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How the map of Jammu and Kashmir could have been significantly different today

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How the map of Jammu and Kashmir could have been significantly different today
by Arjun Subramaniam
Published 14 hours ago.
Had India not accepted the cease-fire of 1948, much of the land that’s with Pakistan and China today may have been with India.
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The 1947-'48 war with Pakistan was baptism by fire for independent India’s armed forces and, contrary to common perception, much of its contemporary DNA can be attributed to what emerged from the year long conflict.

As a white blanket of snow heralded the onset of winter and the bare Chinar trees and walnut groves sadly watched over the war, the times did not augur well for the Indian Army as operations slowed down. Further making the going tough for both Thimayya and Atma Singh was the fact that after due clearance from the Pakistan Army C-in-C Gen Frank Messervy, their divisions were now frontally engaged by a division each of the regular Pakistan Army (9th Frontier Division and 7th Pak Division).

Much to the frustration of their aggressive brigade commanders like Harbaksh Singh and Yadunath Singh, they would have to wait for the spring of ’49 to build up forces for any further offensive towards Mirpur, Kotli, Muzzafarabad and into the Northern Regions of J&K.

This was not to be, as Mountbatten pushed Nehru and the Pakistani political leadership to accept a UN brokered ceasefire on 31 Dec 1948 that left large portions of the Northern region, Kashmir Valley and Jammu Province in Pakistani hands. The military angle of this nudge was that had the Indian Army, supported by an increasingly confident Royal Indian Air Force, chosen to conduct their spring offensive along the Indus towards Gilgit and Skardu, the strategically important region may no longer have been a buffer that could be exploited by the British in the Great Game; a possibility, which they optimistically thought could be sustained for decades to come.

Pressured by the UN to settle for a ceasefire for almost a year after it had surprisingly moved the Security Council to intervene in the conflict in early ’48, the Indian government settled for a UN sponsored ceasefire on 1 Jan ’49.

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Jawaharlal Nehru and Sheikh Abdullah discussing military plans with Brigadier Mohammad Usman, Commander of 50 Para Brigade
However, the much anticipated plebiscite in Kashmir never happened. There were too many geographical pre-conditions that favoured Pakistan and by not being assertive enough about retaining control over areas like the Haji Pir pass, Gilgit and Skardu, India ceded operational advantage in the region to Pakistan. It would prove ominous in the years ahead, particularly when China started evincing keen interest in Ladakh.

If India had not accepted the UN brokered ceasefire, it would have built-up forces methodically through the winter as Lt Gen Cariappa had by then, taken complete charge of military operation. Nehru would have seen through the fog of war and Mountbatten, who, after initially sympathising with India, had started gravitating towards Pakistan as Indian military successes through 1948 pushed Pakistan on the back foot.

His assertive military commanders, like Thimayya and Atma Singh, would have impressed on him the need to go for the jugular and push the Pakistanis completely out of Kashmir. While this may not have been possible as the Pakistan Army would have fully joined in the fight, large tracts of territory in the Skardu region, Domel, Tithwal and Poonch areas could have been reclaimed by the Indian Army during a spring offensive in 1949, following which India may have accepted the ceasefire after getting assurances of further withdrawal from occupied territories.

Importantly, Shaksgam Valley would never have been ceded to China. All senior commanders of the time felt that had India stalled the ceasefire and built up forces for a spring offensive in 1949, the map of Jammu and Kashmir would have been significantly different today.

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7-Dakotas of 12 Squadron – the saviours of Poonch
The 1947-48 war with Pakistan showcased a remarkably refreshing emerging ethos of the Indian Armed Forces: an ethos that transcended its colonial legacy and showcased its secular, multi-cultural and multi-ethnic flavor. A Sikh regiment was the first to be rushed in to defend a Muslim-majority province. Lt David, who charged in from the rear in his Daimler Armoured Car of 7 Cavalry and caused mayhem amongst the tribals at Shalateng, was a Christian.

Major Maurice Cohen, the young Signals officer who took part in the various battles that were fought in the Poonch sector, was a Jew. Brig Usman and Sqn Ldr Zafar Shah were Muslims who chose to stay in India despite direct approaches from Jinnah.

Mehar Singh was a fiery Sikh; Mickey Blake, the dashing flight commander of one of the Tempest squadrons who made all those daring forays over Skardu, was among the many Anglo-Indians who were decorated for their exploits in combat; Minoo Engineer, the Officer Commanding of 1 Wing (Srinagar) was a Parsi; and, best of all, the engineer regiment that built the track to Zozila in freezing temperature was a company from the Madras Engineering Regiment under the command of Major Thangaraju.

Many of these “Thambis” (most South Indians in the armed forces are affectionately called Thambi, which means “little brother”) had never seen snow in their lives! This is not to forget all the other ethnic communities who fought side-by-side – Kumaonis, Gorhkas, Jats, Ladakhis, Dogras, Marathas, Mahars, Rajputs, Coorgs, Mahars and many more. It truly was a spectacular show of unity in diversity.

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9-Major Thangaraju, Madras Engineering Regiment opening Zojila Pass 1948-2
The last lesson from this war which would have a bearing on future conflicts involving India was the fact that India as a country would always prefer restraint and caution when it came to using force as an instrument of statecraft. It would always prefer negotiations and diplomacy instead, revealing that as a nation it was more comfortable with articulating deterrence rather than pursuing coercion as a security strategy.

This singularly meant that it would employ its defence forces in a primarily defensive role, thereby exposing it to significant initial attrition before offering a befitting riposte. It is to the credit of India’s military leadership that it has respected this political strategy, albeit, at times, paying a heavy human price for it.

The brave words of Maj Somnath Sharma – “I shall not withdraw an inch but will fight to the last man and the last round” would ring true in many battles and encounters that India’s armed forces would fight in the years ahead to protect Indian democracy and sovereignty.

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Excerpted with permission from India’s Wars: A Military History 1947-1971, Arjun Subramaniam, HarperCollins India.


http://scroll.in/bulletins/8/meet-f...he-consumer-at-the-center-of-their-businesses
 
Nehru did the blunder of declaring the ceasefire and going to UN. His blunder is haunting us until today.
 
India—reluctance of a can-be great power
on: June 26, 2016

Ashok K Mehta

Last week two back-to-back book discussions on war and hard power passed off routinely when they ought to have attracted higher political and public interest and attention: After all, it is never too late to review past strategic errors and oversight which have cost India dear by allowing China into making India a military and economic laggard. The release of Air Vice Marshal Arjun Subramaniam’s outstanding history of India’s Wars 1947-1971 was a landmark event, as the book is the first collective account of wars penned by a serving Air Force officer whose version was cleared by Government censors. The book is all the more striking because the official account of India’s wars has been suppressed since independence by Governments led by the Congress, the BJP and the Third Front. The ruling NDA Government was expected to unlock the dark secrets of political and military failures but has chosen to maintain the veil of secrecy. Fortunately the BJP’s MJ Akbar, the keynote speaker, made a candid observation: “Military history has not been made public because the political class is as afraid of its failures as it is of the military’s successes.”
The lack of knowledge and experience of defence and strategic security among the Indian political class was due partly to Whitehall retaining both as its exclusive preserve. Worse was its transforming civilian political control into bureaucratic control of the military without any accountability or responsibility. Jawaharlal Nehru’s idealism coupled with Mahatma Gandhi’s pacifism in a milieu of missing strategic culture turned the British empire’s greatest Army into a reactive and defensive force. The strategic mistakes of not preventing China’s occupation of Tibet, proactively attempting to resolve the inherited disputed McMahon Line, and prematurely terminating the war in Kashmir by taking it to the UN, are still extracting a high cost.
The central question AVM Subramaniam asked about the strategic content of the wars was lost in the tactical details of war fighting. Except the 1971 war, where a synergised politico-military and diplomatic strategy underscored the 13-day lightening campaign, in other wars the strategic thinking was conspicuously absent. Reason: Since the political and military defeat in the high Himalayas, a passive and reactive mentality had taken root. Witness the unrequited parliamentary resolutions on Kashmir and the 1962 debacle focus on recapturing every inch of lost ground leading to defence fortifications around ditch-cum-bund and canal obstacles. Even 45 years after the great 1971 victory, the conventionally superior Indian military is flummoxed by Pakistan’s wily employment of cross-border terrorism under a nuclear shadow, virtually paralysing a military response after the attack on Parliament and Mumbai. For the under-utilisation of the military are three reasons: Lack of political will, absence of higher political and military direction, failure to build a military edge with a killer instinct. On the other hand, India has flaunted strategic autonomy, eschewing military alliances and calibrated use of force. Strategic restraint and strategic patience are proclaimed as virtues.
The second book is Bharat Karnad’s Why India is Not a Great Power (Yet). Karnad is at his audacious, provocative and unconventional best and, therefore, the book is fun debating. He says there is no national interest, no national security strategy and no joint military doctrine document. The nub of his argument is that India lacks the software of hard power and is hobbled by resources: Small and inconsistent defence budgets, nascent military industry and rudimentary defence research and development. By contrast, India’s space and nuclear programmes are world-class. By February 1964, India’s secret nuclear programme had reached a nuclear weapons threshold, but Nehru dithered and did not test. Last week, the US State Department declassified a report noting that India had weapons grade plutonium to go nuclear.
Karnad argues that sequencing the rise of India as a great power through first becoming an economic power followed by developing military power is not tenable, as hard power must accrue in sync with soft power. The Chinese in their Four Modernisations had relegated defence modernisation to the fourth place – and, therefore, the yawning military capability gap with the US. In 1991, Finance Minister Manmohan Singh, while launching the economic liberalisation programme, had told the three Services they would have to make do with smaller budgets till the GDP growth rate took off. The consequences of that decision were felt during the Kargil war, when defence inventories for fighting even two divisions dried up. But for the SOS to Israel and South Africa, many more lives would have been lost on the Kargil heights.
Does India wish to be a great power, leave alone why it is not one yet? The US is keen to help India in becoming a great power in its own right. During UPA2, Congress president Sonia Gandhi and Prime Minister Singh literally shied away from the poser of India’s great power status at a Hindustan Times summit. That the question was ducked by both tells us something: Great power status brings rights and responsibilities; India wants to be recognised as a great power but is unwilling to fulfil the accompanying responsibility.
Is the BJP-led NDA Government any different? In its first avatar, little was done to enhance the Military Order of Battle after the attack on Parliament. But it did cosy up to the US supporting ballistic missile defence, providing logistic assistance in Afghanistan and escorting US ships across Malacca Straits. After the nuclear tests, the Next Steps to Strategic Partnership with the US were completed by the Vajpayee Government culminating in the ten-year Defence Framework Agreement and the India-US Civil Nuclear deal with the UPA regimes. Then Defence Minister AK Antony was rather suspicious of the US. The Defence Intelligence Sharing Agreement of 2003 lapsed in 2008 and has not been renewed. Similarly, the Defence Foundational Agreements have been languishing for more than a decade.


http://news.statetimes.in/india-reluctance-can-great-power/
 
I'd highly doubt that; what India was fighting was just a bunch ragtag and barely-armed rebels.

The Pakistan Army did little, they captured Azad Kashmir but were not allowed to advance any further due to orders of the Chief of Army (who was British and only looked after British interests). By the time a ceasefire was called; Pashtun reinforcements were just about to begin pouring in and dozens of militias had begun to form including the Ahmadiyya Furqan Force.
 
Nehru did the blunder of declaring the ceasefire and going to UN. His blunder is haunting us until today.
They could have pushed to pre infiltration limits. Any losses taken that time would have turned tide drastically in favour of india. Even now our security forces are suffering losses & people of J&K.
 
Plz don`t make a blunder with history my grandfather was part of the war He used to tell me that they would`ve captured Srinagar if it was en`t for the cease fire as they were on higher ground and the Indian army had not completed arrived there.
 

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