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Army chief to Antony: Don't block gun trials

A worried army chief, General Deepak Kapoor, has protested to Defence Minister A K Antony about the derailing of vital defence purchases by allegations of corruption. On June 10, General Kapoor complained about the cancellation of army trials on the Pegasus ultra-light howitzer, after the manufacturer, Singapore Technologies Kinetics (STK), was suspended on suspicion of links with a discredited MoD official.
The trials of the 155 mm Pegasus were to commence on 22 June at the Pokhran Ranges in Rajasthan. Any delay, General Kapoor warned Mr Antony, would push back the hot-weather trials by a year.
The next day, the deputy chief, Lt Gen MS Dadwal, fired off a letter to the Defence Secretary, Vijay Singh (Letter No 00048/Proc/DCOAS (P&S)/Sectt) reiterating that the Pegasus trials must continue, even while the Central Bureau of Investigation probes whether STK was connected in any way with Sudipta Ghosh — the former chairman of the Ordnance Factories Board (OFB) — who was arrested for corruption on 19 May. If STK was found guilty, the purchase could always be cancelled.
The army chief, an artilleryman himself, has emphasised on the crucial need for modern artillery; the last important purchase was more than 20 years ago: the 155mm Bofors FH-77B gun in the mid-1980s. Even that was restricted, by allegations of kickbacks, to the direct purchase of 400 guns. The chance to manufacture thousands more in India, through transfer of technology (ToT) was thrown away, even though India paid for the technology. In 2005, amidst a push to buy towed and self-propelled artillery, South African gun manufacturer, Denel, was banned. Soon afterwards, Israeli artillery firm, Soltam Systems, found itself under the scanner.
General Kapoor’s request to Antony has counte0d for little; the CBI and the CVC suggested to the MoD that the ban on STK continues. The MoD wrote back to Army HQ (Letter No 1(5)/2007/D(Proc) dated 7 July) saying that the trials stood cancelled until further orders.
Ironically, the army could benefit from this delay, which creates conditions for bringing another gun into contention: the combat-proven BAE Systems M777 ultra-light howitzer, which is currently doing battle in Afghanistan and Iraq. So far, Pegasus was the only gun in contention — a monopoly situation explicitly discouraged in the MoD’s Defence Procurement Policy of 2008 (DPP–2008). BAE Systems could not bid because the MoD refused to grant it several months for clearing Indian ammunition to be fired from M777 howitzers.
Major General AJS Sandhu, an Indian artillery expert, explains that — since British Army M777 crews would fire Indian ammunition during the trials — British regulations demanded that the ammunition first be “classified”, or cleared by safety experts, before the trials. And since India insisted on firing several types of ammunition during trials, classifying every one of them would take several months.
Asked to confirm, BAE Systems India President, Julian Scopes told Business Standard by email, “In the tender for ultra-light howitzers, there were requirements in the [tender] that made it difficult for us respond in the time available. But we remain hopeful that M777 can be considered and continue to point out to the MoD that the BAE Systems M777 is the lightest 155mm howitzer in the world, in service with the US Army, US Marine Corp and Canadian Army, and the only one that is combat proven.”
Defence experts are unanimous that India’s artillery has deteriorated worryingly from poor procurement. In a hurry to acquire ultra-light howitzers, the MoD opted for a single vendor (STK), which offered a gun that has never seen battle. Now, with STK blacklisted, a yearlong delay seems inevitable; but that period, says General Sandhu, could allow the MoD to bring in BAE Systems, generating wider choice and competitive bidding.
The MoD has tendered for three types of guns: self-propelled guns for the mechanised forces; towed guns for divisions deployed in the plains; and ultra-light howitzers for mountainous areas. Two new mountain divisions, being raised for offensive operations on the China border, will be equipped with these guns. Constructed largely from titanium, their low weight provides tactical mobility, or the ability to quickly move around the battlefield on mountain roads and dirt tracks where heavier guns would get bogged down. Ultra-light guns can even be airlifted into inaccessible firing positions by helicopter.
 
The Myth of Martial Races
Though I've always been proud of the Sikh tradition in military service -- particularly in the First and Second World Wars -- the fact that the British Raj designated certain ethno-religious groups as martial races makes me uneasy. And recently I've been reading a book on the Gurkha regiments, (Byron Farwell's The Gurkhas), and after working through a number of chapters I'm ready to throw out the designation entirely.

For those who are unfamiliar, the Gurkhas (or Gorkhas) come from a region of Nepal west of Kathmandu, and have been actively recruited by the British for service as mercenaries since 1815. It so happened that the British discovered the Gurkhas' military aptitude after defeating them in a series of particularly tough battles -- just as they did with the Sikhs, the Marathas, and indeed, the Zulus (all of whom would be designated "martial races"; see the full list here). Often, troops from one recently conquered region would be instrumental in defeating the next group (the Gurkhas were deployed in the Anglo-Sikh Wars, for instance).

As a side-note, though most Gurkha regiments joined the Indian army at independence, the British did retain a small number of Gurkhas for the British Army after 1947 -- and they still actively recruit them today (on a fully voluntary basis, of course). Gurkhas were deployed in the Falklands' War, in Kosovo, and are now in Afghanistan. Retired Gurkhas are also probably going to be deployed to monitor the fragile peace agreement between the Maoists and the new government of Nepal. Joining the Gurkha regiments in the British Army is considered desirable, but it's a tough gig to get: one of the physical tests in order to be accepted involves running uphill for 40 minutes with a 70 pound bag of stones strapped to your back!

The author of the book on the Gurkhas is mainly a military historian, not an anthropologist, so it's probably too much to expect to ask him to deconstruct the idea of "martial races." But it's extremely frustrating that in episode after episode Farwell seems to reiterate a few straightforward stereotypes as explaining the Gurkhas' effectiveness in battle on behalf of the British: they are simple peasants, they are hardened by life in a mountainous region, and they have a strong sense of cultural identity. The same could be said of many other ethnic groups, most of whom were not designated "martial races." So why the Gurkhas?

It seems hard to escape the conclusion that "martial race" is a convenient term created by the British to continue military recruiting patterns favorable to the progress of imperial expansionism.

The authors of the Wikipedia entry on "martial races" have stated the problems with the term quite well:


Martial Race was a designation created by officials of British India. The British officials described these races as naturally warlike and aggressive in battle, and to possess qualities like courage, loyalty, self sufficiency, physical strength, resilience, orderliness, hard working, fighting tenacity and Military tactics. The British recruited heavily from these Martial Races for service in the colonial army. This doctrine of martial races postulated that the ability and desire of the soldier was inherited and that most Indians, with the exception of the specified castes, did not have the requisite genes that would make them warriors. Critics of this theory state that the Indian rebellion of 1857 may have played a role in reinforcing the British belief in Martial races. During this event some Indian troops (known as "Sepoys"), particularly in Bengal, mutinied, but the "loyal" Sikhs, Punjabis, Dogras, Gurkas, Garhwalis and Pakhtuns (Pathans) did not join the mutiny and fought on the side of the British Army. From then on, this theory was used to the hilt to accelerate recruitment from among these races, whilst discouraging enlistment of "disloyal" Bengalis and high-caste Hindus who had sided with the rebel army during the war.



The geography and culture of these martial races had common marks, such as hilly and mountainous terrain, a basis as hunting or agricultural societies, and a history of conflict, whether internally or with external groups. A case in point are the Gurkhas, who challenged British imperial expansion and gained the respect of their enemies for their fighting prowess and tenacity, thus earning them their reputation and their continued employment in the British Army. Some authors like Heather Streets rebuff this Martial Races Ideology stating that the military authorities puffed up the images of the martial soldiers by writing regimental histories, and by extolling the kilted Scots, kukri-wielding Gurkhas and turbaned Sikhs in numerous paintings. The Martial Race theory has also been described as a clever British effort to divide and rule the people of India for their own political ends." (link)


The damning parallel between the groups that were loyal during the Mutiny and those who would be designated as "Martial Races" later seems hard to escape. Though I generally try and avoid paranoid speculation, the idea of "divide and rule" also seems to be relevant here: by keeping the various ethnic regiments of the Indian army divided along linguistic or ethnic lines, they prevented them from congealing along racial (as in, brown vs. white) ones.

For better or worse, groups once designated by the British as "martial races" still tend to carry that badge with pride. But it's a dubious source of honor, and also an extremely dubious way of asserting one's manhood & masculinity. (How much violence against women has been perpetrated in the service of the myth of Jat or Pathan/Pashtun martial masculinity?) I think it would be better if we just threw out all those old myths, spattered as they are with the blood of wars of subjugation.
 
The author is right on target.

After 1857 mutiny,the Begalis were termed non-martial race because it was Bengalis who were mostly involved in Mutiny.

But we all know,that Bengal always resisted foreign invasion.From Akbar to British.
 
But it's a dubious source of honor, and also an extremely dubious way of asserting one's manhood & masculinity. (How much violence against women has been perpetrated in the service of the myth of Jat or Pathan/Pashtun martial masculinity?)

This part I think was a bit of a rant. Martial Race concept and violence against women is hardly related. I feel there is some merit in the concept of martial races. The Bengalis for instance might have been good at rebelling now and then but that doesn’t necessarily make them martially proficient or warlike. Traditional Bengali culture has very few warrior-hero folk tales or martial traditions, especially if you compare them to the Punjabi or Pathan, even the Sikh populations where professional soldiery is looked proudly upon. This was one of the reasons so few Bengalis joined the Pakistan Army (around 10%) when their population was actually more than 55% of Pakistan's.

If we generalize and stereotype a bit, often Bengalis tend to look at themselves as the more intellectually oriented, while at least some look(ed) down on Pathan and Punjabis as the more-brawns/less-brain type physical oriented folk. This stereotyping was present on both sides, and probably still is. It doesn’t mean that a Pathan army can defeat a Bengali army any day, innumerable factors are involved in any war and it’s impossible to conclude anything. But the way people and communities look upon themselves does have an impact on their longer term direction and growth.

The Pakistan Army recruits heavily from the so called ‘martial castes’ and there is no doubt that Pakistan Army’s NCO crops is one of the finest in the world. They’re hardy people used to and dependant on martial traditions; representing tough but stable communities, not too prosperous but not hopelessly poor either. A bit like the Prussians of Germany. General Kayani is one of them, his dad was a NCO.

It’s too easy to stereotype the concept either way, it has its merits but it also has its limitations. Not every kid born to a ‘martial community’ will be soldier material, neither will every kid born to a ‘non-martial caste’ be unfit for soldiery.

If the British wanted to divide and polarize their Armies in India, encouraging the notion of the ‘martial castes’ was hardly the best or only way to do it. It is more likely they were just serving their interests based on what they perceived of the natives. They may have had trust issues (not without reason) with some ethnicities while others could’ve earned their genuine respect. What is without doubt is that these ‘Martial Races’ served the British well enough, and the British in turn had a deep and profound impact on the culture and growth of these communities.
 
The "Martial Races" where those groups that backed the british and helped them.......from an indian-pak perspective they could be called the "sell out races".
 
The author is right on target.
After 1857 mutiny,the Begalis were termed non-martial race because it was Bengalis who were mostly involved in Mutiny.
But we all know,that Bengal always resisted foreign invasion.From Akbar to British.
Sorry, i Have to disagree with you on that ! In 16th century mughal general Islam khan conquered bengal !
9bcda4de157c96429cfcca43ddd85dcc.jpg

And then,British East India Company gained taxation rights in Bengalsubah, or province, following theBattle of Plasseyin 1757, whenSiraj ud-Daulah, the last independent Nawab, was defeated by the British.The Bengal Presidency was established by 1766.
 
The author is right on target.
After 1857 mutiny,the Begalis were termed non-martial race because it was Bengalis who were mostly involved in Mutiny.
Have to disagree with you on that too.....TheIndian Rebellion of 1857began as a mutiny ofsepoysof the British East India Company's army on 10 May, 1857, in the town ofMeerut, and soon erupted into other mutinies and civilian rebellions largely in theupper Gangetic plainandcentral India, with the major hostilities confined confined to present-day Uttar Pradesh,Bihar, northernMadhya Pradesh, and theDelhi region..Company-controlled India¡ªBengalprovince, theBombay Presidency, and theMadras Presidency¡ªremained largely calm.
 
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There is no doubt that the term 'martial races' was coined by the British to help serve their interests, and to justify selective recruitment policies.

However, there is an historical reality that we cannot ignore. Throughout history, there have been clans, tribes, castes, people that have on the whole been more war-like, aggressive, expansionist than others. Of course, these traits do change (if they are not rooted in genetics) over a course of time, but cultural social links make sure that certain proffessions remain the domain of some in posterity.

If I had a grandfather, uncle, etc. in the Army, it is more likely that I would also join the Army rather than someone from a family of Doctors or Accountants. This can be amplified to traits in certain castes, tribes, races, etc.
 
The Myth of Martial Races
Though I've always been proud of the Sikh tradition in military service -- particularly in the First and Second World Wars -- the fact that the British Raj designated certain ethno-religious groups as martial races makes me uneasy. And recently I've been reading a book on the Gurkha regiments, (Byron Farwell's The Gurkhas), and after working through a number of chapters I'm ready to throw out the designation entirely.
For those who are unfamiliar, the Gurkhas (or Gorkhas) come from a region of Nepal west of Kathmandu, and have been actively recruited by the British for service as mercenaries since 1815. It so happened that the British discovered the Gurkhas' military aptitude after defeating them in a series of particularly tough battles -- just as they did with the Sikhs, the Marathas, and indeed, the Zulus (all of whom would be designated "martial races"; see the full list here). Often, troops from one recently conquered region would be instrumental in defeating the next group (the Gurkhas were deployed in the Anglo-Sikh Wars, for instance).
As a side-note, though most Gurkha regiments joined the Indian army at independence, the British did retain a small number of Gurkhas for the British Army after 1947 -- and they still actively recruit them today (on a fully voluntary basis, of course). Gurkhas were deployed in the Falklands' War, in Kosovo, and are now in Afghanistan. Retired Gurkhas are also probably going to be deployed to monitor the fragile peace agreement between the Maoists and the new government of Nepal. Joining the Gurkha regiments in the British Army is considered desirable, but it's a tough gig to get: one of the physical tests in order to be accepted involves running uphill for 40 minutes with a 70 pound bag of stones strapped to your back!
The author of the book on the Gurkhas is mainly a military historian, not an anthropologist, so it's probably too much to expect to ask him to deconstruct the idea of "martial races." But it's extremely frustrating that in episode after episode Farwell seems to reiterate a few straightforward stereotypes as explaining the Gurkhas' effectiveness in battle on behalf of the British: they are simple peasants, they are hardened by life in a mountainous region, and they have a strong sense of cultural identity. The same could be said of many other ethnic groups, most of whom were not designated "martial races." So why the Gurkhas?
It seems hard to escape the conclusion that "martial race" is a convenient term created by the British to continue military recruiting patterns favorable to the progress of imperial expansionism.
The authors of the Wikipedia entry on "martial races" have stated the problems with the term quite well:
Martial Race was a designation created by officials of British India. The British officials described these races as naturally warlike and aggressive in battle, and to possess qualities like courage, loyalty, self sufficiency, physical strength, resilience, orderliness, hard working, fighting tenacity and Military tactics. The British recruited heavily from these Martial Races for service in the colonial army. This doctrine of martial races postulated that the ability and desire of the soldier was inherited and that most Indians, with the exception of the specified castes, did not have the requisite genes that would make them warriors. Critics of this theory state that the Indian rebellion of 1857 may have played a role in reinforcing the British belief in Martial races. During this event some Indian troops (known as "Sepoys"), particularly in Bengal, mutinied, but the "loyal" Sikhs, Punjabis, Dogras, Gurkas, Garhwalis and Pakhtuns (Pathans) did not join the mutiny and fought on the side of the British Army. From then on, this theory was used to the hilt to accelerate recruitment from among these races, whilst discouraging enlistment of "disloyal" Bengalis and high-caste Hindus who had sided with the rebel army during the war.
The geography and culture of these martial races had common marks, such as hilly and mountainous terrain, a basis as hunting or agricultural societies, and a history of conflict, whether internally or with external groups. A case in point are the Gurkhas, who challenged British imperial expansion and gained the respect of their enemies for their fighting prowess and tenacity, thus earning them their reputation and their continued employment in the British Army. Some authors like Heather Streets rebuff this Martial Races Ideology stating that the military authorities puffed up the images of the martial soldiers by writing regimental histories, and by extolling the kilted Scots, kukri-wielding Gurkhas and turbaned Sikhs in numerous paintings. The Martial Race theory has also been described as a clever British effort to divide and rule the people of India for their own political ends." (link)
The damning parallel between the groups that were loyal during the Mutiny and those who would be designated as "Martial Races" later seems hard to escape. Though I generally try and avoid paranoid speculation, the idea of "divide and rule" also seems to be relevant here: by keeping the various ethnic regiments of the Indian army divided along linguistic or ethnic lines, they prevented them from congealing along racial (as in, brown vs. white) ones.
For better or worse, groups once designated by the British as "martial races" still tend to carry that badge with pride. But it's a dubious source of honor, and also an extremely dubious way of asserting one's manhood & masculinity. (How much violence against women has been perpetrated in the service of the myth of Jat or Pathan/Pashtun martial masculinity?) I think it would be better if we just threw out all those old myths, spattered as they are with the blood of wars of subjugation.
Martial race not just a propaganda ,it has been recorded thoroughout the history.

b33a7a71c5c5925c12f7f74ee2f010fd.jpg

French postcard depicting the arrival of 15thSikh Regimentin France duringWorld War I. The post card reads,"Gentlemen of India marching to chasten the German hooligans"

martial classes in india as designated by the British are Ahirs/Yadavs,Awans,Bhumihars,Bhatia,Dhangar,Dogra,Gakhars,Garhwalis,Gujjars,Gurkhas,Jats,Kamboj/Kamboh,Khokhars,Kodava(Coorgs)Kumaoni/Kumaunis,Sikh Labanas,Maravars/Thevars,Mohyals

more info on gurkhas - http://www.defence.pk/forums/india-...-army-regimental-boot-camp-gorkha-rifles.html
 
Just a few points to add..

Bengal did not lead or actively take part in the mutiny. It was the Bengal Army of the Bengal Presidency that did. In fact if Calcutta too had gone up in flames as Lucknow, Cawnpore , Delhi & Meerut did the mutiny would have run a diff course.

On the subject of Martial Races, it was more to do with those communities / regions that either did not rebel or helped the Brits in reconquest of N India which they had all but lost. Oudh was the state that bore the brunt of the Brit policy of not recruiting from those areas that rebelled.

I have had mixed experiences while dealing with “ martial” & ‘ Non Martial’ races. Both have performed and non performed at diff times. While the stereo typing may have been relevant back in the 19 & 20th Centuries , it does not hold good any more.

What matters is (a) Motivation & a cause , and ( b) Leadership & logistics. The LTTE & Vietnamese are fine examples of this.
 
martial myth may be created by british but it had long impact on the mentality of people of united India and later in Pakistan it grew with larger misconceptions.
Pakistani army always considered themselves part of the martial race thus considered themselves stronger as compared to their Indian counter parts till 1947 to 1965.This mentality were among the several reasons of 1965 war. it was the main reason of mistrust between Bengali and Punjabi Pakistanis, this could be another reason 1971.

dont take me wrong, but this were true then Pakistani really need introspect their beliefs because a simple misunderstanding could lead to nation catastrophe.

i am quoting these points from article written by Maj (Retd) AGHA HUMAYUN AMIN in pakistani defence journal.


The Pakistani nation had been fed on propaganda about martial superiority of their army! Brigadier A.R Siddiqi who served in the army’s propaganda/media management wing known as the ISPR (Inter Services Public Relations Directorate) states that "the 1965 war had exalted the military image to mythical heights”. 31 The common man drew false conclusions and to compound things further, the 1965 war was viewed differently in West and East Pakistan. The West Pakistani populace and particularly the majority West Pakistani ethnic groups i.e. the Punjabis saw the war as a triumph of a preponderantly Punjabi Muslim army over a numerically larger Hindu army!



Yahya cannot be blamed for the muck that had been accumulating for more than two decades. Yahya’s intention to raise more pure Bengali battalions was opposed by Major General Khadim Hussain Raja, the General Officer Commanding 14 Division in East Pakistan, since the General felt that instead of raising new purely Bengali battalions, Bengali troops should be mixed with existing infantry battalions comprising of Punjabi and Pathan troops.37 Such was the strength of conviction of General Khadim about not raising more pure Bengali battalions that once he came to know about Yahya’s orders to raise more East Pakistani regiments, he flew to the General Headquarters in Rawalpindi to remonstrate against the sagacity of raising more pure Bengali units. Khadim’s advice that Bengali troops could not be relied upon in crisis situations should have been an eye opener for all in the GHQ. No one at least at that time took his advice seriously. It appears that the generals were convinced that the Bengali was too meek to ever challenge the martial Punjabi or Pathan Muslim


The Bengalis were despised as non martial by all West Pakistanis. However much later an interesting controversy developed in which the Punjabis and Hindustanis blamed each other for doing so! The Hindustanis blaming Aziz Ahmad etc and the Punjabis blaming many Hindustani ICS old foxes of the 1950s! There is no doubt that this exercise in Bengali degrading was neither totally or exclusively Punjabi led but a a true for all West Pakistanis business!



The essence of the whole business was the fact that the Pakistani GHQ placed entire reliance on the “Superior Valour and Martial Qualities of the Pakistani (Punjabi and Pathan Muslim soldier) vis a vis the Hindu Indian soldier, as proved in 1965 war” and felt that somehow, in the next war to miracles would occur and the Pakistan Army would do well! The tangible military facts of the Indo Pak politico-military scenario were not analysed in their true dimension! It was a classic case of perceptual distortion and losing sight of reality. Eric Berne an eminent psychologist defined "adjustment" as "ability to change one’s images to correspond to a new reality”. Berne rephrases "adjustment" as "flexibility" which he defines as " ability to change your images as they should be changed according to reality". This in Berne’s view is more important than intelligence. Berne thus concluded that ‘the successful man is the one whose images correspond most closely to reality, because then his actions will lead to the results, which he imagines




The Pakistanis as a nation were forming wrong and unrealistic images right from 1947! Too much faith was based on ideology (Islam) to unite two entirely diverse regions of East and West Pakistan! Even Shauakat Riza a pro establishment historian, commenting on religion as a common factor between the East and West wings caustically noted that “Twenty four years is too long to gamble on one card”41 History was distorted to show that the Muslims were ruling the timid Hindu when the British snatched power from the brave Muslims by treachery! This was sadly not the case! In reality the Muslims were saved from total defeat by the British advent in India! A false image was formed by official propaganda right from 1947 that the Muslims were more martial than the timid Hindus were! It was a poor modification of the "Martial Races Theory" of the British, which was a purely imperialist theory to "Divide and Rule" India! But once Pakistan was defeated in 1971, all blame was heaped on Yahya and liquor, disregarding the fact that Yahya was merely the tip of the iceberg, and the irrefutable fact that many great commanders in history were absolutely incorrigible and compulsive womanisers and drinkers!



The Pakistan Army From 1965 to 1971
 
Army officials allegedly involved in scam
NDTV Correspondent, Sunday July 19, 2009, Jaipur


Six defence officials including three Majors and three Subedar Majors were allegedly involved in the Army recruitment scam busted in Ajmer on July 13.

The Army has reportedly identified all the six offending officials.

Their names surfaced after the arrest of eight agents or touts who were recently arrested in Ajmer after the police busted the recruitment racket.

The touts who in connivance with the six Army officials organised the scam were allegedly charging one and a half lakh rupees from each candidate for their selection in the Army.

The gang headed by an ex-armyman Abhilash Singh was using undergarments of a particular company as a code to get their candidates identified and passed through the physical and medical tests.


Army officials allegedly involved in scam
 
The touts who in connivance with the six Army officials organised the scam were allegedly charging one and a half lakh rupees from each candidate for their selection in the Army.

Its a bad news.

Is the salary so high that one has to pay Rs.1.5 lakhs ?
 
well i am not shore.but its really very bad for any force of world people join them illegaly.
 

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