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Bratva
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Sire do you have time to scan the book ?... as I would come to Pak next year and can't wait that long to buy urdu version (IF it would be available in Urdu bazar of Lahore) and read it. :/
Amaa'n
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If it is urdu version that you require then i saw a link to pdf download, will pm you that,
Farah Sohail
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Plz send me...the link of urdu version too...
Zarvan
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Guys current chief is going to retire soon so have a guess who will be next chief let see who is proven right
Amaa'n
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The Black Warrant - US role in ZAB's death:
Note: First Para - a classic technique for Counter Surveillance - incase either of the spooks were being followed
Scoop snaps of Kahuta - is actually a scoop, will post later tonight. am in rush for now
How and Why those Embassy cars got that Red Registration Plate on their vehicles and Who made it happen
I will explain later how this number is defined and how agencies use just the number to find out which embassy the vehcile belong to---
Note: First Para - a classic technique for Counter Surveillance - incase either of the spooks were being followed
Scoop snaps of Kahuta - is actually a scoop, will post later tonight. am in rush for now
How and Why those Embassy cars got that Red Registration Plate on their vehicles and Who made it happen
I will explain later how this number is defined and how agencies use just the number to find out which embassy the vehcile belong to---
Bratva
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The Black Warrant - US role in ZAB's death:
Note: First Para - a classic technique for Counter Surveillance - incase either of the spooks were being followed
Scoop snaps of Kahuta - is actually a scoop, will post later tonight. am in rush for now
View attachment 53340
How and Why those Embassy cars got that Red Registration Plate on their vehicles and Who made it happen
I will explain later how this number is defined and how agencies use just the number to find out which embassy the vehcile belong to---
View attachment 53341
View attachment 53342
Are you reading A Q Khan columns ? It was General Naqvi team which fixed all these gentlemen (Journalist and French ambassador) in both incidents
A little disappointed that he didn't criticize Gen.Zia insensible decision to hand those Kahuta tapes back to americans.
I thought A Q Khan was delusional and obsessed with Munir A.Khan and his diatribes are due to his mental instability. But now I'm begining to doubt his loyalty after reading Brig.Tirmizi observations
The chapter before the "Visa Section" was hilarious
Escapades of Mrs. Dhawan, Our Beautiful and Handsome Pakistani and Our Pathan dealer made me "emotional" 
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Amaa'n
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No, i have not been reading his columns, but i do remember, Tirimzi sb mentioning about General Nqvi somewhere in the book.
This was written in 1994, so certain things had to be kept under wrap out of OpSec....
Mrs Dhawan and the Pathan chapter is epic, i was planning on sharing it today but was busy.....
Have you read the book already??? Damn you are fast,
This was written in 1994, so certain things had to be kept under wrap out of OpSec....
Mrs Dhawan and the Pathan chapter is epic, i was planning on sharing it today but was busy.....
Have you read the book already??? Damn you are fast,
Are you reading A Q Khan columns ? It was General Naqvi team which fixed all these gentlemen (Journalist and French ambassador) in both incidents
A little disappointed that he didn't criticize Gen.Zia insensible decision to hand those Kahuta tapes back to americans.
I thought A Q Khan was delusional and obsessed with Munir A.Khan and his diatribes are due to his mental instability. But now I'm begining to doubt his loyalty after reading Brig.Tirmizi observations
The chapter before the "Visa Section" was hilarious
If you can skip ahead, i suggest, chapter to read is Russia(USSR) Man for a Man (Adlay ka badla)---and under Domestic Scene - Baghi Jernail - towards the end you will see between the Lines - Why ISI is the Premier Agency nd Militry Intelligence is just Agency :pAre you reading A Q Khan columns ? It was General Naqvi team which fixed all these gentlemen (Journalist and French ambassador) in both incidents
A little disappointed that he didn't criticize Gen.Zia insensible decision to hand those Kahuta tapes back to americans.
I thought A Q Khan was delusional and obsessed with Munir A.Khan and his diatribes are due to his mental instability. But now I'm begining to doubt his loyalty after reading Brig.Tirmizi observations
The chapter before the "Visa Section" was hilarious
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Das_Reich
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Are you reading A Q Khan columns ? It was General Naqvi team which fixed all these gentlemen (Journalist and French ambassador) in both incidents
A little disappointed that he didn't criticize Gen.Zia insensible decision to hand those Kahuta tapes back to americans.
I thought A Q Khan was delusional and obsessed with Munir A.Khan and his diatribes are due to his mental instability. But now I'm begining to doubt his loyalty after reading Brig.Tirmizi observations
The chapter before the "Visa Section" was hilarious
The late Mr. Munir A Khan wrote a detailed rebuttal to the allegations leveled against him in this book to the then Director-General ISI, Lt. Gen. Javed Ashraf Qazi in 1995 and to also to a former Director-General ISI. The ISI in its response to Munir Khan completely disowned the book, its author and its contents and all the allegations made therein. It was categorically stated that no information was given to the author, or any access provided to him about the claims, allegations and scoops published in the book.
The nuclear infrastructure established by PAEC during the 19 years (1972-1991) of Mr. Munir A Khan's leadership exists on ground and speaks for itself.
It includes the complete nuclear fuel cycle; the 50-70 MW plutonium production reactor at Khushab and heavy water plant; uranium exploration, mining & refining and uranium oxide and uranium hexafluoride (feedstock for centrifuges at KRL) production plants complex at Dera Ghazi Khan; the Kundian Nuclear Fuel Complex; New Labs and Chashma plutonium reprocessing plants; 1986 Sino-Pak civil nuclear cooperation agreement and 1989 agreement for 300 MW Chashma-1 nuclear power reactor; Centre for Nuclear Studies (now PIEAS) and KINPOE; several nuclear medical and agricultural centers; nuclear weapon design, development and testing infrastructure including the Chaghi, Kharan test sites for hot tests and cold test sites at Kirana Hills where the first cold test of a working nuclear device was conducted by PAEC on March 11, 1983 followed by 24 more cold tests of 4-5 weapon designs up to 1995 that were hot tested in May 1998 by the PAEC team. Groundwork was also laid for the setting up of NDC, HMC-3 and several other nuclear equipment workshops that have enabled Pakistan to design and produce three additional plutonium production reactors at the Khushab Complex.
Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb published in 2012 by Stanford University Press contains testimonies and interviews of scientists and engineers who worked in different projects of PAEC and KRL. It provides a balanced and well documented picture of the contributions, controversies and work done by various organizations and individuals.
Regards.
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Amaa'n
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Welcome on board, and it seems you have been ready this page.....
You do know that Brigadier Trimzi sb was an Intelligence Officer himself - and this book is not a novel but a memior
Bratva
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Finished the book in two days.
I commend Brig.Tirmizi for what he did in Iran. Though his successor Brig Billa undid all his his hard work and blemished ISI reputation. You are spot on about MI. The heavy handedness mentality still prevails in MI. That's what caused fckups by MI DG Ejaz Nadeem in Balochistan. Has Balochistan be left entirely to MI, Balochistan would have been a lost cause by now. But thanks to brilliance of FC intel wing, their specs op wing and the ISI in supporting role undid the damage of MI.
A Q usual diatribes again Munir and Abdus Salam and Gen.Naqvi role in it
"After imposing martial law, Gen Zia appointed his old colleague and friend from the Indian Military Academy, Dehradune days, Gen Syed Ali Zamin Naqvi, as adviser security on nuclear affairs. Gen Naqvi, an MA in English from Allahabad University, looked very much like a European – fair, light coloured hair, green eyes. He was a soft-spoken and pleasant person. He had an office at the PAEC Head Office and took Col Qamar Faruqui, director security PAEC, as his staff officer.
Within a few weeks he realised that Munir Ahmad Khan was averse to producing a nuclear bomb. When he mentioned this to me I told him that Munir had, on numerous occasions, tried to convince me that nuclear weapons were a bad thing for Pakistan. He also said that, were his wife (a European lady) to find out, all hell would break loose. This had serious but positive consequences, about which more in the next column. I personally believed, and still believe, that without nuclear deterrence we would have lost Pakistan. Statements made by Indian leaders are testimony to this.
There were many intrigues and plots against me and our nuclear programme, more so by locals than by foreigners. Now, while putting things in writing, all those events come to mind. Let me just tell you about one. A very fine, competent colleague of mine was, at that time, working in a defence organisation. He was frustrated as the head of that organisation, a former professor and a disciple of Prof Salam, had no practical experience or knowledge of defence projects. I obtained orders from Gen Zia to have him transferred to us. He turned out to be an invaluable, capable asset.
He told me that when Mr Bhutto had put pressure on Munir to explode the promised device by December 1976, Munir had discussed the matter with Prof Salam and my colleague’s boss. They decided to get about 2000 tons of explosives, put radioactive cobalt in it (obtained from X-ray machines) and explode it in a small tunnel. They would then take Mr Bhutto there and show him with a Geiger Counter that the explosion had been successful. They then informed Mr Bhutto that the explosion would take place after three or four months. To their good fortune, Mr. Bhutto announced elections and we all know what happened after that. Had their plot been successful, Mr Bhutto may very well have considered the centrifuge route redundant and Pakistan would have been put in mortal danger."
"In continuation of my previous columns on the same subject, here follow three interesting events that are not common knowledge. I had mentioned earlier that both Gen Naqvi and Col Faruqui had doubted Munir’s loyalty. Gen Zia himself had warned me to be wary and I was not to discuss any important or confidential matters with him.
The event discussed here was told to us by our foreign minister, Sahibzada Yaqub Khan, after his return from a trip to the USA. The same incident was also told to Mr Zahid Malik by the Foreign Secretary, Niaz A Naik, and included in Mr Malik’s book ‘Dr AQ Khan and the Islamic Bomb’ (1992).
Sahbizada Yaqub was in Washington with Foreign Secretary George Schultz and they were discussing matters of mutual interest. He had his team members with him. During the course of the discussions Schultz suddenly changed the topic and started talking about our nuclear programme. He threatened to stop all aid to Pakistan if we did not restrict our nuclear programme.
Yaqub tried to defend our stance and said that our programme was for peaceful purposes only. A senior official of the CIA retorted that he should not insult their intelligence as they had all details of our programme. They even had a mock-up of our nuclear device, he said. They then asked Yaqub to follow them through the corridor to another room. The officer removed a cloth that covered a table and Yaqub saw a design of a plant on it. He said that that was our Kahuta Plant.
He then went to the next table and removed a cloth from what looked like a sphere in two parts with cables, etc. and told Yaqub that it was a model of our nuclear weapon. Yaqub feigned ignorance, even though he realised it looked like what he had so often seen in Kahuta. He told them that he was not a technical man or a scientist and could not say anything about it. But if you say that is what it is, then let it be so.
Mr Schultz said that he could not fool him. They had irrefutable proof. When they left the room and walked down the corridor towards Schultz’ office, Yaqub’s sixth sense told him to look over his shoulder. He got the shock of his life when he saw a renowned Pakistani scientist coming out of the adjacent room and going straight into the room they had just left. He instantly understood the whole game. Information had been passed on to the Americans.
The second event – an important one – took place after some time in Kahuta. After ERL (Engineering Research Laboratories) had been established, I asked Gen Faiz Ali Chishti, Commander 10th Corps, Rawalpindi, to give me a good officer to look after our security matters. He sent Col Abdul Rahman, an extremely competent, efficient officer.
After having explained to him what I wanted him to take care of, he hired many observers and informants around Kahuta. One day a “shepherd” returned from a routine inspection and sat down on a medium-sized stone to rest. He thought that the stone looked a bit different and used his small axe to chip off a small piece. The stone was easily cut and underneath he could see copper. He immediately reported the matter to a subedar who, in turn, informed Col Rahman. The stone was taken to the laboratories and put in a safe place.
I was informed and told them not to do anything until the next morning after I had inspected it. Next morning, after having ascertained that it did not contain any explosives, we dismantled it. The outside layer, about 4 inches thick, consisted of resin with sand from the local area. Inside was an aluminium box in two parts screwed together. Upon removing the screws we saw a wonder of technology – a long-lasting battery, antenna, neutron counters, an air-analyser and a recording/transmitter set.
This sophisticated equipment could analyse air samples to find the concentration of enriched or natural uranium hexafluoride, neutrons (from cold and hot tests), could store this information and, on command, could transmit it in a single pulse.
It must have cost millions of dollars. It had definitely been put there at night by a Pakistani agent driving to Kahuta Town. I conveyed details of the “find” to Gen Zia and Mr Ghulam Ishaq Khan, who immediately came to see it. They highly commended the work of Col Rahman and his staff.
A few days later the notorious US ambassador, Dean Hinton, came to see Gen Zia and again harped on our nuclear programme. He boasted that the Americans knew everything about our work. On hearing that, Gen Zia said that if they were relying on that spy stone for their information, it wouldn’t do them much good as it had meanwhile been dismantled and was now non-functional. The Ambassador, visibly shaken, soon departed.
Just a few weeks earlier the US defence attache had taken aerial photos of the buildings at Kahuta and Dean Hinton had gone to the president and asked what type of facilities they were. Gen Zia did not even bother to look at the photos. He only remarked that the US had violated diplomatic norms and if any plane (it was a UN plane that used to fly to Kashmir) flew over Kahuta in future, it would be shot down.
He later conveyed these orders to the Air defence command stationed at Kahuta which had anti-aircraft guns and surface-to-air anti-aircraft missiles.
With time, news of our efforts to acquire nuclear weapons filtered through to the west and they all undertook espionage efforts. The British sent two of their most notorious journalists, Mark Tully, who could speak Urdu, and Chris Sherwell. Sherwell was tasked to cover me. He used to roam around where we lived on his motor cycle.
One night Col Rahman’s people caught him snooping, had him thoroughly thrashed and registered a case of female molestation against him. After his release some time later both he and Tully were deported. Before this episode, Tully had once tried to embarrass Ghulam Ishaq Khan by asking him how much was reserved for Kahuta.
GIK just smiled and quoted from Ghalib: “Magas ko bagh men jaane na dijeo; Keh nahaq khaun perwane ka hoga” (Don’t let the bee into the garden otherwise the poor moths will lose their lives.) Tully was baffled and asked other journalists what Khan Saheb had meant. By the time he found out the meaning of the verse, the press conference was over and Ghulam Ishaq Khan had left.
"In this column two more important events which have become part of our project history. In 1979 workers at Emerson Electronics, UK, went on strike. We had bought 30 high frequency inverters from them. Upon delivery we found that they needed some modifications.
We then ordered 100 units with these changes incorporated. On receiving such a big order, the workers demanded a Christmas bonus, which the management refused, hence the strike. The matter went to Frank Allaun, MP, who, by coincidence, was associated with the British Atomic Energy Authority and knew that inverters were used in nuclear technology. He wrote to Tony Benn, secretary of trade, and an embargo was placed on their export. The MD of Emerson later acknowledged in a press briefing that they had been sure that such sophisticated equipment would remain in their boxes and left to rot. They were, therefore, very surprised to receive a telex from us with suggestions to improve performance.
With an embargo in place, I handed over local production to Brig Azizul Haq, a competent electronics engineer. Unfortunately he died of a heart attack while on official duty in Germany. In his place came Brig Abdul Qayyum, a soft-spoken, competent, hard taskmaster, who went all out to deliver. He was helped by Dr Javed Arshad Mirza, DG Electronics, and Eng Nasim Khan, DG Control and Automation. Prototypes were produced within a few months, followed by production of all the required units. These never failed or gave us any problems.
The inverter affair caught the interest of the diplomatic community in Islamabad and their intelligence services started snooping around. To their misfortune, the French ambassador, Pol Le Gourrierec, and his first secretary, Jean Forlaut, turned out to be overzealous. They took a private car with an Islamabad number plate and drove to Kahuta. Just before Kahuta there is a road turning left to Pharwala Qila (fort). However, they did not turn left. A few hundred yards further they were stopped by Col Rahman’s security people who gave them a good thrashing. Ghulam Ishaq Khan had instructed that foreign intruders were to be taught a lesson.
After a few days the two men went to complain to Gen Zia, who had previously been briefed by Gen Naqvi. They claimed to have wanted to visit the fort. He asked them why they had gone alone in a private car. The chief of protocol would have given them an escort, he said. There are dacoits in that area and it is dangerous for foreigners. When Gen Naqvi saw Gen Zia the next day the latter smilingly said that it had been a befitting treatment. After that no foreigners dared, or were allowed, to go there.
When Iranian students stormed and occupied the US Embassy in Tehran, they found heaps of shredded paper. With great patience they glued the strips together, later published as the ‘Tehran Papers’. It came to light that Forlaut was a CIA agent reporting directly to his boss in Tehran (I have copies). In one of his dispatches he wrote: “Huge, spectacular construction is going on in Kahuta. It is definitely something secret. Contrary to Pakistan’s traditional lethargic pace of work, the speed is spectacularly fast and you can see day to day progress”. He probably spied from the Lehtrar side of the mountain with binoculars.
The second event was a mischievous plot hatched by two senior PAEC scientists working with me. I had mentioned earlier that, when given the choice, some PAEC scientists had opted to remain with ERL. When, on April 4, 1978 we succeeded in enriching UF6 to a moderate concentration, I immediately informed Ghulam Ishaq Khan in writing, clearly mentioning that it was a small but significant step in the right direction, but we still needed hard work and time to achieve our goal. The PAEC officers informed Munir. They hatched a plot to get rid of me and take possession of the project.
With the help of one of their colleagues they managed to approach Air Commodore Saleem Chaudhry, then at Peshawar. He was married to the sister of Gen Zia’s wife. They painted a horrible picture of me and managed to get an audience with Gen Zia. He very patiently listened to their diatribe, said he would have everything checked by the ISI and take appropriate action. After some days he called Gen Naqvi and me. We thought it was just a routine visit.
After the usual courtesies he asked about my colleagues. I told him they were fine and very busy with their respective jobs. Then he pointedly asked me: “Dr Sahib, how well do you know your colleagues and are they trustworthy?” I immediately felt that something was wrong. I replied: “Sir, you know that I am a refugee from Bhopal. I have returned to Pakistan after 15 years. I do not know any of them personally except for Engineer Badrul Islam, who is a dear friend and a capable and competent chartered engineer. I trust all my colleagues.”
His reply was: “Dr Sb you are a simple person. Two of your senior colleagues came to see me a few days ago and told me a lot of b… sh…; things like you being untrustworthy, have no stake in Pakistan, have a foreign wife, have lots of foreign friends and that you would one day vanish, leaving us in the lurch.” He said he had then asked them if they could do the job as their past record was not good, to which they replied: “We will lock him up in his house and take away his passport and if we encounter difficulties with the work, we will fetch him and force him help solve the problems.” “One ‘pidda’ (shorty) and the other ‘darhiyal’ (bearded) were the two” he said.
I immediately recognised them as the two who were extremely close friends and had close contacts with Munir and his right hand man. Gen Zia, quite annoyed by this time, said: “They are trying to do what the Israelis and the Indians could not achieve. They are a bunch of incompetent intriguers. Zamin Sb, tell the DG ISI to pick them up and dump then into a cell from where they will never be seen again.” I requested him not to do that as it would certainly leak out and would have a bad effect on my other colleagues. Those two belonged to PAEC and I would simply send them back. He very reluctantly agreed.
Back at the office I informed my other senior colleagues what had happened. A number of them told me that the two had tried to enlist their support. One colonel did actually join them but, on being exposed, he came to me and apologised in writing for being misled. I asked Brig Anis to immediately have him retired, which he did. The ‘bearded one’ later apologised to me and admitted the whole plot. Had they succeeded, Pakistan would never have become a nuclear power. My knowledge, practical experience and contacts with leading industrialists in Europe were the key to our success."
Pakistan Nuclear History- A Q Khan Version
There is not one, But multiple generals, Senior Nuclear scientists besides A Q Khan, accused Munir Khan. Why is that ?
Amaa'n
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You are spot on - and i smiled when i read this chapter, DMI was same back in the days as it is today, be it behind the closed oors of GHQ or the Field operations into the remote areas of Balochistan - not a heed of change - I am uploading the this chapter - and i hope people will understand that why personnel from DMI are not favored in ISIFinished the book in two days.
You are spot on about MI. The heavy handedness mentality still prevails in MI. That's what caused fckups by MI DG Ejaz Nadeem in Balochistan. Has Balochistan be left entirely to MI, Balochistan would have been a lost cause by now. But thanks to brilliance of FC intel wing, their specs op wing and the ISI in supporting role undid the damage of MI.
and i think now you would understand who shot our Hamid Mir bhai :p
Das_Reich
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Finished the book in two days.
There is not one, But multiple generals, Senior Nuclear scientists besides A Q Khan, accused Munir Khan. Why is that ?
Which other generals and senior scientists please? The President of Pakistan, General Zia-ul-Haq himself paid tribute to the work done by PAEC under Munir Khan during one of his visits to PINSTECH in 1986. Several other senior scientists who worked in PAEC including Dr. Ishfaq Ahmad, Chairman PAEC 1991-2001 and Dr Samar Mubarakmand, founding Chairman NESCOM 2001-2007 among others who worked with Munir and were privy to his work have testified to his dedication in addition to Lt. Gen. Syed Refaqat Ali, Chief of Staff to President Zia from 1984-1988.
It is entirely your choice whose version of events and history you choose to believe but there are always two sides of the story. Each year, the President or Prime Minister, who ever might be the Chief Executive holds a annual meeting of the PAEC Council and the Chairman PAEC was directly responsible to him until the formation of the SPD in 1999.
Every three years, the Chairman PAEC gets an extension in office according to his performance and the President and the Prime Minister have had multiple channels of information and intelligence to make important decisions, especially regarding the nuclear program and the classified projects.
If all this was not the case, then PAEC would have failed as an organization in May 1998 when it conducted six nuclear tests for the world to see. In any event, a full-scale and in-depth inquiry by the government on the loyalty, performance and truth or otherwise of A Q Khan's claims or those of Gen. Naqvi or any one from PAEC can still be conducted to set the record straight.
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chauvunist
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I read the Urdu version of this Book(Lent from a Friend) about 3 years back but alas another Friend took it from me and Lost it..I then searched this particular Book in Various Bookstores but unfortunately couldn't find it...
The particularly worrying thing in this book were allegations against Munir Khan and as written in Book,ISI convinced Gen Zia to take this man off this Project and even decision was made to remove him but then in the neck of the time Zia changed his decision probably under U.S pressure...
Overall it's a very interesting book and if recall it correctly i finished it within 48 hours..
The particularly worrying thing in this book were allegations against Munir Khan and as written in Book,ISI convinced Gen Zia to take this man off this Project and even decision was made to remove him but then in the neck of the time Zia changed his decision probably under U.S pressure...
Overall it's a very interesting book and if recall it correctly i finished it within 48 hours..
Amaa'n
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An Aborted Coup - A coup with in the Army
P.S : this is more about ISI vs DMI
It was not only ISI but do keep it in mind it was the Security Advisor General Naqvi aswell who had these concerns with Munir Khan
P.S : this is more about ISI vs DMI
damn! you guys are good, it took me a week to finish - i only get time at night to read --- my aim is to finish a book with 250-300 pages in a week time ---I read the Urdu version of this Book(Lent from a Friend) about 3 years back but alas another Friend took it from me and Lost it..I then searched this particular Book in Various Bookstores but unfortunately couldn't find it...
The particularly worrying thing in this book were allegations against Munir Khan and as written in Book,ISI convinced Gen Zia to take this man off this Project and even decision was made to remove him but then in the neck of the time Zia changed his decision probably under U.S pressure...
Overall it's a very interesting book and if recall it correctly i finished it within 48 hours..
It was not only ISI but do keep it in mind it was the Security Advisor General Naqvi aswell who had these concerns with Munir Khan
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