Zia and our nuclear programme

Doordie said:

Part - I

Random thoughts



I first met Gen Ziaul Haq, COAS, in July 1976. Due to no progress having been made during the first six months of my stay in Pakistan, I wrote to Zulfikar Ali Bhutto saying I was no longer willing to waste my time and career working with incompetent people and I wanted to return to Europe.

Bhutto replied, asking me to wait for a few days. After two days I was invited to the Foreign Office where I met Agha Shahi (then secretary general of foreign affairs), A G N Kazi (secretary general of finance), Ghulam Ishaq Khan (secretary general of defence) and Gen Imtiaz Ali (military secretary to Bhutto) – all close confidants of Bhutto.

They asked me to explain my case. After hearing me out they offered that I become chairman of the PAEC. I declined, saying that this would be disastrous for our programme as the Americans and Europeans would find out about my expertise in centrifuge technology and would immediately put a tight control on all relevant exports.

I then suggested that, since the programme was very sensitive, difficult and complicated, it should be made into an autonomous project under my leadership. They scheduled a meeting at the same time (5pm) the next day. At that meeting I was told that they had agreed to my proposal and that I would be head of the organisation (named Engineering Research Laboratories at my suggestion).

However, I told them I would need a free hand, to which they replied that Bhutto would have to decide that. Then Gen Imtiaz, using Agha Shahi’s green phone, talked to Bhutto and informed him of the arrangement. Bhutto then asked to speak to me. I told him I agreed to the arrangement but that I would need a free hand. He said that he would call a meeting in a day or two to finalise matters.

After two days he called a meeting at which all the above senior civil servants were present together with Munir Ahmad Khan (chairman, PAEC) and Gen Zia (COAS). Bhutto told those present about the new setup and told Agha Shahi, A G N Kazi and G I Khan that he was delegating his powers to them and that he didn’t want to hear any complaints from me. He formed a coordination board with the three secretaries-general, Munir Ahmad Khan and myself and Imtiaz Ahmad Bhatty, the member finance, as secretary of the board.

I asked Bhutto for one more favour – to advise Gen Ziaul Haq to give me a team of competent army engineers. Gen Zia promised to send me one of his best officers and the next morning, in walked a tall, fair, handsome, smart officer, Brig Zahid Ali Akbar Khan. He was a gem of an officer, always on his toes.

We soon became good friends, and still are. He was rather reluctant, though, to be out of the main service. When I told him that we were embarking on a nuclear weapons programme, he became very enthusiastic. He soon formed a team of competent engineers – Col Mahmood, Col Sajawal Khan, Col Javed, Col Aslam, Maj Saeed Beg, etc and we all got down to work.

First the Kahuta site was acquired and then I started submitting sketches of the buildings that would be needed. Estimates were prepared by an architect in Lahore. My member of finance would release the necessary funds and work progressed fast.

The French first secretary (an agent of the CIA chief in Tehran) wrote to his boss that something very big was being constructed at Kahuta and the speed at which the work was progressing was quite uncharacteristic for Pakistan.

Brig Zahid would come to my Pindi Office driving his jeep and we would go – camouflaged– to Kahuta at least every second day.

On July 5, 1977, Gen Zia staged the coup and within a few days Brig Zahid, to our great disappointment, was posted to Larkana. He later rose to Maj Gen GOC Gujranwala, Lt-Gen Corps Commander Rawalpindi and Chairman Wapda.

In his place, Gen Zia gave us Brig Anis Ali Syed (later Maj Gen and surveyor-general of Pakistan), who was also very competent. He had a great sense of humour and a large stock of jokes. After the coup, Gen Zia appointed Lt-Gen Ali Zamin Naqvi, his old colleague from Indian Army days, as his adviser on security, to liaison with Munir and me.

Gen Naqvi was very fair with blond hair and looked almost European. He was from Lucknow and had a Masters degree in English from Allahabad University. He was soft spoken and very sincere and was a great help to us.

Within a few days of his appointment he had recognised the tensions between PAEC and ERL. He kept Gen. Zia informed. He appointed Col Qamar Faruqi, Director Security PAEC, as his staff officer and thus knew exactly what was going on in PAEC.

After the coup, Gen Zia appointed Ghulam Ishaq Khan as secretary general-in-chief (the de facto prime minister) and head of the coordination board. As finance minister, he looked after our needs well. We held monthly meetings at Kahuta to view progress and one could see he was satisfied when work went well.

Gen Zia also started seeing Gen Naqvi and myself every fortnight. He would listen without interrupting when I gave a briefing. One day he called us after Juma prayers. After the normal briefing, he suddenly said: “Let us go to Kahuta”.

We were a bit surprised, but work went on there 24/7. Gen Zia was in shalwar qameez and Punjabi chappals. I had a red Jeep Cherokee at the time. Gen Naqvi and Gen Zia sat in the back seat while I sat in front with driver Ayub.

Part - II

Random thoughts



Last week I ended with Gen Zia’s sudden, unexpected decision to visit Kahura. There were no guards and no escorting jeep. After crossing Kaka bridge, the road was narrow and in very bad shape.

One spot, known as Jalebi Maur, was very steep and Kashmir-bounds trucks often got stuck there, stopping the normal flow of traffic. Gen. Zia asked why the road had not been repaired. I told him that I had requested Mr. Ghulam Ishaq Khan for the necessary funds. Gen. Zia then asked Gen. Naqvi to tell the DG FWO to repair the road on a priority basis, removing all sharp turns, broadening it and putting a bridge to remove Jalebi Maur. Within 6 months we had an excellent road which increased safety and reduced travelling time by 15-20 minutes.

The staff at the Plant were shocked to see us. First we went to my office. I called the senior on-duty officers and told them we would be visiting the whole plant. Gen. Zia did not hide his surprise and pleasure at seeing the facilities. He said the Plant looked more European/American than Pakistani. In the Mechanical Division we were received by a very competent mechanical engineer. Gen Zia commented that our mechanical shops were cleaner than CMH.

When we were in another hall, Gen Zia decided to offer Asr prayers. To a handsome, competent scientist who sported a black beard fell the honour of leading the prayers.

Sadly, Gen Zia had Bhutto hanged through a doubtful case. I had met Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit in Ankara and asked him to intercede. He showed me the names of the four parliamentarians he was sending to Pakistan to see Gen Zia, but he said he was not very hopeful of the outcome.

In 1979 the West got wind of our work. Time Magazine published my photo, cited my background and said that I was leading the programme. Gen Zia and Mr G I Khan became quite worried and called me for a meeting. I told them that I had prepared for this eventuality and Kahuta was now a totally self-reliant organization manufacturing even the most sophisticated equipment we needed. They both praised my foresightedness. The western embassies in Islamabad all wanted to find out what was happening. One ambassador and his first secretary slunk into Kahuta in a private car one day. They were intercepted and dealt with by security. After 2 or 3 days they went to the president to complain. Great actor that he was, he feigned total ignorance.

Apologising, he said: “Excellency, if you wanted to visit the old fort, you should have asked the Protocol Officer at the Foreign Office. They would have provided an escort and a guide, but above all, you should have used your official, flag-bearing car.” When we met the next day, he had a good laugh and said he didn’t think anyone else would try.

By late 1981 we had made a lot of progress and were about make a breakthrough, Gen Naqvi informed Gen Zia about our progress and said it was time to check the progress of work in other departments. The experts’ opinion turned out to be that hardly any progress had been made and that their team was not competent to deliver. The next day Gen Zia called a meeting to inform me and added: “Dr Sb, this is between me, Gen Naqvi and you; tell no one else. Now you go all out to do your work. The experts have told me you can do it.”

It was a big challenge. I called several top-notch scientists and engineers. After solving the theoretical problems we did cold tests. When we had perfected the design, I took a letter to Gen Zia on December 10, 1984 informing him that we could detonate a nuclear bomb at a week’s notice.

With joy on his face he hugged me, kissed my forehead and said: “Thank you, Dr Sb. You have saved this country. Now I will look the Indians in the eye and sort them out.” Later I quietly showed everything to Mr G I Khan, who was overjoyed. Gen Zia then informed Gen Arif, who rushed to Kahuta to see everything.

Gen Zia never allowed the West to discuss our nuclear programme and he had told Mr. Agha Shahi and Sahibzada Yaqub Khan that, if questioned they should tell everyone to discuss the matter with the president as the programme was directly under his control.

Gen Vernon Walters, President Reagan’s Special Envoy, wrote about Gen Zia (President Reagan’s declassified papers): “Either he really does not know anything about the nuclear programme or else he is the most superb and patriotic liar I have ever met in my life”.

Gen Zia did a great favour to Pakistan by protecting our nuclear programme.

Concluded

Email: dr.a.quadeer.khan@gmail.com


@PaklovesTurkiye @dsr478
@LA se Karachi

Click to expand...

Doordie said:

Part - I

Random thoughts



I first met Gen Ziaul Haq, COAS, in July 1976. Due to no progress having been made during the first six months of my stay in Pakistan, I wrote to Zulfikar Ali Bhutto saying I was no longer willing to waste my time and career working with incompetent people and I wanted to return to Europe.

Bhutto replied, asking me to wait for a few days. After two days I was invited to the Foreign Office where I met Agha Shahi (then secretary general of foreign affairs), A G N Kazi (secretary general of finance), Ghulam Ishaq Khan (secretary general of defence) and Gen Imtiaz Ali (military secretary to Bhutto) – all close confidants of Bhutto.

They asked me to explain my case. After hearing me out they offered that I become chairman of the PAEC. I declined, saying that this would be disastrous for our programme as the Americans and Europeans would find out about my expertise in centrifuge technology and would immediately put a tight control on all relevant exports.

I then suggested that, since the programme was very sensitive, difficult and complicated, it should be made into an autonomous project under my leadership. They scheduled a meeting at the same time (5pm) the next day. At that meeting I was told that they had agreed to my proposal and that I would be head of the organisation (named Engineering Research Laboratories at my suggestion).

However, I told them I would need a free hand, to which they replied that Bhutto would have to decide that. Then Gen Imtiaz, using Agha Shahi’s green phone, talked to Bhutto and informed him of the arrangement. Bhutto then asked to speak to me. I told him I agreed to the arrangement but that I would need a free hand. He said that he would call a meeting in a day or two to finalise matters.

After two days he called a meeting at which all the above senior civil servants were present together with Munir Ahmad Khan (chairman, PAEC) and Gen Zia (COAS). Bhutto told those present about the new setup and told Agha Shahi, A G N Kazi and G I Khan that he was delegating his powers to them and that he didn’t want to hear any complaints from me. He formed a coordination board with the three secretaries-general, Munir Ahmad Khan and myself and Imtiaz Ahmad Bhatty, the member finance, as secretary of the board.

I asked Bhutto for one more favour – to advise Gen Ziaul Haq to give me a team of competent army engineers. Gen Zia promised to send me one of his best officers and the next morning, in walked a tall, fair, handsome, smart officer, Brig Zahid Ali Akbar Khan. He was a gem of an officer, always on his toes.

We soon became good friends, and still are. He was rather reluctant, though, to be out of the main service. When I told him that we were embarking on a nuclear weapons programme, he became very enthusiastic. He soon formed a team of competent engineers – Col Mahmood, Col Sajawal Khan, Col Javed, Col Aslam, Maj Saeed Beg, etc and we all got down to work.

First the Kahuta site was acquired and then I started submitting sketches of the buildings that would be needed. Estimates were prepared by an architect in Lahore. My member of finance would release the necessary funds and work progressed fast.

The French first secretary (an agent of the CIA chief in Tehran) wrote to his boss that something very big was being constructed at Kahuta and the speed at which the work was progressing was quite uncharacteristic for Pakistan.

Brig Zahid would come to my Pindi Office driving his jeep and we would go – camouflaged– to Kahuta at least every second day.

On July 5, 1977, Gen Zia staged the coup and within a few days Brig Zahid, to our great disappointment, was posted to Larkana. He later rose to Maj Gen GOC Gujranwala, Lt-Gen Corps Commander Rawalpindi and Chairman Wapda.

In his place, Gen Zia gave us Brig Anis Ali Syed (later Maj Gen and surveyor-general of Pakistan), who was also very competent. He had a great sense of humour and a large stock of jokes. After the coup, Gen Zia appointed Lt-Gen Ali Zamin Naqvi, his old colleague from Indian Army days, as his adviser on security, to liaison with Munir and me.

Gen Naqvi was very fair with blond hair and looked almost European. He was from Lucknow and had a Masters degree in English from Allahabad University. He was soft spoken and very sincere and was a great help to us.

Within a few days of his appointment he had recognised the tensions between PAEC and ERL. He kept Gen. Zia informed. He appointed Col Qamar Faruqi, Director Security PAEC, as his staff officer and thus knew exactly what was going on in PAEC.

After the coup, Gen Zia appointed Ghulam Ishaq Khan as secretary general-in-chief (the de facto prime minister) and head of the coordination board. As finance minister, he looked after our needs well. We held monthly meetings at Kahuta to view progress and one could see he was satisfied when work went well.

Gen Zia also started seeing Gen Naqvi and myself every fortnight. He would listen without interrupting when I gave a briefing. One day he called us after Juma prayers. After the normal briefing, he suddenly said: “Let us go to Kahuta”.

We were a bit surprised, but work went on there 24/7. Gen Zia was in shalwar qameez and Punjabi chappals. I had a red Jeep Cherokee at the time. Gen Naqvi and Gen Zia sat in the back seat while I sat in front with driver Ayub.

Part - II

Random thoughts



Last week I ended with Gen Zia’s sudden, unexpected decision to visit Kahura. There were no guards and no escorting jeep. After crossing Kaka bridge, the road was narrow and in very bad shape.

One spot, known as Jalebi Maur, was very steep and Kashmir-bounds trucks often got stuck there, stopping the normal flow of traffic. Gen. Zia asked why the road had not been repaired. I told him that I had requested Mr. Ghulam Ishaq Khan for the necessary funds. Gen. Zia then asked Gen. Naqvi to tell the DG FWO to repair the road on a priority basis, removing all sharp turns, broadening it and putting a bridge to remove Jalebi Maur. Within 6 months we had an excellent road which increased safety and reduced travelling time by 15-20 minutes.

The staff at the Plant were shocked to see us. First we went to my office. I called the senior on-duty officers and told them we would be visiting the whole plant. Gen. Zia did not hide his surprise and pleasure at seeing the facilities. He said the Plant looked more European/American than Pakistani. In the Mechanical Division we were received by a very competent mechanical engineer. Gen Zia commented that our mechanical shops were cleaner than CMH.

When we were in another hall, Gen Zia decided to offer Asr prayers. To a handsome, competent scientist who sported a black beard fell the honour of leading the prayers.

Sadly, Gen Zia had Bhutto hanged through a doubtful case. I had met Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit in Ankara and asked him to intercede. He showed me the names of the four parliamentarians he was sending to Pakistan to see Gen Zia, but he said he was not very hopeful of the outcome.

In 1979 the West got wind of our work. Time Magazine published my photo, cited my background and said that I was leading the programme. Gen Zia and Mr G I Khan became quite worried and called me for a meeting. I told them that I had prepared for this eventuality and Kahuta was now a totally self-reliant organization manufacturing even the most sophisticated equipment we needed. They both praised my foresightedness. The western embassies in Islamabad all wanted to find out what was happening. One ambassador and his first secretary slunk into Kahuta in a private car one day. They were intercepted and dealt with by security. After 2 or 3 days they went to the president to complain. Great actor that he was, he feigned total ignorance.

Apologising, he said: “Excellency, if you wanted to visit the old fort, you should have asked the Protocol Officer at the Foreign Office. They would have provided an escort and a guide, but above all, you should have used your official, flag-bearing car.” When we met the next day, he had a good laugh and said he didn’t think anyone else would try.

By late 1981 we had made a lot of progress and were about make a breakthrough, Gen Naqvi informed Gen Zia about our progress and said it was time to check the progress of work in other departments. The experts’ opinion turned out to be that hardly any progress had been made and that their team was not competent to deliver. The next day Gen Zia called a meeting to inform me and added: “Dr Sb, this is between me, Gen Naqvi and you; tell no one else. Now you go all out to do your work. The experts have told me you can do it.”

It was a big challenge. I called several top-notch scientists and engineers. After solving the theoretical problems we did cold tests. When we had perfected the design, I took a letter to Gen Zia on December 10, 1984 informing him that we could detonate a nuclear bomb at a week’s notice.

With joy on his face he hugged me, kissed my forehead and said: “Thank you, Dr Sb. You have saved this country. Now I will look the Indians in the eye and sort them out.” Later I quietly showed everything to Mr G I Khan, who was overjoyed. Gen Zia then informed Gen Arif, who rushed to Kahuta to see everything.

Gen Zia never allowed the West to discuss our nuclear programme and he had told Mr. Agha Shahi and Sahibzada Yaqub Khan that, if questioned they should tell everyone to discuss the matter with the president as the programme was directly under his control.

Gen Vernon Walters, President Reagan’s Special Envoy, wrote about Gen Zia (President Reagan’s declassified papers): “Either he really does not know anything about the nuclear programme or else he is the most superb and patriotic liar I have ever met in my life”.

Gen Zia did a great favour to Pakistan by protecting our nuclear programme.

Concluded

Email: dr.a.quadeer.khan@gmail.com


@PaklovesTurkiye @dsr478
@LA se Karachi

Click to expand...