Chak Bamu
RETIRED MOD
- Joined
- Jan 3, 2013
- Messages
- 5,361
- Reaction score
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- Country
- Location
PTI’s mammoth rally in Oct 2011 at Lahore was a welcome surprise for many. I was among those who were filled with hope. I could see that we have a credible alternative to politics of corruption, dynasties, narrow self-interests, and regionalism. I happily congratulated myself and anyone with whom I could talk. My country was going to heal itself with help of the educated middle class. Imran Khan was going to do it!!!
My heart skipped a beat when I got the news that Imran Khan fell down before ascending the stage of a rally in Lahore, just days before May 2013 elections. When I saw his address from the hospital bed, I did not know that this was the high point of his politics and that it was all going to go downhill from there-on until the sad spectacle of today.
Today he stands atop a container close to our august Parliament House while it hosts a rare joint-session. He cuts a forlorn figure in middle of a disappointing crowd in which his party members are heavily outnumbered by PAT workers. He walked into a trap, he is cornered, he paces atop his ‘cell’ like a caged Tiger - roars, hisses, threatens, and generally vents his seemingly impotent rage. How did he get here? How come his ego does not allow him to step into the house into which 7.6 million Pakistanis sent him as a de-facto opposition leader? How come his government in KPK stands paralyzed because he has entangled it into a web of confusing priorities.
Today, we all know that he is not a politician. He does not seem to have an understanding of political dynamics, principles, or history even. The series of mistakes (read blunders) has alienated many. His lieutenants are deserting him overtly or covertly. His party is in revolt against his decision-making. In near future, it seems that Imran Khan will be eclipsed by Shah Mahmood Qureshi within PTI. Today’s lengthy and contradictory address in Joint-session of Parliament by Shah Mahmood Qureshi certainly points in this direction unfortunately.
I've put together a list of ten mistakes of Politician Imran Khan, which got him into this present state:
1. Imran Khan had vision, charisma, reputation, but no intellectual background to build a mega political party. He was a popular public figure, but not a politician. He lacked the discipline and grip on realism to create credible and realistic political goals. He believes more in his charisma than realism and does not possess the flexibility and accommodation that is the hallmark of a successful politician. So the first mistake of his was over-estimating his potential and capabilities.
2. PTI grew too fast after 2011 and into it rushed many people, some of whom had questionable repute and ethics. Rather than taking a well-considered approach and advancing at a measured pace, PTI ballooned within days. It was chaotic and unwieldy and apparently unmanageable. There was hardly any strategy and absolutely no grooming within the ranks which resembled a conglomerate with diction, delivery, and aggression of a mob. The absence of strategy for growth, recruitment, and grooming of raw talent was indeed a reflection of the leader himself. This was the second mistake.
3. The lack of realistic goals and absence of a workable strategy guaranteed wild enthusiasm among PTI supporters and they convinced themselves of impending victory in 2013 elections. Some thought that PTI had come to believe its own spin. Now it seems that PTI leadership was somehow insulated from not only its supporters, partisans, and workers. It was out of touch from its ‘electorate’ as well. There was no feed-back mechanism by which to adjust expectations, find areas of strengths and weaknesses, and thus fine tune strategy. The third mistake was being out of touch with voters and assuming victory as guaranteed.
4. A workable and sustainable strategy might have been to be prepared to assume the role of leader of opposition in the National Assembly, and to bet on possibility of forming a coalition government in KPK. This would have been realistic and would have allowed PTI to emerge as a disciplined party instead of a mob party. The fourth mistake was not having an electoral strategy.
5. The fifth mistake is a logical extension of #4 – in that outside KPK, PTI should have focused on urban and semi-urban areas in Pakistan, since that is where middle class - PTI’s strength, was concentrated. This showed lack of focus and subsequent disappointment. A little more targeted effort could have overturned the marginal defeats into marginal victories in key cities, such as Lahore.
6. PTI should have whole-heartedly accepted the election results even though there were serious reservations. Instead of focusing on party’s organization, delivering results with better governance in KPK, and being de-facto opposition in National Assembly, Imran Khan resolved to follow the politics of agitation. He did not consider that politics of agitation brings instability and doubtful results. The lack of numbers in PTI’s march just shows that PTI leadership was unprepared for lack of Public appetite for politics of agitation. Embarking on this course of action was the sixth mistake, and it ties with #1, #2, and #3.
7. Once the decision to pursue an agitation-based agenda was made, search for possible partners took PTI leadership to undesirable and / or rejected elements in Pakistan’s body-politic. PML-Q, the shameless and corrupt beneficiary of Musharraf’s dictatorship, though moth-eaten, was an eager partner. The next step was contacting PAT and its mental Mullah leader Tahir-ul-Qadri, a psychotic and megalomaniacal individual, who in the course of his rise to fame had been rather shameless in pursuing, using, and dumping benefactors. His political capital consisted of a few thousand die-hard supporters for whom Tahir-ul-Qadri was a political, spiritual, and moral leader. Over more than two decades these people had been brain-washed with a blend of sectarianism, messianic zeal, and certainty of the coming Revolution. This fanatical support should have rung all sorts of alarm bells. But since Imran Khan likes to overestimate himself, he wrongly assumed that he could control his coalition partners. Corralling questionable support was seventh mistake and a consequence of #1, #3, and #6.
8. Once the faulty and (now-apparent) counter-productive strategy of agitation was rolled out, there was no Plan B. The narrative of victimhood was questionable, and did not drum up support from the masses. As has been mentioned in other points above, there was no feedback from the public. PTI essentially believed itself, convinced itself, and strode into the unknown without questioning or counter-checking leadership’s assumptions. The lack of flexibility as apparent in lack of critical review, Plan-B, or exit-strategy was the Eighth mistake.
9. One must know the strength or weakness of one’s political capital. Seeing that most support for PTI emanates from middle class of Urban and semi-urban population centers, it would have been sensible to see how far and at what pace is this class able to support politics of agitation. On social media, this class is over-represented and very active – thereby creating an illusion of popular support for its cause. In the real world that support melts into thin air. This happened in Egypt where social media was of immense help in toppling government of Hosni Mubarak, but then its doyens were duped by the Deep state. Therefore the Ninth mistake was depending on this class which can talk much (and creatively!) but not act as well.
10. This brings us to the Last and (in my view) most serious blunder that a political party can make. Playing Establishment’s game and thinking that Imran Khan could somehow beat the odds and come out the winner. All one needed to do was look at PML-Q and see how, despite massive rigging in 2008 elections, it lost its grip and completely melted in 2013. Our Establishment has a survivalist mind-set and is therefore ruthless. Depending on Military Establishment (or the illusion of it) was the TENTH mistake – and the one which is more a kiss of death.
To illustrate the last point, it should be noted that Shah Mahmood Qureshi’s real brother has said that Shah Mahmood Qureshi expects to replace Imran Khan as the top leader of PTI and was a person of contact between PTI and (the rumored) Military Establishment.
Imran Khan has considerable charisma and pockets of persistent support. He may well survive and be able to resurrect PTI. But in my view he is no longer a credible candidate for Prime Minister. His disastrous decision making has sunk his party, which is now in open revolt. People like Qaisar Khattak, Jahangir Tareen, & Shah Mahmood Qureshi have played (perhaps over-played) Imran Khan. These people are far more experienced and ruthless. Some of them rushed into PTI, once they got a hint of covert Establishment support. As I have said elsewhere, if Imran Khan likes being given bad advice, he deserves the consequences.
@Aether , @Oscar , @Horus , @AgNoStiC MuSliM , @xyxmt , @ice_man , @Spring Onion , @Manticore , @blain2 , @Joe Shearer , @cb4 , @JonAsad , @Fracker , @faisal6309 , @TheFlyingPretzel , @AZADPAKISTAN2009 , @balixd , @Syed.Ali.Haider , @Slav Defence , @SBD-3 , @farhan_9909 , @Jazzbot , @Mugwop , @nair , @Dillinger, @Devil Soul , @Counter-Errorist , @WebMaster , @Secur , @Bratva , @Irfan Baloch , @WishLivePak , @Meengla , @scorpionx , @genmirajborgza786 , @syedali73 , @Devil Soul , @Mav3rick , @orangzaib , @saiyan0321 , @Bratva , @Major Sam , @Ghareeb_Da_Baal, @FaujHistorian
Forgot to invite @S.U.R.B.
My heart skipped a beat when I got the news that Imran Khan fell down before ascending the stage of a rally in Lahore, just days before May 2013 elections. When I saw his address from the hospital bed, I did not know that this was the high point of his politics and that it was all going to go downhill from there-on until the sad spectacle of today.
Today he stands atop a container close to our august Parliament House while it hosts a rare joint-session. He cuts a forlorn figure in middle of a disappointing crowd in which his party members are heavily outnumbered by PAT workers. He walked into a trap, he is cornered, he paces atop his ‘cell’ like a caged Tiger - roars, hisses, threatens, and generally vents his seemingly impotent rage. How did he get here? How come his ego does not allow him to step into the house into which 7.6 million Pakistanis sent him as a de-facto opposition leader? How come his government in KPK stands paralyzed because he has entangled it into a web of confusing priorities.
Today, we all know that he is not a politician. He does not seem to have an understanding of political dynamics, principles, or history even. The series of mistakes (read blunders) has alienated many. His lieutenants are deserting him overtly or covertly. His party is in revolt against his decision-making. In near future, it seems that Imran Khan will be eclipsed by Shah Mahmood Qureshi within PTI. Today’s lengthy and contradictory address in Joint-session of Parliament by Shah Mahmood Qureshi certainly points in this direction unfortunately.
I've put together a list of ten mistakes of Politician Imran Khan, which got him into this present state:
1. Imran Khan had vision, charisma, reputation, but no intellectual background to build a mega political party. He was a popular public figure, but not a politician. He lacked the discipline and grip on realism to create credible and realistic political goals. He believes more in his charisma than realism and does not possess the flexibility and accommodation that is the hallmark of a successful politician. So the first mistake of his was over-estimating his potential and capabilities.
2. PTI grew too fast after 2011 and into it rushed many people, some of whom had questionable repute and ethics. Rather than taking a well-considered approach and advancing at a measured pace, PTI ballooned within days. It was chaotic and unwieldy and apparently unmanageable. There was hardly any strategy and absolutely no grooming within the ranks which resembled a conglomerate with diction, delivery, and aggression of a mob. The absence of strategy for growth, recruitment, and grooming of raw talent was indeed a reflection of the leader himself. This was the second mistake.
3. The lack of realistic goals and absence of a workable strategy guaranteed wild enthusiasm among PTI supporters and they convinced themselves of impending victory in 2013 elections. Some thought that PTI had come to believe its own spin. Now it seems that PTI leadership was somehow insulated from not only its supporters, partisans, and workers. It was out of touch from its ‘electorate’ as well. There was no feed-back mechanism by which to adjust expectations, find areas of strengths and weaknesses, and thus fine tune strategy. The third mistake was being out of touch with voters and assuming victory as guaranteed.
4. A workable and sustainable strategy might have been to be prepared to assume the role of leader of opposition in the National Assembly, and to bet on possibility of forming a coalition government in KPK. This would have been realistic and would have allowed PTI to emerge as a disciplined party instead of a mob party. The fourth mistake was not having an electoral strategy.
5. The fifth mistake is a logical extension of #4 – in that outside KPK, PTI should have focused on urban and semi-urban areas in Pakistan, since that is where middle class - PTI’s strength, was concentrated. This showed lack of focus and subsequent disappointment. A little more targeted effort could have overturned the marginal defeats into marginal victories in key cities, such as Lahore.
6. PTI should have whole-heartedly accepted the election results even though there were serious reservations. Instead of focusing on party’s organization, delivering results with better governance in KPK, and being de-facto opposition in National Assembly, Imran Khan resolved to follow the politics of agitation. He did not consider that politics of agitation brings instability and doubtful results. The lack of numbers in PTI’s march just shows that PTI leadership was unprepared for lack of Public appetite for politics of agitation. Embarking on this course of action was the sixth mistake, and it ties with #1, #2, and #3.
7. Once the decision to pursue an agitation-based agenda was made, search for possible partners took PTI leadership to undesirable and / or rejected elements in Pakistan’s body-politic. PML-Q, the shameless and corrupt beneficiary of Musharraf’s dictatorship, though moth-eaten, was an eager partner. The next step was contacting PAT and its mental Mullah leader Tahir-ul-Qadri, a psychotic and megalomaniacal individual, who in the course of his rise to fame had been rather shameless in pursuing, using, and dumping benefactors. His political capital consisted of a few thousand die-hard supporters for whom Tahir-ul-Qadri was a political, spiritual, and moral leader. Over more than two decades these people had been brain-washed with a blend of sectarianism, messianic zeal, and certainty of the coming Revolution. This fanatical support should have rung all sorts of alarm bells. But since Imran Khan likes to overestimate himself, he wrongly assumed that he could control his coalition partners. Corralling questionable support was seventh mistake and a consequence of #1, #3, and #6.
8. Once the faulty and (now-apparent) counter-productive strategy of agitation was rolled out, there was no Plan B. The narrative of victimhood was questionable, and did not drum up support from the masses. As has been mentioned in other points above, there was no feedback from the public. PTI essentially believed itself, convinced itself, and strode into the unknown without questioning or counter-checking leadership’s assumptions. The lack of flexibility as apparent in lack of critical review, Plan-B, or exit-strategy was the Eighth mistake.
9. One must know the strength or weakness of one’s political capital. Seeing that most support for PTI emanates from middle class of Urban and semi-urban population centers, it would have been sensible to see how far and at what pace is this class able to support politics of agitation. On social media, this class is over-represented and very active – thereby creating an illusion of popular support for its cause. In the real world that support melts into thin air. This happened in Egypt where social media was of immense help in toppling government of Hosni Mubarak, but then its doyens were duped by the Deep state. Therefore the Ninth mistake was depending on this class which can talk much (and creatively!) but not act as well.
10. This brings us to the Last and (in my view) most serious blunder that a political party can make. Playing Establishment’s game and thinking that Imran Khan could somehow beat the odds and come out the winner. All one needed to do was look at PML-Q and see how, despite massive rigging in 2008 elections, it lost its grip and completely melted in 2013. Our Establishment has a survivalist mind-set and is therefore ruthless. Depending on Military Establishment (or the illusion of it) was the TENTH mistake – and the one which is more a kiss of death.
To illustrate the last point, it should be noted that Shah Mahmood Qureshi’s real brother has said that Shah Mahmood Qureshi expects to replace Imran Khan as the top leader of PTI and was a person of contact between PTI and (the rumored) Military Establishment.
Imran Khan has considerable charisma and pockets of persistent support. He may well survive and be able to resurrect PTI. But in my view he is no longer a credible candidate for Prime Minister. His disastrous decision making has sunk his party, which is now in open revolt. People like Qaisar Khattak, Jahangir Tareen, & Shah Mahmood Qureshi have played (perhaps over-played) Imran Khan. These people are far more experienced and ruthless. Some of them rushed into PTI, once they got a hint of covert Establishment support. As I have said elsewhere, if Imran Khan likes being given bad advice, he deserves the consequences.
@Aether , @Oscar , @Horus , @AgNoStiC MuSliM , @xyxmt , @ice_man , @Spring Onion , @Manticore , @blain2 , @Joe Shearer , @cb4 , @JonAsad , @Fracker , @faisal6309 , @TheFlyingPretzel , @AZADPAKISTAN2009 , @balixd , @Syed.Ali.Haider , @Slav Defence , @SBD-3 , @farhan_9909 , @Jazzbot , @Mugwop , @nair , @Dillinger, @Devil Soul , @Counter-Errorist , @WebMaster , @Secur , @Bratva , @Irfan Baloch , @WishLivePak , @Meengla , @scorpionx , @genmirajborgza786 , @syedali73 , @Devil Soul , @Mav3rick , @orangzaib , @saiyan0321 , @Bratva , @Major Sam , @Ghareeb_Da_Baal, @FaujHistorian
Forgot to invite @S.U.R.B.
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