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30 July 2015
While the ASPI report accepts that Australia is increasing its amphibious capability through moves such as the commissioning of ships like HMAS Canberra, it said critical gaps remain in the planning and personnel needed to fully exploit the ships' potential. Source: PA
The Australian Defence Force (ADF) currently lacks the tradition, culture, and organisational expertise needed to maintain and employ a world-class amphibious warfare capability, according to a new study by a leading think-tank.
The paper, released by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) on 29 July, comes just nine months after the commissioning of the 27,800-tonne helicopter landing dock (LHD) HMAS Canberra , the Royal Australian Navy's (RAN's) largest-ever ship, and a few months before the anticipated commissioning of Canberra 's sister ship HMAS Adelaide .
While acknowledging an impressive amount of work over several years by individuals and organisations across the ADF to facilitate institutional change, the Department of Defence (DoD) still faced critical gaps in the planning and personnel needed to fully exploit the ships' potential, the study said.
"Australia is a maritime country without a maritime culture and the ADF, in particular the army, doesn't have one either," the study said.
"The last time the Australian military took on the full spectrum of amphibious operations was in 1945, and the knowledge and culture that developed across the services to support those operations have long since been lost."
The experience being provided by training in the US and the embedding in the ADF of US Marine Corps and UK Royal Marines officers should be captured and developed by the establishment of a joint services' Amphibious Centre of Excellence, the paper recommended.
This would "evolve doctrine, provide for the learning of individuals, provide expertise to other ADF and single service courses and education facilities, generate training teams to assist in unit-level training, and provide highly-qualified staff to certify amphibious elements".
Of the three services, the army faced the greatest challenges. A tiered amphibious readiness model would ensure every infantry battle group received training, instruction, experience, and deployment in amphibious operations within six years. The cycle could then be continued, the report argued.
However, a deficit in key combat support and combat service support elements meant the additional requirements of maintaining a standing Amphibious Ready Element (ARE) and supporting Special Operations Command were likely to require growth in aviation, engineering, and logistics elements, it said.
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ASPI report calls for sea change in Australian approach to amphibious warfare - IHS Jane's 360
While the ASPI report accepts that Australia is increasing its amphibious capability through moves such as the commissioning of ships like HMAS Canberra, it said critical gaps remain in the planning and personnel needed to fully exploit the ships' potential. Source: PA
The Australian Defence Force (ADF) currently lacks the tradition, culture, and organisational expertise needed to maintain and employ a world-class amphibious warfare capability, according to a new study by a leading think-tank.
The paper, released by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) on 29 July, comes just nine months after the commissioning of the 27,800-tonne helicopter landing dock (LHD) HMAS Canberra , the Royal Australian Navy's (RAN's) largest-ever ship, and a few months before the anticipated commissioning of Canberra 's sister ship HMAS Adelaide .
While acknowledging an impressive amount of work over several years by individuals and organisations across the ADF to facilitate institutional change, the Department of Defence (DoD) still faced critical gaps in the planning and personnel needed to fully exploit the ships' potential, the study said.
"Australia is a maritime country without a maritime culture and the ADF, in particular the army, doesn't have one either," the study said.
"The last time the Australian military took on the full spectrum of amphibious operations was in 1945, and the knowledge and culture that developed across the services to support those operations have long since been lost."
The experience being provided by training in the US and the embedding in the ADF of US Marine Corps and UK Royal Marines officers should be captured and developed by the establishment of a joint services' Amphibious Centre of Excellence, the paper recommended.
This would "evolve doctrine, provide for the learning of individuals, provide expertise to other ADF and single service courses and education facilities, generate training teams to assist in unit-level training, and provide highly-qualified staff to certify amphibious elements".
Of the three services, the army faced the greatest challenges. A tiered amphibious readiness model would ensure every infantry battle group received training, instruction, experience, and deployment in amphibious operations within six years. The cycle could then be continued, the report argued.
However, a deficit in key combat support and combat service support elements meant the additional requirements of maintaining a standing Amphibious Ready Element (ARE) and supporting Special Operations Command were likely to require growth in aviation, engineering, and logistics elements, it said.
Want to read more? For analysis on this article and access to all our insight content, please enquire about our subscription options ihs.com/contact
To read the full article, Client Login
(377 of 530 words)
ASPI report calls for sea change in Australian approach to amphibious warfare - IHS Jane's 360
