no greater victor in the US war with Iraq then Iran, this still holds true as Iran is able to gain the cooperation of former enemies, both in Iraq and Afghanistan, to build coalitions against regional enemies. A war the US is definitely losing in Iraq, and while Iran isn't winning in Afghanistan, neither is the US, and for Iran, thats better then pre-2001. (Kagan, 2007) Current activities aside, in the event of a war with Iran, these entities would not sit idly by, while it is important to note that groups like Hezbollah and the Mahdi army are not directly controlled by Iran, and at the heart of it only have their interests at stake, it would be unlikely that they would sit by and idly watch as their greatest enemies (Israel and the US respectively) attack their greatest ally.
Wrapping things up i'd like to emphasize one point. Namely, these are all guesses, 50% of which are probably wrong. This too is in Iran's strategy, the thick fog of disinformation that surrounds the IRGC and the rest of the Iranian armed forces is by ever means a deliberate attempt to impede their enemies decision making. While it might seem foolish to us to make grandiose statements every other week about the new production of a stealth drone, or a new submarine, or another round of war games, they create doubt and uncertainty, sure we can pass off the idea of a stealth bomber as lies, but what about a smaller stealth drone or a new class of tank? The leaders of the military such as Gen. Jafari or his predecessor Gen. Safavi who is now advisor to Supreme Leader Khamenei are simply too smart to be making these decisions without knowing what they're doing. So whenever we hear about how the IRGC Navy are conducting a new round of war games practicing infiltrating tactics we must remember that not only to these war games help train in the use of unrestricted warfare, but even the announcement itself serves a very concrete political purpose.
Citations
-Arasli, J. (2007). Obsolete weapons, unconventional tactics, and martyrdom zeal: how Iran would apply its asymmetric naval warfare doctrine in a future conflict. GEORGE C. MARSHALL EUROPEAN CENTER FOR SECURITY STUDIES, 10.
-Cordesman, A. (2009). Iran as a nuclear weapons power. Burke Chair in Strategy Reports.
-Cordesman, A. (2008). Security Challenges and Threats in the gulf : A Net Assessment. Burke Chair in Strategy Reports. Burke Chair in Strategy Reports.
-Sahimi, M. . (2010, January 21). A Hardliner's hardliner. Retrieved from A Hardliner's Hardliner - Tehran Bureau | FRONTLINE | PBS
-Interview with Gen. Mohammad Ali Jafari. (2008, January 26th). Qatar. Al Jazeera.
-Wright, G. (2009, October 9th). Image analysis - Kermanshah missile storage. Retrieved from The Arkenstone -
-Haghshenass, F. . (2008). Irans asymmetric naval warfare. Policy Focus, 87.Cordesman, A. (2008). The Lessons of the Israeli-Lebanon War. Burke Chair in Strategy Reports.
-Iran and the strait of hormuz: part 1 a strategy of deterrence. (2009). Stratfor Special Series.
-Irgc changes aimed at confronting new threats . (2009, February 18). Retrieved from No Operation
-Kagan, K. (2007, August 20). Iran’s proxy war against the united states and the iraqi government. The Weekly Standard.
-Liang, Q., & Xiangsui, W. (199). Unrestricted warfare. Beijing: PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House.
-Also, it would be important to note the vast litany of image galleries i have viewed in the past years that show the Iranian military on parade and at war games, one of the few reliable first-hand sources available.
